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This book examines the current debate on nuclear non- proliferation and disarma-
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its disarmament provisions.
 Discussing the requirements of a new international consensus on nuclear dis-
armament and non- proliferation, this book builds on the three pillars of the 
nuclear non- proliferation treaty (NPT): non- proliferation, disarmament and 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It reviews the impact of Cold War and post- 
Cold War policies on current disarmament initiatives and analyses contemporary 
proliferation problems: how to deal with the states that never joined the NPT 
(India, Pakistan and Israel); how states that have been moving towards nuclear 
weapons have been brought back to non- nuclear-weapon status; and, in particu-
lar, how to deal with Iran and North Korea. The analysis centres on the relation-
ship between disarmament and non- proliferation in an increasingly multi- centric 
world involving China and India as well as the US, the European powers and 
Russia. It concludes with a description and discussion of three different worlds 
without nuclear weapons and their implications for nuclear- disarmament 
policies.
 This book will be of great interest to all students of arms control, strategic 
studies, war and conflict studies, and IR/security studies in general.
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Introduction
When the Cold War drew to an end, the superpower leaders offered a vision of a 
world without nuclear weapons, in all earnest. They were heavily criticised both 
by their own establishments and by others, and the world was taken by surprise. 
Secretary of State George Shultz met the critics and proponents of status quo 
asking, “What’s so good about a world where you can be wiped out in thirty 
minutes?”
 On the twentieth anniversary of the 1986 Reagan–Gorbachev summit in 
 Reykjavik, a group of former American statesmen revived the vision of a nuclear- 
weapon-free world (NWFW). The call was followed up by Barack Obama and 
leaders of other countries. In many parts of the world, states are waiting to see 
what comes of it. Elimination of nuclear weapons has been proposed before – the 
Baruch plan of 1946, the McCloy–Zorin proposal of 1961, the Reagan– 
Gorbachev attempt in Reykjavik in 1986, Rajiv Gandhi’s plan and plea before the 
UN General Assembly in 1988 – and those initiatives were short- lived. Will it 
fizzle out this time, too? Will the interests tied to nuclear weapon complexes hit 
back and reaffirm the relevance of nuclear arms? Mostly, other countries have not 
been negative, but they are cautiously waiting to assess the realism of it. 
 Some take a grimmer view. They see the call as part of a double agenda, the 
real purpose of which is to sustain and enhance Western unilateral advantage. 
The synergies of disarmament and non- proliferation may stop smaller and 
weaker states from acquiring the “great equaliser” – a nuclear capability of their 
own – and new US conventional weapons that can instantly destroy targets all 
around the globe are more likely to be used than nuclear systems. In a world 
without nuclear arms, the United States may therefore be even more superior, for 
nobody can match its conventional strength. At low levels of offensive nuclear 
forces, improved US ballistic missile defences may, furthermore, create fears of 
first- strike capabilities. If the shield becomes increasingly effective, others may 
be threatened from a position of near impunity. Seen in one or more of these 
ways, nuclear disarmament is not a hallmark of progressive politics, but a change 
to maintain the dominance of the United States and the West. Change in order to 
preserve.
 The US unipolar moment was precisely that – a moment – yielding to a multi-
 centric world. Emerging powers wedded to state sovereignty, territorial integrity 
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and non- interference in internal affairs are changing the parameters of global 
geopolitics, and states in Asia, Africa and Latin- America cooperate more with 
each other to reduce their dependence on Western powers. Hence the debate 
about “the West and the World Without the West”. The systemic changes rede-
fine fundamentally important questions of cooperation and conflict in interna-
tional affairs. 
 The role of nuclear weapons is embedded in international politics. Nuclear 
disarmament presupposes a cooperative approach to international security. Big 
power cooperation is of the essence; regional cooperation likewise. Disarmament 
initiatives must attend to the interests of the emerging powers and to the hopes, 
doubts and scepticisms of states on all continents: to be effective, the initiatives 
must be aligned with ongoing power shifts in the international system. Part I of 
this book tries to situate the functions of nuclear weapons in the context of sys-
temic change, reviewing contemporary power shifts and geopolitical orientations 
and discussing their implications for nuclear disarmament (Chapter 1).
 The Cold War left important legacies that continue to influence nuclear 
weapon policies. Particularly noteworthy are the continuation of threat- based 
policies and nuclear deterrence doctrines, extended deterrence and policies of 
first- use included. President Clinton focused on the benefits of globalisation as 
much as on how to avert threats, but when the period of opportunity of the early 
1990s was over, the politics of fear picked up again. To the extent that specific 
threats no longer sufficed to justify the maintenance of strong nuclear postures, 
they were arguably needed to defend against the unknown. In the mindset of the 
Cold War, uncertainties about the future had to be met by the strongest of 
weapons. Later, 9/11 put the terrorist threat up front; Saddam was turned into a 
threat beyond proportion; and Iran became a strong driver of threat- based pol-
icies. The doctrines of nuclear deterrence therefore outlived the global rivalry 
and confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union: they were 
adapted, but in essence maintained. Part II of the book starts with a review of 
these legacies (Chapter 2), followed by an examination of nuclear- weapon state 
(NWS) doctrines (Chapter 3). 
 The obligation to disarm is inscribed in Art. VI of the NPT. Legally speaking, 
failure to take “effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race 
at an early date and to nuclear disarmament” does not necessarily amount to 
non- compliance by any particular state. Progress depends on the seriousness of 
all negotiating parties and is arguably beyond the powers of any single partici-
pant. However, the political process that led to the NPT clarifies that Art. VI was 
conceived as part of a dynamic bargain to be implemented over time, erasing – 
in due course – the distinction between NWS and NNWS. Converging expecta-
tions were created and a review mechanism was set up to facilitate abolition. 
Although no timeline was given, “cessation of the arms race at an early date” 
left a sense of urgency. Art. VI therefore calls for negotiations in good faith. 
Attempts have been made to clarify the meaning of it and to make the commit-
ments more explicit, binding and tangible. However, in the view of a great many 
parties to the Treaty, the results have been disappointing. 
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 Another part of the grand bargain – the one in the title of the NPT: non- 
proliferation – has held up better than expected. In addition to the five NWS rec-
ognised by the NPT, only four states have acquired nuclear weapons. Throughout 
the nuclear age, more than 20 states did “something” in the direction of a nuclear 
weapon capability at some point or other, but dropped the ambition or were 
stopped in their tracks. 
 The first half of the 1990s was the golden age of non- proliferation: Russia 
became the sole heir of Soviet nuclear weapons; South Africa abandoned its 
weapons and joined the NPT; NPT membership increased considerably; the 
Conference of Disarmament agreed on a mandate for negotiation of a fissile 
material cut- off treaty (FMCT); and by the time the 1995 NPT Review and 
Extension Conference was convened, a comprehensive test- ban treaty (CTBT) 
was in sight. The US and Russian nuclear arsenals were significantly reduced. 
The Review Conference therefore came at the end of a period of good news, 
facilitating the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely. At this point in time, 
non- proliferation seemed to be a winning proposition.
 That turned out to be flawed analysis. India, Pakistan and North Korea went 
on to test, and Iran became a state of growing proliferation concern. Proliferation 
concerns grew, disarmament negotiations came to a halt, big power relations 
deteriorated, and more functions were assigned to nuclear weapons in national 
military doctrines. The grand bargain from 1968 that led to the NPT came apart 
– until a new US government with high disarmament ambitions opened a new 
window of opportunity to revive it. Part II ends with an overview of the basic 
requirements of such a consensus (Chapter 4). 
 Part III is devoted to the problems at the outskirts of the regime. It starts with 
an analysis of the three- state problem (India, Pakistan, Israel), and of the nuclear 
cooperation agreement between the United States and India in particular 
(Chapter 5). It continues with a review and summary of lessons learnt from 27 
cases of nuclear rollback, i.e. of states that have moved towards nuclear weapons 
at some time or other, but that dropped the ambition or were stopped in their 
tracks and rolled back to non- nuclear status (Chapter 6). The chapter reviews the 
explanatory power of realist assumptions and idealist perspectives, and con-
cludes with a list of 16 propositions shedding light on what it may take to turn 
would- be proliferators back to non- nuclear status. These lessons are, in turn, 
used in analyses of the Iranian and North Korean problems (Chapters 7 and 8). 
Part III winds up with a discussion of the relationship between disarmament and 
non- proliferation (Chapter 9). 
 In legal terms, the link between disarmament and non- proliferation is well 
established. More than anything else, the NPT review process has centred on the 
relationship between them, and the academic literature has excellent analyses of 
the subject. Therefore, the discussion in Chapter 9 is not conducted in the legal 
framework, but focuses on the political and military dimensions of the 
disarmament–non- proliferation relationship. Is disarmament important to align 
the three outliers to the non- proliferation regime? Is it important for purposes of 
rollback? Does it matter for North Korea and Iran? The other way around, how 
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important is non- proliferation for disarmament? How can the non- nuclear-
weapon states (NNWS) contribute to nuclear disarmament by making their non- 
nuclear status more convincing? Special attention is paid to the distinction 
between disarmament as a process and disarmament as a state of affairs, and to 
the concept of rank disequilibrium, which appears to have strong explanatory 
power in cases like Iran and India. 
 Looking ahead, the NPT is a regulatory mechanism for non- proliferation, dis-
armament and peaceful uses all the way to zero. However, it says nothing about 
the precise meaning of zero and it is no more than a skeleton agreement, so new 
rules guiding the final approaches to a NWFW will be needed. This is the topic 
of the final Part of the book (Chapter 10), which starts with a discussion of the 
pros and cons of different versions of the vision. 
 To what extent can a vision be a guide to action? All the way, due respect 
must be paid to the path dependency of nuclear disarmament. It would be pre-
sumptuous to claim to know much about a world approaching zero: at that stage, 
the issues will be seen through lenses that are different from the contemporary 
ones. However, some force constellations are more dangerous than others, and 
much is known about the conditions of military stability. The chapter takes a 
closer look at their relevance for the structuring of nuclear disarmament, con-
cluding with a concrete proposition regarding the final steps to a NWFW. 
 The book is comprehensive in its coverage of disarmament and non- 
proliferation issues, but stays within the confines of the state paradigm. There is 
nothing about international terrorism. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy – the third 
pillar of the NPT – are referred to intermittently in some of the chapters, but not 
discussed at any length. The focus is on the other pillars: disarmament and non- 
proliferation. The notes and cross references are made in order to enable the 
readers to use single chapters without having to read the entire book. 
 A preliminary version of Chapter 4 was presented at the Twentieth Anniver-
sary Conference of Rajiv Gandhi’s disarmament speech at the United Nations in 
1988 (Delhi, June 2008). Chapter 7 was first presented at the Nobel Symposium 
on “Peace, stability and nuclear order: Theoretical assumptions, historical 
experiences, future challenges”, Oscarsborg, Oslo, June 2009. Chapter 10 is a 
much expanded version of an article with the same title in Daedalus, Fall 2009. 
 While working on the book I have been a visiting fellow at the Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, Washington, DC), at the Tsinghua 
University (Beijing) and at the Monterey Institute of International Studies 
(Centre for Nuclear Studies (CNS), Monterey, California). I have benefited 
greatly from colleagues at all these places. My thanks go first of all to John 
Hamre, Li Bin and William Potter who hosted me and shared of their rich 
insights with me. I received financial support from the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs: I am grateful to Ambassador Kaare Aas, in particular, for his 
cooperation and encouragement in the early phases of the work. First of all, 
however, my gratitude goes to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
(NUPI), which I had the privilege to direct for ten years and which gave me 
optimal working conditions when I stepped down from the directorship.
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 I have benefited from comments by colleagues in many parts of the world – at 
conference tables and informally, in reference to conference papers and in free- 
wheeling discussions. I would like to thank Steven Miller, Oystein Noreng, 
Benoit Pelopidas, Leon Sigal, Nikolai Sokov and Aruni Wijewardane in particu-
lar, for their inputs in the final stages of the work. The responsibility for the end 
result is mine alone. 
 Like so many times before, Jan Risvik (NUPI) assisted me, competently and 
efficiently, language- wise and otherwise. Lala Kylycheva (CNS) assisted in the 
preparation of notes and references and in meeting other editorial requirements. 
Her professionalism and devotion has been impressive.
Sverre Lodgaard
Monterey and Oslo, March/April 2010

Part I
Power shifts and nuclear 
weapons

1 Power shifts and nuclear weapons
Disarmament, non- proliferation and the security 
environment
Globalisation fosters interdependence and invites rule- based international insti-
tutions. It raises the opportunity costs of hostilities and wars, and offers hope for 
a better- organised world where arms regulation is deemed to be in the common 
interest. However, state sovereignty remains a defining characteristic of the 
international system, and international organisations are usually asked to facili-
tate cooperation between sovereign states. The security sector, in particular, is 
not bound by growing volumes of international interaction, but follows its own 
logic. At the beginning of the twentieth century, trade between European states 
was booming, but this did not prevent the First World War. Today, China is 
Japan’s largest market and Japan is China’s third largest, but they remain wary 
of each other as far as national security is concerned. Much the same applies to 
India and China. Growing interdependence has not led to political integration 
and the formation of security communities. The European Union, where eco-
nomic cooperation did develop into political integration and cooperation on 
security and defence issues, is an exception in this respect.
 The framework conditions for nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation are 
further complicated by the ongoing shifts of power in the international system 
from the west to the east and south. The US hegemony is challenged. Histori-
cally, such transitions have been fraught with tension. For the hegemon, the 
“second country” – the state that is next to it in the international power hierarchy 
– has been the main problem. If the “second country” is rising, it must be 
stopped in its tracks. Others watch such rivalries carefully, satisfied states rally-
ing around the hegemon and dissatisfied ones tending to side with the challenger. 
For the US, the “second country” is primarily China.
 Even if the challenger aims at no more than equal status, what the hegemon 
sees is a trajectory that threatens to cross and overtake its own. In the 1970s, the 
Soviet Union said it aimed for no more than nuclear parity with the US, but the 
US had its eyes on capabilities that were rising faster than its own, leading to 
another round of intensified arms racing. China proceeds cautiously, stressing 
the peaceful nature of its development, while Americans debate their hedging 
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strategies, some arguing that cooperation is possible and others that confronta-
tion is unavoidable.
 With Barack Obama, US unilateralism is slowing down. The state of the 
American economy discourages new, expensive foreign policy adventures, and 
American public opinion wants the administration to extricate itself from the 
wars in the Middle East. The confrontational foreign policy agenda of the Bush 
administration turned out to be too demanding even for the US. Obama empha-
sises international cooperation on the basis of international law. Still, the US 
military budget continues to increase. Cuts are seen as signs of weak leadership.
 To set nuclear disarmament in motion, Obama has to come to terms with 
Russia. If not, the grand ambition of a nuclear- weapon-free world (NWFW) will 
fail before it gets started. The successor agreement to START I is no big deal, 
but without cancellation of the missile defence plans for Poland and the Czech 
Republic, it may not have been possible. Agreement on deeper cuts requires 
more comprehensive accommodation of national interests. Obama recognises 
that disarmament depends on cooperative big power relations, so his vision of an 
NWFW – the number- one priority in his maiden speech at the United Nations – 
is a driver for a cooperative security environment.
 For the time being, the rationale for nuclear disarmament and the economic 
and political incentives for improved international cooperation therefore rein-
force each other in the conduct of US foreign affairs. However, US emphasis on 
military superiority and the reactions and priorities of other powerful actors in an 
increasingly multi- centric world make the continuation open to question. The 
security environment may become more cooperative and so facilitate disarma-
ment, or it may deteriorate into the traditional security dilemma that fuelled the 
arms race of the Cold War, where an increase in the power of one state weakens 
the position of others and drive them to increase their own military capabilities.1 
The opposite prescription is that of “common security” which says that in the 
nuclear age, security is something that adversaries have to build together (ICDSI 
1982). Unilateral steps at the expense of others will not do: the means to enhance 
one’s own security must also make the others feel more secure.
 The negation of the Bush administration’s priorities does not mean that uni-
lateralism is out for ever. Unilateralism is a structural phenomenon that derives 
from the superior position of the US in world affairs, and it would be no surprise 
if the pendulum were to swing back in an effort to reconfirm US superiority and 
keep the challengers at bay. The Bush administration left Russia, China and 
others with a deep distrust of the United States, so it would be premature for 
them to assume that Obama’s policies are the beginning of a new, benign long- 
term trend. Elimination of nuclear weapons may take decades, and those who 
prefer a more assertive foreign policy backed by sophisticated nuclear forces 
may get the upper hand again before disarmament has gone very far.
 The Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is predicated on international 
cooperation across a broad range of issues concerning peaceful as well as mili-
tary utilisations of nuclear energy. To function effectively, it requires more 
concord between the big powers than is common in the international system. 
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Only in two very brief intervals has the UN Security Council functioned the way 
the Charter prescribes and a smooth functioning of the NPT requires: in the 
periods of opportunity immediately after the Second World War and after the 
end of the Cold War. The Treaty also labours under conflicts of interest between 
states in the northwest and states in the south. The latter object to supplier- state 
restrictions on international nuclear commerce and sharply criticise the NWS for 
their failure to disarm. Under mounting pressure from both sets of conflicts, the 
Treaty was in jeopardy when UNSC Resolution 1887 from the Security Council 
summit of September 2009 reconfirmed the validity of its main elements. Many 
NNWS were critical of the Resolution, non- aligned countries in particular: still, 
the new commitment to international cooperation and nuclear disarmament did 
much to facilitate the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
The West
The unipolar moment
The unipolar moment in world politics – the unrivalled hegemonial position of 
the United States, the first truly global military power in the history of human-
kind – was short- lived. It came into being in the 1990s; reached its apex in the 
spring of 2003 following the invasion of Iraq; and dissipated quicker than 
anybody expected. In part, the moment was squandered by the destructive pol-
icies of the US itself; in part, it yielded to economic and political developments 
that had been in the making for several years.
 The foreign policy of the Bush administration has been amply described by 
analysts in and out of the United States. Unilateralism was part and parcel of it, 
but not among its defining characteristics. Unilateralism grew in the 1990s, after 
the Cold War, and was inherited by the neoconservatives who took it to new 
heights. The neocons added exceptionalism to it – the idea that exceptional rules 
should apply to the exceptionally strong, sometimes in reference to the Roman 
empire and Roman law. The statutes of the International Criminal Court became 
an early example: the rest of the world might well adopt it, but no US citizen 
should ever be put before the Court. In the history of the United States, excep-
tionalism is not new either, but after 9/11 the Bush administration leaped ahead 
to take it in new directions. Notable among them were the policies of preventive 
action and regime change, by force if need be. Another distinguishing feature 
was the administration’s unwillingness to talk with its most ardent opponents.
 In practice, unilateralism meant that the US withdrew from some international 
agreements and refrained from joining others. International rules, norms and 
standards were treated selectively in order to not restrict US freedom of action. 
However, once it decided to leave an agreement, it did so the way the treaty pre-
scribed. If the treaty said that a party might leave on 6 months’ notice, the US 
did so. Unilateralism limited the scope of applicable international law, but did 
not challenge its foundations. This is what exceptionalism does: by advocating 
particular rules for the particularly strong, this philosophy takes exception to the 
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principle of the sovereign equality of states, which lies at the root of interna-
tional law.
 The US National Security Strategy of 2002 announced it. It emphasised that 
“the struggles of the twentieth century [left the world with] a single sustainable 
model for national success: freedom, democracy and free enterprise” (White 
House 2002). Insofar as US policies promoted these values, there would be no 
need to legitimise them in reference to the UN Charter, international law and 
multilateral organisations. The policies would legitimise themselves by their 
contribution to basic values. Unilateralism and exceptionalism became parts of 
the same continuum: at the low end of it, the US would extricate itself from 
international rules, norms and standards by withdrawing in orderly fashion; at 
the high end, it would feel free to disregard and contravene them.
 On the international scene, the rule of law was therefore discarded in favour 
of unilateralism and exceptionalism. The National Defense Strategy of 2005 
emphasised that “Our strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by 
those who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial proc-
esses, and terrorism” (DoD 2005). While the rule of law is based on a single 
standard for all parties, hegemonial rule is based on two standards, one for the 
hegemon and one for the subjects. The US was the global rule- maker, but did 
not always have to play by the rules. The National Security Strategy of 2006, 
which was an update along the lines of the 2002 document, provided yet another 
confirmation (White House 2006).
 When Bush declared victory in Iraq, exceptionalism was in high standing in 
Washington. Iraq was supposed to be the first showcase. However, while unilat-
eralism is almost certain to stay in some form or other, exceptionalism has been 
on the retreat. Retreating but not disappearing: where the US remains an undis-
puted number one, there will still be a propensity to act on the basis of self- 
defined rules. Exceptionalism’s longest shelf life will therefore be in military 
affairs, where the US is likely to reign supreme in high- tech capabilities for a 
long time to come. Preventive military action remains an option; regime change 
too. Since the beginning of the Cold War, the US has toppled many governments 
of other countries, but the prominence given to it by the Bush administration has 
gone. The Bush administration stands out as being both more extreme and more 
straightforward in its declaratory policies than other administrations – some say 
more honest than many others.
US military superiority: ambition undiminished
At the core of US dominance is the use or threat of use of force. US foreign 
policy is heavily militarised. Under the heading Global Strike, the Bush adminis-
tration planned for quick destruction of all targets of significance wherever and 
whenever it was deemed necessary. The plans were offensive and pre- emptive in 
nature and based on advanced conventional, space and information warfare cap-
abilities. Nuclear weapons also figured prominently (Kristensen 2006). Another 
element was missile defence, based on the logic that Richard Nixon used in 1972 
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when justifying the ABM Treaty: if you have a shield, it is easier to use the 
sword. Parts of Global Strike were cancelled because conventional strikes could 
be mistaken for nuclear attacks. Other parts just went under the radar. 
 The network of foreign military bases tells a lot about the world’s first global 
military power. Towards the end of George W. Bush’s presidency, the United 
States had 190,000 soldiers and 115,000 civilians at 909 military facilities in 46 
countries and territories. Additional to these numbers were the forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and non- declared facilities in Kuwait, the Philippines, Israel and 
other places. US forces trained soldiers from a majority of the world’s 200 
countries.2
 President Obama therefore inherited a military posture driven by the highest 
of ambitions. The role of military force was confined neither to preventive attack 
nor to national defence: the idea was to make US military superiority so over-
whelming that it would dissuade others from taking up arms. The sword had 
become impressively potent, but the shield remained imperfect. Chinese 
weapons rendered US assets in outer space vulnerable, and other Asian states 
were exploiting US and Western military vulnerabilities by going for ballistic 
missiles that might do great harm to US bases. “The great equaliser” – nuclear 
weapons – had obvious appeal.
 More than anything else, however, the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan 
shed doubt on the realism of the ambition. While the military instruments were 
sharper than ever before, their political utility left much to be desired. In Clause-
witzian terms, the US military machine failed to provide an effective continua-
tion of politics by other means. That lesson came on top of a long- term 
undercurrent – globalisation – that reduces the applicability of military force by 
raising the stakes in peaceful futures and the opportunity costs of war.
 Nevertheless, the US military budget shows no sign of abating, big budget 
and current- account deficits notwithstanding. The US remains determined not to 
allow any other state or combination of states to challenge its military superior-
ity.3 During the 2008 presidential campaign, cutting the Bush administration’s 
defence budget for FY 2009 was anathema. Had the President asked for more, 
he would have had more. President Obama’s FY 2010 budget represents a 
further 2.1 per cent increase in real terms (SIPRI 2010), in spite of the financial 
crisis. Clearly, the political centre has moved to the right in this respect. Military 
superiority is written in stone, and political leaders know that proposals for 
budget cuts may be devastating for their careers.
 Behind the high- tech conventional weapons there has often been a nuclear 
shadow. Throughout the nuclear age, the US has threatened to use nuclear 
weapons more than 20 times (see Chapter 3). The Bush administration widened 
the option of nuclear weapons use to include contingencies where the adversary 
has no WMDs, only conventional forces. The restrictions that previous adminis-
trations professed to abide by – always sharply criticised by NNWS for being 
too weak – were eliminated. As is customary for a new president, Obama set out 
to rewrite the doctrine: he limited the functions of nuclear weapons to a narrower 
spectrum of situations. At the same time, he gave new impetus to Global Strike, 
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now referred to as Prompt Global Strike (PGS) or Conventional Prompt Global 
Strike (CPGS) (see Chapter 3). 
US political clout: diminished
The harder it is to convert high- tech military force to lasting political gains, the 
more important it becomes to gain the allegiance of others by serving the inter-
ests of all. This was the way the US established its hegemonial position after the 
Second World War, spearheading the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions 
and launching the Marshall Plan. If the hegemon ignores the priorities of others, 
authority erodes. This century, the US has acted in blatant disregard of these 
ground rules and has paid a heavy price for it. In most regions of the world, 
US reputation has fallen dramatically. A notable exception is India, where the 
US–India nuclear agreement made headway.
 President Obama inherited a long tradition of threat- based foreign and secur-
ity policies. Except for a period in the 1990s, when the Clinton administration 
had its eyes on the opportunities of globalisation, the Cold War fixation on 
threats remains vibrant, much invigorated by 9/11. It is as if foreign policy has 
to be based on threats – in recent years radical Islam, terrorism, Iran and to some 
extent North Korea – even when statistics show that the world has become less 
violent. Deaths caused by organised violence are at the lowest level since the 
1950s, and the number of major armed conflicts has gone down since the end of 
the Cold War (SIPRI Yearbook 2009). For a couple of decades, the expansion of 
the global economy has been the dominant theme of international affairs, only 
interrupted by the Asia crisis at the end of the 1990s and the global financial 
crisis a decade later. Nevertheless, contrary to much of the rest of the world, the 
US has focused not only on what it sees as violent threats, but has also become 
sceptical of immigration and of globalisation practices that suppress wages. In 
the state that spearheaded globalisation, there are now protectionist tendencies at 
work.
 President Obama tries to reconstruct the image of the US by reaching out to 
others across major dividing lines in international affairs; using multilateral 
diplomacy; substituting cooperation for confrontation; and calling for nuclear 
disarmament. This way, he may be able to convince others to pursue agendas 
similar to his own. The shift is reminiscent of Hegelian dialectics, which says 
that in all socio- political processes there are contradictory elements, and it is the 
tensions between them that create the dynamics of development. Hence, a phe-
nomenon may turn into its own negation. President Bush took his policies to the 
extremes: with Obama, the pendulum hit back. The question is to what extent he 
will be able to follow up on his ambitions.
US economic strength: on the decline
The United States, Europe and Canada account for a diminishing share of the 
global domestic product – down to about 55 per cent in 2008 – and the financial 
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crisis enhanced the downward trend. Foremost among the emerging states are 
the big powers of Asia.
 Limitations on immigration, which restrain the innovative capabilities that 
have come with foreign scientific talents working and settling in the US, have a 
distinctly negative impact on the US economy. Foreign students and immigrants 
account for about 50 per cent of all science researchers in the US. In 2006, they 
received 40 per cent of all PhDs: in 2010, close to 75 per cent of all science 
PhDs will be awarded to foreign students.4 When these graduates settle in the 
US, they create economic opportunities. When they go home, as is now increas-
ingly the case, the creative capabilities will shrink. Poorer economic prospects in 
the US combine with better working conditions in many countries of origin to 
bring more highly educated people back home.5 Strict and cumbersome proce-
dures for entry into the US after 9/11 add to the problem.
 The US has benefited greatly from owning the international means of 
payment, much the way Britain benefited from the pound in the days of the 
British Empire. Current- account deficits can be managed because dollars spent 
abroad find their way back to the US. If need be, huge deficits can be temporar-
ily managed by printing more money, which the US did during the financial 
crisis of 2008/2009. This privileged position is not going to last, however. 
History shows that the international currency comes and goes with power shifts 
in international affairs. When the British Empire went down, the pound was 
replaced – with a certain delay – by the dollar. Today, as the US is ceding power 
to others in an increasingly multi- centric world, a handful of power centres will 
have a say in the development of a system that would be beneficial for many and 
not just advantageous for one. To own the international currency is to own a 
very important means of economic and political influence, so the struggle over 
this issue is going to be intense.
 The US unipolar moment was exactly that – just a moment in modern history. 
It is followed by a rapid transition to a world where the US remains unrivalled in 
military terms, but where other powers are on a steep rise economically and 
politically. In the evolving multi- centric system, the United States will be one of 
many centres and in that sense more of a “normal” country, although still a 
particularly important one.
The “second country” is the problem
The “second country” is the problem, the challenge or, eventually, the enemy. In 
the days of the British Empire, London had its eyes fixed on the “second 
country”, that is, on the one(s) that was next to it in the power hierarchy and that 
might be able to undermine its hegemonial status. For the United States today, 
the “second country” is primarily China. Therefore, it has strengthened its mili-
tary cooperation with Japan; Japan and Australia have signed a Joint Declaration 
on Security Cooperation: trilateral cooperation between the US, Japan and Aus-
tralia has been enhanced; the US and Japan are courting India in a bid for geopo-
litical cooperation against China; in 2007 the US, Japan and India held a joint 
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military exercise for the first time in history; and the nuclear deal between the 
US and India is a door- opener for comprehensive cooperation between them. 
However, while being involved in a subdued arms competition with China, India 
is intent on maintaining an independent foreign policy in all directions and keeps 
its options in relation to China open. In Japan, the Hatoyama government 
launched a comprehensive review of the US alliance for the first time in decades, 
setting out to reduce the US footprint in Japan and to improve relations with 
China.
 In some respects, the “second country” is also the European Union (EU). The 
European challenge is economic and monetary: the EU is the world’s biggest 
economy in macro terms, and the growing demand for euros means reduced 
demand for dollars. Also, the EU can deny the US legitimacy for its actions. The 
Union is based on international rules, norms and standards, and in that sense pro-
grammatically obliged to sustain international rules of the road in its external 
affairs. It is therefore a challenge to the US in soft power terms. The Bush 
administration’s attempts to circumvent international law demonstrated that the 
costs of doing so can be very high.
 The Bush administration tried to split EU members into “new” and “old” 
Europe. The new members in Eastern and Central Europe were easy prey: in 
view of their history of subordination to the Soviet Union and Soviet use of 
force, they believe the US is needed to defend them. The EU is too weak. To 
enhance the likelihood that the Americans will come to their defence, they wel-
comed US military bases right up to Russia’s borders, bringing relations with 
Russia to their lowest after the end of the Cold War. Russia suspended its partic-
ipation in the CFE agreement and threatened to withdraw from the INF Treaty. 
Alarmed by NATO’s war over Kosovo, it upgraded the role of nuclear weapons 
in its military doctrine. When NATO could go to war against Serbia without a 
mandate from the UN Security Council, it might do so again closer to Russia’s 
borders.
 The US partnerships with East European states drove a wedge into the 
Union’s efforts to develop a common security and defence policy. The “second 
country” was hampered in its integration endeavours and constrained in its 
ability to act in international affairs. This is no more than a temporary hurdle, 
however, for in due course “the new Europe” is likely to fold into “the old 
Europe”. The shift may be slow and arduous, but this is the political law of 
gravity. The EU integration process is all- encompassing, and the new members 
in the east are small compared with the founding states and other member coun-
tries further west. President Obama’s conciliatory policy towards Russia facili-
tates it. There may be US bases in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and other East 
European countries for a long time to come, but the most contentious plans are 
gone. The more cooperative relations between the USA and Russia become, the 
easier it will be to unite new and old members behind common approaches to 
security and defence. The moves are incremental and modest, but they point in 
the direction of enhanced integration. Still, for a long time to come the EU will 
be unable to muster its economic strength for global geopolitical ends.
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 When the Cold War ended, European political leaders stressed that Russia 
had to be drawn into European cooperation and security, but US/NATO policies 
and Russian nationalism came in the way. East European anxieties and the 
domestic situation in Russia – authoritarian rule, restrictions on civil and human 
rights, corruption and uncertainties about economic policies – continue to pose 
problems. Still, there is more that binds than separates these heavyweights. In 
the long term, geographic proximity, mutual economic interests, absence of mili-
tary threats and security challenges in their common neighbourhoods will knit 
them closer together. However, what could have changed quickly in the begin-
ning of the 1990s, during the latest period of opportunity for systemic change, is 
now likely to be a slow movement towards Russian integration into the Euro-
pean economic space and an all- European security architecture.
Diverging interests across the Atlantic
The Western world is a network of democracies. Economically, it is closely 
integrated. Cross- Atlantic investment flows are massive and despite the reces-
sion, the United States and Europe remain each other’s most important foreign 
commercial markets (Hamilton and Quinlan 2010). Culturally, the commonali-
ties are well- known. The historical roots are weakening, yet significant. The US 
entertainment industry dominates in Europe as well. English is the first foreign 
language in most European countries. On the Internet, English has no real com-
petition. Politically, the transatlantic community is tied together by tradition and 
common institutions. After eight years of relative US neglect, the Obama admin-
istration is paying more attention to transatlantic cooperation in NATO.
 Still, the cohesion is not what it used to be. In the United States, the political 
regions of gravity have shifted from the northeast to the south and west. John F. 
Kennedy was the last president from the northeast. Many Americans distance 
themselves from what they perceive as European “socialism”, a bad word in the 
US. Most important, the US no longer relates to international law the way Euro-
peans do. While most Europeans remain true to international agreements and 
multilateral cooperation, US unilateralism persists. There will be more or less of 
it – with the Obama administration, less – but the shifts are likely to be varia-
tions of the same theme. Different attitudes towards international rules, norms 
and standards are at the core of transatlantic controversies and are also likely to 
be a source of much contention across the Atlantic in the years to come. Differ-
ences do not necessarily translate into incompatibilities, however: occasionally, 
they may be complementary. For instance, in some respects, European non- 
proliferation policies and American counter- proliferation strategies may rein-
force each other to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons (Lodgaard 2007).
 Another related source of contention concerns the use of force. Most Europe-
ans do not condone US use of force in violation of international law. The occu-
pation of Iraq marked a watershed in that respect. For many years, use of force 
against Iran has been a recurrent issue in US politics, and Obama’s diplomatic 
overture did not rule this option out. The Europeans, on the other hand, have 
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warned against it all the time. East European governments may be inclined to 
follow where the US leads, but there is no certainty about it. On Iraq and other 
issues of war and peace, European public opinion has been more reserved about 
cooperation with the US than European governments, and that goes for Eastern 
Europe as well.
 NATO has adapted to the transatlantic cleavages by changing from being a 
coherent alliance under US leadership to becoming a two- pillar structure where 
both sides of the Atlantic may use NATO infrastructure for their own purposes, 
and sometimes for a common purpose like stabilisation of Afghanistan. NATO 
is no longer the decision- making body it used to be – decisions are made in 
Washington and in Europe – but a platform for transatlantic consultations.
 The West has therefore become a diverse political entity. The US, which 
urged the Europeans to unite after the Second World War to become a better 
partner, now has to treat the Union and its largest members both as a partners 
and challengers.
Implications for armaments and disarmament
The Europeans are norm- bound and supportive of the international non- 
proliferation regime. The EU attaches non- proliferation provisions to its trade 
agreements, which are negotiated and entered into at the Union level. In the NPT 
review process, common EU positions are comprehensive, and the Union can be 
counted on to strongly support the Treaty and the regime that it harbours in the 
future.
 The US is less predictable over the long haul because of the likely fluctuations 
of unilateralism. Under President Obama there appears to be a comprehensive 
overlap between US and European non- proliferation polices, but that was not the 
case under President Bush and it may not be the case under the next president. Dif-
ferences can amount to complementarities, but will more often cause tensions.
 The US is committed to superior military strength and increases its military 
expenditures in spite of its economic problems. This translates into a propensity 
to solve foreign- policy problems by military means, whereas the Europeans have 
cut their military investments to the bone after the Cold War and therefore 
emphasise non- military solutions to problems out of necessity as well as convic-
tion. Confronted with acute challenges at the outskirts of the non- proliferation 
regime, this may lead to different responses on the two sides of the Atlantic.
 As for the NPT commitment to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and disarmament and the US call for abolition, the Europeans are split. In 
simplified terms, non- nuclear Germany is pitted against pro- nuclear France with 
the UK being outspoken in favour of multilateral nuclear disarmament while 
considering modernisation of its sea- based deterrent. Obama’s call for nuclear 
disarmament is strongly supported by most Europeans. Sarkozy reiterates the 
importance of nuclear weapons for France – continuity prevails in French 
nuclear policy – but he is not unaffected by the reinvigorated debate about an 
NWFW (Tertrais 2008).
Power shifts and nuclear weapons  19
 Progress in disarmament affairs depends very much on accommodation with 
Russia. To reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons, threat perceptions must be 
alleviated. The US accounts for 45 per cent of world military expenditures; 
Russia for 3 per cent; so to wait for stronger conventional forces to reduce the 
role of nuclear weapons makes little sense. For the West, that means policies that 
can ease tensions along Russia’s borders in Europe, the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. When Obama pushed the “reset button” to improve relations with Russia, 
US policy got closer to that of the big West European countries, but caused 
anxiety in Eastern Europe. Three different political cultures were at work: a 
Western European culture where Germany is the heavyweight, disposed to closer 
cooperation with Russia depending on political and economic developments 
there: an East European culture still marked by its recent history of subordina-
tion to the Soviets, but gradually moving closer to the rest of the EU; and an 
American culture, which currently translates into policies that are sensitive to 
Russian concerns, but which has controversial elements. The first one seems 
rather stable and predictable. The second one is likely to swing back and forth 
on the way to closer EU integration. US culture bodes for political shifts of much 
greater consequence.
The World Without the West
Defining characteristics
The West is economically, culturally and scientifically attractive, and politically 
and militarily powerful. Many countries are therefore drawn into its orbit. Given 
its dominant position in world affairs, anything else would have been a surprise. 
The pull is supplemented by political and military power, which instils respect 
and projects influence. The gravitational field around the Western star is strong. 
Quite often, bandwagoning pays off.
 Globalisation, which makes everything flow more easily across borders, ema-
nated from the West. Western technologies facilitated it and the West is capitalis-
ing on it. The extension of norms, institutions and habits is essentially an outward 
flow from the West. The Western world has formidable soft power, and those who 
defy co- option and assimilation may be exposed to its equally formidable hard 
power. Small and medium- sized states either play with the West or they risk being 
discredited and isolated. Even a big state like China steps carefully not to antago-
nise the US. In the US, the debate about China typically revolves around two well- 
established camps: one of them wants to engage China and make it a responsible 
stakeholder in the international system while hedging against hostile behaviour. 
The other holds a starker view, envisioning an inevitable conflict between the two 
countries. It is either systemic conflict or assimilation. Discussions often boil down 
to the question of how much hedging is enough and how much is too much, i.e. 
risking becoming a self- fulfilling prophecy.
 This rudimentary description fits the past better than the present, however, 
and ignores other options that are opening up to the non- Western world. During 
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the US unipolar moment it would have been a fair description; today, it fails to 
capture the power shift that is going on in the international system. The finan-
cial crisis has accelerated it: for Brazil, China, India and many smaller countries 
of Asia it meant no more than a blip in their formidable growth rates – in China 
and India, down to 8 and 6 per cent in 2009 – while the economies of Western 
countries had zero or negative growth. The same countries were also among the 
first to get out of it. Naturally, they are coming out with enhanced self- 
confidence.
 For the emerging powers of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the power shift 
also presents new international options. They are no longer confined to integrat-
ing into the existing liberal order or challenging the West for international 
leadership. By building relations with each other, they are making the West less 
relevant. More and more, they take what they need from the West while routing 
around the US- led order. Empowered by the same technologies that the West 
has been using in its globalisation drive, they are giving preferential treatment to 
each other, gradually establishing their own frames of reference in international 
affairs. To enact their own preferences they no longer have to confront the West, 
but can more often afford to ignore it.
 Under the headline “A World Without the West”, Barma, et al. (2007) started 
an important debate on this subject. Their reading of globalisation was as 
follows:
While connectivity for the globe as a whole has increased in the last twenty 
years, it is increasing at a much faster rate among countries outside the 
Western bloc. The World Without the West is becoming preferentially and 
densely interconnected. This creates the foundation for the development of a 
new parallel international system, with its own set of rules, institutions and 
ways of doing things – and currencies of power.
(Barma et al. 2007)
 For instance, trade between the 20 largest and wealthiest countries in the 
world is growing significantly faster than world trade, and faster than standard 
economic models would predict. Economic growth in big countries like China, 
India and Brazil does not account for all of it. These countries are trading prefer-
entially with each other. They are not cutting their ties to the West, but the rela-
tive importance of those ties is diminishing. The same goes for foreign direct 
investments and telecommunications. Indigenous media networks make it 
increasingly difficult for the Western media to penetrate other political cultures. 
The World Without the West is shaping its own narratives of world affairs, redu-
cing that source of power in Western hands. Preferential connectivity South–
South is underwritten by intergovernmental institutions that coordinate and 
stimulate cooperation between its members. Well- known examples are IBSA 
(the India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum), ASEAN, ASEAN+1 (China) 
and ASEAN+3 (China, South Korea and Japan), and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan; Mongolia, 
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Iran, Pakistan and India being observers). During the Bush presidency, the non- 
aligned movement also became more active again.
 The rules governing relations “Without the West” are neo- Westphalian: state 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non- interference in internal affairs. In Asia 
in particular, states tend to behave the way the authors of the UN Charter said 
they should back in 1945 – less so in India, South Korea and Japan; more so in 
China, Russia and Iran. Inviolable sovereignty – the right to determine one’s 
own social, economic and political order – rejects key tenets of liberal interna-
tionalism like global civil society, development aid tied to good governance, and 
international responsibility to protect people who are ill- treated or left in misery 
by their governments. Sovereign states determine their own domestic order while 
dealing with each other on a market basis. Communal, rather than individual, 
traditions are strong. State stewardship of the economy is the dominant ideology. 
The material foundations are natural resource endowments, manufacturing 
capacities and incremental innovation, i.e. learning by doing. International insti-
tutions have no legitimate business other than to serve and facilitate these ends. 
Interdependence is growing, gradually shifting from the West to the World 
Without the West, but without fostering political integration. The financial crisis 
pushed it further: to compensate for the slack in Western markets, the World 
Without the West is dealing more with each other.
 The strategy of the West is to turn the emerging powers into responsible 
stakeholders in the institutions of the existing liberal order. To make it work, the 
rules are adapted to the new distribution of power. The G8 is being replaced by 
the G20, but the leaders of the former will continue to meet a couple of times per 
year, apparently as an inner core. The new heavyweights have got greater roles 
and expanded voting rights in the Bretton Woods system, the WTO and other 
international organisations, but all the time on the assumption that the global 
political economy shall be structured around rules sponsored by the West and 
that the organisations shall be led by Westerners. The head of the World Bank is 
American and the head of the IMF is European, by a tradition to be upheld. It 
follows that there is a tendency for the emerging powers to be left with less than 
their importance would suggest, especially since greater voting weights have to 
come at the cost of somebody else: if the US is not willing to give way, the 
Europeans have to, but the enlarged EU has the biggest GDP in the world. For 
some time, China and the other emerging powers have been working within this 
system, accommodating to it and not trying to overturn it. Will it continue this 
way, or will the current system have to yield to more radical changes in the 
global political order?
 Some years ago, Flynt Leverett pointed out that “the sustained rise in energy 
prices since 2002 is redistributing wealth – and prospectively, economic power – 
across the world” (Leverett 2008). The major beneficiaries were major oil 
exporters in the Middle East and the former Soviet Union and major industrial 
exporters such as China, Japan and Germany. The principal loser was the United 
States. In 2008 and 2009, the prices came down again, but at the level of $70 per 
barrel, the petroleum business remained lucrative. The winners are deepening 
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and multiplying their economic linkages: “If a world without the West is . . . 
indeed taking shape – these linkages are its foundation” (Leverett 2008). Two- 
thirds of current oil exports from the Persian Gulf are going to Asian customers, 
and for the Gulf States and Russia the most important growth markets lie in the 
East. The other way, India, China, Japan and other Asian energy importers have 
compelling strategic interests in deepening their ties to major oil and gas export-
ers. Investment flows between them are building up both ways. Before the finan-
cial crisis struck, the combined current account surpluses of Russia and the six 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council exceeded that of China, leading to 
increasing volumes of eastbound investment. To secure its energy and raw- 
material supplies, China is investing wherever supplies can be obtained. The 
interests are strong and mutual, adding economic substance to the World 
Without the West. 
 Leverett notes that sovereign wealth funds (SWF ) and similar kinds of state- 
owned investment channels provide a potential for coalitions of creditor nations 
to restrain the US from acting contrary to their interests. So far, the central banks 
of major creditor countries have had their eyes on macroeconomic stabilisation, 
and most SWFs have focused on maximising the value of their assets. Looking 
ahead, state- controlled entities may turn to strategic as well as economic consid-
erations. Such actions can restrict the flow of financing for the US current- 
account deficit, further diversify away from the dollar as a reserve asset, and 
broaden the currency regime for international oil trading to include other curren-
cies than the dollar.
 Iran is at the interface between the West and the rising powers of Asia. 
Russia, China and Iran support each other on issues of vital national interest: 
Russia and Iran back China on the Taiwan issue; China and Iran support Russia 
in Chechnya; and for Russia and China it is important that Iran does not fall back 
into the US sphere of influence. India weighs in to strengthen Iran’s eastward 
orientation, tempered by its new relationship with the United States. Iran may 
support the Nabucco pipeline to Europe, which does not pass Russian territory 
and which may not be fully fed without Iranian supplies, or it may send more 
gas eastwards and leave westward deliveries to Russia through South Stream and 
other pipelines. Traditionally, Iran has been as much oriented towards the East 
and Northeast as it has been oriented towards the West, and more comprehensive 
Western sanctions in response to its nuclear programme are likely to enhance its 
eastward orientation. The Western part of its external affairs is where its prob-
lems and conflicts lie; the Eastern part meets growing opportunities. Under the 
circumstances, Asia is about to become a comfort zone for Iran.
 Taking a second look at the Goldman Sachs prediction that with sound polit-
ical leadership and a bit of luck the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) could 
outpace the original G6 nations in dollar terms by 2040, Ian Bremmer argues 
that the political factors that drive the economic policies of these countries 
“differ in crucial ways, undermining any notion that they carry collective weight 
as a coherent economic bloc” (Bremmer 2009). As for China, there are numer-
ous question marks about its ability to manage the effects of globalisation. 
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Another vulnerability is access to energy to fuel its blistering economic growth. 
The energy market is tense; the competition is tough; state intervention is all 
over the place; and the leadership has little experience in handling political risks 
in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. India faces risks of fragmentation 
and is hampered by poorly developed infrastructure. India and China have an 
agreement about joint exploration of foreign energy sources to temper competi-
tion, but more often than not they compete for commercial opportunities.
 Russia, with its comprehensive definition of “strategic sectors”, has proven 
less interested in opening its economy to market forces than in leveraging its 
energy wealth to consolidate domestic politics and restore Moscow’s interna-
tional influence. This has limited its growth potential, as does its singular con-
centration on the energy sector. This sector accounts for about 1 per cent of 
Russia’s jobs, yet energy exports account for 20 per cent of its economic growth. 
Small- and medium- sized businesses account for only 13 per cent of its GDP. 
However, the financial crisis, which struck Russia very hard, may persuade it to 
diversify its economy and leave some strategic sectors for privatisation.
Interdependence, but not integration
Gradually, states outside the Western world are left with more choices than 
assimilating with the West or confronting it. China, India, Brazil and other eco-
nomic powerhouses make the West less dominant and relevant, and they can 
enhance that trend by enhancing the connectivity with each other.
 Continuation along these lines cannot be taken for granted, however. Globali-
sation, and the power that unfolds in this rapidly expanding space, is based on 
factors that often change. Assets are shifting hands all the time, and the uncer-
tainties are exacerbated by domestic dislocations and political instabilities. 
Usually, authoritarian political systems like China, Russia and Iran are assumed 
to be more vulnerable to domestic ruptures than democratic ones such as India, 
South Korea and Japan.
 Growing interdependence between emerging powers does not translate into 
political integration between them. China, India and Russia have opened their 
economies to the outside world – China from 1978, India from 1991, Russia in 
fits and starts from its reconstitution in the early 1990s – but they all stress the 
importance of state sovereignty. China and Russia are converging in their man-
agement of civil society. Coming to it from different backgrounds – Russia from 
the liberal and chaotic years under Yeltsin and China from the totalitarianism of 
traditional communist rule – they are trying hard to control their own domestic 
order. China and Japan are trading partners of sorts, but this does not convert 
into a high degree of political trust. If trade and investments between China and 
India develop into a common market – hyperbole, maybe, but not excluded – 
they may still be wary of each other when it comes to geopolitics and military 
dispositions. Relations between the US and the EU underscore the same point: 
cross- Atlantic investments are peaking and the North Atlantic alliance remains, 
but the political cultures are different.
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 Liberal internationalists are right in saying that interdependence raises the 
stakes in peaceful relations. They rightly emphasise that globalisation is the 
essential driving force that limits the ability of any nation to control its own 
development and makes adaptation the key to success. But realists are also right 
in claiming that the politico- military sphere is different from the economic 
realm. There is no comparison with the European Union, where the Coal and 
Steel Union was established with a view to political unification and became the 
starting point of remarkable progress in that direction. The EU became the prime 
example of international political integration, while in East Asia a number of 
cooperative frameworks have been established, yet none of them with integra-
tionist aspirations comparable with the EU.
 The principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non- interference 
mesh with nation- building and nationalism. Following “the century of shame”, 
the civil war, the turbulence of the great leap forward and the cultural revolution, 
China has had only 30 years of steady nation- building. Nationalist sentiments 
are strong. The Russians, about to regain their pride and part of the power posi-
tion that was lost with the demise of the USSR, are in a nationalist mood as well. 
Provoked by the establishment of US and NATO positions along its borders, the 
government thrives and legitimises its policies in reference to Russian history 
and big power traditions. India is more conscious of its size and weight than ever 
before. Nationalism is a strong force there, too: it was the nationalist government 
of Prime Minister Vajpayee that went ahead and tested nuclear weapons in 1998. 
In dozens of countries, one can see the same set of forces at work: a growing 
economy, a resurgent society, a vibrant culture, growing military self- confidence, 
and a rising sense of national pride. In some of them, nationalism also arises out 
of frustration over American and other Western narratives of history and inter-
pretations of contemporary affairs. Divergent narratives are nothing new, but 
now the information revolution exposes and disseminates them. Nationalism 
adds to state sovereignty in restraining the impact of globalisation and whatever 
interests there might be in going from interdependence to integration.
Implications for armaments and disarmament
What are the implications for world armaments and disarmament? In particular, 
what does it mean for nuclear weapon policies?
 First, strong economic growth facilitates strong growth of military budgets. In 
East Asia, two- digit economic growth has fostered military build- up of the same 
order (Ball 1993–1994). In the decade 1999–2008, China’s increase has roughly 
paralleled its economic growth; India’s likewise (SIPRI 2009). In the case of 
China, significant hidden expenditures come on top of this. So far, however, 
national build- ups have stopped short of arms racing. There has been no distinct 
tendency for national military acquisitions to interact and feed on each other, 
except for the Indian–Pakistani relationship where Pakistan tries hard to keep 
pace with India. China, India and Pakistan are all modernising and expanding 
their nuclear forces: China by introducing different versions of the DF- 31 ICBM 
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and building four or five new SSBNs; India by aiming at a minimum deterrence 
triad; and Pakistan by building more nuclear warheads for delivery by land- 
based ballistic missiles. While the US and Russia reduce their nuclear arsenals, 
the Asian NWS are doing the opposite.
 Second, interdependence without integration underpins this trend. Interde-
pendence raises the costs of war, but for lack of political integration the security 
sector is a sphere of its own depicting a dangerous world. Far from constituting a 
security community,6 Asian powers attend to the risks of war all the time. They 
are rearming but, conscious of how much is at stake, they try to avoid the 
dangers posed by arms racing.
 Third, a nuclear- disarmament strategy that tries to generate support from like-
minded states in order, subsequently, to build mounting pressure on recalcitrant 
ones in the east and south (Daalder and Lodal 2008) would be short- sighted. The 
power shift away from the West, and growing cooperation within the World 
Without the West, translate into diminishing Western leverage and greater 
staying power for the emerging powers. China, India and other states are less 
and less susceptible to pressure and increasingly able to pursue their national 
interests. The call for an NWFW started as a US and Western initiative, and 
without US leadership such a call would have gotten nowhere, but the sooner the 
Asian NWS are included in dialogues on how to proceed, the better. If their pri-
orities are not taken properly into account, leaving them with no feeling of own-
ership to the process, progress will be hard to sustain.
 Fourth, does the World Without the West make it easier for Asian powers, 
Brazil, South Africa and others, to coordinate their positions on nuclear disarma-
ment and non- proliferation issues? There are institutional vehicles at hand: the 
non- aligned movement (NAM), the G77 and China, regional fora like the 
ASEAN Regional Security Forum and smaller groups like IBSA may all be used 
for that purpose. For instance, IBSA played a role in forging support for the US–
India nuclear cooperation agreement. Similar to the growth in South–South eco-
nomic cooperation, South–South political consultations are also likely to expand 
in the time ahead.
 However, India is not a fully legitimate partner in nuclear- weapon discus-
sions. Pakistan is far from being there. Even if India is recognised as an NWS, 
China and India are generally too far apart to discuss nuclear- weapon issues 
with a view to common positions. A strategic dialogue between them is desir-
able, but not near at hand. The others are non- nuclear-weapon parties to the 
NPT and in the great majority of cases also members of nuclear- weapon-free 
zones, urging all NWS to disarm. Thus, coordination efforts can hardly go far. 
Rather, the “have nots” – protesting against nuclear weapons and supplier- 
instituted technology restraints – can be expected to maintain a common front 
against the “haves”. India remains a member of NAM, and NAM can reinforce 
important tenets of Indian foreign policy by facilitating the transition from a 
uni- centric to a multi- centric world. However, after 1998, India has grown out 
of its traditional NAM leadership role, aspiring instead to be accepted as a 
bona fide NWS. 
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 Fifth, the front against the NWS is not a front against a homogeneous group 
of nuclear powers. The World Without the West knows to distinguish between 
the main Cold War antagonists and the emerging powers of Asia. For one thing, 
the growing body of economic cooperation between China and other states in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America makes the latter less eager to criticise China. For 
another, there is less of a reason, too, as long as China’s nuclear profile is a low 
one focused on core deterrence and prevention of nuclear coercion. China and 
India abstain from nuclear posturing, keeping their weapons in a low state of 
preparedness. Their power play is unfolding on arenas other than the nuclear 
one, first of all in the economic sphere where trade relations, the attractions of 
their huge domestic markets and their savings and investment capital are power-
ful assets that can be used for political ends. China’s centralised political system 
makes it particularly well equipped to do so. In short, the salience of nuclear 
weapons in China’s foreign affairs is modest while in India, it looms larger as 
long as the fight for big power status on a par with other centres of the emerging 
multi- centric system is going on.
The shift to Asia
The historical narrative
In a lecture in Copenhagen in 1831, the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel said that history is moving from the East to the West. It started 
in the East and is ending in the West, where the highest level of civilisation is 
taking shape. When the Cold War ended, Francis Fukuyama said much the same, 
i.a. in reference to Hegel. He declared “the end of history”, claiming that the 
economic and political organisation of the West – i.e. market economy, multi- 
party democracy, human rights and rule of law – represents the end station of a 
long historical development. The West has come to the end of history while the 
rest is still in it, having longer or shorter distances to go.
 These are chauvinistic misconceptions. One flaw has to do with the West’s 
own shortcomings – a big subject that the financial crisis helped us to recognise 
– another that it fails to make proper account of history. Nearly 100 years before 
Columbus, the Chinese admiral Zheng He took a flotilla of 317 ships, much 
bigger and better than those of Columbus, through the waters of the Indian 
Ocean and around Southeast Asia. As late as 1820, when the Qing dynasty had 
been on the decline for a while, China and India still accounted for some 45 per 
cent of the world’s economic output. They were centres of a comprehensive 
regional trading network.
 Today, when the Chinese speak of rejuvenation, they mean restoring China’s 
power position to that which it used to enjoy in previous centuries. This can only 
be realised if China grows significantly faster than the others, and Chinese elites 
consider that to be fair. There is something natural about it that can only be 
understood against the background of long historical periods of superior per-
formance and strength. Rejuvenation is nothing new. It is destiny.
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 India’s history is also one of big power, and Indian elites of the twentieth 
century who rediscovered their country’s rich heritage were convinced of India’s 
“exceptionalism”. The first prime minister upon independence, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, noted that fate had marked India out for big things, and that it was 
entirely natural for New Delhi to take a leadership role in world affairs. Similar 
to China’s notion of rejuvenation, Nehru’s notion of greatness is part of the 
nation’s mental make- up. Indian exceptionalism is not of American proportions 
– Americans keep emphasising that the US is “a great force for good”, “the 
greatest force for good” or even “the greatest force for good in the history of 
mankind” (John McCain during the presidential campaign) – but it seems 
stronger than that of the Chinese. In one important respect it is distinctly differ-
ent. Nehru’s call for greatness had strong moral underpinnings. It was not a top- 
down ambition backed by military force.
 Rejuvenation or restoration by whatever name: it is both destiny and strategy. 
The strategy is openness – China from the end of the 1970s, India from the 
beginning of the 1990s. China’s historical experience is unambiguous in this 
respect: during periods of openness, China did well; in periods of isolation, it 
declined. The story of Zheng He is as striking as any illustration can be. From 
the 1430s onwards, the voyages were cut back and soon discontinued altogether. 
They were considered too costly as Mongols and other raiders threatened the 
frontiers. Seafaring was judged to be an expensive distraction from more import-
ant tasks. China turned its back on trade and exploration and oriented itself 
inwards. While the Western powers were energised by the new discoveries and 
substituted observations, experiments and critical thought for the dogmas, beliefs 
and rituals of the Middle Ages, China stagnated. The fact that by 1820 it still 
accounted for as much as 30 per cent of world output has to be explained in 
demographic terms.
 China can therefore be trusted to stay open to the outside world to the best if 
its ability, and so can India. Like China, development is India’s overriding prior-
ity, informing a foreign policy that prioritises accordingly, stressing the impor-
tance of peace and stability. It therefore reserves itself in relation to US 
balancing strategies against China. The Indian economy is not as open as 
China’s, and in terms of ease of doing business it has been ranked as number 
120 on a list of 178 states.7 However, subsidies and protectionism are clearly 
giving way. When Russians emphasise that they can manage this and that on 
their own without attending to others, the Chinese disapprove of it and so do 
many Indians.
 In a stark illustration of the difference between the security sector and other 
sectors, China is highly secretive on nuclear matters. Secrecy is an important 
part of its nuclear posture, and in this respect there is no sign of change.
Contemporary China
For good reasons, analyses of ongoing power shifts revolve around the US and 
China. Other important actors are the EU, Russia, India and Japan.
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 When China’s foreign minister asked Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to 
characterise US foreign policy in one word, she said “leadership”. Despite mount-
ing problems and declining influence in recent years, the US still sees itself in a 
global leadership role. In the view of many Americans, the US remains the essen-
tial nation and a force for good, destined to lead the world. No politician aspiring 
for high office would suggest that the US should abdicate from the leadership role. 
The means by which it is exercised vary from one administration to the next. Com-
pared with his predecessor, President Obama is upgrading the importance of alli-
ances and multilateral cooperation in conformity with international law.
 Returning the question, her Chinese counterpart said “partnership”. China 
treasures partnerships in all directions, conscious of the importance of harmoni-
ous external relations to sustain its formidable domestic modernisation project. 
At the same time, it is keenly interested in its own power position in the world. 
Measuring comprehensive national power is a favourite sport among think tanks 
and university institutes specialising in foreign affairs. It begs the question of 
what that power is going to be used for. One thing is clear: comprehensive 
national power is a relative concept, not an absolute one. What is measured is 
China’s strength relative to other big powers, to the US in particular.
 In 2003, Chinese leaders introduced the term “peaceful rise”. The word “rise” 
was commonly assumed to imply superpower status. “Rejuvenation” does the 
same: that expression was introduced by Sun Yat- sen and reiterated by Mao 
Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Both expressions mean 
restoring China’s power position to that enjoyed during the prime of the Han, 
Tang and early Qing dynasties (Yan 2006). The objective of China’s rise is 
therefore to regain its lost international status, and what should be regained is 
top rank in the international system conditioned by superior achievements and 
overall strength. However, realising that “rise” has offensive connotations that 
may worry China’s neighbours and opposite numbers in world affairs, “peaceful 
development” substituted for “peaceful rise” in 2004.8
 The thrust is nevertheless the same in both expressions. China wants to allevi-
ate concerns that a rapidly growing China will upset the global status quo, con-
scious that the rise of new powers tends to cause turbulence, especially as 
ascending powers have been about to overtake established leaders. In particular, 
peaceful development is intended to reassure neighbours that China is seeking 
win–win outcomes in its foreign affairs. In a well- documented analysis, David 
Kang shows that, so far, China has been successful in this respect. The smaller 
countries of Southeast Asia cooperate more and more with China without cutting 
their ties with the US, not because they are afraid of China but because it is 
deemed to be in their best interest. They are neither balancing nor bandwagon-
ing. Realism, liberal internationalism and constructivism all help to explain the 
evolving regional system: the only theory that Kang emphatically rejects is that 
of balance of power (Kang 2007). However, relations with Japan, Vietnam and 
India remain difficult.
 Chinese commentators link the strategy of peaceful development to China’s 
domestic situation. The magnitude of its growth is matched by the magnitude of 
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its internal problems. If the past is a guide to the future, domestic upheavals are 
very much what the leadership should watch out for. The “Great Leap Forward” 
caused a major set- back in 1959–1963; the “Cultural Revolution” meant another 
period of decline in 1966–1976; and in 1989–1993, starting with the Tiananmen 
Square massacre, the reform economy hit a blow and China’s political standing 
suffered. Since 1993, it has emerged from the international isolation that started 
in 1989 and achieved around 10 per cent annual economic growth. The East 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 hit hard at other countries in the region but not at 
China, which greatly enhanced its overall position in the area. Based on the firm 
conviction that isolation was the major factor behind China’s periods of decline 
and that openness to the outside world is a sine qua non, the strategy therefore 
acknowledges the need for a peaceful international environment in order to not 
jeopardise domestic developments.
 These strategic assumptions found their way into declaratory policy in the late 
1990s and early 2000s.9 First, China seeks to maintain a stable international envir-
onment, especially around its periphery, so that it can focus on economic, social 
and political problems at home. “A developing China needs a peaceful interna-
tional environment and a favourable climate in its periphery” (Information Office 
of the State Council of China 2002). Second, China aims to augment its wealth 
and influence, but in a way that reassures its neighbours about its peaceful and 
mutually beneficial intent. In effect, China tries to manage the security dilemma 
in a common security spirit (ICDSI 1982). In similar fashion, China is saying to 
its neighbours that in the age of globalisation, economic, social and political 
progress is something that nations must pursue together, for mutual benefit.
 Third, China seeks to alleviate and circumvent what it sees as excessive 
US influence around its periphery while avoiding confrontation with the US. 
Mindful of US power and of its own relative weakness, it does not want the US to 
see it as a foe (Wang 2005). Rejuvenation is a long- term process, and there is no 
better choice for China than to step carefully in relation to the one and only 
existing superpower.
 Compared with other big powers, China has a relatively balanced power 
profile: economically, politically and militarily, it can be rated as strong, while 
France, the UK, Russia, Japan and Germany are strong in some respects and 
weak in others. China has, moreover, a strategic purpose and a will to pursue its 
national strategy. If comprehensive power is understood to be the product rather 
than the sum of hard and soft power the way Cline’s function assume – Pp = 
(C + E + M)  ×  (S + W), where Pp is perceived power, C critical mass, E economic 
capability, M military capability, S strategic purpose and W the will to pursue 
national strategy – China is therefore relatively well positioned.10
 If power is seen not only as something states possess, but also as something 
that is embedded in the structure of international affairs, China is progressing 
from a low starting point. It opened up to the outside world only 30 years ago. A 
natural preference is East Asian regionalisation – but Japan is reluctant to accept 
the rise of China and is a brake on regional cooperation. If regionalisation never-
theless proceeds – multilateral cooperation is usually advantageous for smaller 
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countries and therefore draws much support from them – it has been indicated 
that Japan might follow the example of the UK. The UK is a member of the EU, 
yet in part on the sidelines, maintaining a special relationship with the US (Yan 
2006).
Implications for armaments and disarmament
In China and India, the nuclear- weapon programmes are rooted in great national 
ambitions. For China, rejuvenation in reference to the power position it used to 
enjoy in previous centuries suggests that the aim is a dominant position in inter-
national affairs. In India, there is a strand of exceptionalism in its pursuit of a 
leadership role in world affairs, and nuclear weapons are deemed necessary in 
order to attain that role. If the United States is seen to reduce its reliance on 
nuclear weapons as part of a strategy to maintain US military superiority – 
nobody can match its conventional forces – while achievement of an NWFW is 
in the blue, none of them are likely to be cooperative. Then, disarmament would 
run contrary to their historical claims for greatness. In order for China and India 
to contribute to a disarmament process in good faith, there has to be a distinct 
element of equity built into it.
 This is underscored by their growing national self- confidence. High economic 
growth and vibrant nationalism fosters it, and it was enhanced by successful 
management of the latest financial crisis. The emerging powers – China, India 
and Brazil foremost among them – were reassured of the appropriateness of their 
development strategies and foreign policies. In some fundamental respects, 
China is ready for nuclear disarmament. The main missing element is a strategic 
dialogue with the US based on mutual deterrence. Influenced by the US disarma-
ment initiatives, India has revived its radical disarmament rhetoric, but will 
hardly be prepared for much disarmament action until a minimum deterrent force 
has been established and a seat at the negotiating table has been secured. Both 
are sensitive to the contents and sequencing of the specific steps to be taken – 
India in particular, since it is playing for time. The Asian giants are powers in 
their own right, increasingly averse to external attempts to interfere with their 
national interests.
 Secrecy is an impediment to disarmament. For China it is an important 
element of its strategic posture, and a sign of weakness. The Chinese nuclear 
arsenal is small and vulnerable. Confronted with improved US ballistic missile 
defence systems and long- range conventional precision- guided munitions, it may 
therefore want to maintain a high level of secrecy while modernising its arsenal 
and going for less vulnerable deployment modes. In the face of such policies, it 
will not be an easy partner in disarmament deliberations in the years ahead. 
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The structure of geopolitics
The US, China and the EU
It is commonly assumed that global geopolitics will revolve more and more 
around the United States and China, and they see it that way themselves. For the 
US, China and the EU are “second countries”; for China, the US is number one 
in all main respects, being the only superpower, while the EU is unlikely to 
emerge superior to China in comprehensive power because of the slow pace of 
its political integration.
 In terms of economic growth, China is outdoing the US and the EU by a wide 
margin. Politically, China’s ascent depends on the political mobilisation capabil-
ities of the US and on European integration. The US capability to rally interna-
tional support behind its policies has declined considerably, but may take a U- turn 
with Obama’s commitment to multilateralism, alliance politics and international 
law. In East Asia, China has usurped the traditional US role of exporting hope, 
optimism and reassurance.11 In Europe, EU enlargement put a brake on integration 
and the financial crisis hit the Union hard, but integration remains an overriding 
political objective. In short, the US and China are the likely drivers of geopolitics 
in the time ahead, while the EU attracts the keen attention of both of them. 
 In one important respect, the EU and China are coming closer to each other: 
the sea route through the polar basin is opening up for an expanding part of the 
year, reducing the transport time between Shanghai and Rotterdam by more than 
50 per cent. Geopolitics is about the impact of geography on politics, and the 
geography of the Arctic is changing rapidly as a function of global warming.
 The EU is China’s largest market, and in ten years’ time China may eclipse 
the US as the EU’s largest trading partner. The EU has no hard power aspira-
tions in East Asia and does not share US perceptions of the need to curb China’s 
military capabilities. Growing Chinese military investments do not present a 
threat to Europe; Taiwan is a peripheral issue for the Europeans; and Chinese 
activities in the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait are not of prime concern 
either. Protection of SLOCs all the way to the energy sources in the Middle East, 
from which they both draw, establishes an interface between them, but far from 
being any new departure in international politics, China’s emerging blue water 
navy brings it in line with other big powers. Energy is a strategic commodity of 
sorts, and big powers have long been in the habit of protecting their maritime 
lifelines – the United States for some 200 years.
 China’s shortcomings with regard to democratic practices and human rights 
are sources of irritation. The plight of ethnic minorities in Tibet, Sinkiang and 
other places are discouraging and censorship practices comprehensive. Official 
statistics tell that there are some 100,000 public protests of various kinds per 
year. However, if China’s economic and political performance continues to 
improve, and Europe adopts broader and more instrumental approaches to demo-
cracy and human rights as China becomes better known, tensions will be 
alleviated. 
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 Richard Carney and Richard Bitzinger have argued that China and the EU can 
be seen as a binary star system in which both stars revolve around each other, 
but effectively constitute a single sun. They have no security concerns in relation 
to each other, and substantial economic and political interests in common. They 
share a common interest in a multi- centric world order, and they both wish to 
enhance their role in global governance institutions. They see the US as the 
single star of a neighbouring solar system (Carney and Bitzinger 2007). This is a 
minority view, however. Most observers believe that for a long time to come, the 
commonalities of interest between the EU and the US outweigh the cooperative 
potential of European–Chinese relations as far as security issues are concerned. 
The other Asian powers
India
How does India tie into such a geopolitical constellation? India is another huge 
country on a steeply rising curve, although not as steep as China’s.
 India has a rugged and resilient democracy, and historical and linguistic ties 
to the West. Up to the 1990s, it practised economic policies of import substitu-
tion and protectionism and security policies in close cooperation with Russia, 
both of which kept it at a distance from China and Japan as well as the US. With 
the end of the Cold War and Russia’s opening to the US and China, its common 
geostrategic interests with Russia dissipated and threatened to leave it isolated. 
This spurred it into a search for improved relations with China. During Wen Jia-
bao’s successful visit to India in 2005, a strategic partnership was declared. 
China formally recognised Indian sovereignty over the Himalayan territory of 
Sikkim, and India reaffirmed its position that Tibet is a part of China. The two 
sides also agreed on a road map for settlement of the border dispute, which had 
brought them to war in 1962.
 Along the border, a number of confidence- building measures have been insti-
tuted, including a ceiling on troop deployments, agreement to clarify the line of 
control, advance notification of military movements and manoeuvres, periodic 
meetings of force commanders, and measures to avoid violations of each other’s 
airspace. The parties have also agreed to refrain from use of force to change 
existing borders: this is a precondition for confidence- building measures to work 
as intended. Following the visit, India got China’s support for a permanent seat 
on the UN Security Council, and China was accorded observer status to the 
South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
 Given the historical complexities; China’s traditional support for Pakistan; 
and the potential rivalry between them; this turn of events was remarkable. Still, 
the border conflict is far from settled, and economic cooperation is hampered by 
material shortcomings such as weak Indian infrastructure and lack of knowledge 
about each other’s social and economic systems and ways of doing business. 
China sees Russia, Japan and the US as neighbours, but India is far away. Oscil-
lating between indifference and rivalry, the relations between India and China 
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are vulnerable to tactics of divide and rule. The nuclear cooperation agreement 
between the US and India has such a geopolitical aspect. It opens a broad range 
of economic, political and military cooperation between them. Clearly, the 
agreement has an edge against China, which therefore had misgivings about it, 
yet did not see fit to block consensus about it in the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG). 
 The nuclear- weapon dimension looms in the background. Within the frame-
work of the US–India agreement, India can produce in the order of 50 nuclear 
weapons per year if it makes maximum use of its capacity. This is not going to 
happen, however: neither India nor China wants to be trapped in a nuclear arms 
race. By the end of 2008, India was estimated to have in the order of 60 to 70 
weapons, aiming at a minimum deterrent in the low hundreds. Since India’s 
forces are meant to deter both China and Pakistan, and the function of China’s 
weapons is to deter the US, Russia and India, they are facing multiple incentives 
to upgrade and expand their arsenals: China from the US and India in the form 
of US missile defences and an expanding Indian arsenal, and India from Paki-
stani and Chinese expansion and modernisation. China is modernising and diver-
sifying its forces, but it is unclear to what extent it intends to expand its 
capabilities beyond substituting new, more survivable missiles for old ones. By 
January 2009, China was estimated to have 186 operational weapons and a total 
stockpile of 240 warheads (SIPRI 2009).
 In the India–Pakistan relationship, threats and use of nuclear weapons cannot 
be excluded. There is a major unresolved territorial conflict between them 
(Kashmir). In the relationship between China and India, the prospects are better: 
here, the role of nuclear weapons may be contained within an expanding totality 
of cooperative ventures. However, it takes politically astute leaderships in 
Beijing and Delhi and skilful diplomacy to clarify the functions of their nuclear 
weapons and avoid being entangled in competitive arms acquisitions. 
 Standing in an unbroken tradition of non- alignment, India shuns alliances. It 
is mindful of its independence and widely assumed to be the fulcrum of balance 
in Asia. As characterised by Matthew Rudolph, its stance will be neither balanc-
ing nor bandwagoning, but aimed at ensuring a dynamic equilibrium 
both domestically and internationally – domestically between cultural and 
political forces such as nationalism/cosmopolitanism, anti- Americanism/ 
pro- Americanism, self- sufficiency/trade optimism; internationally between 
American technological and commercial affinity versus American hegemonial 
ambitions, and Chinese commercial appeal versus concerns about Chinese pres-
sure (Rudolph 2006).
Russia
The Soviets did not use the term “geopolitics”, but the Russians do. Geopolitical 
analyses tend to see the world through zero- sum lenses – what one party gains 
another loses – and the Russians have always been inclined to read international 
politics this way. Fresh experiences remind them of the validity of it: when the 
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Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact fell apart and Russia was left weak and 
impoverished, the West used the opportunity to move east, right up to Russia’s 
borders, filling the vacuum. Today, geopolitics is prominent in Russian analyses 
of international affairs.
 NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, without a UN mandate and there-
fore in violation of international law, triggered a sea change in Russia’s attitude 
towards the West. Since NATO could do this, it might do more of the same 
closer to Russia’s borders. Its conventional forces were weak and clearly inferior 
to NATO’s, so Russia upgraded the role of nuclear weapons in response.
 While the Bush administration suffered severe set- backs in the Middle East, it 
was successful in extending its sphere of influence to Russia’s borders in Eastern 
Europe and the Caucasus. It tried to do the same in Central Asia, but inconclu-
sively so. New physical facts were established on the ground in the form of US 
military bases in Eastern Europe and assistance to Georgia, while efforts to 
enlarge NATO even further to include the Ukraine and Georgia were thwarted. 
These developments could only come at the expense of relations with Russia and 
the arms control architecture. In contrast with China, which tries to avoid open 
confrontation with the US, rising Russia tried to hit back as soon as it overcame 
the economic difficulties and humiliations of the 1990s. 
 US–Russian relations were therefore at a low point when George Bush left 
the White House. Under Barack Obama they quickly improved, much as a func-
tion of his ambitious nuclear disarmament plans. Without another agreement 
with Russia for further cuts, his high- profile call for an NWFW would have 
come to nought. When the plans for a missile shield in Poland and the Czech 
Republic were shelved, the stage was set for another agreement to replace 
START I, which expired on 5 December 2009.
 Russia’s relations with China have been much improved. The border dispute 
has been settled. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) promotes 
common interests in fighting terrorism and keeping the US out of Central Asia. 
The SCO may also be used to regulate their access to Central Asia’s energy 
resources, but so far there is more competition than cooperation in that respect. 
Russia and China support each other on Taiwan and Chechnya, and they have a 
common geopolitical interest in keeping Iran out of US hands. To the extent that 
they feel encircled and contained by the US, they are likely to strengthen their 
ties in opposition. However, China does not want geopolitics to tilt in this direc-
tion and Russia, which has been a major arms supplier to China in recent years, 
is ambivalent with regard to arms and oil supplies, vacillating between economic 
interests and political concerns not to boost China’s position. Relations between 
these powers are pacific, but restrained.
 Russia’s relations with the EU suffer from its own economic policies as well 
as from its authoritarian political system. Its economic openness is limited by a 
comprehensive governmental hold of strategic sectors, and human rights and 
rule of law deficiencies obviate against closer cooperation. In the long run, 
however, history, geographic proximity, a growing Russian market and eco-
nomic complementarity speak in favour of closer cooperation between them. 
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The EU is Russia’s biggest market. Similar to China and the EU, Russia acts out 
of respect for the UN Charter and international law. For Russia, its veto power in 
the Security Council is particularly important given its weakness on many other 
dimensions of power.
 Russia’s relations with Japan are constrained by the territorial dispute over 
the Kurile Islands, for which there are no signs of early resolution. This is more 
of a non- relationship than a strained relationship. The coupling of Japanese tech-
nology and economic strength to Russian raw materials in Siberia, a matter of 
much speculation and intermittent hopes since the end of the Cold War, has not 
materialised.
 What is left for Russia? First of all, the answer is energy, which is a formid-
able economic and geopolitical card. The answer is also the European option. 
Most of Russia’s economy is in the European part of the country and oriented 
towards the West. The exercise of this option – to become an integral part of the 
European economic space – is up to Russia itself, for it is primarily a matter of 
economic and political reforms. Other options are cooperation with China, India, 
Iran and others in Asia: there are a variety of common interests between them. If 
China and the EU form a binary star system some day, Russia is somewhere in 
its gravitational field.
 Putin took Russia from chaos and decay in the 1990s to stability and eco-
nomic growth in this century. The correlates of that transformation were author-
itarian presidential rule, a firm governmental grip on a comprehensive set of 
strategic sectors, and virulent nationalism. The next phase may see democratic 
reforms and economic liberalisation stimulating more diversified and robust eco-
nomic growth and opening the doors both to Europe and the economic power-
houses of Asia.
 The military doctrine of 2000 stated that the upgraded role of nuclear 
weapons was temporary, awaiting the reconstitution of sufficient conventional 
forces. In addition to being a counterweight against NATO, nuclear weapons are 
deemed important also in defending the vast and thinly populated expanses of 
Siberia bordering China. There is considerable uncertainty about Russia’s inven-
tory of sub- strategic or tactical nuclear weapons, but on the basis of available 
delivery platforms, SIPRI estimates that Russia has approximately 2,000 opera-
tional warheads and about 5,400 altogether, reserves and weapons awaiting dis-
mantlement included. In 2008, the Russian chief of staff affirmed Russia’s 
commitment to non- strategic weapons in reference to the situation in Europe.12 
The 2010 military doctrine signals continuity, but constrains the role of nuclear 
weapons somewhat (see Chapter 3).
 If a reduced role for nuclear weapons must await conventional force upgrades 
that are substantial enough to assure the Russian leadership that its borders can 
be defended by conventional means, one will have to wait a long time. However, 
in view of Obama’s rapprochement with Russia, the threat perceptions may be 
downgraded and the importance accorded to nuclear weapons likewise. Cer-
tainly, in order to reach another disarmament agreement beyond the START I 
replacement, the sub- strategic weapons have to be included in the negotiations. 
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The Russian inventory of sub- strategic weapons is significantly larger than the 
US one, so for the US to agree to, say, no more than 1,000 deployed strategic 
weapons while leaving Russian sub- strategic weapons aside is virtually 
unthinkable.
Japan
Few relationships display such a stark contrast between economic interdepend-
ence on the one hand, and political and military animosity on the other, as that 
between Japan and China. Trade is flourishing while historical grievances, terri-
torial disputes in the South China Sea, political rivalry in Southeast Asia, stra-
tegic competition for vitally important natural resources and mutual security 
concerns – Japanese perceptions of Chinese assertiveness and Chinese worries 
about the evolution of the US–Japan alliance – put heavy strains on relations 
between them. The Taiwan issue exacerbates the tensions, and so does Japan’s 
involvement in the US missile defence programme.
 Following the incursion of a Chinese submarine into the waters off Okinawa in 
November 2004, Japan unveiled new defence policy guidelines which for the first 
time named China as a possible military threat. In response, China expressed deep 
concerns over the adjustments of Japan’s military strategy and over a joint US–Japan 
statement in February 2005 declaring Taiwan to be a common security issue for the 
two of them. At that time, Chinese officials deemed the relationship to be at its 
lowest since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972. A number of popular 
nationalistic protests were levelled at Japan: such manifestations can be spontaneous, 
but the government in Beijing may also have it in its power to trigger them.
 When Bush left, the US–Japan alliance was stronger than ever before, and 
Obama wants to enhance US alliances both in Asia and in Europe. The guide-
lines for Japan–US defence cooperation includes consideration of situations in 
areas surrounding Japan, which the Chinese take to be a reference to Taiwan. 
Rather than using the alliance to constrain Japan, China is concerned that the US 
empowers it. US defence commitments to Taiwan rely on logistical support 
based in Japan and if it comes to another Taiwan Strait contingency, Japan might 
be involved. In one important respect, however, the alliance does restrain Japan: 
while conservative nationalist politicians openly advocate Japanese acquisition 
of nuclear weapons, the alliance keeps those circles at bay. The new Japanese 
government seems, moreover, to take a different view of US extended deter-
rence, possibly favouring a doctrine of no- first-use. No- first-use means that 
nuclear weapons would be used only to retaliate in kind.
 In the face of stronger US political and military commitments in East Asia, 
China is doing in relation to Japan what it did in relation to India when the US–
India agreement was in the making: doing its best to warm relations and alleviate 
the pressures from its geopolitical opponents. In this respect, Hu Jintao’s visit to 
Japan in May 2008 may be compared with his visit to India in November 2006. 
He went out of his way to highlight the cooperative dimensions of the relation-
ship and downplay the conflicts of interest.
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 North Korea complicates the geopolitics in East Asia by deepening Japan’s 
cooperation with the US on missile defence and bringing Japanese nuclear- 
weapon considerations into the open, and by making China wary of Japanese 
rearmament and further strengthening of its alliance with the US. The US missile 
defence deployments in Alaska and California, ostensibly to defend against mis-
siles from North Korea, may as well detract from the Chinese deterrent. This 
amounts to a strong common interest in bringing North Korea back to non- 
nuclear status, but not always to agreement on the best strategy to make it 
happen.
The US call for disarmament and the reactions of other 
powers
In response to President Obama’s call for an NWFW, what can we expect of the 
emerging powers of Asia?
 China and India are rearming: China to maintain a credible deterrent; India to 
establish a minimum deterrent. For both of them, disarmament would mean a 
turn of trends. In some respects, China nevertheless seems ready for it. It does 
not depend on nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional weakness, and 
its international status is less dependent on nuclear weapons than that of any 
other NWS save the US. Having a huge population, a vast territory, impressive 
economic growth, a prestigious historical record and rapidly growing self- 
confidence, China cannot be ignored. It has no need for nuclear weapons to be 
heard. For China, the most pertinent questions concern its strategic relationship 
with the US.
 The US never resolved to base the relationship with China on mutual vulner-
ability and deterrence. Opponents of mutual deterrence argue that it would be 
irresponsible to leave the US, Japan and Taiwan vulnerable to Chinese nuclear 
weapons as long as these weapons can be negated by a combination of offensive 
and defensive capabilities. In the face of emerging US missile defence systems, 
China is therefore bound to take precautionary measures in the form of more 
weapons in less vulnerable deployment modes. Also, it reserves its position on 
the fissile material cut- off issue because it is not sure that it has enough weapon- 
grade materials in stock to meet future requirements. To remove these rearma-
ment incentives and build confidence in future cooperation, a US decision to 
accept mutual deterrence along with a strategic dialogue on how to manage it is 
therefore of the essence.
 US PGS capabilities pose another challenge. The United States wants to 
reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons by assigning more functions to new con-
ventional systems – systems that others do not have. If it launches a conventional 
attack on Chinese strategic assets, what would China do? To avoid the first- use 
dilemma in the face of a declaratory policy never to be the first to use nuclear 
weapons, new investments to enhance their survivability is a logical answer. 
This is what China is doing, i.a. by investing more in nuclear- equipped subma-
rines. The challenge is not unique for China, but presents similar dilemmas for 
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Russia and others. In other words: the United States may be about to reduce its 
reliance on nuclear weapons in ways that make it more, not less, difficult for 
others to embark on disarmament. In the view of ardent US critiques, it confirms 
one of the most sinister interpretations of US disarmament policy, which sees it 
as a variation of the conservative theme of change in order to preserve, i.e. pre-
serving US military superiority. 
 China acquired nuclear weapons to deter others and avoid being coerced, and 
adopted a policy of no- first-use from the beginning. In this respect, it is usually 
credited with a progressive disarmament policy. A couple of reservations may be 
in order, however. First, with the century of shame in mind, there are lingering 
concerns that others may be trying to get at China, and a feeling that nuclear 
weapons help to keep challengers at a distance. Second, even if nuclear weapons 
are marginal to China’s overall status in international affairs, there is an element 
of pride in the nuclear achievements also in this country.
 India will continue its nuclear- weapon programme until a minimum deterrent 
force of some sort has been established. Only then will it be ready to join multi-
lateral disarmament talks. In the meantime, it may feel compelled to accede to 
the CTBT if the US, China and others ratify the Treaty and urge it to do the 
same, but this is far from certain. It is not ready for a fissile material cut- off, but 
willing to participate in negotiations. It had a high profile on disarmament 
matters before it started to align itself with the international arms control order 
after the 1998 tests. Other states may encourage India to build on the tradition 
from Jawaharlal Nehru and Rajiv Gandhi and get ready for disarmament talks as 
soon as possible.
 Sequencing is important both for China and India. Art. VI starts with a call 
for “cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date . . .”: this was always 
understood to refer to a test ban and a ban on production of fissile materials for 
weapons. In the bipolar world of the Cold War, it was logical to start with meas-
ures that would bring the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of the arms 
race to a halt and then proceed to disarmament. But it did not have to be done in 
that order: the original bargain did not tie the members to any particular 
sequence. A CTBT and an FMCT are important both for substantial and sym-
bolic reasons, and have been uppermost on the priority list of states from the 
beginning of nuclear- arms-control endeavours 50 years ago, but so have reduc-
tions in operative arsenals. The latter was never made conditional on achieve-
ment of the former. Today, the interests of India and China suggest that further 
deep cuts in US and Russian arsenals should come first. Increasingly, the Asian 
giants are able to put political weight behind their preferences.
 For instance, Russia and the United States have conducted about 1,000 
nuclear weapon tests each, while India have conducted five. The advanced NWS 
are increasingly sophisticated in simulating nuclear explosions: the latecomers 
do not have the same capabilities. Will the CTBT be accepted under such cir-
cumstances? Will it have to be supplemented by NWS commitments not to intro-
duce new types of weapons? Or should the sequencing be different, going for 
further substantial cuts first and trying to clinch a CTBT later? Similar questions 
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can be asked of the FMCT. China is hedging and hesitates to proceed to an early 
cut- off agreement. India is in the process of building up its arsenal and is there-
fore all the more unprepared. To Western voices arguing nuclear disarmament, 
Asians say, “Go ahead, we’ll support you.” But if the response is an arms- control 
agenda that constrains them while leaving the usual suspects largely off the 
hook, initiatives will quickly go sour.
 Russia has two important foreign- policy assets: petroleum and other raw 
materials, and nuclear weapons. Unable to equilibrate upwards, it does its utmost 
to preserve and capitalise on the top- dog positions it holds, using its oil and gas 
exports both politically and economically, and assigning important roles to 
nuclear weapons in its national military doctrine. Russia’s economic growth is 
slower, more uneven and more vulnerable than China’s and India’s, so at best, it 
will take a long time to beef the conventional forces up to the point where 
nuclear weapons would no longer be needed for other purposes than core nuclear 
deterrence. Alternatively, it takes a much more benign security environment to 
get there. This is the option to be pursued: reduction of threats and accommoda-
tion of vital interests are necessary for deep cuts and multilateral talks to be 
agreed. Gorbachev was unable to realise his vision of a European house. 
Medvedev has called for a new European security architecture (Bobo 2009). The 
scars from the Cold War have not been healed, but to prepare Russia for deep 
and comprehensive cuts, they must be overcome. 
 The United States and its allies in Europe and Asia are conducting policies of 
extended deterrence. These policies are up for review. The states to be deterred 
are primarily China, Russia and North Korea. The alliances are not at stake and 
neither is nuclear deterrence, but the question concerns what nuclear weapons 
are supposed to deter. So far, the claim has been that, for extended deterrence to 
be credible, the first- use option must be kept, but for how long will the Japanese 
and the Europeans stay by this policy? What will the US do? What will it take to 
drop it and be ready to deter and defend against a conventional attack by con-
ventional means, limiting the nuclear dimension of extended deterrence to deter-
rence of nuclear attack? The Hatoyama government that came to power in Japan 
in 2009 started a comprehensive review of the alliance with the US inter alia 
with a view to redefine the role of nuclear arms. Most Europeans want to send 
the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe back to the United States, and few 
consider the first- use option to be important for the cohesion of the Alliance. 
 What is the dynamics of alliance relations in this regard? During the Cold 
War, US and European hardliners fed on each other to build support for new 
arms acquisitions. Hardliners on one side of the Atlantic colluded with like-
minded people on the other to raise security concerns that arguably needed a 
military response, to which they could conveniently refer when arguing for new 
weapon programmes at home. The same kind of interplay has been at work in 
US–Japanese affairs to thwart Obama’s disarmament ambition. At this juncture, 
however, it may be that the governments of European countries, Japan and the 
United States, all of which are poised to take a fresh look at the role of nuclear 
weapons, will develop common interests in reducing the role that these weapons 
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play in their bilateral relationship and internationally, and that this cooperation 
will outweigh the collusion of nuclear- weapon interests.
 During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were spread over large parts of the 
globe, at sea and on land. Starting with the Presidential Initiatives of 1991/1992, 
all of them have been removed from foreign territory and sent back to their pos-
sessors, except some 200 aerial bombs in Europe. By the winter of 2010, they 
were also up for consideration.
Part II
The legacies of nuclear 
history and the 
requirements of a new 
consensus on  




The bomb in the mind
In his eminent book The Seventh Decade: the New Shape of Nuclear Danger, 
Jonathan Schell emphasises that “Before there was a physical bomb, there was a 
virtual bomb, a bomb in the mind” (2007: 26). The first bomb sprang to life not 
in 1945, but in the brain of Leo Szilard a decade earlier. It is the bomb in the 
mind that stands at the heart of the nuclear proliferation problems, for the mental 
one is available to all.
 The physical one, in the possession of states, came about for fear of others. 
Szilard was appalled by the physical destruction of the bomb, but feared Hitler 
even more. Roosevelt did the same. Hitler’s Germany became the driver of the 
Manhattan Project. Later, all members and aspirants to the nuclear club have 
said that they wanted the bomb for fear of others.
 In a prelude to the concerns of the twenty- first century, the British MAUD 
report of 1942 made an ominous elaboration: even if Hitler failed to get it first, 
England would need it, for no nation “would care to risk being caught without a 
weapon of such decisive capabilities” (Rhodes 1986: 369). In other words, if the 
threat is not manifest it will always be latent, for the bomb in the mind does not 
know geographical borders and the future is unpredictable. Current rationales for 
retention and modernisation of nuclear arms are reminiscent of the MAUD 
report. For instance, the stated rationale for the British proposition to build a 
replacement for the Trident submarine system emphasises the need to defend 
against the unpredictable. The same rationale can be used by many other states, 
and it fits some states much better than it fits Britain.
 During the Cold War, the fundamental flaw of this rationale was coined “the 
fallacy of the last step” – the mistaken belief that the latest military acquisition 
would provide a lasting advantage. The Cold War became replete with exam-
ples. No solution to the fallacy was found then, and there is none now. Further 
proliferation, horizontal and vertical, remains a matter of great concern, horizon-
tal proliferation more so than during the Cold War.
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The legacies of the Cold War
The first nuclear era – that of the Cold War – left four important legacies influ-
encing the policies of the second. First, the recurrent attempts at threat inflation 
and the corresponding politics of fear. Often, policies were made on the basis of 
worst- case analysis. Sometimes, it was worse than that: they were made in refer-
ence to images deliberately construed to justify enhanced arms build- up. Advo-
cacy substituted for analysis. When the period of opportunity of the early 1990s 
was over, this practice was resumed in reference to new threats, from non- state 
as well as state actors. Second, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence outlived the 
global rivalry and confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
It was adapted, but in essence maintained. Threats of using nuclear weapons, a 
recurrent practice during the Cold War, have also been issued later. Third, the 
arms race left enormous stocks of weapons and fissile materials behind, many of 
them in excess of military needs and without adequate protection. Risks con-
nected with lax controls fed into strong elements of push and pull for nuclear 
proliferation both in the state and non- state paradigm, and still do. Finally, as the 
Cold War drew to an end, the superpower leaders offered a vision of a world 
without nuclear weapons, in all earnest – a vision that was revived 20 years 
later.
Threat	inflation	and	the	politics	of	fear
The first period of the nuclear age – the first nuclear era – was part and parcel of 
the Cold War. The distinct characteristics of this world order translated into an 
equally distinct nuclear arms race driven by threat inflation and politics of fear.
 For a couple of centuries, the lifetime of international orders had been limited 
to a few decades. From the end of the Napoleonic war to the end of the Cold 
War – 175 years – Europe saw five orders corresponding to five distinctly differ-
ent distributions of power, for an average of 35 years each. The Cold War lasted 
for 40. This historical observation passed unnoticed, however: the Cold War was 
sometimes referred to as a duel without end, and the nuclear arms race as a race 
to oblivion (York 1970). Innovators know that to get on to something new, it is 
important to go back to basics and start from scratch. The rigidities of the Cold 
War discouraged any such attempt. Like bad chess players, decision- makers con-
sidered each move to be a necessity, without trend- breaking alternatives. Schol-
ars and observers met to discuss security and arms- control issues, but the agenda 
was usually confined to small- scale, reformist variations of existing policies, and 
even modest refinements seemed unrealistic.
 Threat inflation and politics of fear were essential features of security politics 
on both sides of the East–West divide. Its origin and form differed, but it was so 
deeply ingrained both in Moscow and Washington that it survived the Cold War 
and got a new lease on life in this century. In the United States, the practice re- 
emerged towards the end of the 1990s and got a formidable boost when terror-
ism struck the United States on 11 September 2001.
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The way it worked in the United States
All through the Cold War, threat inflation was used by American politicians and 
experts to promote arms programmes. Under the pretence of analysis, a series of 
reports were in effect advocacies of enhanced arms build- up. Among the most 
prominent ones were the following:
1 In the spring of 1950, Paul Nitze and his staff prepared “NSC- 68: United 
States Objectives and Programs for National Security”. The report (NSC- 
68. . . 1950) claimed that, should a major war occur that year, the Soviet 
Union could immediately overrun Western Europe, drive towards the oil- 
rich areas of the Near and Middle East, consolidate communist gains in the 
Far East, launch air attacks against Britain and air and sea attacks against 
the shipping lanes of both the Atlantic and the Pacific, and attack selected 
targets in Alaska, Canada and the United States with nuclear weapons. 
While Truman was sceptical at first, the Korean War helped persuade him to 
endorse the report, leading to a fourfold increase in the defence budget. 
Thus began a new budget practice prioritising defence over all else. Most 
administrations after Truman have determined defence requirements first, 
and then allocated the rest to domestic needs. Or the budget was run with a 
deficit. Steady, significant economic growth allowed it. In rare cases, taxes 
were raised. The weapons laboratories did not wait for the military to define 
the needs, but found out themselves what the art of the possible would be. 
They made it up as they went along (Rhodes 2007: 83).
2 In 1957, the Gaither panel conducted a similar exercise, widening the 
mandate given to it by President Eisenhower to correspond to that of NSC- 
68. The NSC- 68 had identified 1954 as the year of maximum danger: the 
Gaither report moved it forward to 1959, predicting that a catastrophic 
missile gap was in the making. Presidential candidate John Kennedy took it 
on board, appealing to fear for political advantage. When incoming Secret-
ary of Defense McNamara found that there was a missile gap, but in the 
US’s favour, the President told him that the politics of the matter had come 
to a point that necessitated as many as 1,000 Minuteman missiles (in addi-
tion to the Titans already deployed, for a total of 1,054).
3 In 1976, George H.W. Bush, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), appointed three “B- teams” to review the data and conclusions of the 
CIA’s own “A- teams” that prepared the 1976 National Intelligence Estimate 
(NIE). The real initiators of the review were John Foster and Edward Teller, 
both of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, taking the view that intelli-
gence officers should deliberately try to influence policy by emphasising the 
worst that the Soviet Union could do. The conclusions lived up to it:
While hoping to crash the “capitalist” realm by other than military 
means, the Soviet Union is nevertheless preparing for a Third World War 
as if it were unavoidable. . . . Within the ten year period of the National 
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Estimate the Soviets may well expect to achieve a degree of military 
superiority which would permit a dramatically more aggressive pursuit 
of their hegemonial objectives.
(Rhodes 2007: 125)
With the benefit of hindsight, the B- team’s allegations about Soviet weapon 
systems were all wrong – but that, in a sense, is beside the point.
4 At first, the B- teams had little impact. However, their conclusions were fol-
lowed up by the Committee on the Present Danger, which declared war on 
Jimmy Carter and his notions of nuclear sufficiency. The Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT II) agreement was not ratified and Jimmy Carter 
was not re- elected. The politics of fear played into the hands of Ronald 
Reagan. During his presidency, the hegemon–challenger dilemma – the 
challenger claiming parity; the hegemon fearing it would go for more – 
ushered into another major wave of Cold War. At times, East–West affairs 
were about little more than nuclear arms racing and bean counting. For a 
while, Soviet spokesmen characterised the early 1980s as a pre- war period.
The Soviet side
To hide Soviet weakness after the Second World War, Stalin put the loss of 
human lives at 15 million. Real losses were much higher, and they came on top 
of millions of victims of the “Great Terror” of the 1930s. When the nuclear age 
began, the Soviet Union was, therefore, on its knees, much inferior to the United 
States. The feeling of inferiority haunted Soviet leaders all through the Cold 
War. Soviet politics of fear emanated from this inferiority complex, and from the 
self- interests of a military sector that grew to almost one half of its gross national 
product (GNP), eventually breaking the back of Soviet economy.
 Nevertheless, up to the Cuban crisis of 1962, Soviet policies were to some 
extent budget- driven, conservative and cautious – although the grip on Eastern 
Europe was maintained without hesitation by threat or use of military force in 
East Germany (1953), Poland (1956) and Hungary (invaded in 1956). In another 
reading of the same period, the resource limitations left the leadership without 
any real possibility of matching the United States. However, the political 
restraints of those years become clear when juxtaposed to what followed after 
the Cuban crisis. Cuba became a turning point.
 At the time of the Cuban crisis, modest numbers of Soviet Bear and Bison 
bombers were based deep inside the Soviet Union and would have to be forward 
deployed before flying inter- continentally. That could reveal their intention and 
make them vulnerable to pre- emptive attack. The Soviets had a few R- 7 and 
R- 16 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) carrying 2.8 megaton thermo-
nuclear warheads, and Soviet submarines in the Caribbean could use their mis-
siles against targets in the United States in retaliation.1 American forces 
consisted of several thousand bombs on 1,576 Strategic Air Command (SAC) 
bombers, 183 Atlas and Titan ICBMs, 144 Polaris missiles on nine nuclear sub-
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marines, and the first squadron of ten Minuteman I missiles, brought to full alert 
for the first time at the height of the crisis on 26 October 1962. That day, Castro 
asked Khrushchev for a pre- emptive nuclear strike on the United States. Khrush-
chev declined (Reed 2005:18).
 The parties drew similar conclusions from the showdown. Swallowing their 
humiliating retreat, the Soviet leaders were determined to deny the United States 
another dictate. Vasily Kuznetsov, the diplomat who negotiated the crisis settle-
ment for the Soviet Union, told his American counterpart that much: “I want to 
tell you something. You’ll never do this to us again” (Rhodes 2007: 94). Parity 
with the United States became economic priority number one – a formidable 
ambition for a much smaller economy – but the dictatorship had it in its powers 
to pursue it. For the US leaders, the outcome confirmed the importance of stra-
tegic superiority. They could better afford it: US military expenditures peaked in 
the 1960s at 11 per cent of the GNP. By the end of the 1970s, the two powers 
were in for the classical dilemma referred to above: while the (Soviet) challenger 
said it aimed at parity, the (US) hegemon saw a rising curve threatening to over-
take its own. The result was an annual 10 per cent increase in US military expen-
ditures from 1980 to 1986 – and renewed fear in Moscow about US superiority 
and nuclear war.
 Old habits die hard. In 1998, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile 
Threat to the United States, better known as the Rumsfeld Commission, focused 
on the dangers posed by rogue states developing ballistic missiles capable of 
reaching the United States, arguing that the US intelligence community had 
underestimated these threats. Proponents of missile defence used the findings to 
push their case. The Commission grouped Iran, Iraq and North Korea together 
because they all pursued missile programmes based on Soviet Scuds: some 
observers have seen a line from its report to the “axis of evil”. In due course, 
missile- defence deployments in Alaska and California were justified in reference 
to North Korea and the planned deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic 
in reference to Iran. In Russia, President Putin was riding high on a nationalistic 
trend, upgrading external threats and capitalising on his own strongman image.
Nuclear deterrence
During the first nuclear era, nuclear weapons were tailored to all sorts of deliv-
ery systems – to land-, air- and sea- based missiles of various ranges, to land- and 
carrier- based aircraft, and to artillery systems. The Soviet Union had nuclear 
land- mines as well. Nuclear weapons substituted for conventional munitions to 
such an extent that by the 1960s and 1970s, important US and Soviet force cat-
egories had little capacity for conventional warfare.
 In numerical terms, the reliance on nuclear arms grew astronomically. In the 
United States, Eisenhower sought unilateral advantage through quantitative 
superiority. During his presidency, the US stockpile leaped from 1,400 to 20,000 
warheads, while the Soviet arsenal grew from 120 to 1,000 warheads. The Cuban 
crisis triggered a veritable Soviet catch- up effort, demonstrating – in the course 
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of 15 years – the fallacy of the last step also in quantitative respects. When the 
Cold War ended, the world’s arsenals contained about 60,000 warheads, 98 per 
cent of them Soviet and American ones.
 These numbers, and the incessant pursuit of nuclear superiority and parity 
that produced them, speak to the formidable importance that the United States 
and the Soviet Union assigned to nuclear weapons during the Cold War. The 
weapons were explained and justified in terms of deterrence: mutually assured 
destruction (MAD) was the best guarantee against nuclear war. To explain the 
ever- expanding size of the arsenals, nuclear war- fighting doctrines were added. 
To be able to destroy each other’s weapons in series of attacks and counter- 
attacks, large diversified and well- protected arsenals were arguably needed.
 The doctrines of deterrence and war- fighting are related. For deterrence to 
work there has to be a will to use the weapons if attacked; the best way to con-
vince the adversary about that is to prepare for it; and the only way to be seen to 
be ready is actually to be ready. Especially if you think you can win a nuclear 
war – and this is what the war- fighting doctrines were about – the inhibitions 
against use goes down; hence the argument that war- fighting doctrines are 
helpful in making deterrence credible.
 Did strategic scenarios envisaging attacks and counter- attacks and use of 
nuclear weapons in the thousands make it to the “real world of real political 
leaders”? McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy’s and Johnson’s national security advisor, 
said “no”. In the real world of real political leaders “ten H- bombs on ten cities 
would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities 
unthinkable” (Bundy 1969). He argued that the mere existence of nuclear 
weapons had a restraining effect irrespective of the sophistry of nuclear- war 
planning. Having the Cuban missile crisis fresh in mind, Bundy introduced the 
term “existential deterrence”. In the “real world”, deterrence theory may have 
boiled down to existential deterrence all through the Cold War – yet the nuclear 
build- up continued and the nuclear doctrines became ever- more sophisticated.
 What disappeared with the Cold War and what was left behind? The nuclear 
arsenals have been cut by more than 60 per cent. Still, there are altogether some 
23,000 nuclear weapons in the arsenals of nine nuclear- weapon states (NWS). 
Nuclear doctrines are no longer in the foreground of international affairs, but nearly 
one decade into the twenty- first century they stayed much the same. Deterrence, 
war- fighting and possible first- use of nuclear arms remained key organising con-
cepts. Only the rising Asia giant – China – was committed to a policy of no- first-use 
(NFU). After the tests in 1998, India also adopted such a policy, but later extended 
the role of nuclear weapons to include deterrence of chemical and biological 
weapons. As was the case during the Cold War, nuclear policies were driven by 
fear of the other(s); by vested domestic interests in research, development and pro-
duction of arms; and by a belief in the political significance of military superiority, 
notably in the United States, where it was written in stone. Others may think the 
same way without admitting to it, because they are unable to challenge it.
 China’s outlook appears different, however. During the second wave of 
US–Soviet arms racing in the 1980s, China showed remarkable restraint, and 
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by 2009 it still had only 24 ICBMs capable of reaching the West Coast of the 
United States. The Chinese evidently consider that if a few (megaton) bombs 
can be detonated over US cities, that is enough to deter a US nuclear attack, 
and they are most probably right. For any US administration, a few H- bombs 
on US population centres mean unacceptable destruction. India has not defined 
what its objective of minimum deterrence would mean and it is too early to 
judge where it is heading, but it seems bent on avoiding an arms race with 
China.
Remnants of the Cold War
When the duel was over and the Berlin Wall came down, 40 years of arms racing 
had produced 70,000 nuclear weapons and huge amounts of highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) and plutonium. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which had 
based its nuclear management on physical control without any rigorous material 
accountancy, caused grave concerns about proliferation to state and non- state 
entities. Later, the discovery of the Abdul Qadeer Khan network widened it into 
a concern tous azimuth: firms and individuals from more than 30 countries on 
four continents had contributed to the network, but nothing seemed to have come 
from the former Soviet Union. Effective implementation of Article I of the 
Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), obliging suppliers 
not to assist others in the acquisition of nuclear weapons, became an issue of the 
highest order.2
 The first nuclear bomb to be dropped – over Hiroshima – had not been tested. 
Testing was not considered necessary, for by shooting two significant amounts 
of HEU at each other, the weapon developers were virtually certain that a 
nuclear explosion would follow. The Hiroshima bomb had a yield of 12.5 kilo-
tons, i.e. equivalent of 12,500 tons of TNT.
 Ever since Hiroshima, latecomers and newcomers to the nuclear club, there-
fore, knew that they had a choice: if they went for HEU, they could declare their 
capabilities by testing or they could leave others “in the dark” and still be virtu-
ally certain that they had a weapon that would work. They had that choice using 
plutonium as well, but with some additional problems to overcome: implosion 
technologies had to be mastered and unstable isotopes (240, 241, etc.) had to be 
controlled. The plutonium bomb that was used over Nagasaki had been tested at 
Alamogordo. Most of the newcomers chose to test, while Israel and South Africa 
adopted policies of opacity and ambiguity.
 When the risk of nuclear proliferation began to transcend the state paradigm, 
the lesson from Hiroshima became particularly relevant. For terrorists, there is 
little doubt that the material of choice is HEU. Equally obvious, the first and 
most effective line of defence is at the source, meaning reduction of weapons 
and weapons- grade materials, and effective control of the remaining inventories. 
There is an extensive literature assessing this problem, describing the multitude 
of programmes that try to come to grips with it and discussing shortcomings and 
remedies (Ferguson and Potter 2005).
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 Risk is probability times outcome. The probability of catastrophic terrorism is 
a function of time. The outcome may be a question of what a nuclear explosion 
will do to an urban area, i.e. another Hiroshima. Even more dramatic, it may be 
a question of how the United States would react to a nuclear explosion in one of 
its cities. 9/11 hit a raw nerve in its government machinery and changed the 
world: the reactions to an act of nuclear terrorism would be even more dramatic. 
Somehow, the superpower would probably strike in revenge, e.g. against states 
that are believed to host or support the group behind the terror. The political 
system of the United States may change very much for the worse, and so may 
that of others. The world economy would take a severe blow. The consequences 
are actually hard to imagine.
Reykjavik
As the Cold War began to wind down, a spectacular attempt was made to rid the 
world of nuclear weapons. Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan shared the 
objective of a nuclear- weapon-free world (NWFW), and had a go at it in Reykja-
vik in October 1986.
 The prelude was the summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985, best 
known for a joint statement emphasising that a nuclear war cannot be won and 
must never be fought. The following year, Gorbachev sought direct dialogue 
with the United States at the highest level, aiming, first of all, at agreements in 
the field of arms control and disarmament. Reagan, too, preferred to do business 
that way. He shied away from bottom- up summits issuing communiqués that had 
been negotiated in advance. Geneva had been conducted in a top- down way, and 
Reykjavik was cast in the same mode. Without it, there was no chance of getting 
around old habits blocking new departures towards cooperative security.
 In his memoirs, Gorbachev says that “our generals and even some people in 
the Foreign Ministry and in our negotiating team in Geneva . . . were firmly stuck 
in the logic of antagonism, and the military sought to protect their corporate 
interests” (1996: 415–416). Much the same applied on the American side. Elabo-
rating on “what really happened at Reykjavik”, Secretary Shultz writes that “the 
outcome of Reykjavik portended such a departure from the past that it split my 
colleagues in the State Department” (1993). Some argued that comprehensive 
disarmament would undermine the Western alliance and make the Europeans 
accommodate to the Soviets. Nuclear weapons knit the alliance together. 
 Reykjavik had been a trap. The argument was anchored in the past, in the text-
books of the Cold War, void of readiness and ability to imagine what a world 
without East–West confrontation and nuclear weapons might be like.
 At Reykjavik, Reagan and Gorbachev confirmed to each other their objective 
of eliminating all nuclear weapons, observing parity and equality at each step 
along the way. Gorbachev seized on the Palme Commission’s notion of common 
security (Rhodes 2007: 220–221). The Commission had emphasised that, in the 
nuclear age, security was something the parties had to seek together, to mutual 
advantage. It was not something one party could achieve at the expense of the 
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other. Disarmament had to proceed through a series of win–win stages. Gor-
bachev proposed a timeline for elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 
2000.
 The stumbling block was the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In his 
correspondence to Gorbachev of 25 July 1986, Reagan had proposed that the 
side that wished to deploy strategic defences should be obligated to present a 
plan for sharing the benefits of them and for eliminating offensive ballistic mis-
siles. If the missiles were eliminated before deployment of defences against 
them, then no capability for a first strike would exist. Deployment of defences 
would be justified anyway, as an insurance policy against cheating or against 
some other power that might acquire offensive strategic missiles (Shultz 1993: 
754). Reagan’s rationale was much different from that of later administrations, 
which can best be described the way President Nixon justified the Anti- Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 (which prohibited national missile defences): “If 
you have a shield, it is easier to use the sword.”
 Gorbachev tried as best as he could to curtail the SDI, partly because of com-
mitments he had made at home, partly because the programme was of genuine 
concern to him. The mix was unclear, however. Soviet scientists had told him 
that the SDI could be neutralised for 10 per cent of what the missile shield would 
cost. In February 1986, he had asked some of his assistants, “Maybe it is time to 
stop being afraid of the SDI?” (Dobrynin 1995: 620). At Reykjavik, Gorbachev 
insisted that the SDI should be confined to laboratory research and testing for a 
period of ten years – and that blocked the big deal. The leap towards an NWFW 
failed. In effect, the Reykjavik summit nevertheless prepared the ground for the 
Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces (INF ) agreement, which eliminated all US 
and Soviet missiles in this category, and for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START I), which reduced operational strategic nuclear weapons by 50 per cent.
 Reflecting on the issues that thwarted the high ambitions of the leaders, 
Anatoly Dobrynin wrote:
As an eyewitness to Reykjavik, I feel Gorbachev was no less responsible 
than Reagan for its failure because he held SDI hostage for the success of 
the meeting. He held good cards with impressive disarmament proposals, 
and he could have played them far better if he had not been as stubborn on 
SDI as Reagan. It could have been postponed for further consideration if 
they had reached agreement on a deep reduction of nuclear weapons, and as 
a matter of fact Gorbachev followed that bargaining strategy in later negoti-
ations toward the end of the Reagan administration.
(1995: 620)
This assessment seemed appropriate at the time it was written, and even more so 
today, knowing the technological difficulties that ballistic missile defence 
(BMD) still encounter.
 Two issues were glaringly absent from the Reykjavik negotiations. First, 
when talking about an NWFW, the superpowers seem to have taken the consent 
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of the other NWS for granted. Neither are there any references to the question in 
the US and Soviet memoranda of conversation, nor is there any mention of it in 
Reagan’s, Shultz’s, Gorbachev’s and Dobrynin’s accounts of the discussions. 
This speaks to a fundamentally important feature of the first nuclear era: without 
a shred of doubt, the superpowers were dominant, certainly in their own eyes 
and most probably also in those of others. The other NWS were mere appendices 
to the bilateral dimension of this world order.
 Second, there was no mention of the NPT, despite the fact that Article VI of 
the NPT made elimination of nuclear weapons an international legal obligation. 
This confers credence to the view that, for the major powers, the NPT was some-
what marginal to their core security concerns. Or they had never paid much 
attention to Article VI and, therefore, failed to recognise it even as they tried to 
implement it.
 In his account of the meeting, George Shultz writes:
The achievements at the Reykjavik summit were greater than those in any 
U.S.–Soviet meeting before, but the popular perception of the outcome in 
Iceland at the time was one of near disaster or near farce. Over the years, 
that perception hardened into accepted truth.
(1993:776)
Gorbachev notes that Margaret Thatcher “rushed her fences”: “We must not 
allow a second Reykjavik to happen” (1996: 420). There was something unreal 
about it all, partly because it had not dawned on those who received the news 
that the Cold War might soon be over. In part, it was also due to the way it hap-
pened. Between Geneva and Reykjavik, there had been some 25 communica-
tions back and forth in preparation of the summit, but they were high- level secret 
ones setting the stage for a leader- driven negotiation. Therefore, the news took 
governments and public opinion by surprise. Also, they were met with incredu-
lity because the leaders had been thinking big in unconventional ways. Could 
this be part of the real world?
 While much progress was made in the field of disarmament, an NWFW was 
not to be. However, Reykjavik revived the vision, shaking governmental 
bureaucracies entrenched in the nuclear paradigms of the Cold War and giving 
hope to the people who had been at their mercy.
 George Shultz met the critics of Reykjavik and proponents of status quo 
asking, “What’s so good about a world where you can be wiped out in thirty 
minutes?” (1993: 780). When commemorating Reykjavik 20 years later, he was 
joined by other former US leaders. Together, they published an article in the 
Wall Street Journal highlighting the goal of an NWFW (Shultz et al. 2007).
3 Post- Cold War doctrines
The functions of nuclear weapons
The first nuclear era conferred many functions on nuclear weapons. They were 
deployed in the name of national security and they enhanced the status and pres-
tige of their possessors. By moving them forward, including them in military 
manoeuvres and keeping them in high states of readiness, nuclear weapons were 
used to maintain superpower spheres of interest and mark political ambitions. 
Produced in enormous numbers, widely distributed and well- integrated in the 
military machines of their owners, there was a nuclear shadow to many deploy-
ments, operations and conflicts.
 After the Cold War, some of these functions have continued unabated; others 
have been weakened and discarded; and yet others have been given a new lease 
of life by adapting the nuclear postures to new political and military circum-
stances. To better understand what it takes to change the role of nuclear 
weapons, a closer look at their current functions is in order.
The structural impact
Karl Marx wrote that the most effective power is the structural one which func-
tions without being used. Nuclear weapons function this way. Military strength 
is an important determinant of the international hierarchy of states, and nuclear 
weapons are the ultimate expression of strength. States are sensitive to the inter-
national hierarchy: consciously or subconsciously, they shape their policies and 
actions with a view to the power that others can wield, accommodating to those 
who are high in the hierarchy. Nuclear weapons are unique in their destructive 
capacity, instilling a sense of awe in the minds of opponents and fostering 
caution and respect in the minds of others. Their structural impact comes down 
to what McGeorge Bundy (1969) called “existential deterrence”: stripped of 
sophisticated doctrines and war plans, nuclear weapons influence others by their 
sheer existence. They function without being used, just by being there.1
 The status value of nuclear weapons played a role in the British and French 
decisions to go nuclear. They got what they wanted in the way of “a place at the 
table” (Bundy 1988). France also got the muscle to chart an independent foreign 
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policy. In 1966, it withdrew from NATO’s military organisation. In 1968, when 
the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was opened for signature, the struc-
tural significance of nuclear weapons was enshrined in treaty form. The NPT is 
based on the distinction between “haves” and “have- nots”, between five big 
powers and all others – a distinction that persists in a somewhat diluted form – 
another four de facto nuclear- weapon states (NWS) have been added – despite the 
fact that it was supposed to be temporary. Precisely because the weapons are in the 
hands of a privileged few, their status value becomes all the more conspicuous.
 Some 30 years later, domestic as well as international prestige played a role 
in India’s declaration of nuclear- weapon status. Elements of the Indian scientific 
community pushed for it to show that they mastered the technology. In the 
beginning, the international reactions to the 1998 tests were harsh and condemn-
ing, but today, India is well on its way to become a recognised NWS, adding 
self- confidence to strong sentiments of national sovereignty and independence.
Deterrence and war- fighting
The end of the Cold War eliminated the political and ideological confrontation 
between East and West, but the nuclear doctrines remained much the same. The 
United States and Soviet/Russian forces were much reduced, but the Clinton 
administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) became an exercise in continu-
ity, the first- use policy included. Russia changed its doctrine to make it more 
similar to that of the United States. Nuclear planning resisted political change.
 The stated rationale for acquisition of nuclear weapons has always been 
phrased in terms of national security. It comes in several forms. One of them is 
deterrence by mutually assured destruction (MAD). During the Cold War, all 
NWS adopted this logic, although operationally, they gave very different mean-
ings to it. The United States and the Soviet Union built enormous forces to guar-
antee unacceptable destruction; China, France and the United Kingdom 
introduced notions of sufficiency and minimal deterrence.
 Deterrence of strong conventional forces is another function. For the United 
States, this goes back to the Soviet blockade of West Berlin in 1948 and what it 
might take to defend the city. In the face of superior Soviet conventional forces, 
use or threats of use of nuclear weapons were deemed necessary to maintain 
access to the city and to defend it. First- use became a crucial part of NATO strat-
egy from the inception of the alliance, and led to the deployment of thousands of 
tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
 This function also outlived the Cold War, but now the tables were turned: it 
was Russia’s turn to be conventionally inferior and to raise the role of nuclear 
weapons to compensate for weakness. Russia discarded the Soviet declaration of 
no- first-use of 1982 and adopted the Western first- use policy.2 For Israel, deter-
rence of Arab conventional forces has always been the essence of its nuclear 
policy, along with a determination to maintain nuclear monopoly in the Middle 
East. Later, the role of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons also came to centre on first- 
use, deterring India from making deep intrusions into its territory.
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 A third function was that of nuclear war- fighting, contemplating nuclear 
exchanges between the USA and the USSR involving thousands of nuclear 
weapons back and forth, as if nuclear war could be similar to conventional war 
and be lost or won. Even without actual war, the theoretical possibility of victory 
was thought to translate into political advantage: this was one of the perceived 
lessons of the Cuban missile crisis. Even in the absence of any expectation of 
waging large- scale nuclear war, both powers therefore went for demonstrated 
capabilities to win or at least deny victory to the other party. These plans, which 
could justify whatever number of weapons – about 10,000 deployed strategic 
nuclear weapons on each side during the height of the Cold War – were among 
the worst excesses of the Cold War.
 When the Cold War ended, the arsenals were significantly scaled back. The 
Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces (INF ) Treaty eliminated land- based interme-
diate range missiles; the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) reduced 
the strategic forces by one- third; the Presidential initiatives of 1991/1992 ordered 
comprehensive withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons; the Strategic Offensive 
Reductions Treaty (SORT) limited the number of deployed strategic weapons to 
1,700–2,200 by 31 December 2012; and a new agreement replacing START I 
further reduced the strategic arsenals. Today, the role of nuclear weapons in war 
is geared less to strategic big- power settings and more to regional contingencies.
 A fourth function was that of extended deterrence. The United States main-
tains extended deterrence postures in cooperation with its allies in Europe and 
East Asia. The end of the Cold War changed the weapons configurations in these 
regions,3 but not the essence of the doctrines. The United States keeps the option 
of being first to use nuclear weapons in response to an attack on its allies, be it 
an attack by conventional or by unconventional means.
 The credibility of this doctrine has always been in doubt. At one point, Henry 
Kissinger warned the European allies not to repeat requests for assurances that 
the United States could not possibly mean.4 President Obama’s disarmament ini-
tiatives triggered renewed debate about extended deterrence at official levels 
both in Japan and Europe, leading politicians holding that the role of nuclear 
weapons should be limited to deterring their use by others. The alliances were 
not at stake, nor nuclear deterrence: the issue was the first- use doctrine.
The impact of nuclear threats
Over the years, the United States has issued specific nuclear threats more than 20 
times. Before Barack Obama, nine out of ten presidents of the nuclear age have 
done so during crises and limited wars in Berlin, Cuba, East Asia, Indochina and 
the Middle East. The one exception – Ronald Reagan – did not experience a 
crisis of the kind that made the other presidents invoke such threats. All ten have 
maintained continuous commitments, along with up- to-date planning and readi-
ness, to implement nuclear plans should a major challenge arise in the NATO 
area, the Middle East or other countries under the US nuclear umbrella, such as 
Japan and South Korea (Ellsberg 2009).
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 None of them is known to have considered adopting a no- first-use posture. 
To many Europeans, this seemed a logical thing to do when the conventional 
imbalance that justified NATO’s first- use policy disappeared and big- power 
cooperation got off to a new start. That, however, was naive, because it 
ignored the importance that the United States attaches to possible first- use 
elsewhere in the world. Also, the United States was increasingly bent on 
exploiting its superiority, seeing no need for compromise and accommodation 
of Russian interests or those of others. European governments went along with 
it, more or less.
 Threats of first- use have been made to maintain US spheres of interest. Some-
times, they were invoked to protect US forces far away from home from larger 
ground forces in their neighbourhoods. Sometimes, friends and allies who might 
not be able to stand their ground on their own needed support. When they were 
in danger of being surrounded or overrun, resort to nuclear weapons often came 
up for consideration: in support of US marines at the Chosin Reservoir and Khe 
San, the French at Dienbienphu, Chiang Kai- shek’s troops deployed on Quemoy. 
The nuclear card was played to defend US positions: it was not played to extend 
them (Ellsberg 2009). Some of the threats were bluffs, some were defied and 
some may have worked more or less as intended.
 Shortly after the Iron Curtain came down, nuclear threats were levelled at Iraq 
in connection with the first Gulf War. Delivering a warning letter to Iraqi 
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, Secretary of State James Baker says in his memoirs 
that, “I purposely left the impression that the use of chemical or biological agents 
against Israel could invite tactical nuclear retaliation” (Baker 1995). President 
Bush says in his memoirs that he had “privately decided” not to do so: in his 
own mind, the threat was therefore a bluff (Bush 1999). However, William 
Arkin’s interviews with Iraqi officials left him in no doubt that Saddam Hussein 
and his government believed the United States was prepared to use nuclear 
weapons had Iraq used chemical weapons against coalition forces or against 
Israel (Arkin 1996).
 Another reading points in a different direction. Baker’s letter also warned 
Aziz that if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons, supported terrorist attacks 
and burnt Kuwaiti oil fields, the US objective “won’t just be the liberation of 
Kuwait, but elimination of the current Iraqi regime” (Baker 1995). Two of these 
three actions were actually taken by the Iraqis during the last days of the war, 
which perhaps implies that they were not deterred from using chemical weapons 
either. So why did Iraqi leaders say that the nuclear threat deterred them from 
using chemical and biological weapons? Joseph Fitchett cites an unnamed Arab 
diplomat:
The regime had to explain to its military commanders why it was pulling 
back from the brink, so it looked a lot better to say that it was sparing the 
Iraqi people from nuclear holocaust than to admit that the leaders were 
worried about their own skins.
(Fitchett 1995)
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 However, Baker believes the calculated ambiguity about the US response was 
part of the reason why Iraq did not use its chemical and biological weapons. To 
him and others, the utility of nuclear threats therefore appeared to be confirmed. 
Whether that interpretation was correct or not, whatever chance there might have 
been for the United States to adopt a policy of no- first-use after the dissolution 
of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, it effectively disappeared with this 
experience.
 Later, the Clinton administration issued threats of nuclear- use against North 
Korea (1995, shortly after a near- launch of a US conventional attack in 1994) 
and publicly warned of the nuclear option against Libya (1996, in reference to 
the Tarhuna underground chemical weapons facility). The Bush administration 
issued threats against Iraq (2003) to deter Saddam from using chemical and bio-
logical weapons against US and allied troops and against Israel.5 In 2009, the 
bipartisan US Congressional Strategic Posture Commission under the leadership 
of William Perry and James Schlesinger (Perry et al. 2009) rejected a no- first-
use policy because it would “undermine the potential contributions of nuclear 
weapons to the deterrence of attack by biological weapons” (and be “unsettling 
to some US allies”).
 The Bush administration also made contingency plans for the use of conven-
tional as well as nuclear weapons against Iran, and the administration repeatedly 
emphasised that “all options are on the table”. To make contingency plans is 
quite customary, however, and to say that all options are on the table falls well 
short of specific threats for specific purposes, but governmental statements made 
the nuclear option a live issue for public attention and debate. Among the leading 
candidates for the 2009 presidential election, only Obama took partial exception 
to the use of nuclear weapons – against Afghanistan and Pakistan, “involving 
civilians” – but not against Iran. The military brass seemed more sceptical of 
threats and use of nuclear weapons than their political leaders.
 The threats against Iraq and Iran were not made in defence of US spheres of 
interest, but in an effort to expand American influence in the Middle East.6 They 
were part of Bush’s policy of regime change, which targeted the regimes in Iran, 
Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Syria.7 The general mood was asser-
tive: many others therefore went along with it, to not weaken their own credibil-
ity. Such was the bandwagoning effect. However, during the second term of 
Bush’s presidency, the policy of regime change lost much of its appeal and cred-
ibility because of the traumatic experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Discrete political use of force
In a study of US politico- military behaviour from January 1946 to December 
1975, Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan examined 215 instances in which 
armed forces were used in a discrete way for specific political objectives (Blech-
man and Kaplan 1978). To qualify for inclusion on the list, a physical change in 
the disposition of armed forces had to occur for the specific purpose of influ-
encing the behaviour of another actor in a particular situation, short of any intent 
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to go to war. The foremost instrument was the navy. Ships are easier to move 
around than army units or land- based aircraft. They can be nearby yet out of 
sight, and therefore be used more discreetly than land- based forces. In part, using 
the navy was also a matter of tradition: for most of US history, there were no or 
few forces stationed abroad, so the navy was the only available instrument. Air-
craft carriers took part in half of the instances.
 During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were deployed at sea and in other 
countries for strategic and tactical warfare. Warships had nuclear weapons on 
board for surface- to-air missiles (SAMs) and anti- submarine warfare, and aircraft 
carriers had nuclear air- to-ground ordnance as well. Any deployment of such 
forces to the vicinity of hot spots, or involvement in incidents in other regions of 
the world, could therefore be used to extend a nuclear signal of some sort. At the 
very least, the projection of nuclear weapons on to foreign shores, their use in 
military exercises and shifting levels of readiness were recurrent reminders of 
their comprehensive existence and integration into the force postures. Without 
extending specific threats of nuclear- weapon use, they left the impression that 
nuclear weapons were weapons of war, and that was indeed the intention.
 Naval nuclear weapons were mixed with conventional firepower. Other 
weapon systems had a designated role in the strategic war plans against the 
Soviet Union. In the period under study, such systems played a role in 19 of the 
215 instances.
 Of course, the relative size and sophistication of military forces influence the 
propensity to use them. Stronger postures widen their applicability and enhance 
the confidence of their owners that they can be brought to bear on others with 
positive results. In particular, the US monopoly on nuclear weapons was an 
important asset in its foreign affairs – for as long as it lasted. The bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki contributed to it: had nuclear weapons never been used 
in war, they might have been classed with chemical and biological weapons and 
considered so abhorrent that they would be discounted in the calculations of 
policy- makers. Similarly, the Soviet acquisition of a nuclear capability strength-
ened the diplomacy of Soviet leaders, primarily vis- à-vis the United States and 
NATO. Still, for many years they were clearly inferior, learning it the hard way 
during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. They drew the lesson that 
neither quick fixes nor basic deterrence would work: not to be humiliated again, 
they invested enormously in an assured second- strike capability aiming at parity 
with the United States It seems to have had the expected effect: Blechman and 
Kaplan found that, as the Soviet Union gained in nuclear and conventional 
strength relative to the United States, especially after the mid- 1960s, the United 
States employed its armed forces less frequently for political objectives.8
A norm of non- use
In the final analysis, the functions noted above depend on the political will to 
employ the weapons more or less the way the doctrines prescribe. If the will is 
seen to be weak and wavering, their credibility will be undermined. This is what 
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more than 60 years of non- use in combat tends to do. Ever since 1945, decision- 
makers have shied away from using these weapons in war. There is a certain 
truth to the observation that the more time that passes without a nuclear weapon 
being used, the stronger the norm of non- use.
 T.V. Paul (2009) speaks of an “informal tradition” of non- use arising from 
two interrelated factors: the unique destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the 
reputational costs of using them. In a globalising world, both governments and 
non- governmental organisations have to care about their reputation. The United 
States abstained from nuclear- weapon use in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union 
shied away from using nuclear arms in Afghanistan. The non- use tradition is a 
function both of reputational costs, which tend to grow with growing inter- 
relatedness and media coverage, and the length of time without nuclear- weapon 
use (Tannenwald 2007).
 During the Cold War, the leading powers had a relatively easy job upholding 
the credibility of nuclear- weapon use. Well- established threat- based policies 
were always helpful in this respect. The threats were highlighted and exagger-
ated, and stronger nuclear forces were recommended in response. In this envir-
onment, the focus was all the time on the risks of nuclear war, not on the view 
that the threat might be receding because of a creeping norm of non- use.
 Shows of force in the vicinity of hot spots around the world also helped to 
maintain the credibility of nuclear policies. They raised the visibility of the 
nuclear assets and alerted the conflicting parties to the stakes involved. Usually, 
these manifestations were many steps away from nuclear use, but they reminded 
others of the global reach of nuclear weapons and had the potential to instil awe 
and respect in their minds. They testified to the relevance of nuclear weapons in 
the conduct of international politics.
 Nevertheless, the nuclear- weapon establishments could not but be concerned 
about the utility of what they were producing. The United States had a big 
 military–industrial complex closely linked to the political system.9 The Soviet 
Union came close to being such a complex. To keep and, if possible, expand their 
share of government budgets, the nuclear weapon establishments went for new 
nuclear weapons that would be more usable. A range of weapons suitable for a 
variety of tasks were built, including low- yield weapons approaching the yield of 
the largest conventional bombs. Manipulation of effects – blast, heat, radiation 
and fallout – to tailor them to specific purposes was also tried. The best- known 
example is enhanced radiation weapons (neutron weapons): by releasing more of 
their energy in the form of radiation and less in the form of blast and heat, killing 
people while inflicting less damage to material structures, they were held to be 
particularly suitable for use. The logic was bizarre. President Carter turned them 
down, against the recommendation of his closest advisors.
 After a lull in the early and mid- 1990s, when President Clinton focused on 
the opportunities of globalisation and Russia had more than enough to do in 
coping with its own internal problems, threat- based policies picked up again 
towards the end of the decade. This time, the focus was on regional contingen-
cies rather than global ones between the major powers. The idea that one could 
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gain a significant advantage in relation to other nuclear powers by investing 
heavily in nuclear forces had lost much of its currency.
 Shows of force of the kind discussed above have nearly disappeared. The 
presidential initiatives of 1991/1992, which eliminated tactical nuclear weapons 
from surface ships and removed all nuclear deployments from foreign soil except 
airborne weapons in the low hundreds in Europe, did away with almost all those 
options. The introduction of new types of nuclear weapons has also been 
severely restricted by the moratoria on nuclear- weapon tests and the signatures 
on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), although to some 
extent more sophisticated simulation techniques enable the most advanced NWS 
to circumvent the limits imposed by a test ban and defy its original purpose. All 
NWS have issued unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing.
 By the turn of the century, the means to counter the creeping norm of non- use 
had therefore shrunk. That predicament was soon to be addressed, however, in 
new and provocative ways.
The neoconservative ambition
The US National Security Strategy of 2002 emphasised that “the struggles of the 
twentieth century” left the world with “a single sustainable model for national 
success: freedom, democracy and free enterprise”.10 This is the American model. 
In so far as US policies promote these values, there would be no need to legiti-
mise them in reference to international law, the United Nations (UN) Charter 
and multilateral organisations.
 On the international scene, the rule of law was downplayed in favour of uni-
lateralism and exceptionalism. The US National Defense Strategy of 2005 recon-
firmed it: “Our strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those 
who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, 
and terrorism.” While the rule of law is based on a single standard for all parties, 
hegemonial rule is based on two standards, one for the hegemon and one for the 
subjects. To maximise its freedom of action, the United States withdrew from 
some international agreements and abstained from others.
 At the core of US hegemonial rule was economic, cultural, technological and 
political strength and, increasingly, the use or threat of use of force to dissuade, 
deter or – if deterrence failed – defeat those who sought to challenge it. US 
foreign policy had become heavily militarised. Under the heading “Global 
Strike” – headquarters in Offutt, Nebraska – the aim was to be able to destroy, 
on short notice, all targets of significance wherever and whenever it was deemed 
necessary (Kristensen 2006). Ever since the deployment of solid- fuelled inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the 1960s, the United States had had 
such a capability in the form of ICBMs and submarine- launched ballistic mis-
siles (SLBMs) on alert. Global Strike was different, however, because it focused 
on regional scenarios; incorporated conventional capabilities along with nuclear 
ones; and emphasised pre- emptive and preventive attacks rather than retaliatory 
strikes. Missile defence was another, interrelated part of military planning, based 
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on the logic that Richard Nixon used in 1972 when justifying the ABM Treaty, 
which prohibited national missile defence systems: “If you have a shield, it is 
easier to use the sword.”11 Like so many other technologies, missile defence can 
be used for attack as well as defence. This time, however, missile defence was 
conceptualised differently. By forcing total vulnerability upon any potential 
adversary and creating near- invulnerability for the United States, it was prima-
rily intended to stop countries from challenging the American hegemony.
 The military ambition was therefore highest. The role of military force was 
confined neither to preventive attack nor to national defence: the idea was to 
make US military superiority so overwhelming that it would dissuade others 
from taking up arms. The sword had become impressively potent, but the shield 
was marred by technological problems and remains incomplete to this day.
The evolution of nuclear doctrines
US doctrine
The National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006 said that the United States 
must deter and defend against the threat of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMDs) before they are unleashed. It will not do to wait until the targeted 
regimes have built their weapons and can retaliate with them. President Bush 
called it a strategy of pre- emption, in accordance with the way this expression 
had been used in the past, but that use of the term blurs the important distinction 
between pre- emption and prevention. The difference is one of timing and legal-
ity. In international law, pre- emption – at the moment an attack is about to be set 
in motion – is permitted.12 Preventive attack, against an opponent who may or 
may not become a real threat in the future, is not. The Bush administration 
embraced preventive action, but did not elaborate on the means that might be 
used.13
 The NPR of 31 December 2001 introduced a new triad of forces. Substituting 
for the old triad of the Cold War – ICBM, SLBM and heavy bombers – the new 
one had an offensive leg combining these delivery systems with conventional 
strike capabilities; a defensive leg including ballistic missile defences; and a 
revitalised defence infrastructure including the nuclear weapon production 
complex. The first leg obscured the qualitative differences between nuclear and 
conventional weapons (radiation effects, legal and moral inhibitions): they were 
all parts of increasingly flexible war- fighting capabilities that could more easily 
be adapted to evolving circumstances. Putting all kinds of offensive weapons 
into a continuum also invited new weapons to fill eventual gaps. Three new 
types of nuclear weapons were pursued: weapons of lower yield to reduce collat-
eral damage, weapons to destroy chemical and biological agents, and better 
weapons for use against hardened or deeply buried targets, referred to as robust 
nuclear earth penetration (RNEP) warheads or “bunker busters” (Kristensen 
2007). However, Congress blocked acquisition of them. Further advances in 
these directions were limited to adaptation of existing warheads.14
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 The integration of nuclear and conventional weapons into one and the same 
offensive leg, without distinction, left the impression that nuclear weapons were 
treated on a par with other offensive weapons. This way, nuclear weapons also 
appeared more acceptable and credible in roles other than the retaliatory one vis- 
à-vis other NWS. Another aspect of the organisational change pointed in a dif-
ferent direction: greater roles for conventional weapons could be taken to reduce 
the relevance of nuclear arms. The effect on the nuclear threshold therefore 
seemed different depending on which aspect one chose to emphasise. However, 
when considered in conjunction with simultaneous doctrinal changes that 
allowed for the use of nuclear weapons not only to deter chemical and biological 
weapons, but also in situations where the adversary has conventional arms only, 
the picture becomes clearer. By integrating all means of offensive warfare – 
nuclear and conventional – into one and the same continuum with no special 
doctrinal restrictions on any of its elements, use of nuclear weapons became 
easier to contemplate and in that sense more likely to happen.15
 The NPR shifted “planning for America’s strategic forces from the threat- 
based approach of the Cold War to a capabilities- based approach”.16 In the face 
of growing uncertainty about the new international environment, all sorts of mil-
itary assets could be justified, “just in case”. Still, the NPR listed six countries as 
potential targets (in addition to Russia): China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea 
and Syria. More enemies and greater target complexity called for a wider array 
of military options against regional adversaries. Therefore, strategic weapons 
would be available for tactical purposes as well, and there would be greater flex-
ibility in the numbers of nuclear weapons that might be used. In part, this could 
be seen as compensation for the withdrawal of sub- strategic weapons that the 
presidential initiatives of 1991/1992 set in motion; in part, it strengthened the 
utility of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts. Nuclear planning was reoriented 
in order to enhance US force- projection capabilities.
 More than anything else, the NPR departed from past nuclear policy by 
downplaying and repudiating international arms- control instruments. The Bush 
administration renounced the Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and did not 
seek ratification of the CTBT.17 It adopted an à la carte approach to the NPT, 
stressing the non- proliferation provisions and belittling the obligation to disarm. 
These moves were made in the name of flexibility: the Cold War had given way 
to a unipolar world in which the United States was in a class of its own, espe-
cially in military terms. Therefore, the removal of restraints on the US exercise 
of power should have come as no surprise. The Bush team criticised the Clin-
tonites for not having done more to exploit US superiority after the Cold War.
 In 1978, the Carter administration stated that the United States would not use 
nuclear weapons against non- nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) parties to the NPT 
unless they were allied or associated with an NWS in an attack against the 
United States or its allies. In 1995, UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 
984, which summarised the security assurances given by the five permanent 
members of the Council, reaffirmed it.18 The Clinton administration added 
another reservation. Believing that deterrence would be strengthened by ambigu-
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ity, it took the position that “no options are ruled out” in response to an attack by 
any WMD, i.e. in response to chemical and biological weapons, as well as 
nuclear weapons, irrespective of whether the state in question was taking part in 
an attack together with an NWS. In connection with the US signature of the pro-
tocol to the African Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty in 1996, it 
announced that US adherence “will not limit options available to the United 
States in response to an attack by a NWFZ party using weapons of mass destruc-
tion” (Mendelsohn 1999).19
 The Bush administration took it further, allowing for the use of nuclear 
weapons in settings where the adversary possesses conventional weapons only. 
Clearly, US policy evolved to become substantially at odds with UNSC Resolu-
tion 984. It may be argued that a UNSC Resolution has the force of international 
law and therefore trumps national strategy documents. However, there is little 
doubt that, in reality, it was the other way around, especially as the Bush admin-
istration showed little respect for the UN and disregard for much of what the 
Clinton administration did. Moreover, since Resolution 984 does not authorise 
any action, but merely collects the unilateral assurances declared by the five, its 
legal force is disputed.
 For a while, the moratorium on nuclear tests and the end to discrete political 
use of nuclear force enhanced the norm of non- use. However, doctrinal changes 
– starting in the 1990s and taken to the extremes in this century – stemmed that 
development. The United States widened the spectrum of possible nuclear use, 
thereby correcting the diminishing utility of nuclear arms. The Russian and 
French doctrines also assigned new roles to nuclear weapons, and the British and 
Indian doctrines did the same, only to a smaller extent.
 The Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) turned the trend 
(Nuclear Posture Review Report 2010). This administration will not use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against NPT members in good standing. Chem-
ical and biological weapons will be deterred by conventional means, with reser-
vations made for new scientific developments in the biological sector. In 
practice, this negative security assurance covers about 180 states. Exempt are the 
NWS and NPT members that in the US’s view do not comply with their NPT 
obligations, such as Iran and possibly Syria.
 “The fundamental role of US nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as 
nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, its allies 
and partners” (Department of Defense 2010). The NPR does not go as far as no- 
first-use, but commits the administration to “work to establish conditions under 
which such a policy [of no- first-use] could be safely adopted” (Nuclear Posture 
Review Report: viii). In the case of Russia, this is a tall order, for the European 
political architecture would have to change in a way that substantially reduces 
Russian threat perceptions.20 However, progress in this direction is also neces-
sary so that deeper cuts in US and Russian arsenals can be agreed. The US wants 
follow- on negotiations with Russia when New START has been ratified. Other 
obstacles are Pakistan, which sticks to a policy of first- use because of its conven-
tional inferiority vis- à-vis India, and Israel and North Korea.
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 Adoption of no- first-use doctrines is a promising way to de- legitimise nuclear 
weapons and enhance the norm of non- use. Obama’s NPR articulated the objec-
tive: “It is in the US interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 65-year 
record of nuclear non- use be extended forever” (Nuclear Posture Review Report: 
ix). The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical and biological 
weapons – in practice, a no- first-use protocol – made these weapons illegitimate, 
whereupon possession of the weapons were prohibited by international treaties. 
Also, such doctrines have an intriguing in- built disarmament corollary. They 
limit the functions of nuclear weapons to one and one only – deterring others 
from using theirs. It follows that nobody would need them if nobody had them.
Russian doctrine
In 1993, Russia formally dropped the Soviet no- first-use policy. Promulgated in 
the early 1980s, some Westerners saw it as admission that nuclear weapons were 
no longer essential. To them, the NFU doctrine confirmed Soviet conventional 
superiority. In the view of others, this policy had little credibility as long as large 
numbers of tactical nuclear weapons were deployed along the dividing line in 
Europe. Had war broken out, there would have been strong pressures to use them 
early, and possibly first.21 The doctrine and the military posture told different 
stories. Seen this way, the change to first- use made little difference.
 There is no evidence, however, that the Soviet nuclear posture was ever opti-
mised for first strike, as was widely believed in the United States under Reagan. 
Like previous doctrines, the Russian military doctrine of 1993 reserved nuclear 
weapons for the eventuality of global nuclear war.
 The MAD policies outlasted the political rivalry with the United States. 
Inertia prevailed, the sea change in US–Russian relations notwithstanding. By 
the turn of the century, renewed tension between the Cold War antagonists 
removed any the need for artificial life support.
 For Russia, the nuclear arsenal underpins its sovereignty and helps it maintain 
an independent foreign policy. The nuclear sector is the only field where Russia 
can claim equal status with the United States, so it benefits from the structural 
impact of nuclear weapons on international affairs. By 2009, it deployed a fifth- 
generation silo- based as well as road- mobile ICBM (Topol M); introduced a new 
SLBM (Bulava); built new ballistic- missile submarines (SSBNs; the Borey 
class); had developed a manoeuvrable warhead for the Topol M and enhanced 
defence- penetration capabilities for the Bulava and a new version of the SS- N-
23 (Sineva); and upgraded existing long- and medium- range bombers. Also, it 
was introducing a new, conventional air- launched cruise missile (ALCM) and 
several new, shorter range sea- launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Except for the 
Bulava, virtually all of these modernisation programmes were launched during 
the Soviet era. Sharp budget reductions limited modernisation to already- existing 
programmes.
 Starting in 1999, a new National Security Concept was elaborated, and for-
mally adopted in January 2000 (Sokov 2007b). A new Military Doctrine fol-
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lowed in April 2000, and the role of nuclear weapons was further elaborated in a 
White Paper that was adopted in autumn 2003.22 These documents introduced a 
new mission: in regional conflicts of a conventional nature, Russia might have to 
use nuclear weapons first in the form of demonstrative strikes against targets 
located in unpopulated areas in the enemy’s rear, or by detonating a few tactical 
devices on the battlefield. The background was US and NATO expansion 
towards Russia’s borders and, specifically, the war over Kosovo. Since NATO 
could bomb Serbia in violation of international law, without any mandate from 
the UNSC, it might exploit Russia’s weakness and do the same closer to its 
borders, or even inside it. In 1999, Russian leaders were worried about possible 
Western interference in Chechnya, where a second war broke out that year.23 
Another postulated threat was foreign attempts to take control of Russian natural 
resources (Sokov 2007b).
 If such an attack were to occur, demonstrative nuclear strikes would force the 
enemy to stop hostilities or face nuclear escalation. The more inferior the 
Russian conventional forces turned out to be, the lower the nuclear threshold. 
Since the stakes would be higher for the defender (Russia) than the attacker (US, 
NATO), it is assumed that the attacker would not be willing to escalate the war 
to the strategic level, but prefer retreat. Therefore, limited use of nuclear 
weapons could be an effective tool for deterring and fighting limited conflicts. 
The credibility of nuclear use would neutralise threats of force for political ends, 
and actual use of a few weapons might be an effective means of de- escalation.
 Limited use of nuclear weapons was entertained during the Cold War as well. 
Such options could best be performed by tactical nuclear weapons causing less 
damage and entailing lower risks of escalation than strikes with strategic 
systems. By and large, however, it was considered unrealistic. Efforts to contain 
nuclear war were likely to fail, leading to a strategic nuclear war that nobody 
wanted. Contemporary Russian doctrine attaches realism to limited use in 
regional contexts, primarily to stop conventional attacks by Western NWS, but 
tactical weapons are not necessarily the weapons of choice any longer. Influ-
enced by the US’s use of long- range strike assets in Kosovo, Afghanistan and 
Iraq, as well as the Bush administration’s NPR, the White Paper of 2003 empha-
sises the need for long- and intermediate- range strike systems. The United States 
had kept important assets at considerable distance from the areas of combat, so 
the counterstrategy had to target weapon systems and command, control and 
communications (C3) centres in the enemy’s rear. Long- range aircraft equipped 
with dual- capable cruise missiles and precision- guided gravity bombs might be 
suitable for such missions.
 Tactical or sub- strategic weapons have therefore lost part of their relevance, 
although they are still considered essential theatre- level assets. Elements of the 
strategic forces, which have been justified in reference to the increasingly 
unlikely eventuality of global nuclear war, can be assigned to regional missions 
as well without undermining strategic deterrence. To obtain the desired de- 
escalation effect, a few weapons may do: in military exercises, no more than ten 
weapons have been used for this purpose. This may facilitate inclusion of 
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 sub- strategic weapons in US–Russian disarmament negotiations. So far, 
however, the Russians have been recalcitrant in the face of Western demands for 
transparency and reductions of this category of weapons.
 The new mission is the product of perceptions of dire threats as well as acute 
weakness. The main threat is believed to come from the West – from the United 
States and its allies in Europe – which may use force on a limited scale for limited 
political goals in a manner similar to the wars in the Balkans.24 Targets in Japan, 
the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean have also figured in Russian military 
exercises. Clearly, pressures from the West are seen in the wider context of US 
and allied encirclement of Eurasia. There is a latent concern, moreover, about 
Russia’s territorial integrity in the Far East, where vast and thinly populated areas 
in Siberia meet a populous and rapidly growing China.25 These worries have been 
somewhat softened as the borders between China, Russia and the neighbouring 
Central Asian states have been agreed and a stronger partnership with China has 
been forged. However, the Russian military still considers China as a potential 
future adversary, and nuclear weapons feature prominently in such scenarios.
 The weakness pertains to the conventional forces, which all of a sudden 
became inferior when the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union fell apart, and 
which labour under stricter financial constraints than potential opponents both in 
the East and in the West. The nuclear compensation has been phrased in asser-
tive terms: “Due to the existing geopolitical risks we rely on the qualitative 
improvement of strategic forces, so as to eliminate the aggressor by a retaliatory 
strike or by launching under attack in any situation” (Ivanov 2006). The new 
Russian military doctrine of 2010 reconfirms the role of nuclear weapons in 
regional and large- scale global wars, but whereas the 2000 document foresaw 
resort to nuclear weapons “in situations critical for the national security” of 
Russia, the 2010 version allows for their use in situations when “the very exist-
ence of [Russia] is under threat”.26 The change suggests that the criterion for 
employment of nuclear weapons has been somewhat tightened. Like the earlier 
document, the new doctrine reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response 
to nuclear attack, attack with other WMDs and also in response to conventional 
attack. To carry out these missions, a deterrence capability at the level of suffi-
ciency, defined as the ability to inflict predetermined or tailored damage to an 
aggressor under any circumstances, is required.
 Russia used to distinguish between nuclear and conventional firepower both in 
its military doctrine and in its organisational set- up. The 2010 doctrine indicates a 
change in this respect. The doctrine assigns high- precision conventional weapons 
to strategic deterrence, apparently following the US lead in equipping some long- 
range delivery vehicles with conventional warheads. In so far as this happens, the 
organisational distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons is lost. Like 
in the US, the mix of conventional and nuclear assets may also provide for greater 
flexibility in the choice of weapons to meet security challenges.
 Russia’s de- escalation concept includes possible first- use of nuclear weapons 
in response to attack by any kind of weaponry. The security assurances incorpo-
rated in UNSC Resolution 984 apply unless Russia is attacked by an NWS or by 
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an NNWS operating together with an NWS. It is unclear whether the military 
doctrine is consistent with these assurances. The much- emphasised threat of 
NATO involvement in regional conflicts near its borders indicates that it is.
 The reliance on nuclear weapons is a function of the range of missions 
assigned to them and the probability of the scenarios where they may play a role 
(Sokov 2007b). The 2000 doctrine expanded the range of missions to include 
regional contingencies, and the probability of use in such scenarios has gone 
from nil to something more. Concerns about the effectiveness of the strategic 
retaliatory capabilities persist – regarding the debate about missile defence 
deployments in general and regional defences for Europe in particular – but the 
probability of global nuclear war is deemed to be close to zero. Retaliatory cap-
abilities are maintained and modernised “just in case”, and in order to reinforce 
the credibility of regional deterrence. The 2000 doctrine emphasised that the 
increased reliance on nuclear weapons will last only until the conventional forces 
are sufficiently modernised and strengthened. The 2010 doctrine puts stronger 
emphasis on conventional weapons relative to nuclear ones, but unless the threat 
perceptions are much alleviated, it may take a long time to remove the need for 
nuclear stop- gap measures.
French and British doctrines
France’s nuclear weapons were never intended for use on the battlefield. Nuclear 
escalation was not a part of it. The French weapons were deployed to deter other 
nuclear powers tous azimut – omni- directionally; the main target being Russia. 
If it comes to war, the objective is to give the French armed forces a decisive 
advantage. Deterrence of other nuclear powers is primarily for the navy, while 
the air force may be better suited for missions that require flexibility.27 For the 
strategie de dissuasion to be credible, there must be no doubt about the profes-
sionalism of the officers and the will of the president to implement it. These fun-
damentals remain unchanged.
 In January 2006, President Chirac indicated a number of other functions. In a 
speech at France’s main nuclear submarine base in Bretagne, he went beyond 
the doctrine set out in the “Livre blanc sur la défense” of 1994, elaborating and 
expanding on changes that were set in motion after the 9/11 attacks on the 
United States (Chirac 2006).28
 Similar to US doctrine, the main new element is deterrence of regional 
powers. More employable nuclear options have been developed for this purpose: 
“All our nuclear forces have been reconfigured accordingly.” The choice is not 
between inaction or annihilation, but the “flexibility and reactivity of our stra-
tegic forces would enable us to exercise our response directly against the centres 
of power and its capacity to act”. The message was addressed to states sponsor-
ing terrorism or contemplating the use of WMDs:
The leaders of states who use terrorist methods against us, as well as those 
who consider using in one way or another weapons of mass destruction, 
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must understand that they will expose themselves to a firm and appropriate 
reaction on our part.
In October 2001, Chirac had warned that France could not rule out the use of 
nuclear weapons against regimes which “are busy developing their own weapons 
of mass destruction. This response could be of a conventional kind. It could also 
be of a different kind.” At that time, his statement was primarily intended for 
Iraq and North Korea. Repeating it in 2006, Iran topped the list.
 Strategic supplies – meaning petroleum, first of all – is another vital interest 
that may be protected by the nuclear deterrent.29 Chirac also reiterated the idea of 
extending the French nuclear umbrella to cover its European allies: France has had 
regular discussions of nuclear issues with Britain since 1995. Two years later, 
President Sarkozy touched on the same proposition – sometimes referred to as 
“concerted deterrence” – inviting a broader dialogue on the role of nuclear 
weapons in European security.30 Sarkozy stressed the basics of deterrence in a way 
that some observers took to be a step back from Chirac’s expansion of roles, yet 
without defining the vital interests that might bring nuclear weapons into play.
 French nuclear doctrine has traditionally included the possibility of a nuclear 
warning shot to persuade an aggressor to desist or risk a massive nuclear strike. 
Chirac reiterated that option. Two forms have been indicated: detonation of a 
small warhead in an uninhabited area, and detonation of a warhead at high alti-
tude so that the electromagnetic pulse could destroy electronic systems (Merchet 
2006).
 Chirac hailed the achievements of the nuclear programme as a matter of 
national pride, emphasising that “nuclear deterrence . . . became the very image 
of what our country is capable of producing when it has set itself a task and 
holds to it”. The prestige that Iran has come to attach to its nuclear programme is 
similar to the pride that France takes in its nuclear achievements.
 The British nuclear force consists of four SSBNs, each carrying 16 Trident 
D5 missiles. The total number of deployed warheads is less than 200. Only one 
submarine is on patrol at any time. The time it takes to fire the missiles has been 
extended from a few minutes to a few days. Having eliminated its air- launched 
nuclear weapons, the British force is less flexible than the French one.
 British doctrine has nevertheless evolved in directions similar to the US and 
French doctrines. The strategic role is first and foremost to deter aggression 
against the United Kingdom and its allies. Then there is another role – “an option 
for a limited strike that would not automatically lead to a full scale nuclear 
exchange”. Like the French doctrine, a small nuclear weapon might be used as a 
demonstration or “a shot across the bow” to signal to aggressors that they have 
miscalculated Britain’s resolve, without using the full destructive power that 
Trident offers. A third role is retaliation against biological and chemical weapon 
attacks on Britain or its allies. Finally, pre- emptive use is envisaged against a 
state that threatens Britain’s vital national interests. The meaning of pre- emption 
probably extends beyond use on concrete signals that an attack is coming: as in 
US terminology, it seems to include prevention as well.
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 In many respects, the French doctrine is similar to that of the US under 
George W. Bush. The regional focus, the emphasis on state- sponsored terrorism, 
putting power centres at risk, deterrence of chemical and biological weapons use 
and the possibility of nuclear use to deter proliferators are much the same. Not 
surprisingly, the British doctrine also ties in, but in ways that are somewhat less 
specific. The accuracy of the Trident missile allows for regional uses in much 
the same way that the United States envisaged to use its strategic systems in 
regional roles. With reservations made for the limitations on French and British 
capabilities, which do not allow for as wide a range of options as US forces do, 
there was a high degree of coherence in the national doctrines of NATO’s NWS.
Chinese and Indian doctrines
To maintain a credible deterrence posture in the face of improved enemy intelli-
gence and surveillance assets, ballistic missile defence systems and conventional 
precision- strike capabilities, China deploys road- mobile ICBMs and introduces 
new long- range missiles on new submarines. Ground- and air- launched cruise 
missiles add to the survivability and flexibility of the nuclear force. Nuclear artil-
lery and other sub- strategic systems may be on their way in. A comprehensive 
modernisation programme is going on, probably leading to a net expansion of 
the force. Still, China’s arsenal is small: of a total stockpile of 240 weapons, 
fewer than 200 are deployed (SIPRI 2009). Much information is missing, 
however, for secrecy remains an important part of China’s military posture.
 At the strategic level, the emphasis is on “gaining mastery by striking after 
the enemy has struck” (Chase et al. 2009). Chinese retaliation will not be imme-
diate, but delayed.31 The objective is to deter nuclear attack and preclude nuclear 
coercion. The goal is also to prevent conventional war from escalating into 
nuclear war, and to prevent low- intensity nuclear war from escalating. Deter-
rence therefore imposes stringent requirements on the Chinese nuclear posture, 
from the strategic level down to the tactical. The leadership of the Second Artil-
lery Corps (SAC) has consistently highlighted the importance of educating high- 
quality officers.
 In some respects, China’s disarmament policy has high credibility. China did 
not acquire nuclear weapons to make up for conventional weakness. The funda-
mental motive was to avoid nuclear coercion and be able to retaliate if attacked. 
By entering the core group of NWS, it enhanced its status in the international 
system, but today, a modest nuclear force does not count much compared with 
the status that economic and political strength provide. For China as well as 
others, the sequencing of disarmament measures is important to ensure that its 
national security is not diminished on the way to zero. Generally, however, the 
military and political utility of its nuclear weapons is limited, so in that funda-
mental sense it is well- positioned for global disarmament to zero.
 No- first-use has been China’s doctrine since the first nuclear test in 1964, and 
remains a much- emphasised part of its posture. It is not elevated above discus-
sion, however. China’s arsenal is both small and vulnerable, so is the NFU 
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policy credible? In particular, is delayed retaliation realistic? The ongoing mod-
ernisation and expansion programme addresses these questions and may put 
China on a rearmament path for quite some time to come. If Chinese nuclear 
assets are attacked by highly accurate conventional means, what should the reac-
tion be? In a military conflict over Taiwan, would resort to nuclear weapons 
always be ruled out? If the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) faces defeat and 
China’s territorial integrity is at stake, there would be strong incentives to lower 
the nuclear threshold. In such a situation, the doctrine seems to allow for an 
exception to the rule of no- first-use: first- use on China’s own territory may be 
legitimate to avoid defeat.
 India issued a draft nuclear doctrine in 1999 and unveiled a final set of polit-
ical principles and administrative arrangements in January 2003. It sets out to 
build a credible minimum deterrent in the form of a classical nuclear triad: air-, 
land- and sea- based systems. The ultimate size and structure of the force – the 
operationalisation of credible minimum deterrence – remains to be seen. While 
China has a rudimentary capacity for tactical nuclear warfare, India has none so 
far.
 After the tests in 1998, India committed itself to no- first-use. Nuclear 
weapons would only be used in retaliation of a nuclear attack on It territory or 
Indian forces elsewhere. However, in a departure from this announcement, the 
official doctrine of 2003 extended the mission to include deterrence of chemical 
and biological weapons as well.
 The arms control and disarmament policy includes non- use of nuclear 
weapons against NNWS; strict export controls; a moratorium on nuclear tests; 
participation in Fissile Material Cut- Off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations, i.e. in 
principle: it is not ready for such a cut- off any time soon; and work towards the 
goal of universal nuclear disarmament.
 India treats nuclear weapons as political instruments of deterrence rather than 
military tools of war- fighting. This is in line with idealist and liberal currents in 
the Indian political culture. Also, it helps to keep the costs down. Trying to come 
to terms with a hostile international environment after the tests in 1998, India 
aligned itself with the international arms- control order. However, elements of its 
traditional disarmament policy, such as an international convention on security 
assurances for NNWS and an international convention on nuclear disarmament, 
were retained.
 Under the impact of Western doctrinal developments, India took a step away 
from its original no- first-use stance, but it may not take much to drop the refer-
ence to chemical and biological weapons again. Like China, it routinely main-
tains its nuclear capabilities at low levels of readiness, keeping warheads and 
delivery vehicles at different locations. For both, the primary function of nuclear 
weapons is to avoid coercion and ensure retribution in case deterrence breaks 
down. There is no strategic dialogue between Beijing and Delhi, but they have 
common interests in avoiding a competitive arms build- up.
 Today, India is not ready for nuclear disarmament. First, it wants to establish 
its minimum- deterrence force at a level it may have defined, but not declared, 
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and to be recognised as an NWS. If it is to be included in multilateral disarma-
ment negotiations, de jure recognition is a sine qua non. However, when that has 
been achieved, India may be ready to participate in good faith. Status and pres-
tige were important in going nuclear, but once a seat at the table has been 
obtained, that ambition is fulfilled. Much like China, India’s international status 
would no longer depend on the possession of nuclear weapons. From then on, it 
might revive its strong disarmament tradition and build on that heritage in 
pursuit of global disarmament. Inspired by the American gang of four and Pres-
ident Obama, it has already begun to do so. Its disarmament diplomacy unfolds 
along two tracks: the pragmatic one which positioned it for the nuclear coopera-
tion agreement with the United States (see Chapter 5), and the normative long- 
term one charting a road to zero.
Impediments to disarmament
When the bipolar world order that fuelled the nuclear arms race came to an end, 
a fundamental reconsideration of the role of nuclear weapons would have been 
appropriate. When so much else was in for radical change, a radical change of 
nuclear doctrines would have been natural. The underlying premise for the main 
mission of the weapons – the confrontation between the US and the USSR – dis-
appeared, inviting a fundamental rewrite of nuclear logic. That did not happen, 
however. On the contrary, the Clinton administration’s nuclear posture review 
carried the stamp of inertia. Russia, too, made only minor adjustments: it admit-
ted that large- scale nuclear war was unlikely, but maintained the traditional logic 
of nuclear deterrence. The changes boiled down to elimination of surplus 
weapons from the Cold War and to management of the disintegration of the 
Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union. In essence, the rationale for high numbers of 
weapons was maintained.
 More significant doctrinal changes came later, and they went in the opposite 
direction of what the end of the Cold War had invited. Except for China, a gap 
opened up between the national strategy documents of the five NWS and their 
negative security assurances as summarised in UNSC Resolution 984. The strat-
egy documents became more permissive of nuclear- weapon use than the assur-
ances codified in the UNSC resolution. India took a step in the same direction.
 These doctrinal changes may be understood in the context of ongoing changes 
in the international system. By the turn of the century, international affairs were 
in a state of flux. In the state paradigm there were conflicting elements of unipo-
larity and multipolarity, and in the non- governmental sphere international terror-
ism became a big concern, especially after 9/11. The emergence of states that 
could challenge the world order – Iran, in particular – also drove policy develop-
ments, especially in the United States. During the Cold War, the threats were 
clearly defined and security planning threat- based: now, governments worried 
more about how to defend against the unforeseen. Part of the answer was reten-
tion of nuclear weapons as an insurance premium in relation to unforeseen 
dangers.
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 It did not stop there, however. During the Cold War, elaborate plans were 
made for the use of nuclear weapons, including thousands of weapons for battle-
field use, yet it was widely believed that any use would lead to large- scale war. 
This century, assumptions were entertained that in regional contexts, where the 
big powers were not at loggerheads with each other, nuclear war could be con-
tained. Russia upgraded the role of nuclear weapons under the influence of 
Kosovo. Seized by the unipolar moment and under the influence of 9/11, the US 
did the same. 
 What followed was a series of strikingly similar doctrinal developments, not 
so much because the United States leant on other NWS to do the same, but 
because it set an example that other powers found it convenient to imitate. Thus, 
the United States came to legitimise a wider role for nuclear weapons in the 
national planning not only of NATO allies, but also of India, which appears to 
have followed the US lead when diluting its no- first-use commitment (Subrah-
manyam 2009). Only China stayed true to its policy of no- first-use. This served 
to uphold the utility of nuclear weapons in world affairs, counteracting the 
restraints that the testing moratoria and the Presidential Initiatives imposed. 
Whether such considerations were part of the motivation for the new doctrines is 
not known. It may not have been designed to stem the norm of non- use, but it 
had that effect.
 Generally, the doctrinal changes detracted from the inhibitions of interna-
tional norms. When the one and only global superpower turned its back on 
important international agreements, it could not but influence the salience of 
international law. For instance, to care about the consistency between UNSC 
Resolution 984 and national strategy documents became a petty matter. Another 
opportunity to enhance the applicability of nuclear weapons emerged, and the 
big powers seized it, to the detriment of the norm of non- use.
 The new US policy may – once again – lead other NWS to follow the US 
example. In important respects, NATO’s new strategic concept will have to 
forge a new doctrinal understanding between the Alliance’s NWS. To what 
extent other powers will be influenced by Obama’s turn of trends is more uncer-
tain, but it is not far- fetched to assume that the new US negative security assur-
ances will also be imitated by other NWS. Russia hardly considers the 
non- nuclear members of NATO to be a threat, and may therefore extend assur-
ances to them while retaining the option of using nuclear weapons first if con-
fronted with NATO as a whole. The UK often follows the US, and China is 
already on board. France may have reservations, but if the other P5 are ready for 
it, would it resist? Another Security Council resolution on security assurances 
based on the new US formula, replacing Resolution 984 of 1995, may be within 
reach. 
 Since the end of the Cold War, the arsenals of the NATO powers have been 
reduced and so has Russia’s. Weapons are withdrawn from active service and 
kept in reserve or slated for dismantlement. The dismantlement process is slow, 
however: one US gravity bomb contains nearly 7,000 parts and, by 2008, dis-
mantlement of plutonium pits was done at a rate of 350 per year.
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 While the Western world and Russia cut their arsenals, Asia is on a different 
trajectory. China modernises its forces, and in numerical terms the introduction 
of new systems will probably outweigh the withdrawal of old ones. India and 
Pakistan are building minimum deterrents of unknown size. Assuming that they 
will end up in the low hundreds of weapons, none of them is more than halfway 
towards such levels. India claims, moreover, that one of the 1998 tests was a 
thermonuclear one, which may lead to an arsenal of fusion as well as fission 
weapons. However, the success of this test is disputed (see Chapter 5). In Asia, 
more states are acquiring ballistic missiles of longer range and higher precision 
that may carry nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. One of them has 
acquired nuclear weapons (North Korea); another may or may not do so (Iran); 
and yet others may be taking steps in this direction. The Middle East and East 
Asia are the main regions of proliferation concern. In South Asia, Pakistan is 
under scrutiny for fear of proliferation to non- state actors.
 In 2000, Paul Bracken published Fire in the East: the Rise of Asian Military 
Power and the Second Nuclear Age. Bracken argued that, just as Asia began to 
assert itself economically in the 1960s and 1970s, by the turn of the century it 
was doing so militarily. Not by taking up a competition with the United States 
and the Western world on their terms, but by exploiting Western military vulner-
abilities. Asian weapons of choice were ballistic missiles and WMDs, and the 
Achilles heel of the United States was fixed military bases in the region. China, 
India, Iran, Iraq (interrupted by “ceasefire” Resolution 687 and the United 
Nations Special Commission, UNSCOM), Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and 
Syria were all building ballistic missiles. Some of them pursued chemical or bio-
logical weapons, and some were building nuclear weapons. Targeted on US vul-
nerabilities, Asian ballistic missiles and WMDs might trump the West’s 
technological lead, making state- of-the- art technology a somewhat irrelevant 
measure of actual military capability.
 Distinguishing between technologies that sustain advantage and technologies 
that disrupt it, Bracken made a powerful analogy to the way IBM was outflanked 
by Microsoft. Concentrating on its undisputed lead in PC hardware and how best 
to maintain it, IBM was undercut as Microsoft wrapped up the software market. 
Similarly, the US’s focus on further improvement of electronic surveillance 
systems, aircraft and mechanised land power made it vulnerable to asymmetric, 
disruptive Asian responses. China emphasises asymmetric warfare capabilities 
aimed at the enemy’s computer and communication networks in particular (US 
Department of Defense 2007). The stage was set for a major contest between US 
efforts to sustain its advantage and Asian efforts to undermine it.
 The full significance of these developments emerges when seen in conjunc-
tion with the deployment of missile defences. In response to the threat that 
increasingly sophisticated Asian ballistic missiles pose to US and allied bases, 
the United States has deployed ballistic- missile interceptors in Alaska and Cali-
fornia, laying the foundation for more robust systems intended to thwart inter-
continental capabilities in East Asia – officially against North Korea, but 
affecting the Chinese deterrent too. Together with NATO, it is building a 
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missile- defence system to neutralise Iranian and other Middle Eastern short- and 
medium- range missiles. For a long while, it has been deploying theatre defences 
in the vicinity of US and allied bases and forces. The same technologies can be 
used for offensive as well as defensive purposes: the Western powers emphasise 
their defensive nature, while their opponents fear that as the West acquires a 
shield, it will be more willing to use the sword. A race in asymmetric technolo-
gies is going on between Asian efforts to exploit US vulnerabilities and US and 
other Western efforts to hold Asian states at risk from a position of impunity.
 As the role of nuclear weapons is reduced, conventional weapons will take on 
a greater share of the mission requirements. Additional options are explored to 
be able to destroy targets around the world on shorter notice. “Today, we can 
present some conventional options to the president to strike a target anywhere on 
the globe that range from 96 hours, to several hours maybe, 4, 5, 6 hours.” This 
might not be fast enough, and “the only thing that we have that goes faster is a 
nuclear response” (General Kevin P. Chilton, as quoted in Sanger and Shanker 
2010). The Obama administration therefore proposes a new spin on the Bush 
administration’s Global Strike plan, now named Prompt Global Strike, using the 
most advanced technology in the military today and some not yet invented, such 
as warheads on missiles travelling through the atmosphere at several times the 
speed of sound, which would be much more manoeuvrable than ballistic 
missiles.
 The Bush administration shelved important parts of Global Strike because the 
Russians feared that if conventional weapons were placed on ballistic missiles, it 
would be impossible to know whether the missiles carried nuclear warheads or 
conventional ones. The Russian concern persists and is reflected in New START: 
conventional warheads on strategic delivery vehicles would be counted within 
the 1,550 warhead limit. However, the Pentagon emphasises that the bar is high 
enough to accommodate PGS: “the New START Treaty does not contain any 
constraints on current or planned conventional prompt global strike 
capability.”32
 PGS should enable the US to destroy threatening targets in timely fashion 
without crossing the nuclear threshold, such as North Korean missiles on their 
way to the launch pads, Iranian nuclear sites and terrorists before they move and 
escape. The Russians and Chinese are worried that they could be targeted at 
them, and that the US would be more inclined to use them because they are con-
ventional. For instance, anti- satellite (ASAT) capabilities in central China may 
be destroyed promptly and pre- emptively at the start of a potential conflict.
 To meet the objections, the PGS concept envisages that other powers would 
be invited to regularly inspect the PGS silos to assure themselves that the 
weapons are conventional and not nuclear, and the silos would be placed in loca-
tions far from the strategic nuclear forces. That, however, would hardly be 
enough to allay the fears. While a benign interpretation would put this concept in 
the context of nuclear disarmament, facilitating deeper cuts in US arsenals, scep-
tics see it as part of a broader effort to sustain US military superiority and widen 
the gap between it and the rest of the world.
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 In conclusion, this poses three major challenges to the drive for disarmament. 
First, the growth of Asian nuclear arsenals represents a challenge, especially the 
South Asian ones since India, and by implication Pakistan, may go for full- 
fledged minimum- deterrence postures before being ready to accept arms- control 
measures and participation in multilateral disarmament talks. Second, the asym-
metric offence–defence competition between the United States and other 
Western powers on the one hand, and Asian states on the other, has to be defused 
in the name of disarmament and non- proliferation. This question taps into the 
broader debate about the relationship between disarmament and ballistic- missile 
defence. The ABM Treaty of 1972 was built on the premise that ballistic- missile 
defences were destabilising. Today, that Treaty is gone, but in the view of many 
states the premise remains valid. And third, PGS adds to the fear that the trans-
ition from nuclear to conventional weapons is a way to enhance US military 
superiority, creating new security concerns rather than eliminating existing fears. 
In the next round of US–Russian disarmament negotiations, the Russians will 
certainly want to include both PGS and ballistic- missile defence. There is the 
risk that a programme that can win broader support for nuclear disarmament 
within the US political system creates additional obstacles for global disarma-
ment and non- proliferation endeavours.
4 A global consensus on non- 
proliferation and disarmament
The Non- Proliferation Treaty: a winning proposition at the 
age of 25?
During the first decade of the Nuclear Age, 1945–1955, three nuclear- weapon 
states (NWS) emerged: the US, the USSR and the UK. The second decade saw 
another two, France and China, and in the third decade, one more: Israel 
readied the first couple of weapons in 1967, before the Six- Day War (Cohen 
1999). In the fourth decade, South Africa produced half- a-dozen bombs, but 
dismantled them in the fifth decade (around 1990) (von Baeckmann et al. 
1995).
 The end of the Cold War brought significant progress both in terms of disar-
mament and non- proliferation. Nuclear arsenals were significantly reduced; 
Russia became the sole heir of Soviet nuclear weapons; South Africa abandoned 
its weapons and joined the NPT; NPT membership increased considerably; the 
Conference of Disarmament agreed on a mandate for FMCT negotiations; and, 
by the time the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference was convened, a 
CTBT was in sight. The Review Conference therefore came at the end of a 
period of good news, facilitating the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely. 
Non- proliferation seemed to be a winning proposition.
 At that point, the P5 may have thought that the proliferation problems could 
be managed irrespective of their own investments in nuclear weapons. Govern-
mental and non- governmental experts reiterated that nuclear proliferation was 
driven by security concerns of a regional nature, more or less unrelated to the 
nuclear investments of the major powers. The NNWS, for their part, had 
reasons to believe that the downsizing of nuclear arsenals would continue in 
the years ahead. The rhetoric of the NWS seemed to confirm it: as late as 1997, 
at the first PrepCom for the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the five NWS 
issued a joint statement reaffirming “their determination to continue the pursuit 
. . . of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, 
with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons . . . ” (NPT/CONF.2000/
PC.II.8).
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The delusion of 1995
This proved to be shallow, misleading analyses, however. First, the NNWS were 
wrong for the simple reason that the end of the Cold War naturally gave way to 
significant reductions of arsenals. After the breakdown of the Soviet Union and 
the end of a world order characterised by arms racing, elimination of overkill 
capabilities had its own unavoidable logic. With one important exception – the 
Presidential Initiatives by the US and the USSR/Russia of 1991/1992, not to lose 
control over tactical nuclear weapons (see Chapter 3) – they were not made out 
of concern for nuclear proliferation or as concessions to NNWS parties to the 
NPT. In 1995 this was not yet clear, for in so many respects the future of inter-
national affairs seemed an open question.
 Much was removed from the operative arsenals and much was kept. Omi-
nously, in national military doctrines the reliance on nuclear weapons was main-
tained (see Chapter 3). After a period of downsizing, the NWS “dug in”: the 
disarmament rhetoric disappeared; at the 2002 PrepCom for the 2005 NPT 
Review Conference, the NWS issued no commitment for the elimination of 
nuclear weapons; and the US distanced itself from both the Principles and Objec-
tives document of 1995 and from the 13 steps towards nuclear disarmament of 
2000. The NWS seemed firmly intent on keeping major arsenals for the foresee-
able future.
 Second, the analysis was shallow for lack of consciousness about the special 
nature of post- war politics. There is a period of opportunity after all major wars 
and so, too, after the Cold War. Karl Deutsch (1963) described it in information 
terms: these are periods when the ratio of current to background information is 
high because much background information from the archives has been rendered 
irrelevant. In these situations, decision- makers have to rely on current informa-
tion flows and are therefore freer and more likely to move in new directions. For 
better or worse, their action space is much enlarged. For instance, in the begin-
ning of the 1990s, for the first time in UN history except for a brief interlude 
immediately after the Second World War, the UN Security Council functioned 
the way the founders had envisaged. Such periods are brief, however, usually 
limited to a few years. Boutros- Ghali drew the line at the Dayton negotiations in 
the autumn 1995, when the UN representative was relegated to the corridors; 
others drew it earlier (Boutros- Ghali 1999). In the minds of many, the period of 
opportunity was misread as a new, encouraging trend in international affairs. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the sense of progress that inspired the 1995 NPT 
Review and Extension Conference was unfounded.
 A few years later, indefinite extension would no longer have been possible. 
New problems emerged along with new ways of handling them. Then, the 
outcome would probably have been a limited extension of the Treaty for one 
or more periods,1 giving the NNWS more leverage in relation to the nuclear 
powers. In the absence of such checkpoints, the NWS are freer to behave the 
way they see fit, which they did, to the point of jeopardising the entire Treaty. 
The bargain that had been struck between the three pillars of the NPT – 
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non- proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses – came apart. Common 
ground evaporated.
Turn of trends
The NWS were deluded, too. After 1995, India and Pakistan, which had been 
nuclear- weapon states in the making for quite a while, tested; North Korea did 
the same; and Iran became a case of grave concern. More states turned their 
eyes to the nuclear- weapon option, and some non- state actors did so too 
(Mowatt- Larssen 2010). This was a turn of trends, and a more dangerous world 
also for the NWS. Far from being manageable, proliferation might get out of 
hand.
 The NPT was in jeopardy not least because the NWS paid little attention to 
their disarmament commitments. The US and others treated Article VI much like 
Article V (as if it did not exist),2 and the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East – 
an integral part of the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely – was not followed 
up upon.3 There was a tendency to pick and choose from the treaty provisions, 
stressing the non- proliferation provisions and ignoring others. Under these cir-
cumstances, NNWS found it hard to accept more comprehensive safeguards and 
more proliferation- resistant peaceful- use practices that would qualify their rights 
under Article IV, because it would further aggravate the skewed implementation 
of rights and obligations.
 Despite the fact that only North Korea has left the NPT and that the “hold-
outs” – states that had not joined the NPT – had shrunk to comprise Israel, India 
and Pakistan only, the Treaty suffered from a growing legitimacy deficit. There 
seemed to be a loss of voluntary compliance. This did not necessarily mean that 
the non- proliferation regime was going down the drain (Price 2007). In theory, 
coercion, economic and diplomatic pressures may substitute for voluntary com-
pliance. The US tried that, largely in the shape of policies of regime change, but 
without success. It threatened North Korea and Iran; they responded by intensi-
fying their nuclear programs; whereupon the US used it to strengthen its own 
case against these regimes. Regime change became a proliferation driver. In the 
case of North Korea, many years were lost until a negotiating approach based on 
reciprocal concessions, step- by-step, was agreed in early 2007(see Chapter 8). In 
the case of Iran, there were no negotiations with the US, only sticks – and no 
progress (see Chapter 7). These policies did not compensate for the legitimacy 
deficit, but compounded them to the detriment not only of the NPT, but of the 
non- proliferation regime in general.
Reconfirming the grand bargain
For many years, nuclear arms- control arrangements revolved around two trea-
ties: the Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Nuclear Non- Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT). This century, the US withdrew from the ABM Treaty, and the 
grand NPT bargain from the second half of the 1960s eroded.
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 All states except four are members of the NPT. Among the four, there is still 
hope that North Korea will be willing to trade its nuclear weapons for a peace 
treaty, reconciliation with the US and the rest of the world, and economic bene-
fits (see Chapter 8). The remaining three – India, Pakistan and Israel – are 
unlikely to relinquish their nuclear weapons sooner than any of the five recog-
nised NWS. They cannot become members of the NPT – they do not want to, 
and in practice the Treaty amendment procedure would not make it possible 
anyhow – but they may be asked to behave “as if ” they were members of the 
Treaty, the formula that France applied until it became a regular party in 1992 
(see Chapter 5).
 Many NPT members stick to what is known as the Swedish example: regard-
less of what the NWS do, it would not be in Sweden’s interest to acquire nuclear 
arms.4 In Europe, Africa and South America, many NNWS stay committed to 
this kind of thinking and to the NPT. Also in Northeast Asia and the Middle 
East, where proliferation may occur and get out of hand, there is broad support 
for the Treaty. If it unravels, there are no nuclear- weapon-free zones (NWFZ) to 
fall back upon in these regions. International safeguards may continue on the 
basis of facility agreements (INFCIRC/66), but this is an incomplete substitute 
for NPT- type safeguards. In short: redundancies exist, but the fallback options 
are not attractive. For the great majority of states, breakdown of the NPT would 
therefore be a significant loss.
 The best, and quite possibly the only, realistic chance for a new global con-
sensus on non- proliferation is therefore to reconfirm the validity of the old one, 
i.e. the grand bargain that was struck in the second half of the 1960s, which led 
to the NPT and a comprehensive international non- proliferation regime.5 
S/Res/1887 on Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, adopted by 
the Security Council Summit meeting on 24 September 2009, is a step in that 
direction.6
 Below, ten requirements for a new global consensus are discussed. They tie 
into each other, so the order in which they are listed is neither an order of impor-
tance nor an order of priority.
The unit of account
For a global consensus to be re- established, requirement number one is to forge 
agreement on the unit of account. In the NPT, nuclear weapons are the units of 
account. It is the weapons that should not proliferate and it is the weapons that 
should finally be eliminated. The Bush administration shifted its attention to 
their possessors, of which there were good and bad ones: bona fide states and 
unreliable rogues. The President frequently asserted that the weapons had to be 
in the right hands, or that the worst weapons had to be kept out the worst hands. 
One favoured way to do it was by regime change, if need be by use of force. The 
US would itself be the arbiter of the new two- tier system.
 Regime change is nothing new in US foreign policy. The novelty of the Bush 
administration was that it took it to the extremes, both in its declarations and in 
80  The legacies of nuclear history
its actions. Ardent enemies and suspected proliferators should be overthrown: 
you don’t talk to evil, you eliminate it. Obama took a different approach. He 
showed respect for the Islamic Republic of Iran, its leaders and its people, as is 
ordinary code of conduct in inter- state affairs, and entered negotiations to steer 
the Iranian nuclear programme away from weapons. Regime change may not 
have been completely abandoned – for instance, it was unclear whether or to 
what extent the covert programmes that Bush ran in Iran were cancelled – but it 
was no priority. With Israel, Obama remained true to the understanding origin-
ally reached by Richard Nixon and Golda Meir in September 1969, i.e. to the 
policy of opacity. The US supports the objective of NPT universality, but for all 
practical purposes Israel is treated as an exemption. One year into the Obama 
presidency, the impression was therefore that it harkened back to US policies 
before Bush, focusing on weapons as the units of account, but not without 
exceptions.7
Negotiations
Second, negotiations must be reinstated as a bona fide modality of non- 
proliferation policy.
 As long as the US was unwilling to talk with its most ardent adversaries – to 
representatives of the nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction – 
there could be no agreed strategy for non- proliferation and disarmament. Then, 
there could only be select areas of cooperation. The main targets were Iran and 
North Korea. As noted above, the quest for regime change and the refusal to 
negotiate became proliferation drivers.
 It stands to reason that, under such a policy, the other side was not keen to 
talk either. Knowing that the US objective was to cut their throat, the adversaries 
had little incentive to negotiate. It was not until January 2007 – when the Ameri-
cans sat down with the North Koreans in Berlin – that the Korean problem took 
a turn for the better, however short- lived (see Chapter 8). Unfortunately, it hap-
pened on the heels of the North Korean test in October 2006, which seemed to 
confirm the political utility of nuclear weapons.
 The P5+1 (Germany) were ready to negotiate with Iran if Iran brought all 
fuel- cycle works to a halt and accepted an Additional Protocol to the NPT safe-
guards agreement. This position turned what should have been the object of 
negotiations – restrictions on uranium enrichment first of all – into a precondi-
tion for them. To Iranian eyes, it was tantamount to saying that, first, you must 
accept defeat, and then we may sit down and talk.
 During the election campaign, Barack Obama said he was willing to talk to 
other governments without preconditions, however hostile they might be to the 
US. Negotiations with Iran began in Geneva on 1 October 2009, and ways to 
resume talks with North Korea were explored. The talks with Iran were short- 
lived: the Western powers took the view that the confidence- building measure 
that was tabled in Geneva was a “take it or leave it” proposition, and the Iranian 
government was split over the issue. By the turn of 2009/2010, Western policy 
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was back on the sanctions track (see Chapter 7). Talks with North Korea were 
slow to materialise. Still, diplomacy and other non- military measures were the 
favoured instruments of non- proliferation policy, but preventive use of force was 
not deleted from the agenda.
Preventive military action
The US National Security Strategy of 2002, updated in 2006 (see White House 
2006), stated that the US must deter and defend against the threat of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) before they are unleashed. It will not do to wait until 
the enemies have built their weapons and can use and retaliate with them. Pres-
ident Bush called it a strategy of pre- emption, in accordance with the way this 
expression had been used for a decade, but that use of the term blurs the import-
ant distinction between pre- emption and prevention. The difference is one of 
timing and legality. In international law, pre- emption – at the moment an attack 
is about to be launched – is permitted.8 Preventive attack, against an opponent 
who may or may not become a real threat in the future, is not.
 In recent decades, there have been four well- known cases of preventive action 
against actual or alleged proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD): 
Osiraq, Iraq (1981), El Shifa, Sudan (1998), the occupation of Iraq (2003) and 
Al Kibar, Syria (2007). Except for Al Kibar – which may have been a success on 
Israeli premises, but a mixed blessing for the non- proliferation regime – the 
results have been discouraging.
 The international non- proliferation regime is rooted in international law. 
Illegal preventive actions undermine it. Had the intelligence on El Shifa been 
right – this pharmaceutical plant allegedly produced precursors for chemical 
weapons (VX nerve gas) and had links to bin Laden – the bombing of it could 
perhaps have been justified as an act of self- defence in reference to Article 51 of 
the UN Charter, similar to the way in which the US justified its attack on 
Afghanistan after 9/11. Or it may have been justified as an act of reprisal.9 It was 
done in response to the terror attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanza-
nia. However, eight months later, the US admitted that it had made a mistake. 
“Guilty until proven innocent” is, anyhow, nowhere in the legal textbooks.
 The actions have been marred by intelligence failures (admitted in the cases 
of Iraq and El Shifa); flawed diagnosis and failure to grasp the consequences of 
bombing in the case of Osiraq (the bombing of it accelerated the secret nuclear 
weapons programme that was discovered ten years later, and may even have 
triggered it10); waiting to be corroborated in the case of Al Kibar, where Israeli 
intelligence seems to have had it right. The target appears to have been a nuclear 
reactor built with the assistance of North Korea. All four actions were illegal 
under international law: three of the four were based on flawed intelligence.
 The political implications have been detrimental to non- proliferation endeav-
ours. Illegal acts of war trigger strong sentiments and much enmity, especially 
when based on claims that are unfounded. The case of Osiraq leaves a lesson 
that is pertinent to Iran and possibly also Syria. If Iranian nuclear facilities are 
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bombed, Iran may try even harder the next time. If it was not going for nuclear 
weapons before being bombed, it would be more likely to do so afterwards. The 
Syrian case is more open to doubt, however. Its territory is much smaller than 
Iran’s, and it is more vulnerable to Israeli intelligence and military capabilities 
than is Iran.
 The bombing raid at Al Kibar was the second application of the Begin Doc-
trine, which holds that Israel will not tolerate acquisition of nuclear- weapon cap-
abilities by its enemies (the bombing of Osiraq was the first). If the charges are 
correct – that Syria and North Korea were cooperating to build a nuclear reactor 
there – Syria had failed to declare the upcoming facility to the IAEA. Being a 
member of the NPT and having an INFCIRC 153 safeguards agreement in force, 
it should have provided design information to the IAEA when the construction 
works started in preparation of safeguards. Israel, which is well known for being 
critical of the effectiveness of international safeguards, did not inform the IAEA 
either. In a vote of no confidence in the Agency, it bombed instead. Unilateral 
action substituted for the way the non- proliferation regime is designed to handle 
such a matter, undercutting its international verification instrument.
 The third requirement is therefore that preventive military action yields to 
legal, treaty- based approaches. However, military action to stop nuclear- 
proliferation programmes is central to Israeli political and military thinking, and 
while President Obama upgraded the role of diplomacy and downplayed the use 
of force, unilateral military options are not ruled out. The security assurances 
announced by the US Nuclear Posture Review of 2010 do not apply in relation 
to NPT members that are not seen to be in good standing (see Chapter 3). Uni-
lateralism is a structural phenomenon rooted in the superior position of the US in 
world affairs, and unilateral action is nearest at hand where it is strongest, i.e. in 
the military field. So the caveat is that for the NPT, the question is how best to 
co- exist with policies which, when enacted, may weaken it. 
 Playing on the assumption that differences do not necessarily amount to 
incompatibilities, but can be made complementary, the tensions between regime 
procedures and unilateral counter- proliferation policies may be alleviated and 
even transformed to become mutually supportive. In certain circumstances, the 
international regime may actually stand to gain because its own enforcement 
mechanisms are commonly recognised to be weak (see Non- proliferation and 
Counter- proliferation, pp. 90–91).
Verification
The original NPT verification standard was full- scope safeguards following all 
fissile materials in member states. The model agreement (INFCIRC 153) provided 
for more intrusive international verification than had previously been accepted by 
states. There were concerns in highly industrialised NNWS that industrial secrets 
might be revealed, but they were put to rest already by the mid- 1970s.
 To be taken seriously, any arms- control regime must have verification provi-
sions that are considered adequate, and INFCIRC 153 was deemed adequate for 
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the purposes of the NPT. When Saddam’s secret nuclear weapon programme of 
the 1980s proved them inadequate, an Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540) was 
elaborated that greatly improved the Agency’s ability to look for activities and 
facilities that might not have been declared. Efforts are going on to make 153 
plus 540 the new verification standard. The principle is adequacy: the operative 
meaning of it may have to be adjusted from time to time, and INFCIRC 540 is 
hardly the end of the road. To oppose the Additional Protocol on the ground that 
it was not a part of the original bargain is therefore misguided. NNWS refusing 
to accept INFCIRC 540 because the NWS do not live up to their obligations – to 
Article VI in particular – should reconsider their stance. This is the fourth 
requirement for reconfirmation of the basic bargain.
 In 2003, the United States did not allow UNMOVIC to come to a conclusion. 
The war cut the inspections short. In Iran, verification is also in a bind. Recur-
rent demands that it should ratify the Additional Protocol; provide early design 
information; and offer voluntary transparency measures are made with the know-
ledge that nobody can prove the negative and in the hope that incriminating 
evidence will be found. As long as Iran is under military threat, it must be 
assumed to distribute its assets on many well- protected sites throughout the 
country and to keep them secret to not help its enemies update their target lists.11 
On the one hand, it is obliged to provide information to the IAEA; on the other 
hand, it wants to minimise its vulnerability to attack. As long as this is the situ-
ation, transparency demands – ostensibly to enable Iran “to come clean” – 
enhance suspicions rather than build confidence.
 Cooperation between the IAEA and possessors of relevant national intelli-
gence data has been mixed. Some governments have shared some information 
with the Agency, but there is no systematicity to it, and it is not always clear for 
what purpose it is done. In the later phases of UNSCOM’s work, national intelli-
gence agencies also infiltrated the Commission. Provision of national intelli-
gence information to the IAEA was not a part of the original bargain, and it is 
fraught with difficulties. But to use national intelligence to complicate and 
obstruct the verification process was certainly not part of the bargain either.
 Reconfirmation of the basic bargain means that member states should refrain 
from any activity or policy that may detract from adequate verification proce-
dures. Those who are in a position to enhance the effectiveness of international 
safeguards should be encouraged to do so in good faith. INFCIRC 540 should be 
universally accepted. By January 2010, an additional protocol had not been rati-
fied by more than 94 states, so it was too early to make it a condition for nuclear 
exports.12 S/Res/1887 could only “encourage states to consider whether a recipi-
ent State has signed and ratified an additional protocol based on the model addi-
tional protocol in making nuclear export decisions” (para. 10).
Balancing the rights and responsibilities of peaceful uses
Reconfirming the basics is very much about re- establishing the balance between 
the three pillars of the NPT: non- proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of 
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nuclear energy. This is requirement number five. What has changed the original 
balance is, first of all, the failure to meet the disarmament obligation of Article 
VI, while imposing a number of supply- side measures restricting the right to 
peaceful uses under Article IV in the name of non- proliferation.
 Article IV was deliberately written to avoid attempts to reinterpret the NPT in 
ways that would make peaceful utilisations more difficult. The only qualification 
was that international transactions must be in conformity with Article I and II, 
excluding acquisitions for weapons purposes. The right to peaceful uses includes 
the right to build national fuel- cycle facilities, i.e. plutonium and enrichment 
plants.13 The spread of such capabilities is undesirable from a proliferation point 
of view, but restrictions can best be promoted in conjunction with other meas-
ures in order to maintain the overall balance of rights and obligations. One type 
of trade- offs that has long been discussed is assurances of fuel supplies and 
access to nuclear technology in return for restrictions on national fuel- cycle 
programmes.
 In 1971, the Zangger Committee was established to operationalise the NPT 
export control provision contained in Article III.2. In 1975, the Nuclear Suppli-
ers Group (NSG) was established following India’s nuclear explosion the year 
before, setting out to control the export of dual- use items. The NSG – a self- 
appointed group of supplier states originally referred to as the London Club, 
holding secret discussions in London – drew resentment right from the begin-
ning. Critics recommended, instead, the negotiation of mutually agreed rules of 
international nuclear commerce between suppliers and recipients. These diverg-
ing approaches have existed ever since and they have been further accentuated 
recently.
 Technology restraints may still be clarified, improved and consolidated. For 
instance, there are proposals for a division of labour between the Zangger Com-
mittee and the NSG, Zangger staying with nuclear items (especially designed or 
prepared (EDP) items) and the NSG with the dual- use list; for linking export 
control information with the IAEA verification system (current practices lack 
systematicity); and for negotiating a global export control convention to 
strengthen the standards and promote their universality and legitimacy. Clearly, 
there is merit to moves that can shore up present arrangements along such lines. 
However, the main agenda of the future should take a different tack with the 
problems, moving to a negotiated set of regulations between suppliers and recip-
ients that would be more legitimate, comprehensive and universal than supplier 
restraints can ever be, and that would provide both assurances of non- 
proliferation and assurances of supply and access.14
Balancing the pillars: the necessity to disarm
Such a deal is hard to strike, however. In view of all the attempts that have been 
made to date, without success, it may only be achieved in a broader framework 
that sees a new understanding of Article IV in conjunction with progress on 
Article VI. Many NNWS object to restrictions on their Article IV rights as long 
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as the NWS pay so little attention to their own obligations. In their view, the ori-
ginal balance of rights and obligations has shifted too much in their disfavour 
already.
 Legally speaking, failure to take “effective measures relating to cessation of 
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament” does not 
necessarily amount to non- compliance by any particular state. Progress depends 
on the seriousness of all negotiating parties and is arguably beyond the powers 
of any single participant. Article VI fails, moreover, to specify which measures 
should be pursued.15 The principles and objectives of nuclear disarmament 
adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the Middle East 
resolution adopted on the same occasion and the 13 steps towards nuclear disar-
mament agreed by the 2000 Review Conference do not make up for this lack of 
specificity, for none of these documents qualify as “subsequent agreements” 
within the meaning of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties. They are political commitments, not legally binding interpretations of 
Article VI (Ford 2007). The Article is simply too vague to provide benchmarks 
for legal assessments of compliance the way, for example, safeguards agree-
ments do.
 Seen in the political context in which the NPT evolved, as part of a larger 
political bargain, the meaning of Article VI looks different, however (Graham 
2007). Right from the beginning of the NPT negotiations in the mid- 1960s, dis-
armament was considered to be a quid for the non- proliferation quo. On 15 
August 1968, one- and-a- half months after the NPT was opened for signature, the 
co- chairs of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee – the USA and the 
USSR – presented an agenda for the Committee that struck a compromise 
between those NNWS that had wanted commitments to specific measures to be 
written into the NPT and those who were willing to leave it for follow- up 
action.16 The nuclear part of the agenda was essentially a package proposed by 
India and Sweden, who had argued for inclusion of specific measures in the 
Treaty text. A month later, the non- nuclear members of the Committee presented 
a comparable agenda. Both agendas included a test ban, a cut- off of all produc-
tion of fissile materials for military purposes, security assurances for NNWS, 
and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles. The co- 
chairs as well as the other members of the Committee emphasised that the viabil-
ity of the Treaty depended on the results achieved in this field, and the review 
conferences were mandated to assure “that the purposes of the Preamble and the 
provisions of the Treaty are being realized” (Article VIII.3). Clearly, Article VI 
was conceived as part of a dynamic bargain to be implemented over time, 
erasing – in due course – the distinction between NWS and NNWS. Measures 
were identified, converging expectations were created, and a review mechanism 
was set up to facilitate the realisation of them. Although no timeline was given, 
“cessation of the arms race at an early date” left a sense of urgency.
 Article VI therefore calls for negotiations in good faith. In the view of Judge 
Muhammed Bedjaoui, president of the International Court of Justice at the time 
its Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons was issued (1996), “good faith” as 
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applied in the NPT context means sustained negotiations and search for compro-
mises; refraining from acts that are incompatible with the purpose of the Treaty; 
proscription of any initiative that would render impossible the conclusion of dis-
armament treaties; prohibition of unjustified termination of negotiations; no 
selectivity regarding which provisions to implement; and a general obligation to 
inform and communicate – mainly on the part of the NWS – since the pursuit of 
disarmament is an obligation on all parties and the status of the Treaty is a matter 
of global concern (Bedjaoui 2009). In short, the “good faith” provision was 
inserted to enhance the prospects of “systematic and progressive efforts to imple-
ment article VI”.17 The ICJ Advisory Opinion therefore held that Article VI 
amounts not only to an obligation to negotiate, but also to an obligation to bring 
the negotiations to a conclusion (ICJ 1996).
 In the years following signature (1968) and entry into force (1970) of the 
NPT, the Treaty became the backbone of an international regime comprising 
arms- control agreements, a growing number of nuclear- weapon-free zones, 
security assurances for NNWS, full scope safeguards, rules of international 
nuclear commerce and national export- control regulations. Commonly referred 
to as the international non- proliferation regime, it conforms to a classical regime 
definition in the study of international affairs: a set of explicit or implicit prin-
ciples, norms, rules and decision- making procedures around which actor expec-
tations converge in a given issues area (Krasner 1983). In the realm of 
declaratory policy, expectations clearly converged. Assurances were exchanged 
tying non- proliferation to disarmament.
 National interests turned out to be a different matter. In her account of the 
negotiations, the Swedish negotiator and Nobel Peace Prize winner Alva Myrdal 
(1977) felt betrayed. The review conferences of 1980 and 1990 failed over 
Article VI issues, and the 1975 and 1985 conferences papered over profound 
divergences of views on the same issues. The period of opportunity after the 
Cold War brought enough progress for disarmament and non- proliferation to 
enable the 1995 Review and Extension Conference to extend the NPT indefin-
itely but, a few years later, the treaty architecture began to unravel: the US with-
drew from the ABM Treaty; Russia dropped START II per consequence; the 
INF Treaty came under pressure; and START I was due to expire on 5 Decem-
ber 2009. Except for SORT (2002), which strictly speaking was not a disarma-
ment treaty (Lodgaard 2003), no negotiations were conducted. The CTBT had 
not entered into force; negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut- Off Treaty had not 
started; and the security assurances for NNWS – always conditional – were 
further weakened. Clearly, the bargain of 1968 came apart. 
 Substantial progress in implementing Article VI, setting the world on a path 
towards a nuclear- weapon-free world, is requirement number seven for the ori-
ginal bargain to be reconfirmed. President Obama has taken a series of initiatives 
in this direction, but how far they will lead is an open question.
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Security assurances
Security assurances for NNWS were part of the NPT bargain from the begin-
ning. In return for accepting a temporary division of the world into nuclear and 
non- nuclear-weapon states, the NNWS demanded assurances that they would 
not be subject to use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union and 
the US/UK gave different kinds of assurances; France and China, which became 
members of the NPT only later, also offered their own formulas (SIPRI 1980). 
All of them were qualified in various ways, except the Chinese no- first-use 
assurances. Prior to the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995, the P5 
summarised their assurances in Security Council Resolution 984.
 Except for China, the assurances remained qualified in ways that limited their 
value. The NPT review conferences have therefore urged the NWS to do better. 
This century, however, the opposite happened: the national doctrines signifi-
cantly widened the range of missions assigned to nuclear weapons, shedding 
doubt on the validity of the assurances contained in Resolution 984 (see Chapter 
3). Only China remained true to its original policy of no- first-use. Reversing this 
development, extending assurances that are more forthcoming to the NNWS, is 
the seventh requirement for a new non- proliferation consensus.
 This is what the Obama administration has begun to do. It will not use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against NPT members in good standing. Chem-
ical and biological weapons will be deterred by conventional means, with reser-
vations made for new scientific developments in the biological sector. In 
practice, this negative security assurance covers about 180 states. Exempt are the 
NWS and NPT members that, in the US view, do not comply with their NPT 
obligations, such as Iran and possibly Syria. Another Security Council resolution 
on security assurances based on the new US formula, replacing Resolution 984 
of 1995, may be within reach (see Chapter 3).
 NNWS are more vulnerable to use and threats of use than NWS. Where mutu-
ally assured destruction applies, resort to nuclear weapons is an ordained act of 
suicide, while in relation to NNWS, the aggressor may get away with it. Accord-
ingly, the threats that have been made have mostly been addressed to NNWS 
(Ellsberg 2009). Non- aligned states have therefore called for an international 
convention committing the NWS not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons 
against NNWS parties to the NPT, no qualifications added. This is more difficult 
to achieve than a Security Council resolution, especially because the convention 
would have to clarify the meaning of being an NPT member “in good standing”. 
That question would certainly also be raised in connection with a Security 
Council resolution, but if the resolution is a collection of national assurances, the 
question does not require a uniform answer.
 No- first-use doctrines, limiting the role of nuclear weapons to that of deter-
ring others from using theirs, would meet the same concerns and, in addition, 
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in inter- NWS affairs to the passive one 
of deterring others from using theirs.18 Unqualified undertakings never to be 
the first to use nuclear weapons have, moreover, an important disarmament 
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 corollary: nobody would need them if nobody had them. In deep cuts and elimi-
nation scenarios, this proposition is therefore more relevant than extension of 
non- use assurances to NNWS. 
 Progressive restrictions on the role of nuclear weapons must go hand- in-hand 
with nuclear disarmament, for without disarmament the doctrinal restrictions 
would not be credible (see Chapter 10). However, no- first-use doctrines are 
harder to achieve than unqualified assurances of non- use to NNWS parties to the 
NPT.19 
Universality: the three- state question
A new global consensus must also include the three states that never joined the 
NPT: India, Pakistan and Israel. They are all NWS. North Korea, which with-
drew from the NTP in 2002, is in a category of its own. It has been a member of 
the NPT (1992–2003), and the objective must be to bring it back into the Treaty.
 After the tests in 1998, India began to rework its nuclear diplomacy. From 
being the world’s leading protestor against discrimination in the nuclear order, 
India transformed itself into a nation ready to support the existing order. It 
stepped up its support for incremental arms control, endorsed the objectives of 
the NPT and supported new US non- proliferation initiatives like the PSI (Mohan 
2007) (see Chapter 5).
 The nuclear deal with the United States rubbed some of these commitments 
in – the commitment to world- class export controls in particular. The deal also 
influenced India’s decision to support the European resolution on Iran at the 
IAEA in September 2005, declaring Iran to have been in non- compliance with 
its safeguards obligations, as well as the resolution that sent the Iranian file to 
the UN Security Council in February 2006 (see Chapter 7). However, India is 
keen to preserve its independence in relation to other big powers, and its policy 
towards Iran is a litmus test of that (see Chapter 1).
 India’s orientation towards the existing order makes it easier to forge a new 
global consensus on non- proliferation and disarmament. To enhance and formal-
ise its involvement in an emerging consensus, it should be asked to behave “as 
if ” it was a member of the NPT (see Chapter 5). Concretely, this would oblige 
India not to assist others in acquiring nuclear weapons (Article I of the NPT), 
abide by the rules of international nuclear commerce (the safeguards requirement 
of Article III.2) and dedicate itself to nuclear disarmament (Article VI). Today, 
it is under no such international disarmament obligation (see Chapter 5). India 
has a strong tradition to uphold in the disarmament field, and a legacy from Rajiv 
Gandhi to honour. Influenced by the “gang of four” and President Obama, it has 
put renewed emphasis on its traditional pleas for nuclear disarmament. It main-
tains its support for a time- bound international convention for elimination of 
nuclear weapons. Therefore, an Article VI commitment is unlikely to be a big 
problem.
 In principle, the “as if ” formula is applicable to Pakistan and Israel, too. 
 Israel’s declaratory policy has always been the same: never to be the first to 
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introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. The ambiguity of it has served 
it well. For the near term, efforts to extract non- proliferation commitments from 
Israel should therefore not be predicated on a change in declaratory policy.20 On 
closer examination, this does not pose any problem: an Israeli commitment to 
behave “as if ” it was a member does not have to clarify whether it is an NWS or 
an NNWS that undertakes it. Often criticised for being recalcitrant and arrogant 
and for blocking arms control in a region that desperately needs it, the merit of 
this for Israel would be to soften that perception.
 De jure recognition of India as an NWS may have to wait until it undertakes 
a full “as if ” commitment. Pakistan must live up to the same standards in order 
to be treated the same way. Pakistan is far from that standard today, but it is in 
the best interest of non- proliferation that it gets there. Another possibility would 
be a more comprehensive criteria- based approach applicable to all outliers, 
building on the elements that were highlighted by the NSG when the exemption 
was made for India and adding some more requirements such as a disarmament 
commitment equivalent to Article VI; signature and preferably accession to the 
CTBT; restrictions on fissile material production while waiting for a cut- off 
treaty to be concluded; and, possibly, a clearer separation line between civilian 
and military activities. Sooner or later, de facto nuclear weapon status will lead 
to de jure recognition, which is necessary in order to bring them into arms- 
control and disarmament negotiations.
 Could NPT members contemplating acquisition of nuclear arms prepare them-
selves under the umbrella of the Treaty, give three months notice of withdrawal, 
and then try to soften the pressure levelled on them by offering to abide by the pro-
visions of the NPT “as if ” they were members, replicating India? This is a substan-
tial concern. There is no simple answer. However, unlike the three which never 
joined the Treaty, states attempting to do this would, first, violate an international 
legal commitment; second, none of them would have the weight of India, so they 
would be more vulnerable to international reactions; third, to further dissuade 
states from leaving the NPT, the Security Council could adopt a generic resolution 
explaining that if a state withdraws after having been found to be in non- 
compliance with its safeguards undertakings, this will be considered as a threat to 
international peace and lead to certain specified reactions, without necessarily 
being exhaustive in that respect;21 and, fourth, the withdrawal clause (Article X) 
should be tightened up to make withdrawal more difficult and give the parties 
more time to persuade the notifying state to maintain its membership (see Chapter 
9). This, however, is unlikely to happen unless it becomes part of a broader 
package to redress the balance of rights and obligations under the Treaty.
 Universality was always the ambition, reiterated at all review conferences of 
the Treaty. In this respect, the NPT has already been more successful than any 
other multilateral arms- control treaty. If North Korea can be brought back to the 
NPT as an NNWS, application of the “as if ” formula to the remaining three 
would bring the Treaty as close to universality as is practically possible. Some 
version of this controversial proposition may be element number eight in a new 
consensus.22
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Non- proliferation and counter- proliferation
Some elements of US policy remain at odds with the non- proliferation regime, 
with no prospect of radical change. In so far as this is the case, the strategy must 
be to reduce the incompatibilities and exploit potential complementarities 
between US positions and those of others whenever possible. For differences do 
not always amount to incompatibilities: they may also be complementary, rein-
forcing each other in the pursuit of common goals.
 One such element is that of counter- proliferation – preventive action in some 
form or other – using military or non- military means to eliminate nuclear instal-
lations. Another related element is that of unilateralism: while the idea that there 
should be exceptional rules for the exceptionally strong – in high currency 
immediately after the occupation of Iraq – is more or less out, unilateralism is 
likely to stay for a long time. Counter- proliferation and unilateralism may 
change with changing administrations and there may be more or less of it, but 
the changes are likely to be variations of one and the same theme. For these pol-
icies derive from the superior status of the US in world affairs, and US military 
superiority, in particular, is unlikely to go away any time soon. The non- 
proliferation regime will have to co- exist with these elements of US policy.
 Counter- proliferation and non- proliferation policies may be incompatible. 
When the IAEA reports a case of non- compliance to the Security Council, 
authorisation of the use of force in a counter- proliferation mode is not excluded 
– on questions of international peace and security the Council is free to decide; 
there is nobody above it – but it is unlikely to happen. Such action is more likely 
to be taken unilaterally or by “coalitions of the willing” and be conducted in 
defiance of the regime. For instance, bombing of nuclear facilities in Iran would 
be a violation of international law, for it could not be justified as an act of self- 
defence in reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter, and the Security Council 
will not authorise it.
 On the other hand, by extending credible threats of the use of force, US 
counter- proliferation policy may be a useful supplement to the non- proliferation 
regime. Such threats can have a deterrent effect which the international regime 
has little or no prospect of providing. Deterrence does not address the root causes 
of proliferation, and in that sense does not solve the problems, but it can affect 
the balance of incentives in favour of staying non- nuclear. For instance, a would-
 be proliferator may defer a decision to go nuclear, or refrain from weaponising 
the programme, seeking political solutions to security concerns instead.
 For threats to be credible, there has to be a capability and a will to implement 
them. Actual use of force to destroy nuclear facilities may, however, do more 
harm than good. A topical case is that of Iran: if it is bombed, it would probably 
leave the NPT, refuse inspections and be motivated to pursue a nuclear- weapons 
programme in secret. Bombing would set the nuclear programme back, but in 
the long run it is more likely to become part of the problem than of the solution. 
Therefore, the relationship between counter- proliferation and non- proliferation 
is ambiguous and complex: counter- proliferation threats may supplement the 
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regime in the best interests of non- proliferation, while actual use of force may 
undermine the same objective.
 Requirement number nine is therefore to live with the differences between 
non- proliferation and counter- proliferation and exploit the opportunities to turn 
them into mutual advantage.
 Against non- state actors, collective action is more easily agreed. Security 
Council Resolution 1540, dealing with measures to be taken against non- state 
proliferators, was passed by consensus under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. For 
the great majority of states, violent non- state actors are “hairs in the soup”. 
Usually dubbed terrorists, they tend to be resolutely addressed, including by use 
of force if needed and at all possible.
Leadership
For international regimes to function properly, some important actor(s) must 
exercise leadership. The non- proliferation regime is no exception. During the 
Cold War, the depository states took responsibility for the NPT in their special 
way, disregarding the disarmament obligation of Article VI. In the beginning of 
this century, there was no leadership at all. A new global consensus on non- 
proliferation and disarmament depends on US leadership. This is requirement 
number ten.
 Nuclear weapons are usually regarded as a source of strength, but they can 
also be seen as signs of weakness and vulnerability. The history of the nuclear 
age speaks to it. The Soviet Union built nuclear weapons to overcome its inferi-
ority in relation to the US (see Chapter 2) and Russia has assigned a wider role 
to its nuclear forces to compensate for conventional weakness (see Chapter 3). 
For the UK and France, nuclear weapons served to underwrite their big power 
status, which rests on narrow grounds. China reacted to US and Soviet weapons. 
Currently, it modernises and probably also expands its arsenal in response to the 
US missile- defence programme. India – largely driven by status ambitions – jus-
tified its tests in reference to China, and Pakistan in reference to India. For North 
Korea, it is a matter of regime survival, and for Israel the nuclear arsenal is the 
ultimate national insurance premium. When considering how best to facilitate 
nuclear disarmament, this perspective is an indispensable guide to what to do.
 While all parties – NNWS as well as NWS – are obliged to work for nuclear 
disarmament, US leadership is vital. The political chain reaction outlined above 
started in the US, and reversal of it also has to begin there. The logic of the argu-
ment rests on the fact that the nuclear weapon acquisitions of the other big 
powers can be fully understood only in reference to that of the US, i.e. coming 
back to the country of origin. The realism of it lies in the fact that the US is 
strong on so many dimensions and in a category of its own when it comes to 
conventional military strength.
 Abolition has been proposed three times before (chapter 2). It came to the 
fore again in connection with the 20th anniversary of Reykjavik, in the form of 
the Hoover plan (Shultz et al. 2007). Three camps have shaped the US debate 
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about it: the Shultz–Nunn–Perry–Kissinger camp, which holds out the vision of 
total disarmament; a “the vision is right but unrealistic” camp that wants smaller 
inventories; and a “this is a very bad idea” camp that fears a return to arms 
control. In the US House of Representatives, a bipartisan resolution was intro-
duced in 2008 calling for a reduction of deployed US and Russian nuclear 
weapons to no more than 1,000, and a total (including reserves) of no more than 
3,000.23
 In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama outlined his vision of a 
world without nuclear weapons, and in September 2009 the Security Council 
summit meeting resolved “to create the conditions for a world without nuclear 
weapons”. In a literal sense, this was nothing new, for the parties to the NPT had 
already undertaken an international legal obligation to work for an NWFW. The 
above quote from S/Res/1887 therefore adds “in accordance with the Treaty on 
the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)”.
 Still, the resolution was important. First, because the Council’s Heads of State 
reconfirmed the validity of the three pillars on which it is built – non- 
proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses. The disarmament pillar got little 
attention in comparison with the non- proliferation dimension, and no mention 
was made of the 1995 Middle East Resolution– the initiators were consumed by 
the Iranian problem in particular – yet disarmament was more prominently 
addressed than in a long while. Second, it raised expectations that the discrepan-
cies that had evolved between UN declarations and national strategy documents, 
between SC Resolution 984 on security assurances and national nuclear doc-
trines in particular, will be eliminated in favour of the former. Third, the summit 
was convened and chaired by a US President who had made nuclear non- 
proliferation and disarmament his number- one priority.24 New START, a new 
US NPR and a Washington summit on nuclear terrorism followed.
 In the diplomatic process that led to the resolution, the negotiating sequence 
was unfortunate. It failed to properly reflect the shift of power to the east and 
south. The sooner the emerging powers are brought into disarmament diplomacy 
on a par with the US and other Western states the better (see Chapter 1). The 
Security Council is, moreover, often perceived as ignoring the interests of less- 
powerful states while the veto protects the interests of the NWS and their allies. 
Resolution 1887 confirmed these concerns. Many non- aligned states found that 
their interests were poorly reflected. They see the Council as a means by which 
the NWS and their allies can short- circuit the international decision- making 
process where, in reality, there is no consensus among UN member states.
 US leadership is essential. Tailoring the conduct of disarmament and non- 
proliferation affairs to evolving world order changes is no less important.
Part III
Proliferation problems and 
the role of nuclear 
disarmament

5 The three- state problem
The outliers
India and Pakistan never joined the NPT and broke no international legal com-
mitment by going nuclear. Neither did Israel, which is known to possess a 
nuclear arsenal, but which practices a policy of opacity and a declaratory policy 
of “not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East” (Cohen 
1998). North Korea, which became party to the NPT in 1985, but left the Treaty 
in January 2003 and conducted a test in October 2006 and another one in May 
2009, has on several occasions declared that it is ready to give up its nuclear 
capabilities in return for external assistance, security assurances and normalisa-
tion with the United States and the rest of the world.1 Efforts are still being made 
to find a political solution that will bring Pyongyang back into the fold of non- 
nuclear parties to the NPT. While the realism of this is open to doubt, the case of 
North Korea is, therefore, different from that of India, Israel and Pakistan. It can 
best be treated separately. All other states are parties to the NPT. No other arms- 
control treaty has such a wide membership.
 India, Israel and Pakistan are variously referred to as outliers or the “three- 
state problem”. North Korea apart, universality for the NPT is a question of how 
to draw the outliers into the web of obligations that the Treaty harbours. All the 
others are on board. Except for Israel, whose nuclear arsenal is integral to the 
security problems of the Middle East, all NWS are looking at each other, justify-
ing their acquisitions in reference to stronger adversaries: Pakistan to India, India 
to China, China to the United States and Russia, France and the United Kingdom 
to Russia, and Russia to the United States.2 The chain comes back to the point of 
origin, i.e. the United States. Two corollaries follow: (1) they are all in the same 
boat, and (2) US leadership is necessary to set the world on the course of disar-
mament (see Chapter 4).
Framing the problem
For many years, supporters of nuclear non- proliferation were caught between the 
unrealistic hope that India, Israel and Pakistan would abandon their nuclear 
weapons and the controversial prospect of accepting them as NWS. On the one 
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hand, there is no particular reason to believe that these states will dismantle their 
nuclear arsenals any sooner than any of the five recognised NWS. The paternal-
istic language of the UN Security Council Resolution 1172 of 6 June 1998, 
adopted after the testing in South Asia that year, never had the intended effect. 
On the other hand, treating them for what they are has been anathema: the NPT 
recognises five NWS only; some NPT parties joined the Treaty on the under-
standing that no other states would openly declare a nuclear- weapon capability;3 
and in 1992, the NSG guidelines made full- scope safeguards a precondition for 
nuclear transfers.
 In Disarmament Diplomacy, ten ideas for how to deal with the three- state 
problem were examined (Nielsen 2007). None of them was found good enough. 
The author concluded that under the circumstances, status quo might be the best 
option. One year later, that option was no longer available, for at long last the 
US–India agreement was clinched. That agreement recognises the fact that India 
is an NWS, but stopped short of formal recognition. Subsequently endorsed by 
the 45-member NSG, it redefines the relationship between India and the rest of 
the world, making India a bona fide commercial partner in the nuclear field. 
Status quo would have been an untenable situation anyhow, just waiting for a 
better way to engage the outliers.
 The failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) and the failure of 
the September 2005 UN Summit to agree on anything regarding nuclear non- 
proliferation and disarmament fully demonstrated that the Treaty was in danger. 
In the following years, the crisis grew deeper. At the same time, the NPT proved 
its resilience. For the great majority of member states it remained important, so 
for them it was a matter of buying time for common ground to be re- established 
at a later stage when, hopefully, the situation would make that possible 
(Lodgaard 2007). Amidst all the conflicting interests and diverging policies, 
there was a growing realisation that it should be re- established as a matter of 
urgency. The best, and maybe the only, way to achieve it would be to reconfirm 
the validity of the old bargain and, in 2009, UNSC Resolution 1887 did so. A 
better approach to the three- state problem must be sought in that framework. 
Engaging the outliers must be part of the broader consensus effort.
 Reconfirmation comes with an update. Some 40 years after the bargain was 
struck, this is to note the obvious. It applies to all three pillars of the NPT: non- 
proliferation, peaceful uses and disarmament. Also, it applies to the international 
system in which the non- proliferation regime functions. Two political- order 
observations rank above all others: (1) the United States remains the global 
power number one, so regime leadership – which no international regime can do 
without – is primarily up to the United States to exercise; and (2) the power shift 
from the West to the East and South and the rise of the “World Without the 
West” means that Brazil, China, India, South Africa and others should be more 
involved and have a greater say in shaping the disarmament and non- 
proliferation agenda.
 The most important factors framing the approach to the three- state problem 
are therefore: (1) the implications of the US–India agreement and (2) the search 
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for a new global consensus on non- proliferation and disarmament on the basis of 
an updated reconfirmation of the grand bargain of 1968, realigning the regime to 
ongoing power shifts in the international system. The first is India- specific,4 but 
influences considerations of how to engage the other outliers. The second is a 
world- order issue.
The US–India agreement
The origin of the US–India Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement goes back 
to the nuclear- weapon tests in 1998, when India began to rework its nuclear 
diplomacy. From being the world’s leading protestor against discrimination in 
the international non- proliferation regime, India transformed itself into a nation 
ready to support the existing order. It stepped up its support for incremental arms 
control, endorsed the objectives of the NPT, declared its readiness to join negoti-
ations for a Fissile Material Cut- Off Treaty (FMCT), endorsed the NSG guide-
lines without being a member of the NSG, issued a moratorium on testing, 
supported nuclear- weapon-free zones (NWFZ) elsewhere in the world, 
announced its willingness to seek substantive confidence- building measures 
(CBM) with Pakistan and tightened export- control regulations. In addition, India 
supported US non- proliferation efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initi-
ative (PSI) (Mohan 2007). The agreement with the United States, the safeguards 
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the NSG 
decision to give India access to the international nuclear market in reference to 
its non- proliferation commitments turn these undertakings – originally unilateral 
– into international obligations.
 The deal therefore grew out of many years of pragmatic, concrete reorientation 
towards the existing arms- control order. In view of the fundamental change of 
Indian foreign policy that it amounted to, the gestation period – ten years – was 
surprisingly short. Too short for comfort when the deal was introduced and India 
began to debate it: the meaning of the turn- around had not been fully grasped and 
digested. The big political battle that followed can be fully understood only against 
this background. Indian right- wingers were concerned that the agreement would 
block further testing and constrain the nuclear arsenal; left- wingers feared that 
India would become too subservient to the United States. Access to modern tech-
nologies attracted them all. Since 1974, the United States had systematically 
denied broad categories of sensitive technologies to India, such as supercomputers, 
missile and space technology, satellites, advanced fighters, microelectronics and 
fibre optics; now, the door to those technologies was opening up. Access to nuclear 
technology was important both substantially and symbolically. Having developed 
a comprehensive nuclear programme since the 1950s, largely on its own, utilisa-
tion of nuclear energy resonates well in Indian public opinion. On 22 July 2008, 
after a raucous debate, the government of Manmohan Singh won a vote of confi-
dence tied to the nuclear deal by 275 votes to 256.
 For the United States, the agreement met a range of objectives. It opened an 
important market for US export industries; it helped meet India’s rapidly 
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growing energy needs and reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in a country 
where almost 70 per cent of the electricity production was based on coal; and it 
paved the way for India to join global efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons.5 Also, it was seen as a catalyst of military cooperation including joint 
exercises, cooperation in multilateral operations, common efforts to fight terror-
ism, arms transfers both ways, research and development (R&D) cooperation, 
technological transfers, cooperation on missile defence and intelligence collec-
tion, dialogues about defence strategies and military reform and strategic dia-
logue at the highest levels.6 In short, it freed the bilateral relationship from the 
limitations that were introduced after India’s test of a nuclear device in 1974 and 
its nuclear- weapon tests in 1998. In the words of Nicholas Burns, the US chief 
negotiator, the nuclear agreement is the symbolic centrepiece of something much 
larger – a comprehensive engagement between the world’s oldest and the 
world’s largest democracy.7
 In all of this there is a geopolitical dimension, variously characterised as 
“strategic” and “compelling”.8 India was deemed ripe and ready to be a geopolit-
ical partner. The US National Security Strategy of January 2006 emphasised it: 
“India is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United 
States in a way befitting a major power” (National Security Strategy 2006). Two-
 and-a- half years later, when the agreement was clinched, the contours of a multi- 
centric world had become clearer and the geopolitical importance of the 
Agreement more obvious. In view of the rise of China and of Islamic radicalism 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it was argued that the national security of the 
United States would be enhanced by a strong and enduring partnership with 
India.
 More than anything else, it may have been the geopolitical rationale and the 
economic benefits of engaging a rapidly growing market of 1.2 billion inhabit-
ants that made Congress pass the agreement so quickly9 and with such a wide 
margin: the House voted 297–117 and the Senate 86–13. The Indian–American 
community was vital in explaining the advantages of it both in the United States 
and in India.10 The US–India Business Council, representing 300 of the largest 
American companies investing in India, was particularly effective in arguing the 
commercial benefits. The geopolitical arguments were easily understood by the 
politicians themselves, irrespective of lobbies. In the United States, they were 
relatively uncontroversial. For weaker but rapidly ascending India they were 
troublesome, however. India cares very much about its sovereignty and inde-
pendence, and the sceptics were critical to the point of suspecting that the gov-
ernment had reassured the United States by extending promises in secret.
An “as if ” kind of deal
Some suggestions for how to get beyond the dilemma described above have 
addressed India, Israel and Pakistan in joint fashion. One such idea is to commit 
them to behave “as if ” they were members of the NPT. This was French policy 
for quite a while, until it became a regular member in 1992. Concretely, the “as 
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if ” formula would oblige them not to assist others in acquiring nuclear weapons 
(Article I of the NPT); to abide by the rules of international nuclear transactions 
(the safeguards requirement of Article III.2); and to dedicate themselves to 
nuclear disarmament (Article VI). Unlike the NPT parties, they are not under 
any legal obligation to disarm. In addition, they should be asked to join other 
elements of the non- proliferation regime.11
 The US–India Joint Statement issued after the meeting of President Bush and 
Prime Minister Singh on 18 July 2005 seemed to offer an “as if ” kind of deal, 
but for India only. Emanating from the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership Initi-
ative launched in January 2004, India would acquire the same benefits and 
advantages as other states “with advanced nuclear technology” (a euphemism for 
NWS). In return, it would assume the same responsibilities and practices. The 
statement treated India for what it is, a de facto NWS, yet without formally rec-
ognising India as a nuclear power. However, the end result – the US–India 
Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, often called the “123 Agreement”12 – 
stopped short of being a fully- fledged “as if ” agreement.
Rationale
Having declared itself a nuclear- weapon power in May 1998, after years of hesi-
tation and vacillation, India embarked on three basic foreign- policy transitions: 
from the normative to the pragmatic; from ideas of collective security to balance 
of power; and from the notion of disarmament to arms control. It turned around 
from being world champion in criticising the NPT for being discriminatory and 
the big powers for being hypocritical, to supporting and promoting the Treaty 
and the regime that it anchors. The 123 Agreement confirms and elaborates on it.
 Basically, the non- proliferation rationale for the agreement is simple. To lean 
on India to eliminate its nuclear arsenal and join the NPT as a non- nuclear-
weapon state (NNWS) is unrealistic to the point of being counterproductive. 
Neither can it join as an NWS, for the NPT recognises five NWS only and, in 
practice, cannot be amended. Better, then, to treat India for what it is – an NWS 
– and to commit it to the non- proliferation regime on an “as if ” basis. In the long 
run, policies are best when based on facts and not on fiction. In view of all the 
pressing proliferation concerns both in the state and non- state paradigms, the 
universality of the regime is more important than ever. The 123 Agreement is a 
step in that direction, breaking the stalemate surrounding the “three- state 
problem”. It substitutes engagement of India and commitments to non- 
proliferation standards for isolation and top- down talk.
 Did it effectively exploit the non- proliferation opportunities? Access to 
nuclear materials, equipment and technology on a par with NPT parties was a 
major concession to India. How much did it pay back in terms of non- 
proliferation commitments?
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Strengths and weaknesses
The separation plan
A plan was made to identify and separate civilian and military nuclear facilities 
and programmes in a phased manner and to declare them to the IAEA. The 
United States is committed under Article I of the NPT not to assist India in the 
development of its nuclear- weapon programme:13 does the separation plan 
square with that obligation?
 The plan places 14 of India’s 22 power reactors under safeguards. As of March 
2006, when the separation plan was introduced, 15 reactors were operational and 
seven under construction (Squassoni 2006). A fast- breeder test reactor and a proto-
type breeder under construction at Kalpakkam are on the military side of the line 
and will, therefore, not be safeguarded.14 Eight heavy- water reactors (HWRs) are 
exempted from safeguards in order to provide plutonium for current and future 
breeders in their start- up phase. A breeder reactor can produce more plutonium 
than it uses. However, it takes some years to make the prototype operational, and a 
decade or two before it can start producing plutonium for weapons. Therefore, its 
plutonium potential has the character of a nuclear insurance premium for the long 
term. HWRs also yield plutonium of weapon quality and are used for that purpose, 
but at the cost of reduced efficiency in electricity production.
 All new civilian reactors will be safeguarded. However, India itself will 
decide which reactors will be on the civilian side of the separation line (Nayan 
2006). As for the research reactors, Cirus – which produced the plutonium for 
the test in 1974 – will be decommissioned in 2010 while the other two – Dhruva 
(Trombay) and Kamini (Kalpakkam, uses U- 233) – are used for military ends. 
The core of the oldest reactor, Apsara, will be removed from the Bhaba Atomic 
Research Centre (BARC, Trombay) and submitted to safeguards in 2010.
 India has an enrichment plant in Mysore (named Rattehalli), which enriches 
uranium for use in Indian submarines. This plant and all enrichment research pro-
grammes are exempted from safeguards. India will build a new reprocessing plant 
to make the distinction between civilian and military uses clearer. On the civilian 
side, all reprocessing will be done at this plant. The United States will then treat 
India the same way as Japan and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom), where the United States allows reprocessing of fuel of American origin.
 Heavy- water production facilities – there are six of them – are not safe-
guarded on the basis of INFCIRC 153, but will be reported under the Additional 
Protocol (INFCIRC 540), to which India will accede. It remains to be seen how 
many plants will be placed on the civilian side and covered by safeguards.
 The separation plan will be introduced gradually up to 2014. Without the 
Agreement, only six of 22 power reactors would have been safeguarded;15 under 
the Agreement, 14 will be covered. On the other hand, the Agreement permits 
India to import uranium fuel for its civilian reactors so that India’s own uranium 
production, which did not allow all reactors to work at full capacity, can be used 
for military purposes instead. This is openly acknowledged on the Indian side as 
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well.16 However, the bottleneck concerns the mining and processing of the uranium 
rather than the size of the reserves, and is about to be removed. Supporters of the 
Agreement claim that the reserves are big enough for India to produce as many 
nuclear weapons as it wants to without external assistance (Tellis 2006).
 Irrespective of the sufficiency or insufficiency of domestic uranium reserves, 
transfers of nuclear material, equipment and technology to safeguarded activities 
are not in violation of Article IV of the NPT. The NSG provision of full- scope 
safeguards is, furthermore, a guideline for its 45 members, not a rule. India has 
received much safeguarded assistance over the years, subject to INFCIRC 
66-type controls. As the Agreement was coming to a conclusion, Russia was 
building two power reactors in India along with assurances of fuel supply – the 
NSG guidelines notwithstanding– and without anybody raising any question 
about Article I of the NPT.
 By and large, India can continue its nuclear- weapons programme according 
to existing plans. The 123 Agreement makes no significant difference in any 
direction, neither expanding nor constraining the programme.17 Therefore, the 
United States can hardly be criticised for violating Article I.
Enrichment-, reprocessing- and heavy- water technologies
The agreement says nothing specifically about the transfer of sensitive technolo-
gies, but it is the agreed interpretation of the NSG guidelines that sales of such 
technologies are not permitted. The United States, therefore, argued that it was 
unnecessary to repeat it in the Agreement. However, the guidelines are recom-
mendations, sometimes referred to as a “gentlemen’s agreement”, while the 123 
Agreement is binding on the parties.
 Two exceptions to the prohibition are envisaged: first, for multinational facili-
ties, which are more proliferation- resistant than national ones, and in which there 
is renewed interest; and, second, for research and development (R&D) facilities 
of more proliferation- resistant technologies, especially for reprocessing.
Access to reactor fuel
This is crucial for India, and has met with full understanding by the United 
States.18 To avoid disruptions in the deliveries, the United States was ready to 
(1) write assurances of fuel deliveries into Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy 
Act; (2) negotiate, together with India, an agreement on fuel supplies with the 
IAEA; (3) support India in the establishment of a strategic fuel reserve; and (4) 
join India in organising a group of suppliers (including France, Russia and the 
United Kingdom) that would be ready to assist if all else failed.
Safeguards
In the United States, Russia and China, the IAEA applies safeguards to select 
facilities only, on a voluntary basis. France and the United Kingdom, on the 
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other hand, have separated their civilian and military programmes, applying 
Euratom/IAEA safeguards to all civilian activities. The 123 Agreement follows 
the French/British model, precluding withdrawal of any plant or activity for 
national- security purposes and providing safeguards in perpetuity. Safeguards on 
all civilian facilities have the additional advantage of facilitating Indian partici-
pation in an international cut- off agreement.19
 Knowing that the Additional Protocol is applied, suppliers can be all the more 
certain that their deliveries will not be misused for military ends. However, the 
Protocol was developed to help detect undeclared activities in NPT member 
states, so in the case of India the value of it is limited.
The NSG guidelines
According to the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers agreed by the NSG, trigger- 
list items or related technologies can only be transferred to an NNWS when the 
receiving state has brought into force an agreement with the IAEA for safe-
guards on all source and special fissionable material in its current and future 
peaceful activities. That ruled out nuclear transfers to India. The 123 Agreement 
takes India out of the category of NNWS, places it on a par with “other leading 
countries with advanced nuclear technology such as the United States”, and aims 
at “full civil nuclear energy cooperation”.
 Some years ago, the full- scope safeguards requirement for nuclear transfers 
was important in order to bring more countries into the NPT and NPT- type safe-
guards (INFCIRC/153).20 That objective has been fulfilled. All NNWS have 
joined the NPT and its safeguards system. There is, in other words, nothing more 
to achieve by stressing the full- scope safeguards requirement. It is by accepting 
India (Israel and Pakistan) as an NWS and applying safeguards to the civilian 
activities that the safeguards coverage can be further extended.
 Today, the equivalent to the full- scope safeguards requirement – introduced 
by some suppliers already in the 1970s and adopted by the NSG in 1992 – is the 
attempt to make the Additional Protocol part of a new, enhanced safeguards 
requirement for nuclear transfers. There is a long way to go: by January 2010, 
protocols were in force in only 94 NPT member states. India’s acceptance of the 
Protocol is a minor step towards universal application of the new requirement. 
Presumably, there is a tipping point at which the NSG might agree to make 
acceptance of the Protocol a condition for transfers, but that would be at a much 
higher number of acceptances.
 India’s record of compliance with the rules of international nuclear commerce 
sheds credibility on its commitment to go by the NSG guidelines and refrain 
from transferring fuel- cycle technologies to states that do not have them. It 
pledges, furthermore, to “support international efforts to limit [the] spread of 
enrichment and reprocessing technologies”. This is a general expression of 
support for enhanced international efforts to constrain the proliferation of fuel- 
cycle facilities in line with President Bush’s proposal of February 2004 (White 
House 2004).
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Export control
The United States wants India to institutionalise world- class export controls. 
Under UNSC Resolution 1540, India is already committed to the strongest pos-
sible non- proliferation practices in this respect. Legally, the Agreement, there-
fore, does not add to the obligation already undertaken. Concrete export- control 
improvements can just as well be worked out on the basis of Resolution 1540. 
However, the Agreement raises the awareness and stresses the importance of 
strict controls.
 The commitment under Article I of the NPT is not limited to the governmen-
tal sphere. The governments must see to it that the private sector, too, complies 
with it. The same goes for the safeguards obligation under Article III.2. In order 
to live up to these commitments, effective export- control systems and proper 
reporting routines to the IAEA are needed. Under an international legal arrange-
ment to this effect, other states can legitimately raise questions about export reg-
ulations and, also, offer their cooperation in establishing more effective 
domestic- control systems. The NSG guidelines do not have that status, but 
UNSC Resolution 1540 has.
Fissile Material Cut- Off Treaty (FMCT)
The commitment to work for an FMCT is not new either. It was part of the 
Indian policy package to soften the political shockwaves created by the 1998 
tests, along with a moratorium on new nuclear tests, a no- first-use (NFU) pledge 
and a minimum deterrence posture.
 The FMCT has been a non- starter. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) 
adopted a mandate for FMCT negotiations in 1995, but no negotiations have 
taken place. The prospects got even dimmer when the Bush administration stated 
that an FMCT would not be verifiable. There is an element of cynicism in this 
plea: India promises to work towards a treaty which is not expected to come 
about, or the negotiation of it may be marred by so many difficult problems that 
it would go on until a sufficient amount of materials has been produced. In the 
meantime, India’s fissile- material production continues.
 Four of the five recognised NWS have issued a moratorium on production 
of fissile materials for weapons. China seems to have stopped, too, but without 
announcing it. Critics of the Agreement see the lack of such a commitment by 
India as a serious weakness. However, had a cap on fissile- material production 
been made a condition, no agreement would have been possible (Mohan 
2007).
Nuclear testing
India declared a moratorium on nuclear- weapon tests in 1998 and has an under-
standing with Pakistan not to be the first to resume testing. The 123 Agreement 
adds a bilateral commitment to the United States to that same effect. This was 
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the least the Agreement could contain on the important matter of nuclear- weapon 
testing.
 What will happen if India resumes testing? The Agreement is vague on this 
issue. US law entitles the administration to stop further cooperation, and this is 
the likely consequence if India is the first to break out of the current moratorium. 
If another NWS starts testing and India follows suit, the reaction is not so 
obvious. There might be no legitimate ground for leaning on India.
 India’s signature on the CTBT would have been an achievement. A party 
signing an international agreement commits itself not to do anything that may 
complicate the ratification of it. However, since the Bush administration had 
been looking for ways to erase Clinton’s signature of the Treaty, it was not in a 
position to urge India to sign.
Missile technology control regime (MTCR)
India committed itself to follow the guidelines of this regime. The commitment 
is important, for India has an advanced missile programme. Similar to its nuclear 
export controls, India already has a good record of compliance with these rules.
Disarmament
This is an empty category. The Agreement contains no such commitment. While all 
members of the NPT are under an international legal obligation to work for nuclear 
disarmament, the non- members are not. In view of the dismal disarmament record 
of the NWS parties, the same undertaking by India would not necessarily make 
much of a difference. However, had it been committed in reference to Article VI, it 
could have been held accountable in the review process of the NPT and be asked to 
respond to questions in other settings where nuclear disarmament is discussed on a 
par with the other NWS. Today, there is no formal basis for such requests.
 Similar to the test- ban issue, the United States could not be expected to press 
India to undertake a disarmament commitment that it itself belittled. The 
domestic debate about the agreement hardened India’s opposition to it, the right- 
wing fearing that the nuclear arsenal would be unduly constrained. Traditionally, 
however, India has had a high profile on disarmament issues, and under the influ-
ence of recent US policies it revived that declaratory policy. It continues to 
support the proposal for a nuclear- weapon convention to abolish such weapons 
worldwide on an agreed timeline. As the controversies about it are put to rest, it 
may therefore see fit to make such a commitment, especially if, in the meantime, 
progress is made on disarmament and non- proliferation matters.
Assessment
If India exploits its capacity fully, it can produce in the order of 50 nuclear 
weapons per year without violating the Agreement. That would trigger an arms 
race with Pakistan and China. Pakistan tries to match India as best it can.
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 China has shown impressive restraint over the decades. Challenged by the 
evolution of the US force posture, it modernises and expands its nuclear forces 
at the risk of provoking India, but with no special intention of doing so. China 
tries to maintain its retaliatory capabilities while avoiding steps that may lead to 
a more demanding security environment. This is a delicate balance, conducted in 
the best interest of domestic economic and political development and reform. 
India has never defined what “minimal deterrence” should mean. It justifies its 
force acquisitions in reference to China, but has no interest in triggering any 
arms competition with it. Its maximum production capacity is therefore of little 
or no practical interest. However, India also has a balancing act to conduct 
between China and Pakistan, building a nuclear arsenal that addresses both 
without being trapped into arms- racing.
 For the Bush administration, a strategic partnership with India was a major 
foreign- policy objective.21 Widely criticised for its hard- nosed, militaristic foreign 
policy – and for the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular – a diplomatic 
success was in high demand. A breakthrough in relations with one of the heavy-
weights on the Asian scene would be a major achievement. Critics, therefore, 
claim that the United States entered the negotiations at a disadvantage: if you fall 
in love with a commodity before the price is fixed, you end up paying more than 
is strictly speaking necessary. However, pressures for such a partnership had been 
building up in India, too. India worked hard to become a legitimate partner in 
international affairs, especially after the tests in 1998, and the nuclear deal lifted 
it from a lower tier of nations to a bona fide partner with the United States and 
other big and small nations. Much was therefore at stake on both sides. Both had 
a keen interest in closer relations. The fact that the Agreement was passed with 
the smallest of margins in India, while both Houses of the US Congress endorsed 
it with big majorities, suggests that if any of them could have offered more 
without risking defeat at home, it was the United States rather than India.
 Non- proliferation critics charge that the United States gave priority to eco-
nomic interests and geopolitical considerations at the expense of non- 
proliferation concerns. This impression is shared by many supporters, too. On 
the other hand, what more could the United States have obtained, given its own 
devaluation of many elements of the non- proliferation regime?
 The critics seem to ignore India’s new- won economic and political strength. 
Powers that are strong and about to grow even stronger usually have the confi-
dence to pursue their interests with particular vigour, and India is no exception. 
India shows greater respect for international rules, norms and standards than the 
United States did at the time the Agreement was negotiated, but like so many 
other states in the East and South it cares very much about its sovereignty (see 
Chapter 1). In its current phase of rapid growth, India stiffly opposes external 
attempts to dictate its foreign policy. The United States never had a say in Indian 
affairs anywhere near its influence in, for instance, Pakistan and many countries 
in the Middle East and East Asia.
 Still, in some respects the nuclear deal was important enough to warrant 
accommodation to US interests. US attempts to line India up against Iran were 
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painful for India. On two occasions – in September 2005, when the IAEA Board 
of Governors declared Iran to be in past non- compliance with its safeguards 
obligations, and in February 2006, when the Iran file was sent to the UNSC – 
India voted with the United States. On both occasions, it may have yielded to US 
and Western pressure not to jeopardise the deal. Had it not gone with the major-
ity, it could also have complicated India’s relations with Israel, its second largest 
defence supplier.22 Later, the Hyde Act underlined the importance of securing 
India’s “full and active participation” in US efforts to block Iranian attempts to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and asked the administration to 
report on the steps that India took in this connection (Hyde Act, Section 103(4)). 
The United States also lent on India to cancel the plans for a gas pipeline from 
Iran via Pakistan. However, it was the security environment in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan that held it up: US pressure was rebuffed. While India had reasons 
of its own to oppose another NWS in the region, it kept stressing that it had 
friendly relations with Iran.23
 Once the Agreement was clinched and the sanctions were lifted, India was 
free to pursue its own priorities with great determination. However, the Indian 
opposition remained suspicious of hidden concessions to the United States, and 
kept questioning the government about it.
 Did the gains of the Agreement come at the cost of diminished commitments 
to non- proliferation by others? Many non- proliferation experts argued that the 
Agreement amounts to a reward for bad behaviour and that as a consequence, 
other states would feel less committed to the Treaty. They feared that some 
states would actively exploit it for objectives of their own other than non- 
proliferation. In particular, the critics argued that the Agreement left the door 
wide open for Israel and Pakistan to emulate it, using the Indian precedent to 
gain access to the international nuclear market, irrespective of their weapon 
acquisitions. Iran and other NPT members in dubious standing might see fit to 
do the same. Why should Iran be punished on mere suspicion of weapons intent 
when India, a non- member and a declared NWS, was granted full access? In the 
view of some, the cause of non- proliferation would have been better served by 
sticking to the full- scope safeguards requirement as a condition of supply, avoid-
ing any exception to the NSG rules. In the view of others, the Agreement is 
flawed for lack of non- proliferation and disarmament commitments from India.
 The worries about Israel and Pakistan are exaggerated, however. They are far 
from being in a position to benefit from the 123 Agreement. True, Pakistan 
wants an agreement with the United States similar to India’s, and it has been 
speculated that China and Pakistan may emulate it. Israel has also explored the 
possibility of being exempted from the NSG guidelines. However, Pakistan has 
not reoriented itself the way India has, and does not enjoy the same status. It is 
not a state in proper export control standing: for years, it violated the rules of 
international nuclear commerce and governmental institutions remain weak. This 
is not the time, therefore, to invite the NSG to make an exemption for Pakistan. 
China did not try, anyhow. Its gigantic, domestic modernisation project depends 
on harmonious relations with the outside world, and provocative foreign- policy 
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experiments are alien to the decision- makers in Beijing. China hardly appreci-
ates the US–India agreement – certainly not its geopolitical aspects – but went 
along with it so as to not antagonise the United States and others. Israel does not 
admit to having nuclear weapons and is therefore not prepared to draw any sepa-
ration line between civilian and military programmes. It follows that it is not in a 
position to claim exemption from the NSG guidelines in reference to India.
 Iran criticised the NSG for making the exemption: “It is in the direct contra-
vention with the Treaty [NPT] . . . to engage in nuclear cooperation with any 
State whose nuclear facilities are not under IAEA full- scope safeguards” (NPT/
CONF2.2010/PCIII/WP.7, paragraphs 11 and 12). The criticism was muted, 
however. India is important for Iran and so are other Asian states. Russia and 
China, the Asian members of the P5, are holding back on UN sanctions, and 
India is a big potential customer of Iranian petroleum. Economically, Asia is 
about to become a comfort zone for Iran, compensating for the restraints that are 
imposed by the Western world. In the history of Iran, relations with countries to 
the East and North East have been at least as important as relations westwards. 
A reorientation in that direction therefore means resumption of long traditions.
 Arab states strongly criticised the exemption and continue to do so, mainly 
out of concern for the potential implications for Israel. Other NAM countries 
likewise, although at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on 1 August 2008, 
several NAM members gave broad support to the conclusion of the new safe-
guards agreement with India24 and, implicitly, to the NSG exemption.25 Some 
NSG members that argue for stricter non- proliferation provisions may have suc-
cumbed to pressure from the United States and others, but the great majority 
willingly supported the Agreement. States in the South (Argentina, Brazil, South 
Africa) as well as vendors in the North came out in favour. No NPT member has 
signalled reduced support for the Treaty because of the exemption, and no one 
has withdrawn from any other part of the international non- proliferation regime. 
In the future, those who favoured stricter provisions will shift their attention 
from criticising the Agreement to becoming first- line guardians of the non- 
proliferation commitments that were listed in the NSG decision and work for 
further restraints. The NSG decided to review the implementation of the Agree-
ment on a regular basis.
 In one way, the US–India agreement is stricter than the NPT; in another, more 
permissive. The permissive part concerns the disarmament commitment of 
Article VI. The agreement contains no commitments in this respect. The stricter 
part concerns the fact that, under the NPT, the NWS are free to assist each other 
in developing nuclear warheads and in testing them; to receive from any state 
the material necessary to pursue their nuclear- weapon programmes; and to 
decide by themselves whether, and to what extent, they should accept interna-
tional controls over their peaceful activities.
 The US–India agreement does not provide the same privileges for India. The 
United States wanted to ensure that India applies world- class export controls, 
blocking Indian contributions to any and all weapon- oriented programmes. Fur-
thermore, by separating military and civilian activities and putting all civilian 
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activities under safeguards, suppliers would know that they do not contribute to 
India’s military programme, although the line between civilian and military 
applications is not watertight and probably never can be. The prohibition of 
enrichment, reprocessing and heavy- water technology transfers – in the NSG 
guidelines, but not explicated in the agreement – corroborates it.
 In the long run, policies are best when based on facts and not on fiction. The 
fact is that India is an NWS and is unlikely to eliminate its arsenal any sooner 
than any of the five. Since it cannot become a member of the NPT, this means 
that the only way to commit it to the principles and practice of non- proliferation 
and disarmament is to urge it to behave “as if ” it were a member of the Treaty 
and commit it to all other relevant parts of the non- proliferation regime. The 
US–India agreement is a step in that direction – a building block that may lead 
to full- scale involvement in the regime. The warnings of negative effects, so 
strongly propounded by alarmist non- governmental critics, were exaggerated.
 Given the differences between the three outliers, there was always a case for 
addressing them separately, one by one. The US–India agreement, specific for 
India, confirms it. However, it suggests certain options for Israel and Pakistan as 
well. If they follow the Indian example and move closer to the international 
regime, similar agreements may sooner or later be agreed for the other outliers. 
For all of them, however, there is a point at which they cannot be brought deeper 
into non- proliferation and disarmament endeavours unless they are formally rec-
ognised – de jure – for what they are, i.e. NWS.
Recognition
Unless international law has a life of its own, disconnected from the realities of 
the world, de jure recognition of India is a matter of time. The question is not 
whether it will happen, but when and under what circumstances. Still, it is a 
touchy question that merits thorough examination. In the following analysis of 
arguments for and against recognition, “recognition” is used in the full de jure 
sense of the term.
 First, representatives of some states have indicated that, if the nuclear club 
were to be enlarged beyond the five, they might have to reconsider their non- 
nuclear status. For instance, such voices have been heard in Japan, despite the 
difficulties that this would pose in the consensus- minded Japanese political 
system and the pain that nuclear issues evoke among the victims of nuclear 
bombing. In effect, however, India has been an NWS for a long time: if these 
states could live with the reality of Indian nuclear weapons, they should be able 
to live with the formality of it as well.
 For Japan, like the United States, geopolitical factors favouring closer rela-
tions with India out of concern for China, and economic interests in the Indian 
market, played a role in this connection. In the end, the 123 Agreement did not 
trigger any national debate about Japan’s commitment to the NPT. During the 
NSG deliberations, the countries urging India to enhance its non- proliferation 
commitments were non- proliferation stalwarts, such as Austria, Ireland, New 
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Zealand and Norway, not states that acceded to the NPT on the ground that there 
would be five NWS only.
 Second, none of the countries that entered the NPT on the understanding that 
there would be only five NWS – Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Japan, South Africa 
and South Korea – can credibly claim that their security is jeopardised by the 
nuclear- weapon acquisitions in South Asia. As India acquires missiles of longer 
range, some of them may come within their reach. Still, it would be far- fetched 
to argue that the formal aspect – recognition of the nuclear facts – is a factor 
upsetting their security calculations. States base their security policies more on 
tangible facts than on formalities.
 However, there is a category between tangibles and formalities – political 
perceptions of prestige and civilisational pride – that affect security policies. For 
instance, deterrence relies not only on tangible facts but also on impressions of 
willpower. Recognition would be a sign of success and strong will on the part of 
those who were determined to follow through on their nuclear ambitions. In a 
sense, recognition would not only recognise India’s nuclear assets, but pay 
tribute to its assertiveness and willpower as well, leaving other states a bit infe-
rior in comparison.
 Third, while being harshly criticised in 1998 and for some time thereafter, the 
123 Agreement took India off that hook. Clearly, this is a relief for Delhi. 
However, it should not be seen as a concession: to drop a policy that did not 
work is no reward to others.
 Fourth, does recognition bring a bonus in terms of higher status in the inter-
national system? It probably does. At least in rudimentary terms, states distin-
guish between the mighty and the less mighty, and adjust their behaviour to that 
ranking order. Nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945, but they remain 
attractive because they translate into status and weight in the international 
system. As long as they are perceived this way, they function accordingly.
 Higher status for some means lower status for others, so there is a feeling 
among some NNWS that higher status for India will leave them at a loss. For 
instance, India’s nuclear programme may be invoked against a permanent seat in 
the UNSC, not to provide any reward for the 1998 tests and not to extend the 
unhappy combination of between permanent membership and nuclear weapon 
possession, but in the long run such arguments are likely to dissipate in favour of 
gross size and weight, to which its nuclear weapons contribute. So there is prob-
ably a bonus to be reaped both in absolute and relative terms.
 Fifth, the agreement provides full access to civil nuclear technology in return 
for (marginally) stronger non- proliferation commitments. Some see this as a 
reward for imprudent behaviour; others consider it a win–win situation. If it 
leaves the impression that hereafter threshold countries could move ahead to test, 
gain access to nuclear technology and be recognised as NWS – on the Indian 
precedent – the implications are clearly unfortunate for the cause of non- 
proliferation. However, no other case is quite comparable to India (Israel and 
Pakistan). Should other states want to go nuclear, they would have to renege on 
their NPT commitment.
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 Sixth, are there other ways in which recognition of India as an NWS would 
encourage other states to follow suit? Could NPT members contemplating acqui-
sition of nuclear arms prepare themselves under the umbrella of the Treaty, give 
three months’ notice of withdrawal, and then try to soften the pressure levelled 
on them by offering to walk in the path of India and abide by the provisions of 
the NPT “as if ” they were members?
 It is important to rule this possibility out. The 123 Agreement should be 
accompanied by intensified efforts to make the non- proliferation regime univer-
sal and further proliferation more difficult. New instruments and procedures 
should be devised to make it harder to leave the NPT. A variety of ideas have 
been aired in recent years (see Chapter 9). India should be asked to participate 
actively in the development of such measures to ensure that the 123 Agreement 
would not make proliferation less difficult.
 Seventh, as noted above, recognition of India qua NWS would make it possible 
to draw it into arms- control arrangements from which it is now excluded. It could 
be asked to extend security assurances to members of NWFZ; a bilateral no- first-
use commitment between India and Russia might be possible, on the model of an 
existing exchange of letters between the leaders of Russia and China containing 
such a commitment; or a trilateral agreement to this end could be considered. If the 
United States and Russia were to reduce their arsenals to no more than 1,000 oper-
ative weapons while inviting the other NWS for multilateral disarmament negotia-
tions, excluding India and others on the ground that participation would confer 
recognition on them would be absurd. Given that we are dealing with an NWS that 
has come to stay, it would be unwise not to extract commitments from it.
 All told, the advantages outweigh the costs. The cost is, first of all, the 
enhanced status that recognition confers on India. This is nothing new, but 
reconfirmation of the status benefits of nuclear weapons is bad enough. The main 
advantage is that recognition allows for Indian involvement in arms control and 
disarmament agreements. Since India stands to gain from being recognised, it 
should be invited to undertake additional arms control and disarmament commit-
ments, on the basis of a list of criteria to be applied to all three non- parties. All 
states – the members of the NPT as well as the non- parties – should be drawn 
into a new consensus on non- proliferation and disarmament based on the grand 
bargain of 1968.
Reconfirming and realigning the grand bargain
What does it mean to draw the outliers into a new global consensus on non- 
proliferation and disarmament? What is required of them and how much do they 
have to change? Tying into the ten requirements of a new global consensus out-
lined in Chapter 4, eight of them have implications for one or more of the three 
non- parties.
 First, in the NPT, it is the weapons that are the units of account, not their pos-
sessors. India and Pakistan follow the NPT in this respect, while the Israeli posi-
tion is ambiguous.
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 Second, negotiations must be reinstated as a bona fide modality of non- 
proliferation policy. The Obama administration set out to do so. India and Paki-
stan also favour negotiations, while Israel has little faith in such an approach 
towards Iran. Rather, it believes in the utility of military force.
 Third, in international law, preventive attack against an opponent who may or 
may not become a real threat in the future is not permitted. Such attacks are at 
odds with the non- proliferation regime, which is part and parcel of international 
law. In Israel, preventive attack has been military doctrine for more than 25 years26 
and advocated as a means of last resort to stop the Iranian nuclear programme. 
India and Pakistan do not favour preventive attack against the nuclear programmes 
of other states, and have agreed not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities.
 Fourth, in the field of verification, the principle is adequacy. The operative 
meaning of it has to be adjusted from time to time.27 India has accepted that 
standard for its civilian activities. Israel and Pakistan stay with pre- NPT facility- 
specific INFCIRC 66-type agreements.
 Fifth, reconfirming the basics is very much about re- establishing the original 
balance between the pillars of the NPT: non- proliferation, disarmament and peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy. Among the outliers, Pakistan is known to be one of the 
worst proliferators ever. On nuclear disarmament, India has been more vocal than 
the others. All of them would like to be admitted into the international market for 
nuclear material, equipment and technology, but for Israel this has been a lower pri-
ority than for the South Asian states. India and Pakistan have been world champi-
ons in criticising the NPT for being unbalanced and discriminatory, and the NWS 
for being hypocritical. After 1998, that criticism has abated, but it remains a signi-
ficant undercurrent in both countries. Israel has been low- profile in this respect.
 Sixth, all parties to the NPT are obliged to work for nuclear disarmament. 
India and Pakistan have criticised the NWS vehemently for their failure to 
disarm – the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia in particular. Today, the 
aggressiveness of their disarmament advocacy is gone. Instead, they are trying to 
fend off global measures to implement the first part of Article VI – “cessation of 
the nuclear arms race at an early date” – which includes a test ban and a cut- off. 
Israel was never very outspoken on behalf of nuclear disarmament, in reality 
being an NWS itself from the late 1960s, and has been wary of criticising its 
close partner and security guarantor, the United States.
 Seventh, the relationship between counter- proliferation and non- proliferation 
is ambiguous and complex. Counter- proliferation threats may supplement the 
regime in the best interests of non- proliferation – adding a deterrent capability to 
a regime that is very weak on means of enforcement – while actual use of force 
may undermine the same objective. The aim must therefore be to live with the 
differences between non- proliferation and counter- proliferation as best one can, 
and exploit opportunities to make them mutually re- enforcing. This is a delicate 
challenge for non- parties as well as parties to the NPT.
 Eighth, for international regimes to function properly, some important actor 
or actors have to exercise leadership. The roles of India, Israel and Pakistan can 
only be secondary in this respect, for the very reason that they are outliers. 
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India’s orientation towards the existing arms- control order makes it easier to 
forge a new consensus on non- proliferation and disarmament.
Summary and conclusions
The US–India agreement recognises the fact that India is an NWS. By endorsing 
the agreement and exempting India from the NSG guidelines, all NSG members 
did the same.
 Sooner or later, de jure recognition of India as an NWS will follow. Interna-
tional law – which currently holds that there are only five nuclear powers – will 
have to be reconciled with the realities of the contemporary world. The question 
is: under what circumstances would it be appropriate to make that happen?
 Except for the disarmament clause of Article VI, India has committed itself to 
the provisions of the NPT. It seems well on its way to an Article VI commit-
ment, too. In October 2006, it outlined a set of proposals for nuclear disarma-
ment, determined that its post- 1998 alignment with the existing arms- control 
order should not erase its traditional push for disarmament. At the twentieth 
anniversary of Rajiv Gandhi’s UN speech of 1988 outlining India’s “Action plan 
for ushering in a nuclear- weapon-free world and non- violent order”, Manmohan 
Singh (2009) expressed urgency with respect to the goal of an NWFW and 
stressed that measures to this effect would apply both to parties and non- parties 
to the NPT. At the Munich Conference in February 2009, India’s national secur-
ity advisor Mayankote Narayanan presented New Delhi’s approach to nuclear 
disarmament, non- proliferation and arms control, stressing their interconnected-
ness and outlining a set of steps on the way to an NWFW. The pronouncements 
at the Rajiv Gandhi anniversary were clearly inspired by the American “gang of 
four”, and the Munich speech, likewise, by President Obama’s disarmament 
vision.
 The new US policies have enabled India to revert to its pro- disarmament 
stance. To be fully recognised as an NWS, it plays on its disarmament creden-
tials to curry favour both with the Western powers and with NAM countries. A 
formal Article VI commitment may, therefore, be near at hand. If and when it 
happens, India would have undertaken to behave “as if ” it were a member of the 
NPT. One possibility, therefore, would be to wait for this commitment to come 
forward before extending de jure recognition to it, and let this be the standard 
that Pakistan must live up to in order to be treated the same way. Pakistan is far 
from that standard today, but for the sake of disarmament and non- proliferation 
NPT parties should encourage and assist Pakistan to get there. The prospect of 
an agreement similar to the Indian one could help it walk the last mile.28
 Another possibility is a criteria- based approach applicable, in principle, to all 
outliers. It could build on the elements that were highlighted by the NSG when 
the exemption was made for India. They were:
• separation of civilian and military facilities and declaration of all civilian 
facilities to the IAEA, in accordance with the separation plan;
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• an agreement on the application of safeguards to the civilian facilities in 
accordance with IAEA standards;
• adoption of an Additional Protocol to the standard safeguards agreement;
• no transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not 
have them, and support for international efforts to limit their spread;
• institution of a national export- control system capable of effectively control-
ling transfers of multilaterally controlled nuclear and nuclear- related mater-
ial, equipment and technology;
• harmonisation of export control lists and guidelines with those of the NSG 
and a commitment to adhere to the NSG guidelines; and
• a moratorium on nuclear testing and a readiness to work with others towards 
the conclusion of a multilateral FMCT.
 In addition, a disarmament commitment equivalent to Article VI; signature, if 
not accession, to the CTBT; limitations on fissile material production while 
waiting for a cut- off treaty to be negotiated, if not a moratorium; and, possibly, a 
stronger separation line between civilian and military activities may be 
required.29 This means a longer timeline for recognition than a mere “as if ” 
requirement. So far, India has not been willing to sign the CTBT, and had the 
United States demanded a halt in the production of fissile materials there would 
have been no 123 negotiation. For Pakistan, which faces the same hurdles, it also 
remains to meet some of the criteria listed above, the export control requirement 
in particular.
 For India, signature and ratification of the CTBT presupposes that the United 
States and China do so first. It may not be enough: in the domestic debate, some 
proponents of a thermonuclear capability claim that this cannot be achieved 
without further testing. But if other states in the “World Without the West” urge 
India to take responsibility for the global nuclear order by doing what the other 
NWS do, India’s interest in being recognised as a global leader could lead it to 
cooperate – especially if the request is framed in India’s long- standing quest for 
nuclear disarmament and addressed to a Congress Party government.
 For an FMCT to be concluded, more will be required of the leading NWS, 
such as restrictions on ballistic- missile defence and militarisation of outer space. 
This may win enough time for India and Pakistan to acquire the fissile material 
stocks they deem adequate. India is unlikely to compromise on its ambition to 
build a minimum deterrent, and Pakistan will be no different. There is hardly 
any short- cut to nuclear arms control and disarmament in South Asia.
 As for the separation line, the 123 Agreement fails to prohibit India from 
extracting tritium for weapons from its safeguarded power reactors, and permits 
free flow of personnel and information between safeguarded and unsafeguarded 
activities. This indicates that there is scope for further clarification.
 Israel has signed the CTBT and may have enough fissile materials to agree to 
a cut- off. It probably finds it harder to accept the necessary verification arrange-
ments. As long as it does not admit to being an NWS, there is no separation line 
to discuss and no recognition to consider. In this fundamental respect, Israel is 
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unprepared for a criteria- based approach built on the US–India- type deal. 
However, its declaratory policy of opacity/ambiguity does not prevent it from 
making an “as if ” commitment. For Israel, such a commitment would entail no 
significant sacrifice and no significant gain. It would be a gesture of good will.
 As long as the outliers are not formally recognised for what they are, they 
cannot become parties to arms- control agreements qua NWS. For instance, they 
cannot be asked to extend security assurances to members of NWFZ. If they are 
to be involved in nuclear disarmament negotiations with a view to ambitious 
agreements affecting the arsenals of all NWS, de jure recognition of them is a 
sine qua non. Any serious pursuit of an NWFW must take them on board, so at 
some stage they have to be formally recognised as NWS.
 The requirements for a new consensus on non- proliferation, disarmament and 
peaceful uses show that much more than Articles I, III.2 and VI is involved. 
There are fundamental modes of behaviour to be respected (unit of account, 
negotiations, commitment to international law); a proper balance between the 
pillars to be re- established; a delicate co- existence between non- proliferation and 
counter- proliferation to be managed; and a leadership role to be filled. Among 
the outliers, India is closest to the requirements for a new consensus, while 
 Pakistan and Israel, in particular, are at a great distance from it.
 When the US–India agreement entered into force, there was no similar agree-
ment in the making. If there is another agreement, it may have to wait a long 
time. For India to comply with the demands of a criteria- based approach may 
take a long while as well, depending on where the bar is set. For some time 
ahead, the best approach may therefore be a pragmatic, incremental one, sensi-




Proliferation is about moves towards weaponisation. Rollback is a process in the 
opposite direction, reversing intentions and/or capabilities to acquire nuclear 
arms.1 Some states have rolled back to stable non- nuclear status. Others have 
kept a certain preparedness for going nuclear if changing circumstances so 
suggest. Yet others have rolled back and forth between different degrees of inter-
est in the nuclear option and different degrees of material preparedness to exer-
cise it. This is sometimes referred to as “nuclear latency”.2
	 Ariel	 Levite	 (2002–2003)	 defines	 rollback	 as	 “a	 governmental	 decision	 to	
slow	or	 stop	 altogether	 an	 officially	 sanctioned	 nuclear	weapons	 programme”.	
Unauthorised weapon- related activities and private- sector research and develop-
ment	in	weapon-	related	fields	are	not	included	in	the	definition.	The	distinction	
between sanctioned and unauthorised activities is not clear- cut, however: when 
scientists have had ample resources at their disposal and felt free to use them, 
they have sometimes “strayed off ” into weapons- related experiments. Inadvert-
ently or deliberately, the authorities may not have given accurate guidance, 
leaving a grey area that experts felt they could legitimately explore. Some such 
cases were discovered when the IAEA began to implement the Additional Proto-
col, among them South Korea, which conducted enrichment experiments as late 
as 2000. The Protocol enables the Agency to undertake a more comprehensive 
examination of the nuclear history of member states, inducing stricter govern-
mental guidance of nuclear activities.
	 The	 definition	 includes	 cases	 where	 no	 explicit decision has been made to 
pursue the bomb, or where a governmental decision to acquire the bomb could 
not be ascertained. Because the lead times are long, such decisions are rarely 
made at early stages of a nuclear programme. It simply serves no purpose 
because, largely, preparations can be done under dual- use cover.3 Non- nuclear 
components of nuclear- weapon systems can, moreover, be developed in secret 
because	the	Additional	Protocol	does	not	allow	the	Agency	to	go	beyond	fissile	
materials	and	fissile	material-	related	activities.	If	an	early	decision	is	leaked	well	
before the weapon is in hand, it would be a major inconvenience.4 Better, there-
fore, not to run such a risk and conduct the programme under other headings, 
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waiting to see how things unfold. Similarly, rollback processes often begin 
slowly and hesitantly and proceed incrementally. Clear- cut conclusions are 
seldom drawn until the trade- offs are apparent and the risks are minimised 
(Levite 2002–2003).
	 At	the	core	of	this	wide	definition	is	the	distinction	between	states	that	have	
“done something” in the direction of the weapons option and then abandoned it, 
and those that have shown no interest. It leads to a list of 36 cases where some 
weapon- oriented activity or other has been conducted: 23 of them tried but gave 
up; four produced weapons or had them on their territories, but decided to elimi-
nate and remove them (South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan); and 
nine became NWS (Muller and Schmidt 2010).
 For the purpose of analysing proliferation and rollback, states may be grouped 
in	 five	 categories:	 rejection,	 hedging,	 restraint,	 active	 pursuit	 and	 acquisition.	
Three	of	them	pertain	specifically	to	rollback:	rejection,	hedging	and	restraint.
 “Rejection” means that the option to acquire nuclear weapons has disappeared 
from the political agenda. Similar to the use of force in security communities, it 
is no longer being considered. It is not that the weapons option is discussed from 
time to time, but turned down: it has disappeared from the screen. Rejection 
means that weapons acquisition has become a non- issue.
 Rejection may or may not be combined with dismantlement of relevant infra-
structure. To roll North Korea back to stable non- nuclear status, dismantlement 
of most, if not all, of its nuclear facilities would be required. Even so, given the 
deep distrust in the North Korean government, a credible rejectionist posture can 
only	evolve	over	time,	or	full	confidence	can	be	obtained	by	a	change	of	regime	
–	in	North	Korea	or	in	the	form	of	a	reunified,	non-	nuclear	Korean	peninsula.	In	
highly industrialised states, on the other hand, dismantlement may not be a prac-
tical option because a variety of dual- use technologies already exist in civilian 
sectors. There, the credibility of rejectionist postures rests on a national political 
consensus to disregard the nuclear option.
 “Hedging” means maintenance of an indigenous capacity to produce nuclear 
weapons on relatively short notice, ranging from several weeks to a few years. A 
hedging strategy may be more or less sensitive to changes in the factors that con-
dition it. It may be actively adapted to changing circumstances or it may be 
linked to a certain capability that is passively maintained irrespective of contex-
tual changes. Hedging is a choice of strategic posture ranging from active to 
passive preparedness for nuclear- weapon production.
 “Restraint” falls short of reversal but keeps states from proceeding to promi-
nent nuclear activities such as testing of nuclear explosive devices, production of 
weapon- grade materials and construction of fuel- cycle facilities that may be used 
for military ends. For many years, India and Pakistan exercised various kinds of 
restraints. In terms of testing, India held back for almost 25 years: it tested a 
nuclear device as early as 1974, but did not proceed to weapons tests until 1998. 
South Korea and Taiwan have also been persuaded – by the United States – to 
exercise restraint. On other occasions they have been pressed to roll back.5
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The cases
Using Levite’s categorisation and Muller and Schmidt’s update as of 2010, the 
history of nuclear rollback and nuclear proliferation looks as follows:
 Sweden is a case of complete rejection. In the 1960s, after having built two 
plutonium production reactors and after a period of slow decline in the govern-
ment’s interest in the weapons option, Sweden concluded that regardless of what 
the NWS were doing, it would not be in Sweden’s interest to acquire nuclear 
weapons. The conclusion was virtually unconditional. The only reservation was 
in reference to possible long- term developments making “nuclear weapons 
standard equipment of ordinary states” (Prawitz 1995; Cole 1997; Jonter forth-
coming). Widely known as the “Swedish example”, it inspired other govern-
ments to draw similar conclusions and join the NPT.
 South Africa is the only state to have eliminated an indigenously 
developed,6 ready- made nuclear arsenal. When President de Klerk halted 
weapons production in 1989, seven gun- type uranium weapons had been built 
and number eight was under construction. The dismantlement of them began 
in July 1990 and was completed by June 1991, when all HEU had been 
removed from the weapons and transported to Pelindaba. South Africa signed 
the NPT on 10 July 1991; the safeguards agreement entered into force on 16 
September; and the IAEA began its inspections in November. South Africa 
provided full disclosure – on a formula allowing the IAEA to go “anywhere, at 
any	time,	but	for	a	reason”	–	enabling	the	Agency	to	confirm	beyond	doubt	its	
reversal to non- nuclear status.7
 The NPT permits the non- nuclear parties to move close to nuclear- weapon 
possession,	first	of	all	by	allowing	national	fuel-	cycle	facilities.	Only	activities	
unambiguously related to weapon acquisition – such as work on warhead design, 
trigger mechanisms and other non- nuclear components of nuclear weapons – are 
prohibited. Advanced industrial states can cut these obstacles short, for relevant 
know- how exists in civilian sectors. They may come within a few weeks of 
ready- made weapons without doing anything illegal. In such cases, it is doubtful 
whether the safeguards system can provide any meaningful warning.
 This leaves a wide range of hedging options. Japan is at the advanced end: it 
has	 high-	capacity	 fuel-	cycle	 plants,	 huge	 stocks	 of	 fissile	materials,	 electronic	
trigger technology and the human expertise to build a large arsenal in a short 
period of time. Despite its “three nuclear principles”8 and the constitutional pro-
hibition	of	nuclear	weapons,	Japanese	officials	have	emphasised	that	the	princi-
ples may be revisited and the constitution reinterpreted.9 Germany is comparable 
to Japan capability- wise, but has no hedging strategy. Other European states, as 
well as Canada and Australia, are in a similar position, possessing advanced 
nuclear industries but with no intention to mobilise them for military ends. They 
are closer to Sweden than to Japan, and are usually considered rejectionist. 
Argentina and Brazil are parties to the Tlatelolco Treaty and the NPT and may 
be considered in a state of passive hedging, while South Korea and Taiwan – 
which have rolled back and forth a couple of times – may be labelled cases of 
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active hedging. If there is a crack in the non- proliferation dam in East Asia, more 
states may reconsider their current status.
 Rejection is not to say that nuclear weapons are out forever. The predictabil-
ity of international relations is too low for guarantees to be issued.10 However, 
for many states on the nuclear rollback list of Table 6.1 – Australia, Canada, 
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Iran	 and	 to	European	 reluctance	 to	 let	Turkey	 into	 the	EU,	but	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	of	 specific	
moves in this direction. Also, there have been assertions, but no publicly available evidence, of 
nuclear aspirations in Finland and Greece. These cases have not been listed for lack of 
documentation.
b  Ukraine had Russian nuclear weapons in its custody, although apparently not the codes to use 
them. The missile launch codes were in Russian hands as well. In Belarus and Kazakhstan, the 
weapons remained under Russian control while being on their territories.
c  While it has been in the spotlight, little is known about the degree and circumstance of Algerian 
interests in nuclear weapons.
d  Chile	had	a	significant	nuclear	research	programme	and	did	not	accede	to	the	NPT	until	Argentina	
did. The two countries nearly went to war in the late 1970s. Muller and Schmidt (2010) neverthe-
less acknowledge a lack of conclusive evidence.
e  North Korea tested a nuclear device in the autumn of 2006 and another device in the spring of 
2009. It is not known whether it has deliverable nuclear weapons.
f  Levite describes Spain as an uncertain case; Jo and Gartzke (2007) do not include it in their list of 
reversals.
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Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
and Serbia – it will take major world- order changes to regenerate an interest in 
nuclear weapons.
 Among those who attained nuclear weapons but gave them up – Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, South Africa and Ukraine – none show signs of rolling forth again 
(Potter 2009; du Preez and Maettig 2010). In the Middle East, Egypt’s nuclear 
programme is rudimentary and in Saudi Arabia there is not much to build on. 
However, as Iran proceeds with its nuclear programme and as interests in nuclear 
power are growing, some states may adopt active hedging strategies (Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey) (Dunn 2007; Varnum 2010).
Theoretical approaches to proliferation and rollback
Realist assumptions
The realist perspective on international affairs accounts for much of what prolif-
eration and rollback is about. In an international anarchy, states need to deter 
potential attackers, and the gold standard of deterrence is nuclear. To turn states 
back from weapons pursuits, their security concerns have to be alleviated, either 
by reducing the threat or by enhancing deterrence in one or both of its basic 
modes, i.e. deterrence by defence and deterrence by retaliation. During the Cold 
War,	the	superpowers	threatened	each	other’s	clients	and	responded	by	beefing	
up their extended deterrence postures, holding the clients under strict control and 
keeping proliferation at bay both in Europe and in East Asia. However, the dom-
inant motivation was not fear of proliferation, but fear of the other side and com-
petition	 for	 influence	 worldwide.	 The	 non-	proliferation	 gains	 followed	 per	
implication, virtually free of cost.11 Neither the US nor the Soviet Union really 
confronted the question of what to pay to prevent proliferation (Dunn 2006). 
How much the big powers are willing to pay today remains unclear.
 The one- dimensional nature of realist logic – of neo- realism in particular – 
has a tendency to lead from anarchy to “life in a nuclear crowd”.12 All nuclear- 
weapon	programmes	have	been	 justified	 in	 reference	 to	 security	 concerns,	 but	
the realist perspective exaggerates their importance and overrates the propensity 
to proliferate. Realists were quick to predict proliferation to tens of states, but 
although tens of states have the economic, technological and industrial potential 
to make weapons, there are only nine NWS to date. Realism fails to explain the 
gap between the large and fast- growing number of nuclear- weapon-capable 
states and the small and slowly growing number of actual NWS.13 It does not 
explain under what conditions security concerns trigger nuclear programmes and 
under what circumstances they lead to conventional responses, new alliance for-
mations or other policy responses, nor does it explain the timing of policy shifts, 
for it tends to ignore national political cultures, shifting national economic and 
political trade- offs and individual preferences.14 In these respects, the idealist 
perspective, capturing domestic factors and individual mindsets, does better 
(Lavoy and Walker 2006).
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 Realism comes in different versions, though. In the history of nuclear prolif-
eration, the French rationale for nuclear weapons is the arch- realist one. De 
Gaulle	 stressed	 that	 the	 US	 would	 not	 sacrifice	 Chicago	 for	 Paris.	 Only	 a	
national	finger	on	the	trigger	would	do.	This	logic	–	fortunately	not	 tested,	but	
quite possibly valid – invited proliferation. It was underwritten by the fact that 
friends are not forever: the allies of today may be enemies tomorrow. The French 
doctrine was therefore tous azimut, i.e. the weapons were in principle turned in 
all directions.
	 During	the	Cold	War,	worst-	case	assumptions	were	notorious	for	their	influ-
ence on security policies. In the 1990s the strongest physical manifestations of 
Cold War thinking were eliminated, yet worst- case assumptions remained 
important in the security policies of states. This century, threat- based policies 
were brought to new heights in reference to state as well as non- state actors. 
Even so, the pros and cons of nuclear- weapon acquisition are numerous and 
states are weighing the arguments. For instance, Iran is widely considered to be 
a rational actor susceptible to external incentives as well as domestic interests. 
Only when national existence is threatened (Israel) or regime survival is at stake 
(the communist regime in North Korea, the apartheid regime in South Africa) 
may it be attractive beyond doubt to possess the strongest of all weapons as an 
ultimate insurance premium. This is a softer type of realism: states that acquire 
the bomb may be buying themselves problems as well as opportunities, but if 
they are faced with existential threats and cannot rely on the help of a nuclear- 
armed	 ally,	 they	will	 ignore	 the	 potential	 difficulties	 and	go	nuclear	 (Ericsson	
2001; Hymans 2006a).
 In yet another version, T.V. Paul has introduced the notion of “prudential 
realism”, which substitutes “most probable” threat assessments for the worst- 
case thinking of hard- nosed realists (Paul 2000). Prudential realism means that 
states “balance their interests and capabilities so as to minimize the security 
challenges they pose to others and in expectation of reciprocal benign behaviour 
in return”. However, Paul did not offer prudential realism as the key to under-
standing nuclear rollback, but emphasised that there is no single overarching 
explanation of this many- faceted phenomenon.
 Realists defend their alarmism partly in reference to proliferation as a contin-
uum, ranging from different degrees of preparedness to ready- made operative arse-
nals. Even if the number of NWS remains in the one- digit range, many more states 
have moved closer to nuclear- weapon status. Overall, there is a proliferation slide 
which	is	not	captured	by	the	exclusive	focus	on	testing	as	the	defining	criterion	of	
an NWS (Hymans 2010). National capabilities are proliferating; hedging is wide-




nuclear capabilities are rejectionist. Others are hedging.
 Realists also defend themselves in reference to the NPT and the supply- side 
measures that they see as the core virtue of the non- proliferation regime. The 
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NPT has been a success, and the regime has been heavily tilted towards export 
denials, export controls and safeguards. Supply- side policies have been useful, 
and when they have been shown to be ineffective and inadequate they have been 
heavily criticised by realists and others for that. However, realists are also 
responsible for the relative ignorance of other parts of the regime, notably the 
disarmament commitment of Article VI, and the combination of technology 
denial and failure to disarm undermines the trade- off on which the NPT is built.
Idealist perspectives
The importance of ideas manifests itself at three levels. At the international 
level, it is evident in the non- proliferation norm. As the NPT got more and more 
members, states found it increasingly important to subscribe to the norm in order 
to be in good standing (Rublee 2009). After a while, the Treaty got more parties 
than any other arms- control agreement. Except for India, Pakistan, Israel and 
North Korea, it has become universal. The NPT may have been more or less 
important in tilting states towards non- nuclear status, but once they have joined 
the Treaty they have taken a keen interest in ascertaining that other parties 
remain true to their Treaty obligations.
 This century, the commitments to the NPT were weakened. A weaker NPT 
means a weaker non- proliferation norm, for the Treaty is the main standard- 
setter in the global nuclear realm.
 Fortunately, the norm also rests on grounds other than the NPT, among them 
nuclear- weapon-free zones (NWFZ), which entail more comprehensive non- 
proliferation commitments than the NPT.16 Also, the norm is underwritten by the 
likelihood that those going for weapons will fall into disgrace. Even if the 
enforcement mechanisms are weak, states proliferate at the risk of becoming 
international	pariahs.	Being	subject	to	sanctions	at	first,	India	was	soon	forgiven	
for what it did in 1998, but any future proliferator will be small in comparison 
and much more vulnerable to international reactions. A future proliferator would 
also have to violate the NPT, or withdraw in orderly fashion, whereas India 
never joined the Treaty and therefore broke no legal commitment.
 At the national	level,	Etel	Solingen	(2007)	finds	a	difference	between	propo-
nents of openness towards the outside world and those who prefer to shut the 
world out. Not surprisingly, the former is more likely to turn the nuclear option 
down, while the latter are more inclined to keep it open or even to exercise it. 
Peter Lavoy (2006) homes in on the “nuclear mythmakers”. Are there strong 
believers in the utility of nuclear weapons for national security and national 
status? How able are they to legitimise and popularise those assumptions among 
fellow elites and political leaders? To what extent are they able to integrate their 
views and preferences into governmental institutions and budget priorities? The 
focus	on	“national	mythmakers”	does	not	disregard	external	influences	and	chal-
lenges, and so does not belittle the relevance of realist perspectives. The differ-
ence lies at the level of analysis: where neo- realists operate at the systemic level, 
focusing on external developments that may trigger national responses, the 
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mythmaker approach links those developments to policy debates and reorienta-
tions in the national political system.
 Transitions between civilian and military rule crystallise the difference 
between openness and isolation. The nationalistic orientation and dubious legiti-
macy of military rulers tend to turn them into outcasts. If economic, technolo-
gical	 and	 industrial	 capacities	 enable	 them	 to	 conduct	 a	 significant	 nuclear	
programme, they may try to solidify their positions by going nuclear. Such rulers 
may be favourably disposed for the nuclear option from the outset, and the 
negative feedback they receive from the surroundings may tempt them to exer-
cise it.
 The Swedish experience highlights the importance of military strategy in 
national debates. The leading opponents of nuclear weapons – Alva Myrdal and 
Inga Thorson – deemed it particularly important to do better than the military 
officers	in	strategy	discussions.	They	were	keenly	aware	that,	while	the	listeners	
might not understand all of the arguments – some of them too complex to be 
grasped by non- professionals – they sensed very well who won the debates. If 
they could beat the military on their home ground, the rest would be easier to 
manage. They therefore prepared particularly well for debates about military 
strategy.
 At the individual level, case studies of leaders from France, Australia, Argen-
tina	and	India	suggest	that	leaders	with	definite	nuclear-	weapon	ambitions	differ	
from the great majority of others in their conception of national identity. Seeing 
their nation as “both naturally at odds with an external enemy, and as naturally 
its equal if not its superior”, they have been dubbed “oppositional nationalists” 
(Hymans 2006b). Driven by fear and pride – i.e. a combination of security and 
status motives – oppositional nationalists go for nuclear weapons not merely as a 
matter of calculation, but as a matter of self- expression. Unlike most of their 
peers,	who	find	 it	 hard	 to	make	 a	 rational	 assessment	 of	 the	 pros	 and	 cons	 of	
weapons acquisition given all the uncertainties about the consequences, for 
oppositional nationalists the choice of nuclear weapons is neither a close call nor 
a possible last resort, but a matter of necessity.
 On the rollback list, de Klerk was the right man at the right time in South 
Africa. The December 1988 agreement which provided for the withdrawal of 
50,000 Cuban troops from Southern Africa presented an opportunity to place 
South Africa’s identity anchor in the Western community of nations. As the 
security concerns receded, de Klerk grabbed it and spearheaded the decisions 
that	made	South	Africa	 a	bona	fide	 entity	 in	 international	 affairs:	 transition	 to	
majority rule and elimination of nuclear weapons. Some 15 years later, Colonel 
Gaddafi	of	Libya	made	a	 similar	 choice,	burying	all	 efforts	 to	 acquire	nuclear	
weapons and earning goodwill from the US, the UK and the rest of the Western 
world. From the mid- 1980s, the presidents of Argentine and Brazil held con-
verging	views	on	 the	 importance	of	building	confidence	between	 their	nations,	
leading to the Common System of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control 
and its implementing agency ABACC, accession to the Tlatelolco Treaty and 
membership of the NPT (Brigagao 2009).
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 Both realists and idealists have to attend to the technical, economic and polit-
ical feasibility of nuclear- weapons acquisition. In South Africa, scientists dem-
onstrated the feasibility of building nuclear weapons at a time when the country 
felt increasingly threatened by enemies both in the region and internationally. 
Security concerns merged with the practical feasibility of a focused, cost- 
effective programme that produced half- a-dozen bombs. In North Korea, an indi-
genous programme developed with Soviet assistance reached the point where it 
could	produce	significant	amounts	of	plutonium	right	at	the	time	the	Cold	War	
came to the end and the Soviet Union and the security guarantees it had issued 
disappeared. From then on, the nuclear programme became the lifeline of the 
communist	regime	in	Pyongyang,	leading	to	a	first	nuclear	test	in	2006.	In	Libya,	
on	the	other	hand,	Colonel	Gaddafi	tried	and	failed	to	purchase	nuclear	weapons	
from China and bomb production materials from India, Pakistan, the Soviet 
Union, Argentina, Brazil and Belgium during the 1970s and 1980s and from the 
Khan network in the 1990s and 2000s, but gave up in favour of integration into 
the existing Western economic and political order.
Quantitative analysis
In a quantitative analysis of the 36 cases listed above, Muller and Schmidt 
examine	existing	propositions	in	the	field,	adding	to	our	understanding	of	prolif-
eration/de- proliferation dynamics.
 Comparing the building of research reactors with the conduct of weapon- 
related	 activities,	 they	 find	 no	 support	 for	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 proliferation	 is	
technology driven. A growing number of states have such reactors, but a 
decreasing number are using them for nuclear- weapon activities. The hypothesis 
is further refuted by the fact that more states started nuclear- weapon activities 
before	they	acquired	research	reactors,	and	more	finished	them	after they did so.
	 Neither	do	they	find	support	for	the	hypothesis	that	an	alliance	with	an	NWS	
prevents NNWS from embarking on weapon activities.17 If anything, there is a 
tendency in the opposite direction. The strength of alliance guarantees does not 
seem to matter either. This is not to deny that, in single cases, alliances have 
played a key role in the renunciation of nuclear- weapon options. In East Asia 
this is documented beyond doubt. Statistically, however, the relationship is not 
significant.
 Another realpolitik assumption – that states do not dare to proliferate if the 
big	powers	are	strong	enough	and	flex	their	muscles;	the	“high	posture”	hypoth-
esis (Schoettle 1979) – is refuted as well. Rather, there has been a tendency in 
the other direction: after the Cuban crisis and the conclusion of the Partial Test 
Ban Treaty in the early 1960s, proliferation stagnated; the stagnation continued 
during the détente of the 1970s; there was a slight change of trend during the 
new	wave	of	Cold	War	in	the	first	half	of	the	1980s;	and	with	the	relaxation	of	
tensions from the mid- 1980, terminations accelerated.
	 The	most	important	finding	relates	to	the	international	non-	proliferation	norm,	
which can be traced back to the so- called “Irish Resolution” adopted by the UN 
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General Assembly in December 1961.18 The norm was harnessed by the entry 
into force of the NPT in 1970. Distinguishing between states that were independ-
ent before 1960 and states that gained their independence later, the emerging 
norm had a distinct impact on the way the new states conceived of proper beha-
viour	in	the	security	field.	For	the	old	states,	the	impact	was	lower.	In	the	words	
of	the	authors,	“the	Irish	resolution	appears	to	have	influenced	the	stagnation	of	
proliferation in relative terms,19 [and] with the conclusion of the NPT negotia-
tions the stagnation of proliferation began also in absolute terms.”
	 The	significance	of	the	NPT	is	borne	out	by	the	following	table	showing	initi-
ation and termination of nuclear- weapon activity before and after the conclusion 
of the Treaty:20
	 Not	surprisingly,	the	authors	also	find	that	democracies	are	more	sensitive	to	
the non- proliferation norm than other forms of government, and that democrati-
sation – the transition from authoritarian to democratic systems – contributes to 
norm conformity. Democratising states feel a particular need to posture as norm- 
abiding.
 Finally, little support is found for the hypothesis that governments that open 
up to the outside world are less proliferation prone than those that shut the world 
out. The liberalisation thesis advanced by Etel Solingen is not refuted, but each 
case must be examined on its own merits.21
Lessons from Iraq, Libya and Syria
Recently, there have been three prominent cases of nuclear rollback: Iraq, Libya 
and Syria. What are their experiences, and how relevant are they for other roll-
back efforts?
Iraq
Iraq was effectively disarmed by UNSCOM (the UN Special Commission in 
Iraq)	 and	UNMOVIC	 (the	UN	Monitoring	 and	Verification	Mission	Commis-
sion).	 Shortly	 after	 the	 first	Gulf	War	 in	 1991,	 elimination	 of	 the	 secret	 Iraqi	
nuclear- weapons programme of the 1980s had been accomplished. Saddam gave 
up, and never tried to bring any part of the programme back on track (Blix 2004; 
Cirincione et al. 2005).
 The background for the UN disarmament mission in Iraq was very special. 
The	1991	war	and	ceasefire	Resolution	687	of	the	UN	Security	Council	set	the	
stage for it. The air prohibition zones over northern and southern Iraq further 
Table 6.2  Initiation and termination of nuclear-weapon activity before and after 1968
Before NPT After NPT
NWA Start (%) 41 (24 of 58) 16 (13 of 83)
NWA Stop (%) 13 (3 of 24) 68 (23 of 34)
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restricted Saddam’s freedom of action. Except for a brief period of time immedi-
ately	after	the	Second	World	War,	this	was	the	first	and	only	time	in	the	history	
of the UN that the Security Council functioned more or less the way the authors 
of the UN Charter had hoped. It did not last long – by the mid- 1990s, big power 
cooperation was once again on the decline – but the liberation of Kuwait and the 
constraints on Saddam happened in the cooperative spirit of that period. Not 
only were the conditions for UNSCOM dictated by force: there was agreement 
on them at the UN. This was special to the point of being unique.
 The Iraqi experience had a number of constructive spin- offs. When the 
nuclear- weapon programme of the 1980s came to the fore in the aftermath of the 
war – the IAEA had failed to discover it – this became the impetus to the Model 




 After the second Gulf War in 2003, the inspectors were proven successful. They 
had been right and US and other national intelligence agencies woefully wrong. 
Obviously, big power disinformation campaigns had not disappeared with the 
Cold War, giving a major boost to the standing of international inspections. To the 
extent that reliable information is important for the progressive conduct of non- 
proliferation policies, international inspections are vital. They must be allowed to 
run their course, however lengthy and tiresome the process must be, and interna-
tional institutions should be used and empowered, not bypassed by unilateral 
action. These may be the main lessons of the Iraqi experience.
Libya
What can we learn from the case of Libya? Can anything be generalised and 
applied elsewhere, or is this another unique case?
 Rollback did not occur by a major change in the Libyan political system, as 
was the case in South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea and Taiwan. Nor 
was it the result of public diplomatic campaigns and economic assistance, as was 
the case with Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Sanctions seem not to have done 
the trick either, as the turnaround came in a period when the peak of sanctions 
had already passed. In other words: it happened in a period of systemic continu-
ity (Bowen 2006; Muller 2007; Braut- Hegghammer 2008).
 Rather, it seems that the turnaround was part of a major reconsideration of the 
utility of military- based power politics. Libya shifted from power to economic 
growth and welfare as the best way to keep the regime in power. In this respect, 
Colonel	Gaddafi	seems	to	have	been	under	the	influence	of	a	younger	generation	
of leaders, notably one of his own sons. In part, the long- standing diplomatic 
efforts by the EU to entice Libya into more cooperative relations with the 
Western world also account for the reversal, as do the determined rollback 
efforts by the USA and the UK (Muller 2007). The end result was a complete, 
supervised dismantling of WMD stocks and facilities.
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 The Libyan case is reminiscent of the South African one. Like de Klerk, 
Gaddafi	 gave	 priority	 to	 normalisation	with	 the	West,	 abandoning	 his	 nuclear	
programme and aligning himself with the existing international order. Also like 
South	Africa,	Libya	opened	its	nuclear	programme	for	international	verification,	
full- scale. It skipped its weapons programme in return for normalisation with the 
US and the rest of the world – similar to what North Korea says it would be 
willing to, on and off, without any change of government. Five years later, the 
Libyan political system remains much the same, while in North Korea it is com-




at Al Kibar, Syria, next to the Euphrates river. Israeli and American intelligence 
had	concluded	that	the	target	was	a	camouflaged	nuclear	reactor	under	construc-
tion, built in cooperation with North Korea. A photograph released by the intelli-
gence agencies showed the head of the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission and 
a	senior	official	of	the	North	Korean	nuclear	programme	standing	together	at	the	
site.
	 Later,	 the	 IAEA	confirmed	 that	 the	complex	bore	 features	 resembling	 those	
of a nuclear reactor;22 that the imagery of the site showed similarities with the 
graphite reactor building at Yongbyon; and that traces of uranium and graphite 
had been found on the site despite the fact that Syria had removed the debris 
from the bombed facility and covered the entire site with concrete. The Syrians 
said the complex was a conventional military factory, arguing that the uranium 
traces were of Israeli origin and that no foreigners had been involved at Al 
Kibar. However, they provided no documentation in support of their claims. By 
the turn of 2009/2010, much remained to be understood regarding the relation-
ship to other nuclear activities in and out of Syria and about the procurement 
activities	and	the	financial	aspects	of	it	all,	but	in	essence,	national	intelligence	
seems to have had it right on this occasion.
 Assuming that the target of the bombing was a nuclear reactor in the making, 
Syria had violated the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The agreement 
obliged it to notify the Agency as soon as construction of new nuclear facilities 
starts. Israel in effect reiterated that it does not tolerate other nuclear- weapon 
states in the Middle East, but in so doing violated international law. The IAEA 
emphasised that as soon as the Israelis and the Americans had information about 
an	 illegal	 nuclear	 facility	 coming	 up,	 they	 should	 have	 notified	 the	 Agency.	
Instead, the IAEA learned about the bombing from the media, and was asked to 
search for evidence in the rubble.
 To maintain its nuclear monopoly in the Middle East, Israel seems determined 
to take preventive action. This is the so- called Begin doctrine, named after Prime 
Minister Menachem Begin, who authorised the 1981 strike on the French- 
supplied reactors in Iraq. The question is where the outer limits of the doctrine 
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go, i.e. if it is applicable in the case of Iran. In large measure, the answer comes 
in terms of military capability: had the Iranian facilities been closer at hand and 
easier to destroy, they would have been bombed a long time ago. The non- 
proliferation regime is weak when it comes to enforcement, and Israel has no 
confidence	in	it.
Lessons learnt
Summing up, what are the lessons for policies of nuclear rollback? What does it 
take to turn would- be proliferators away from nuclear arms? What is the state of 
the art?
 In the social sciences, all theses are conditional in one or more ways (x relates 
to y in a certain way provided that a, b and c apply). The following is a list of 
propositions – i.e. hypotheses for which there is some evidence – that are all 
qualified	 in	 various	ways.	 The	 qualifications,	 discussed	 at	 some	 length	 above,	
are only hinted at here.
Alleviate security concerns
All proliferators have invoked security concerns to justify their weapons acquisi-
tions – even if, in reality, other factors may have been as or more important. 
Sometimes, threat perceptions have been alleviated through alliances, extended 
nuclear	 deterrence,	 other	 kinds	 of	 security	 assurances	 and	 improved	 conflict	
management.
 South Africa traded its nuclear programme for normalisation with the West 
and	bona	fide	status	in	international	affairs.	Libya’s	way	out	of	the	squeeze	was	
similar. First, it tried to become a legitimate member of both the Arab and the 
African community of nations, but felt rejected and sought a stronger platform 
for itself by embarking on a nuclear- weapon programme. When that did not pay 
off, it dropped the nuclear programme altogether in return for acceptance by the 
Western world. In the South African case, regime change was another condition 
for universal acceptance, whereas in the case of Libya, state security was solidi-
fied	 without	 any	 change	 in	 the	 system	 of	 government.	 If	 Myanmar	 is	 doing	
something in the direction of a weapons option, these experiences may be useful 
in crafting policies to roll it back. 
 During the Cold War, the superpowers threatened each other’s clients and 
responded by tying them closer to their own camps, thereby suppressing inclina-
tions to proliferate. These non- proliferation gains were spin- offs of Cold War 
dynamics – in essence, non- proliferation for free. Much the same goes for the 
US–Japan alliance: while being a counterweight to China, it helps to keep Japan 
non- nuclear. Presumably, the US is willing to enhance the defences of South 
Korea and Taiwan – over again – if this is what it takes to prevent them from 
building nuclear weapons. However, as illustrated by Iran and North Korea, 
today it is unclear how much the big powers are able and willing to do to prevent 
proliferation.
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Play status gains down/play status substitutes up
Status ambitions do not always play any important role when states consider the 
nuclear option. For small and medium- sized states, strong security concerns can 
make status considerations next to irrelevant. For de facto NWS shying away 
from documenting and demonstrating their capabilities, rank in the international 
system obviously plays little or no role (Israel, South Africa). However, for the 
majority of NWS, the status gains have been quite important. For India, crossing 
the	nuclear	threshold	may	first	and	foremost	have	been	a	matter	of	status	(Perko-
vich 1999).
 The best way to reduce the status value of nuclear weapons is to scale the 
arsenals	 down	 and	 introduce	 doctrines	 that	 limit	 their	 functions.	 Unqualified	
assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS are 
significant	steps	in	that	direction.	No-	first-use	postures,	limiting	the	functions	of	
nuclear weapons to that of deterring others from using theirs, have an intriguing 
disarmament corollary as well: nobody would need them if nobody else had 
them (Halperin et al. 2009; Sagan 2009a). These are approaches that may work 
over	time	in	a	general	fashion.	They	are	not	flexible	enough	to	be	of	use	in	par-
ticular cases.
 For less- industrialised countries, civilian nuclear programmes can be power-
ful	 expressions	of	 technological	 sophistication	yielding	 significant	 status	bene-
fits,	especially	if	they	include	fuel-	cycle	elements	that	make	them	self-	sustainable	
(Argentina, Brazil). In Iran, the national consensus on nuclear issues is built 
around an allegedly civilian high- technology prestige programme. Iran also 
wants to be recognised as an important actor in Middle Eastern affairs (see 
below, p. 130). Playing status substitutes up – applying imagination to such 
options across technological sectors, nuclear and non- nuclear, and in the struc-
turing of international affairs – is therefore another, complementary approach to 
playing the status value of nuclear weapons down.23
Diplomatic involvement to buy time
This has been an element in many rollback campaigns. It may go on for years, 
waiting for external and/or internal constellations to offer special opportunities 
for diplomatic breakthroughs. In the end, this brought good results in Argentina 
and Brazil. In the case of North Korea, China and others have played for time 
and still do, hoping for propitious moments to appear.
	 The	first	steps	away	from	the	nuclear	brink	tend	to	be	slow	and	incremental	
and sometimes non- linear. Continuous engagement and patience – watching the 
relative strength of different points of view and assessing the direction in which 
national debates are moving – is critically important in any diplomatic effort to 
influence	the	outcome.
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Technology denials
The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation of 1979 predicted that, beyond 
the turn of the century, technology denials would no longer be effective. By 
then, nuclear technologies would be too widely spread for supply restraints to 
have much effect.
 This prediction turned out to be premature. Even if proliferation cannot be 
stopped by technology denial, valuable time can still be bought this way. Over 
the years, technology transfers have been tightened and export controls 
enhanced. In particular cases, denials have been extended into broader sanctions 
regimes. Beyond winning time, however, the effectiveness of such measures is 
questionable. They may as well isolate the state of concern and harden its will to 
carry the weapons ambition through. There seems to be no general prescription: 
specific	cases	call	for	special	measures.	
Individual mindsets
Individual mindsets are important. When the Cold War ended and the Cubans 
withdrew from Angola, de Klerk seized the opportunity to take South Africa 
back from nuclear to non- nuclear-weapon status. In Argentina and Brazil, presi-
dents Alfonsín and Sarney, Menem and Collor held converging views on the 
importance	 of	 confidence-	building	 between	 their	 countries,	 resulting	 in	 full	
coverage for the Tlatelolco Treaty and accession to the NPT. Usually, a change 
of mindset takes a change of government, but not always: Libya’s turnaround all 
happened	under	Gaddafi’s	leadership.
Attend to the activities of mythmakers 
Myths grow out of strong convictions and are therefore hard to change (Lavoy 
1993). Pro- nuclear mythmakers tend to argue the case for nuclear- weapon acqui-
sition	irrespective	of	changes	 in	 their	environment.	Zulfikar	Ali	Bhutto	wanted	
nuclear weapons even if the Pakistanis had to eat grass (Time, in partnership 
with CNN 1985). Egypt’s Nasser and South Africa’s Vorster were also carriers 
of strong beliefs. To succeed, however, more is needed: how strong are their 
constituencies? How effective are they in converting their convictions into budg-
etary priorities? Mythmakers cannot be expected to change their minds, so they 
can only be stopped by technical, economic and political obstacles, or by remov-
ing them from power. At any given time and in any given country, multiple stra-
tegic myths may co- exist and compete with each other, widening the potential 
leverage of external actors.
Beware of nationalistic governments
Countries that abandoned nuclear- weapon programmes in the past, but maintain 
some	 significant	 capability,	 are	 cases	 of	 continued	 concern.	 South	 Korea	 and	
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Taiwan have higher capability levels today than at the time of rollback 20–30 
years ago. These countries remain sensitive to changes in the international secur-
ity environment, and their policies may change with changes in their ruling 
elites. In India, it was a nationalist government that went ahead to test. In Argen-
tina and Brazil, nationalist governments that claim a stronger role for themselves 
in international affairs may once again turn their countries towards the nuclear 
option.
Pay special attention to oppositional nationalists
Jacques	Hymans	has	identified	a	particularly	potent	proliferation	mindset:	that	of	
so- called oppositional nationalists combining fear and pride, security and status 
concerns. When leaders fear for the security of their nation and/or their own 
regime while thinking at least as highly of themselves as of their opponents, the 
temptation to correct this anomaly by launching a nuclear- weapons programme 
may be strong. Such cases are therefore among the hardest ones to roll back. 
Effective measures may be needed both to alleviate the security concerns and to 
satisfy national and personal pride. Iranian leaders illustrate this predicament. 
Iran	is	under	threat,	first	of	all	from	Israel	and	the	US;	in	the	nuclear	field,	the	
rich Persian civilisation is inferior to the young and shaky Pakistani neighbour, 
which is an NWS; and in the shia–sunni context the large Iranian nation repre-
sents the traditional underdog. These are strong asymmetries waiting to be cor-
rected. To pin Iran down to non- nuclear status, a more secure Iran must be 
accepted	as	a	regional	player	of	significance	in	the	Middle	East	(see	Chapter	7).	
Eliminate the role of the military in nuclear programmes
For reasons explained in organisation theory, the military, too, want to maintain 
and expand the role of their own organisations (Niskanen 1971). In Taiwan, 
Argentina and Brazil, the transition from military to civilian rule was crucial in 
steering their nuclear programmes away from weapons acquisition. In South 
Korea, General Park pursued the nuclear weapon option but opened the economy 
to the outside world (see below). Eliminating the role of the military means elim-
inating military rule: no military government is likely to delegate authority over 
any	nuclear	programme	of	significance	to	others.
Encourage openness to the outside world
Statistical support for the liberalisation thesis is meagre, but qualitative analyses 
of	 specific	 cases	 suggest	 that	 proponents	 of	 openness	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 seek	
nuclear weapons than governments wanting to shut the world out. One explana-
tion may be that in a globalised environment where everything moves easily 
across borders, closed societies stand out as an aberration. The governments of 
such countries risk being beleaguered and may turn to nuclear options in 
response. 
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Encourage democratisation
Democracies are more sensitive to the non- proliferation norm than other forms 
of	government,	and	countries	undergoing	democratisation	often	find	 it	particu-
larly important to be seen as norm- abiding. Democracy means openness to the 
outside world: the root cause of the liberalisation hypothesis may therefore lie in 
democratic practice.24
Diplomatic and economic inducements may work
For the three former members of the USSR – Belarus, Kazakhstan and the 
Ukraine – diplomatic engagement, security assurances and economic induce-
ments were enough to make them drop whatever weapon ambitions they might 
have had. Economically, they received assistance roughly proportional to the 
difficulties	they	posed:	Ukraine	most;	Belarus	least.	
 Knowing that the US and its Western partners may be willing to buy would-
 be proliferators off, nuclear aspirants have sometimes played their ambitions up 
in order to maximise the compensation they might receive for pulling back. 
North Korea is famous for this tactic, demanding compensation for crises of its 
own making. At times, Italy, Pakistan, South Korea and Taiwan have also moved 
ahead on the nuclear- weapons path to raise US rewards for rollback (Levite 
2002–2003). 
Apply the Additional Protocol
Nuclear programmes are made up of hundreds of decisions, some of which may 
escape political control. If for no other reason, scientists and engineers may be 
tempted to take their research in new directions out of curiosity, without any 
long- term objective in mind. Application of the Additional Protocol, which goes 
beyond	fissile	materials	to	cover	a	wider	set	of	fissile	material-	related activities, 
can help to institute a stricter non- nuclear-weapon culture. 
Nuclear disarmament
During the Cold War, there were indications that big power détente and arms 
control were conducive to non- proliferation. Today, disarmament is high on the 
agenda along with arms control, but single steps towards disarmament may have 
little or no impact if there is nothing more on the cards. For instance, states of 
proliferation concern would hardly be impressed by further reductions in US and 
Russian arsenals as long as three- digit numbers remain, other NWS are caving in 
and modernising their systems, and the Chinese, Indians and Pakistanis are 
expanding their arsenals. However, if there is a dynamic interplay between the 
vision	of	an	NWFW	and	specific	measures	towards	that	end,	drawing	all	NWS	
into	systematic	and	progressive	reductions,	would-	be	proliferators	would	find	it	
harder to go ahead and be more easily targeted for countervailing action. It is 
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more costly to work against an established trend than to work with it (for elabo-
ration of the relationship between disarmament and non- proliferation, see 
Chapter 9).
The non- proliferation norm
The non- proliferation norm anchored in the NPT is essential for the cause of 
non- proliferation. Ensuring the viability of the NPT may be the single most 
important way to stem proliferation. Better and more balanced implementation 
of the Treaty is therefore of cardinal importance.
 The non- proliferation norm is upheld by the nuclear- weapon-free zones 
(NWFZ) as well. Paradoxically, members of such zones can, nevertheless, 
present a particular challenge to the integrity of the NPT. They may withdraw 
from the Treaty, protesting the imbalanced implementation of rights and obliga-
tions, and do so with relative impunity, for they would still be under an interna-
tional legal obligation to stay non- nuclear and be subject to NPT- type 
safeguards. If a number of NWFZ members were to do that, others may follow 
suit and the NPT unravel. The probability that this would happen may be low, 
but should US–Russian disarmament negotiations get stuck and the US disarma-
ment ambition falter, it is worth watching. 
The crucial role of the US
The US has been effective in its rollback endeavours when it has been in a posi-
tion to offset security threats facing potential proliferators. In Europe, alliance 
commitments contained and marginalised proliferation interests. In East Asia, 
enhanced security assurances rolled South Korea and Taiwan back.25 When the 
US itself has issued threats, such as in the ongoing disputes with Iran and North 
Korea, its policies have been dysfunctional. When the objective has been to 
overthrow another regime, that regime has had little incentive to negotiate. 
 For an international regime to function properly, somebody has to exercise 
leadership. The non- proliferation regime is no exception. While the Bush admin-
istration took a selective view of the NPT, the Obama administration is mindful 
of	 the	 totality	 of	 the	 regime	 and	 has	 assumed	 a	 high-	profile	 leadership	 role.	 
S/Res/1887 went a long way to forge a renewed global consensus on non- 
proliferation and revived the NPT commitment to seek an NWFW (for criticism 
of the Resolution, see Chapter 4).
7 Challenge from within
The case of Iran
Real and virtual arsenals
The Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) defines a nuclear- weapon state 
(NWS) as a state that had tested a nuclear explosive device before 1 January 
1967. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) had done 
so: the Treaty therefore recognises them as NWS. All others should forego 
acquisition of nuclear arms.
 By the testing criterion, another three states have become de facto NWS: 
India (1998), Pakistan (1998) and North Korea (2006). In addition, Israel is 
known to have a nuclear arsenal without any confirmed testing. North Korea 
acceded to the NPT in 1985, but left the Treaty in 2003 as the only country to 
have done so. Israel, India and Pakistan never joined. All other UN member 
states are parties to the Treaty.
 Some non- nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) can build such weapons in a 
matter of weeks or a few months if they decide to do so. While the number of 
states possessing ready- made weapons has increased only slowly, there is 
concern that “virtual arsenals” may now be growing faster, nurtured and legiti-
mised by the growing interest in nuclear power. The key to virtual capabilities is 
national fuel- cycle facilities and fissile materials on stock. Iranian leaders have 
indicated that they may seek such a status, similar to that of Japan. However, 
while “creeping in” under the testing criterion may be legal under the NPT, it is 
not necessarily legitimate.1
 Proliferation is about moves towards weaponisation. Rollback is a process in 
the opposite direction, reversing intentions and/or capabilities to acquire nuclear 
arms. Throughout the nuclear age, more than 20 states have “done something” in 
the direction of a weapons option and then abandoned it. Another four have pro-
duced weapons or have had them on their territories, but have decided to elimi-
nate and remove them (South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan). Some 
of the lessons from this underpublicised part of the proliferation/non- 
proliferation story shed light on the Iranian situation and what it may take to 
keep it an NNWS.
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Reining in a virtual arsenal
Non- proliferation policies should therefore aim at more than stopping states and 
non- state actors from actually acquiring the bomb. Virtual arsenals have a desta-
bilising effect, especially in regions of conflict such as the Middle East, calling 
for transparency and constraints on such capabilities.
Verification
One such measure is implementation of the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540) 
to the standard NPT safeguards agreement.2 The Additional Protocol enables the 
IAEA to search for items that may not have been declared. Without it, the 
Agency can only verify the non- diversion of declared nuclear material and activ-
ities. Application of the Protocol may deter states from developing weapon- 
oriented capabilities in secret, and make others more confident that they know 
what is going on. It limits the scope of uncertainty and the potential for suspi-
cions and misunderstandings.
 From November 2003 to February 2006, Iran allowed the IAEA to apply the 
Additional Protocol. In addition, it offered access to certain sites on a voluntary 
basis. In that period, there were more comprehensive inspections in Iran than in 
any other country in the world. Since February 2006, when the Iran file was 
transferred from Vienna to New York, Iran has not accepted the Protocol and 
declines Agency requests for voluntary transparency measures providing access 
to locations that may be related to the manufacturing of centrifuges, R&D on 
uranium enrichment, and uranium mining and milling. Also, it no longer pro-
vides early design information of upcoming facilities.3 Gradually, the IAEA is 
therefore losing its overview of the programme. Presumably, Iran has spread 
nuclear equipment, materials and technology throughout the country, if for no 
other reason than as a precautionary measure in case it is attacked.4
 Recurrent demands that Iran agrees to the Additional Protocol, provides early 
design information and offers voluntary transparency measures are made with 
the knowledge that nobody can prove a negative and in the hope that incriminat-
ing evidence will be found. Ostensibly requested in order to enable Iran “to 
come clean”, they enhance suspicions as much as they build confidence. As long 
as Iran is widely suspected of having weapons intentions, and as long as it is 
under threat of military attack, there is not much hope of changing this predica-
ment. The situation is increasingly untenable, because the closer Iran comes to a 
nuclear- weapon capability, the more important it is to place those capabilities 
under the best possible safeguards.
Multinational fuel- cycle facilities
Another possible restraint is multinationalisation of fuel- cycle facilities. This 
option, which comes in many versions, was thoroughly examined at the end of 
the 1970s and once again by an IAEA study group in 2005, but never material-
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ised in regions of proliferation concern (SIPRI 1980; IAEA 2005). Multilateral 
facilities are intuitively attractive because they can be run in a joint decision- 
making mode and operated with “black boxes” that limit the transfer of advanced 
technologies. On his first visit to the UN, President Ahmadinejad mentioned the 
possibility of multinational fuel- cycle facilities in Iran. However, such proposals 
raise complex technological, organisational, financial and political questions and 
may lead to long and arduous negotiations. Far from being any quick fix, they 
can be excellent vehicles for buying time.
Internationalisation of the fuel cycle
From a regime point of view, internationalisation of all fuel- cycle facilities, 
existing ones included, would be better than occasional, multilateral ones. 
Special treatment of special cases may be warranted, but equal treatment is the 
regime norm. If backed by the big powers, which have such facilities them-
selves, other states would find it hard to resist. It may materialise as an adjunct 
to a Fissile Material Cut- Off Treaty (FMCT) stopping all production of fissile 
materials for weapons purposes: internationalisation would then apply to all the 
rest. Without an FMCT, a line would have to be drawn between military and 
civilian activities in the NWS. So far, that has been done in the UK, France and 
India, but not in the other NWS. However attractive, this is another long- term 
proposition that may consolidate a solution to the Iranian problem, but hardly 
something that can be implemented in time to help create it.
Supply assurances to forego national facilities
Yet another possibility is assurances of fuel supply, solid enough to convince 
states to forego national fuel- cycle facilities. Preparations for an international 
fuel bank are being made, centred on the IAEA.5 The flaw of such assurances is 
that they tend to preserve another distinction between haves and have- nots (in 
addition to that between NWS and NNWS), i.e. between those who possess fuel- 
cycle plants and those who are encouraged and urged not to build them. This is 
objectionable on political grounds, and for states that have big deposits of 
uranium on their territories, enrichment may also be an attractive business 
proposition.
 The Framework for a Long- term Agreement offered by the E3/EU on 5 
August 2005 contained fuel assurances to Iran in return for halting all fuel- cycle 
activities there. The Europeans committed themselves to assist in the establish-
ment of a buffer store of fuel, sufficient to maintain supplies for a period of five 
years. While international supply arrangements can never be as reliable as 
domestic sources of supply, and the buffer store would be located outside Iran, 
the credibility of these assurances were high. They were made by a group of 
states and communicated to all interested parties through an international organi-
sation (the IAEA), and so could not be withdrawn by any single government. 
The IAEA was invited to monitor and certify the operation of it “on objective 
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principles”. The fuel assurances were the best part of the European offer. On 
other accounts, however, the offer fell short of expectations and was summarily 
rejected by Iran.6
Limiting the scale of fuel- cycle activities
Finally, a broader separation of civilian and military applications could be estab-
lished by limiting the scale of fuel- cycle activities to a level below that required 
for weapons production. A compromise of this kind would allow for research 
and development on enrichment and/or reprocessing, and provide a mobilisation 
base for rapid construction of national industrial plants in case fuel supplies were 
interrupted. More than once, Iran has reportedly been ready to accept such a cap 
on its enrichment programme, but without anybody picking them up on it.7 
Believing that Iran would buckle under pressure, the Western demand was 
always that Iran should give up any and all fuel- cycle activities.
 By August 2009, more than 8,000 centrifuges had been installed in Natanz 
(IAEA 2009).8 Second- generation centrifuges (IR- 2), enriching uranium two- to-
three- times faster than the first generation, were being tested. Iran insists on 
exercising its sovereign rights under the NPT and has made mastery of the entire 
fuel- cycle a matter of national pride.9 The nuclear programme is elevated above 
factional politics in Iran.
 For Iran, the right to enrich on its own territory is a red line in any forthcom-
ing negotiation. Anything less is unacceptable (ICG 2009). An opinion poll 
shows that 89 per cent of the population believe that Iran should master the 
uranium- enrichment process. Since President Obama took office, Iranian offi-
cials have also begun to argue that the Iranian nuclear issue is closed except for 
activities within the framework of the IAEA, and that the world has to come to 
terms with a nuclear Iran.10
The politics of rollback
Rollback is a process reversing intentions and/or capabilities to acquire nuclear 
arms. From a longer list of lessons from rollback experiences,11 the following 
appear relevant to the Iranian case.
Alleviation of security concerns
All proliferators have invoked security concerns. Other factors may have been 
more important, but security considerations have always been used to legitimise 
nuclear- weapon ambitions. Non- nuclear Iran is surrounded by NWS – Israel, 
Pakistan, Russia and the US – and therefore very conscious of the imbalances 
that this creates.12
 At various points in their histories, the leaders of Israel and Pakistan became 
convinced that the possession of nuclear weapons would deter attacks on them, 
or limit how far an attacker would dare to go. Iranian leaders are of the same 
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view, although in their overall assessment of the issue they may or may not 
favour nuclear weapons.
 The Iranian programme was restarted in the midst of the Iran–Iraq war, 
when the country suffered very high casualties and was attacked with chemical 
weapons. Whether Iran knew of Saddam’s secret nuclear- weapon programme 
is unclear, but if it did, this would have been another reason to bring the pro-
gramme back up to speed. There is little doubt that it was the security argu-
ments that made Ayatollah Khomeini – who originally turned his back on the 
Shah’s nuclear ambitions – change his attitude in favour of resuming the 
programme.
 These arguments were reinforced by the first Gulf War, which demonstrated 
that nobody could match US high- tech conventional power. Nuclear weapons 
were widely perceived to be the only “equaliser”. Later, North Korea and Iraq 
confirmed the deterrence value of nuclear weapons: Iraq was believed to possess 
chemical and biological weapons but had no nuclear arms and was occupied, 
while North Korea had nuclear weapons and was not attacked. The conclusion 
appeared obvious: nuclear weapons are effective deterrents, but chemical and 
biological ones are not.
 In recent years, the strong US military presence on Iran’s doorstep and the 
cascade of security- related developments in the aftermath of 9/11 have accentu-
ated the relevance of nuclear weapons. The US Navy has extensive support and 
logistical facilities in Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE and Oman, and there is a major 
American airbase in Qatar. There are a large number of well- supported US 
troops in Iraq and Afghanistan; there is a close partnership, however problem-
atic, between the US and Pakistan and a minor US foothold in Azerbaijan; and 
Israel, the only resident NWS in the Middle East, enjoys staunch US support and 
cooperates with Turkey and India. Iranian perceptions of encirclement are there-
fore based on stark realities. In periods of dire threat such as in the aftermath of 
the occupation of Iraq, when it was feared that Iran would be next, and under the 
impact of recurrent US and Israeli bombing threats, security concerns cannot but 
strengthen the interest in nuclear weapons.
 There is no doubt that Iranian security concerns bring the nuclear- weapon 
option to mind, and that alleviation of threats and formal security assurances are 
important to put it to rest. For some analysts, this is the primary motivation for 
Iran’s nuclear drive.13 Others argue that status ambitions are more important.14
Resolve status concerns
Karl Marx said that the most effective power is the structural one that functions 
without being used. In international affairs, this is military force, nuclear 
weapons being the ultimate expression of destructive power. States have a fine 
eye for who is more and who is less powerful and tend to adjust, consciously or 
subconsciously, to the perceived distribution of power in their surroundings. In 
this way, nuclear weapons are important in order to gain political influence and 
higher international standing.
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 Iran seeks higher status and a greater role in the Middle East and the wider 
Asian setting. In the Middle East, it has gained greatly from US actions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, and in the Arab streets its opposition to Israel and the US has 
paid off. Egypt is intensely aware that Iran is undermining its traditional political 
leadership role in the region. For the neo- revolutionary factions, enhanced 
regional influence is a matter of fulfilling “Iran’s historic mission to lead the 
region and the wider set of Muslim countries to a just world” (Ehteshami 2009). 
For others, it is a matter of ordinary national interest. Nuclear capabilities are 
signs of technological advancement and potential nuclear- weapon status, and 
may be used to this avail, although it is no simple way of projecting power. In 
response to Iran’s ascendancy, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
are launching their own nuclear programmes while seeking military partnerships 
with the US and other Western countries. Saudi Arabia and others are trying to 
counter Iranian influence in Lebanon, Palestine and Syria.
 In the wider Asian context, Iran’s economic power base is unimpressive, but 
its oil and gas deposits make it attractive for rapidly expanding Asian econo-
mies. Traditionally, Iran has been oriented at least as much to the North and East 
as to the West and has developed its relations to a great many Asian states, North 
Korea included. The secretariat and cultural department of the Economic Coop-
eration Organisation (ECO), involving ten Eurasian nations, are in Tehran; Iran 
is a member of the D8 group of eight Muslim countries promoting economic and 
technical cooperation; and it is an observer to the Shanghai Cooperation Organi-
sation (SCO) and would like to become a full member.15 In the face of sanctions 
from the Western world, Asian countries may provide a “comfort zone” for Iran.
 Status motivations for going nuclear can be modified and reversed in two 
ways: by implementing Article VI of the NPT in its software (doctrines) as well 
as hardware (weapon systems) dimensions, thereby reducing the political value 
of nuclear weapons in general, and by allowing a greater Iranian role in the 
Middle East in return for constraints on its nuclear programme. Single reduc-
tions of US and Russian nuclear arsenals to, say, 1,000 deployed strategic 
weapons for each with no promise of further cuts will hardly impress Iran or any 
other potential proliferator. But if disarmament becomes a trend encompassing 
both weapons systems and doctrinal limitations on their use, and involving other 
NWS in addition to the leading ones, the costs of contravening it will be higher.
 Status gains accrue not only from military applications of nuclear energy. 
Civilian programmes can also be powerful expressions of technological sophisti-
cation and yield significant status benefits, especially if they cover the entire fuel 
cycle. In Iran, the national consensus on nuclear issues is built around an alleg-
edly civilian high- tech prestige programme. Today, the enrichment works in 
Natanz and the construction of a big research reactor in Arak have reached such 
an advanced stage and enjoy so much support all across the political spectrum 
that it will be hard to reverse them. However, the stability of such decision 
points, stopping just a little short of weaponisation, is doubtful. To reassure 
others that the nuclear- weapon option is not being pursued, constraints are 
necessary.
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Pay special attention to oppositional nationalists
Iran is fertile ground for “oppositional nationalism” combining fear and pride, 
security and status concerns.16 When leaders fear for the security of their nation 
and/or their regime, while thinking at least as highly of themselves as of their 
neighbours and opponents, there is an asymmetry that cries out for correction. In 
the nuclear field, the asymmetry is most striking in relation to Pakistan: Pakistan 
is a nuclear- weapon state while Iran is not, yet Pakistan is a young and unstable 
state while Iran represents a distinguished age- old civilisation. Status asym-
metries are powerful drivers of policy: Teheran’s most oft- repeated demand is 
that the US must change the way it sees and treats Iran, its regional role and 
aspirations. To help constrain the nuclear programme, the status asymmetries 
must be alleviated as a matter of priority.
 Over and over again, Iran has asked to be treated with fairness and respect. In 
his video message of 20 March 2009, addressed both to the Iranian people and to 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, President Obama did so: instead of policies of 
threat, “we seek . . . engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect”. 
“The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in 
the community of nations.” “You have that right – but it comes with real 
responsibilities.”17
 Talks have taken place – about Afghanistan after 9/11, and three rounds about 
Iraq later on – but they were grounded in specific American needs and separated 
from Iran’s broader regional role. For Iran
that kind of dialogue symbolizes the unequal relationship the US has sought 
to impose under cover of mutual respect. Iran was invited to participate only 
to the extent it had something to offer to the US – not because it had some-
thing to say.18
 Iranians are therefore wary of invitations to discuss specific issues that 
emanate from Washington’s failures and needs without a new overarching stra-
tegic framework that recognises Iran as a full- fledged regional player. For 
instance, annoyed by questions about what it is doing in Iraq, it claims respect 
for its intrinsic religious, economic, cultural, political and historical presence and 
influence there. With Afghanistan, Iran has a 930-kilometre- long border; a strong 
common interest with the US in fighting al- Qaeda and keeping the Taliban at 
bay; there are a million Afghan refugees on Iranian soil; and narco- trafficking is 
heavy. The scope for cooperation is quite considerable provided that the role of 
the regional power (Iran) is respected as much as the role of the major power on 
the other side of the globe (USA).
 The fax that the Swiss caretaker of US interests sent to Washington in May 
2003 also offered to stop material support to Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbol-
lah and to help turn them into political organisations, along with acceptance of a 
two- state solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.19 This is a prerequisite for 
full normalisation of US–Iranian relations. Textbook logic suggests that the 
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nuclear issues can best be solved in a framework of comprehensive normalisa-
tion, because the deeper the mutual confidence, the less need there is to constrain 
the nuclear programme. A high level of overall confidence would make tight 
constraints beyond international regime standards superfluous. However, 
un wavering US support for Israel, and Iranian aspirations to lead the Muslim 
world in its fight against Israel and in support of the Palestinians, make this a 
distant prospect.
 In one key respect, Iran and the West see each other through the same lens: 
the attitude towards the nuclear programme is a litmus test of where the other 
side is heading and how far the dialogue can go. The West does not accept Iran 
becoming an NWS, and political reconciliation is unlikely to evolve fast enough 
to make it live comfortably with an advanced Iranian virtual arsenal. For Iran’s 
oppositional nationalists, the nuclear programme is at the core of its demands: it 
is key to higher status, enhanced security and a stronger regional role, i.e. the 
alleviation of the painful asymmetries they have had to labour under. The pro-
gramme strengthens national independence and self- sufficiency, and raises Iran’s 
international standing in a way reminiscent of the role that nuclear weapons 
played in the revival of France as a big power with an independent foreign policy 
in the 1960s, yet without necessarily turning Iran into an NWS.
Attend to the activities of nuclear mythmakers
Myths grow out of strong convictions and are therefore hard to change. Pro- 
nuclear mythmakers tend to argue the case for nuclear- weapon acquisition irre-
spective of changes in their environment (Ali Bhutto, Nasser, Vorster) (Lavoy 
2006). In Iran, some clerics remain true to Ayatollah Khomeini’s negative atti-
tude towards “the atom” and now and then go public as anti- nuclear mythmak-
ers.20 In September 2003, this position was expressed in a fatwa by conservative 
ulama in Qom, reiterating that “nuclear weapons are un- Islamic because they are 
inhumane” (Bar 2009).
 In the public domain, there are few mythmakers of any significance – no 
Iranian Ali Bhutto who said he would push for nuclear weapons even if the Paki-
stanis had to eat grass. Still, it is not far- fetched to assume that in the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, the Pasdaran) and among second- generation 
revolutionaries, pro- nuclear mythmakers do exist, but that they do not find it 
opportune to go public or are not allowed to do so. At any time and in any given 
country, multiple myths may co- exist and compete with each other: that appears 
to be the case in Iran, too, although by and large Iranians do not seem to hold 
strong, unqualified positions. Rather, they are sensitive to changes in their sur-
roundings. Also, the role of religion and of the religious mythmakers is debata-
ble. One interpretation holds that it is no different from the role that religion has 
played in so many other countries in human history, i.e. that of legitimising 
political interests.21
 Important decisions on nuclear and foreign policy have been made by consen-
sus among the major factions. For instance, the decision to restart nuclear 
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 activities in Esfahan at the end of July 2005 was made by a group comprising 
Khamenei (the supreme leader), the outgoing president Khatami (reformist), the 
incoming president Ahmadinejad (radical), former prime minister Moussavi 
(moderate conservative) and former president Rafsanjani (conservative).
 Multiple mythmakers, few principled ones and decisions by consensus: this 
amounts to a political system where external factors are weighed and debated 
between the factions, but which may be less flexible and less effective than many 
other systems because of the time it takes to forge consensus. The US National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of November 2007 also emphasised the rationality 
of the system and that Iran is susceptible to foreign influence. The government 
of Iran was willing to and capable of adapting to changes in its environment and 
to being a partner in real negotiations. However, after the presidential elections 
in the summer of 2009, the leadership group got embroiled in internal conflicts 
and fell apart.
Reduce the role of the military
One of the most solid theses in organisation theory is that big organisations try 
to maintain and expand their own status and influence. The military is no excep-
tion. In Iran, the military organisation to be watched is primarily the IRGC/ 
Pasdaran. The Army and the Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation (IAEO) were 
inherited from the shah and play more modest roles. The election of Ahmadine-
jad brought people from the Pasdaran into high government offices – so much so 
that to refer to the leadership in Teheran as “the priesthood” is inaccurate. It is 
commonly assumed that the interests in military applications of nuclear energy 
reside first and foremost with the Pasdaran, and that the closer the nuclear pro-
gramme comes to a weapon capability, the greater the influence of the Pasdaran 
will be. To make Iran refrain from weapons pursuits, it is therefore important to 
constrain the influence of this organisation and the second- generation revolution-
aries who liaise with it. The ups and downs of Pasdaran are, however, first and 
foremost a function of domestic political dynamics. There is not much that exter-
nal actors can do to change it, except indirectly.
Encourage openness to the outside world
The hypothesis has been advanced that proponents of openness are less likely to 
seek nuclear weapons than governments wanting to shut the world out (Solingen 
2007). Quantitative analysis does not refute it, but suggests that each individual 
case must be examined on its own merits (Muller and Schmidt 2010).
 The Iranian regime has had few problems living with US sanctions. Using US 
hostility to legitimise and enhance its own position, it has even turned them to its 
own benefit. UN sanctions have been harder to swallow, not because they have 
been biting – they have actually been modest – but because Iran seeks recogni-
tion as a regional power and legitimate partner in international affairs and that 
ambition does not square with international condemnation. For some time, Iran 
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has drawn distinctly unfavourable reactions from many parts of the world, 
making many Iranians ask what is wrong with their foreign affairs. Policies that 
allow it to become a bona fide partner in international cooperation provided that 
the non- proliferation norm is respected may therefore be instrumental in keeping 
it away from nuclear weapons.
 Openness to the outside world is positively correlated with degree of demo-
cratic practice. Countries undergoing democratisation often find it particularly 
important to be seen as norm- abiding. Iran is in many ways more democratic 
than most other countries in the Middle East, although the chaos following the 
2009 elections significantly curtailed civil liberties. Factions compete for influ-
ence and their relative importance is changing back and forth. There is nothing 
unidirectional about it – no signs of a well- functioning democracy at the end of 
any tunnel. Deeper involvement in international economic, cultural, scientific 
and political affairs therefore has to be stimulated in other ways. Sanctions are 
standing in the way, whereas membership in the WTO and other organisations 
may turn it into a stakeholder in organised international cooperation.
Enhance the non- proliferation norm
A strong non- proliferation norm may be among the most important factors in 
stemming proliferation and inducing rollback.22 Better and more balanced imple-
mentation of the NPT is therefore fundamentally important.
 Implementation of Article VI of the Treaty – the disarmament article – is of 
vital importance in this connection. If a dynamic interplay evolves between the 
vision of an NWFW and specific measures towards that end, drawing all NWS 
into systematic and progressive reductions, the original bargain between non- 
proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses will be much healthier. If this were 
to happen, potential proliferators will find it harder to go ahead and be more 
easily targeted for countervailing action. It is more costly to work against an 
established trend in the international system, especially if it is jointly developed 
by the big powers.
 Calling for an NWFW, President Obama easily wins the war of words over 
big power hypocrisy and discrimination charges. He acknowledges the protests 
of double standards and wants to eliminate all nuclear weapons. To make a real 
difference, however, declaratory policies must be followed by action.
Buy time
Diplomatic involvement to buy time has been an important element in many 
rollback campaigns. It may be applied for years, waiting for external and/or 
internal changes to offer special opportunities for breakthrough. In the end, this 
brought good results in Argentina and Brazil.
 In the case of Iran, the talks with the EU3/EU bought time in so far as Iran 
suspended its enrichment works between 2003 and 2005. Beyond that, however, 
making suspension a condition for negotiations meant time lost. For the Bush 
Challenge from within  143
administration, negotiations were a reward granted to foreigners for good beha-
viour.23 It did not want to negotiate with evil, but to remove it. Means and objec-
tives were turned upside down: the objective – curtailing the fuel- cycle activities 
– was made a precondition for talks about it. Both time and opportunities were 
lost.
 When Obama entered the White House he put it straight, offering negotia-
tions without preconditions. The timelines were critical, for the risk was that the 
nuclear programme would be racing ahead of progress in the negotiations. At 
that juncture, a formula for buying time was a double freeze, i.e. a halt to further 
enrichment and to further sanctions while new opportunities were explored.
US and Iranian strategies for conflict management
US strategy
In the spring of 2009, the contours of the new US strategy were coming into 
focus. The US was ready to participate in multilateral nuclear talks in the P5+1 
framework and to initiate a dialogue with Iran without preconditions. The sanc-
tions would be maintained, and efforts were made to build broad coalitions with 
a view to increasing the pressure on Iran if the negotiations were to fail. No 
“artificial” deadlines for progress were set, but a review would be made by the 
turn of 2009/2010.
 The coalition-building aimed at making Russia more cooperative and at mobi-
lising Arab support for US policies. European support seemed assured. The 
message to Russia was that if it joined the US in a successful attempt to keep 
Iran non- nuclear, there might be no need for a missile shield on its borders in 
Eastern Europe. Originally understood to be an exercise in linkage politics, this 
was later said to be a statement of fact. Cancellation of the missile shield plans 
for Poland and the Czech Republic would in turn facilitate disarmament negotia-
tions between the US and Russia, possibly leading – in due course – to multilat-
eral disarmament talks. If successful, it would put broader, concerted pressure on 
Iran not to rock the boat by acting in contravention to the joint US–Russian 
efforts. The plans for Poland and the Czech Republic were subsequently aban-
doned, paving the way for another disarmament agreement to replace START I, 
but Russian cooperation on Iran remained open to doubt.
 Ten years ago – when Russia had to swallow a series of humiliating political 
defeats at the hands of the US and the West – its relationship to Tehran became 
a litmus test of the continued existence of an independent Russian foreign policy. 
Russia was selling weapons to Iran; cooperated with Iran on peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy; and wanted to cooperate with Iran on issues of petroleum policy. 
A closer Iranian alliance with the West could jeopardise its role as the main gas 
supplier to Europe. Russia does not want Iran to fall back into the Western 
sphere of interest. In key respects, Russia, China and Iran are supporting each 
other: Russia and Iran support China on the Taiwan issue; China and Iran 
support Russia in Chechnya; and for Russia and China, Iran is an important 
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 geopolitical entity that should stay where it is and pick up on its historical orien-
tations towards the North and the East. Asia’s rapid economic development and 
growing political influence provide an impetus in that direction. Therefore, US 
cooperation with Russia on Iran will not come easily.
 To get the Arabs on board, the US was leaning on Israel to be more forthcom-
ing towards the Palestinians. President Obama’s insistence that Israel stop build-
ing new settlements, natural expansion of existing settlements included, was 
another go at something previous presidents failed to achieve. In effect, his 
coalition- building with moderate Arab regimes (euphemism for regimes that are 
on friendly terms with the US) was a follow up of President Bush’s Annapolis 
exercise, which ostensibly set out to improve Israeli–Palestinian relations, but 
which had the same subtext: moderating the Arab–Israeli relationship with a 
view to concerted pressure on Iran. The US took care to brief moderate Arab 
states about its policies and diplomacy towards Iran, and extended a hand to 
Syria, Iran’s only ally in the Middle East. A better relationship with Syria might 
weaken Syria’s ties with Iran.
 This was a tall ambition as well, too tall to be realised: Israeli politics had 
moved distinctly to the right, and Obama failed to stop the expansion of settle-
ments. Iran’s vocal opposition to Israeli and US policies and material support for 
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and other groups fighting Israel had earned it 
much support on the Arab streets. The nearer one came to Iran, the more the 
Arab states feared the consequences of a war with it. The closer to Iran, the 
cooler was also the support for sanctions. However, Egyptian, Saudi and other 
Arab leaderships were deeply worried about the bomb potential of the Iranian 
nuclear programme, and many Arab states were launching programmes for civil-
ian applications of nuclear energy.
 Generally, US efforts to gain Arab, Russian and other countries’ support for 
more severe sanctions in case engagement with Iran does not yield satisfactory 
results will therefore be hard- won. However, President Obama is in a better posi-
tion to rally support for his policies than George W. Bush was. With the war in 
Iraq winding down and oil prices being well below 100 dollars a barrel, he is also 
better placed to threaten Iran with economic pain, although he stopped short of a 
cut-off. The single most biting sanction would be a cut- off of refined petroleum 
products, for which Iran still depended on import to almost 40 per cent of its total 
consumption.24 For Tehran, Obama promised to be a demanding interlocutor.
 The US might go far in the direction of accepting the nuclear programme, 
some degree and form of enrichment on Iranian soil included, in return for full 
transparency. As for the negotiating procedure, there was a choice between a 
step- by-step approach and a comprehensive bargain, both with shortcomings and 
dangers. Any approach was subject to tight time constraints.
Iranian strategy
Iranian leaders were not content with US respect for Iran’s sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity and for its Islamic regime. After all, this is no more than a return 
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to general code of conduct in inter- state affairs. Iran wants a negotiating frame-
work that is conducive to recognition of its wider role in the Middle East. Nego-
tiation of the nuclear issues and parallel talks about Iraq, Afghanistan and other 
problems, under a cloud of penalties if agreement is not reached within relatively 
tight time frames, do not meet that desire.
 The Iranians want to have an overarching strategic framework that enables 
them to discuss regional issues with the American superpower across the board. 
In practice, it is far from clear what this means: Iran has learnt much about how 
to manage isolation and how to split big and small powers in their conduct of 
Iranian affairs, but it has little experience dealing with international openings. 
However, while the demands are vague, they are nevertheless central to the 
management of the Iranian problem in general and the nuclear issue in 
particular.
 The nuclear programme is elevated above factional politics in Iran. It has 
many functions beyond providing nuclear power and a nuclear- weapon option. It 
symbolises what the Iranian civilisation can achieve; it can be used to offset 
domestic discontent, for the leaders can always count on widespread nationalism 
in support of their defiance towards the West; and it is one of Iran’s main levers 
for being treated with respect and justice.
 Enrichment is first and foremost a national undertaking, although there is a 
crack in the door for multilateral/international organisation of fuel- cycle opera-
tions. Multinational and international solutions are attractive, but time- 
consuming to implement. A possible compromise may include comprehensive 
verification, solid supply assurances, constraints on the fuel- cycle programme, 
and exploration of multilateral/international options for the long term.
 For the time being, verification is less than meaningful. The Western big 
powers are looking for incriminating evidence. Iran refuses to re- introduce the 
Additional Protocol. In the face of military threats from the US and Israel, it 
stands to reason that it has hidden materials, technology and equipment at many 
different locations. How can that Gordian knot be cut? It is hard to imagine a 
solution in the narrow framework of nuclear issues. It probably takes a degree of 
normalisation of US–Iranian affairs and acknowledgement of Iran’s regional role 
to do it.
 If Iran is serious about developing a weapon capability, it probably plans for 
enrichment somewhere other than Natanz, out of reach of the safeguards system. 
To turn Natanz to the production of highly enriched uranium, or divert material 
from there for upgrading at another site, will make alarm bells ring everywhere. 
That would mean publicity before consumption and more trouble than is, strictly 
speaking, necessary. There is little doubt that for some oppositional nationalists, 
security threats and status ambitions mould into a thought that meets both con-
cerns: “If Iran becomes atomic Iran, no longer will anyone dare challenge it, 
because they would have to pay too high a price” (Clawson and Eisenstadt 
2008).
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Resumption of negotiations – and resumption of sanctions
On 1 October 2009, negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 started in Geneva, 
with full US participation and without preconditions. The run- up could have 
been smoother: the unrest in Iran after the presidential elections in June, and the 
revelation of another enrichment facility under construction near the holy city of 
Qom – named Meshkat – only ten days before the meeting convened, put the 
diplomatic track under pressure.25
 The standard safeguards agreement from the 1970s said that new facilities 
had to be notified to the IAEA at least 180 days before becoming operational. 
Later, this was changed to notification as soon as a decision to build a new facil-
ity had been made.26 In February 2003, Iran accepted that change, as the last 
country to do so, but in March 2007 it reverted to the 180 days provision. 
However, an agreement with the IAEA cannot be changed unilaterally. Work on 
the Meshkat facility did, moreover, start before March 2007. It was therefore 
done in violation of the safeguards agreement.27
 Meshkat is well protected in hard rock. Naturally, a state that is under threat 
of being bombed would do so and distribute valuable equipment throughout its 
territory.28 Iran plans to build ten new uranium- enrichment plants inside moun-
tains to protect them from military attacks.29 Therefore, if more locations become 
known, it is not necessarily a sign of weapons ambitions: it may just as well be 
mere defensive arrangements. To date, there is no proof that Iran is trying to 
build bombs, only plenty of suspicions.
 In the run- up to the Geneva meeting, the US made it clear that, at that junc-
ture, there would be no talk of sanctions. More comprehensive sanctions would 
come later, if the negotiations did not bring satisfactory results. A concrete 
confidence- building measure, advanced by IAEA Director General Mohammed 
ElBaradei, was tabled: Iran would send LEU from Natanz to a third country 
(Russia, France) for fuel enriched up to 20 per cent in order to continue produc-
tion of isotopes for medical use at the Tehran research reactor (TRR). Nearly all 
the fuel that Argentina provided in the 1990s had been spent. The US and Iranian 
chief negotiators met in between the plenary sessions – the first such meeting in 
30 years.
 The US demanded that Iran document its peaceful intentions. The bar is high 
in this respect and the problems run deep, for even if Iran does not plan for pro-
duction of nuclear weapons, it would obviously not like to provide information 
that may help Israel and the US to update their target lists. The Israelis are well 
known to prefer bombing, and the Americans have not written that option off.
 In a comment, President Obama emphasised that Iran would not be singled 
out. The same standards should apply for all members of the international non- 
proliferation regime. His vision of an NWFW, and the UN Security Council 
summit meeting on nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation that he convened 
in September 2009, enabled him to refute assertions of double standards. He reit-
erated that Iran has the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but that 
with the right comes responsibilities, and now Iran had to deliver (Sanger 2009).
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 The continuation was deplorable. Iranian leaders reacted differently to the 
proposal and openly criticised each other, in a reflection of the chaotic govern-
ance situation in Tehran. The common denominator was a concern that they 
would not receive fuel for the TRR after fulfilling their end of the deal, so they 
put forward their own alternatives – exporting the LEU in batches or arranging 
swaps of LEU and fresh fuel on Iranian soil.30 The United States insisted on spe-
cific conditions for any deal to be agreed – 1,200 kilograms of Iranian LEU had 
to be removed from Iranian territory in a single batch before the end of 2009 – 
which effectively blocked diplomatic progress on the issue. In effect, the TRR 
fuel issue was turned into a “take it or leave it” proposition. The impression was 
that Iran was buying time: now, at long last, it had to demonstrate good intent 
and readiness to do business. The announcement of negotiations without precon-
ditions and the promising first meeting between Iran and the 5+1 boiled down to 
stalemate over a modest measure to improve the atmosphere for substantive 
talks.
 Facing prolonged impasse over the issue, the United States, France and other 
Western countries geared up for another round of sanctions, some of them in the 
belief that the domestic unrest had made Iran more vulnerable to external pres-
sure. In Washington, Congress was ready for tougher application of US second-
ary sanctions on European and other companies doing business with Iran, while 
the administration seemed to prefer the UN route. Germany and other European 
countries warned against additional US sanctions because it might simply let 
Chinese companies replace European ones. The emphasis was on targeted sanc-
tions, primarily against the IRGC:31 Israel demanded crippling sanctions as soon 
as possible. In February 2010, Iran started enrichment tests to 20 per cent with a 
view to producing the TRR fuel itself.
 At that juncture, the headline was renewed focus on sanctions. The negotiat-
ing track had been reduced to a subtext.
Assessment
President Obama’s coalition building is a new twist to long- standing US policies 
to contain Iran, running counter to Iranian efforts to correct prevailing status 
asymmetries. The coalition building may not be very successful: as Obama 
failed to deliver on the settlement issue and got nowhere with Iran, there was 
diminishing Arab enthusiasm for a common front against the Islamic republic. 
However, continued attempts to bring them on board did not augur well for set-
tlement of the US–Iranian dispute. To the extent that the purpose is to elicit 
broader support for stronger pressures on the Islamic Republic – Hillary Clinton 
and Dennis Ross have advocated such an approach – the immediate consequence 
will be conflict escalation, not conflict settlement. For as long as Obama’s con-
ciliatory words do not translate into real prospects of being acknowledged as a 
regional actor in the wider Middle East, Iran is unlikely to yield very much on 
the nuclear issue. A high- level Israeli–American working group was set up to 
identify more coercive options if Iran does not meet US conditions.32
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 The covert operations initiated and conducted inside Iran by the Bush admin-
istration may be another impediment.33 Hundreds of millions of dollars were 
invested to destabilise the Islamic Republic. When Richard Nixon started his tri-
angle diplomacy with the Soviet Union and China, he stopped the CIA’s covert 
operations in Tibet. Did Obama do likewise in Iran? The new declaratory policy, 
substituting respect for the Islamic republic for regime change, suggests that the 
covert programmes have been cancelled. The reality may nevertheless be differ-
ent. Covert operations have, moreover, also been conducted by other states, and 
may still be. To the extent that Iran is aware of them, it may be hard to determine 
who is responsible.
 President Obama reached out to the governments of the Middle East and 
competed for sympathy among ordinary citizens. In response, the 2009 Iranian 
presidential candidates were keen to present themselves as best suited to handle 
the new challenges and opportunities. When the US offered unconditional nego-
tiations both multilaterally and bilaterally, Iran was in no position to decline. 
However, because of the leverage that Obama tried to build and use in case Iran 
was not forthcoming enough, the new opportunities were fraught with great risks 
for the government in Tehran. Not only would Obama be more effective than his 
predecessor in gaining support for severe sanctions, but Democratic administra-
tions also have a stronger interventionist record than Republican ones, George 
W. Bush aside. All the time, the Israelis can be counted on to lean on the US to 
take military action or to give a green light for Israeli bombing. Since they do 
not believe in diplomacy, they will try to limit the diplomatic window of oppor-
tunity as much as possible.
 This goes to the heart of political realities and power politics. Israel is con-
vinced that Iran is going for the bomb; Iranian nuclear weapons are unacceptable 
both to Israel and to the US; domestic US pressure in support of Israel is known 
to be very strong; so, to avoid more severe sanctions or being bombed, Iran will 
have to go out of its way to provide credible assurances of non- nuclear status. 
Never mind that the choice between accepting Iran as an NWS or bombing it is a 
false one: if Iran had not decided to go for nuclear weapons before being 
bombed, it would most probably do so in the aftermath. Israel does not see it that 
way, nor do many Americans.
 Under what circumstances would Iran accept the Additional Protocol and 
offer the transparency measures that are necessary to reassure the US, Israel and 
others?
 To convince Israel seems next to impossible. It will be hard enough to con-
vince the United States, even if the 2007 NIE concluded – with a high level of 
confidence – that the Iranians stopped the military parts of the programme by the 
end of 2003.34 Even if Iran were to meet the transparency requirements of the 
IAEA, the concerns about a virtual Iranian arsenal are such that restrictions on 
the fuel- cycle capabilities would be necessary to lay the security concerns to 
rest.
 Iran may not be prepared for that. Anti- nuclear mythmakers claiming that the 
bomb is anti- Islamic are known neither to have protested the abandonment of the 
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Additional Protocol in February 2006 nor to have argued for its re- introduction. 
The role of the IRGC is distinctly negative. Its officials are hardliners limiting 
the scope of conflict settlement. Their influence changes with changing political 
constellations: radical conservatives like Ahmadinejad, reaching back to the 
ideals of 1979, give it a boost; moderate or reformist presidents tend to constrain 
its influence. However, the more advanced the virtual arsenal becomes, the 
greater its influence is likely to be.
 Much hinges on whether the discrepancies between Iranian self- perceptions 
and the way others see and treat them can be alleviated. Iran’s security concerns 
should certainly not be underestimated either. What is more important in its 
nuclear drive – to negate the threats to its security or to overcome the frustration 
over not being properly treated – may be the wrong question to ask. Like apples 
and oranges, they are hard to compare, but they both translate into the nuclear 
programme as a favoured vehicle of change.
 To be more forthcoming to Iran without jeopardising the interests of Arab 
states is in large measure a matter of exploiting the potential for win–win 
arrangements. One example is the proposed Iranian–Saudi/GCC mutual defence 
pact: Iranians have been saying that if the US is behind the proposal, it shows 
that US policy is changing (in a positive direction). Another example might be a 
free- trade arrangement comprising all the countries around the Persian Gulf. A 
third example is a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East, 
an idea that was discussed during the Madrid process of the early 1990s and that 
is inspired by the Helsinki Final Act and the Conference on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe. In effect, Obama’s speech in Cairo on 4 June 2009 had 
important components in common with the Helsinki Final Act.35
 The Nixon administration worked with the Chinese leaders to define what the 
long- term strategic realignment between their countries should be about. Without 
it, the realignment may not have happened (Leverett and Leverett 2009). The US 
and Iran have not come to anything of that kind. Washington has not outlined its 
strategic goals, and Tehran is even less capable than before of explaining its 
overarching objectives in the Middle East. By the beginning of 2010, another 
opportunity for a political solution therefore seemed to be lost.
Implications for the NPT
Should Iran become an NWS, proliferation pressures would grow throughout the 
Middle East – in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey first of all – although contrary 
to widespread beliefs, there is no automaticity to it. If the development of an 
Iranian virtual arsenal is not corrected, the effect will be much the same, tempt-
ing others to go down the same road. The impact on the NPT therefore goes 
beyond Iran.
 The impact of a successful resolution of the conflict may also go much 
beyond Iran. If a multilateral fuel- cycle venture is set up, it would be the first of 
its kind in a region of proliferation pressure. If the case of Iran can be used to 
push internationalisation of all fuel- cycle facilities, existing ones included, the 
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non- proliferation regime will be significantly enhanced. The Iranian problem, 
which highlights the untenable division of the world into haves and have- nots 
and the double standards that have been applied by the NWS, can also be 
invoked in support of nuclear disarmament, the way President Obama set out 
to do.
 The outcome of the Iran conflict is therefore rich on consequences for the 
non- proliferation regime – for better or worse.
8 How to understand North Korea
The one and only withdrawal from the NPT
North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985; entered a safeguards agreement with 
the IAEA in 1992; and withdrew from the NPT in 2003, as the only country to 
have done so.
 The validity of the withdrawal has been questioned on legal grounds. North 
Korea had announced its intention to withdraw once before, on 12 March 1993, 
but went back on that notice on 11 June, one day before it would have taken 
effect. On 9 January 2003, it stated that it would leave the Treaty the next day in 
reference to the 89 days’ notice ten years earlier, which had merely been sus-
pended. This procedure was controversial, since the reasons given in 2003 were 
different from the ones given in 1993.1 Once Pyongyang linked its withdrawal to 
the earlier notice, the legal basis for the final withdrawal arguably rested on the 
original grounds.
 However, while the withdrawal was put before the UN Security Council, the 
Council failed to take any action because of disagreements among the P5, 
notably China and the United States. In effect, it was left to the withdrawing 
state, i.e. the DPRK, to define “the extraordinary events [that had] jeopardized 
its supreme interests”.2 The facts on the ground were that the IAEA had to termi-
nate all safeguards activities in the DPRK. By that yardstick, North Korea had 
for all intents and purposes left the Treaty.
Denuclearisation: is it realistic?
In 2003, North Korea openly declared its pursuit of nuclear weapons. In 2005, it 
said it had weaponised its nuclear programme (Hecker 2005). In October 2006 it 
tested a nuclear explosive device, followed by another test in May 2009. Can it 
be turned back to non- nuclear status? How realistic is it?
 Some take the view that North Korea is determined to be a nuclear- weapon 
state (NWS) and that, in the time ahead, it will seek international acceptance of 
it.3 Nuclear weapons are essential for North Korean security, and military might 
is the only source of its diplomatic power. Others believe it has been willing to 
trade its nuclear capabilities for a fundamentally new political relationship with 
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the United States and other countries, including a peace treaty ending the Korean 
war, security assurances, economic aid and investment and normalisation, and 
that it still could be. Yet others believe limitations can be negotiated, but that 
elimination is out of reach or at least unlikely any time soon.
 In large measure, the differences and uncertainties of interpretation stem from 
the fact that North Korea is a closed society – more so than any other country in 
the world. China and South Korea may have better intelligence on the internal 
workings of the North Korean regime than other states, but they, too, seem to 
have very limited access. North Korea’s attitudes and intentions must therefore 
be judged on the basis of its conduct of external affairs. Efforts to link them to 
domestic factors like leadership changes, the effects of economic sanctions, food 
shortages and changes of economic policy may be interesting, but highly 
speculative.
 Leon Sigal has pointed out that those who believe North Korea was always 
headed for nuclear weapons fail to explain significant anomalies in its nuclear 
efforts over the past two decades. North Korea stopped reprocessing in 1991 and 
did not resume until 2003. It stopped again in 2007 and did not resume until the 
spring of 2009. It fabricated a limited amount of fuel rods before 1994 and has 
yet to make more. It has therefore produced significantly less plutonium than it 
could have done so far. Siegfried Hecker (2010) assesses that, with the capabil-
ities it had or was soon to complete by the early 1990s, Pyongyang could have 
had an arsenal of 100 or more nuclear weapons today. Instead it has enough plu-
tonium for four to eight weapons and is currently not producing more. Plutonium 
from the 5 MWe reactor in Yongbyon remains the only source of fissile material, 
but by 2009/2010 it had been shut down for a while. If North Korea was deter-
mined to become an NWS, why stop (Sigal 2009a)? Why did it take the starkly 
confrontational policy of the Bush administration to trigger another reprocessing 
campaign after 12 years of recess?
 To get Washington’s attention, to get negotiations going and to speed up 
implementation of accords that have been struck, missile and nuclear tests have 
been conducted and threats issued. In a sense, North Korea had no better choice, 
for absent dramatic actions the reclusive regime is off the radar screen, and its 
only means of alerting others to its needs and objectives are the nuclear and 
missile programmes. In contrast to Iran, which may have seen negotiations as a 
way of buying time for the nuclear programme to materialise,4 North Korea has 
taken action when implementation of agreements has been slow or absent. It has 
accepted agreements that have brought significant nuclear activities to a halt, and 
it has been angered when they have not been complied with. North Korea has 
practised tit- for-tat – cooperating when Washington cooperates and retaliating 
when Washington reneges. In game theory, such a strategy is known for its 
ability to turn conflict into cooperation.5 If this is a fair reading of North Korean 
thinking, there is realism to the disarmament ambition. Whether it applies all the 
way back to non- nuclear status is uncertain, however.
 It follows that the North Korean challenge is different from the three- state 
problem. None of the three – Israel, Pakistan and India – seem prepared to 
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 relinquish their nuclear arsenals any sooner than any of the P5. Since in practice 
they cannot become members of the NPT, they are long- term outliers, awaiting 
comprehensive nuclear disarmament. North Korea, on the other hand, is a sepa-
rate case that may be persuaded to limit its nuclear activities and even go back 
into the non- nuclear fold more or less irrespective of big power readiness to 
disarm.
 Even if this reading fits past behaviour, how do we know that it remains 
valid? How do we know that the missile tests and the second nuclear test in the 
spring of 2009 is a wake- up call for renewed negotiations and not a farewell to 
the idea of disarmament for normalisation? In the past, it always wanted to 
revive negotiations, but will it happen this time? If it does, how do we know that 
it is sincere about a disarmament/reconciliation trade- off? Since we are unable to 
look inside North Korean politics, there is always the possibility that Pyongyang 
has given up on that option in favour of nuclear- weapon status for the foresee-
able future, and that with some delay this will be clear. The foreign policies of 
the United States and others are not constant, and the domestic politics of the 
DPRK may certainly also be shifting.
 When the Security Council issued a presidential statement condemning the 
long- range missile test in the spring of 2009 and imposing sanctions on three 
North Korean firms involved in missile trading, a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokes-
man stopped short of abandoning six- party talks forever. He characterised six- 
party talks as “an arena that infringes on our sovereignty” (by opposing its missile 
launch) and “which only aims at disarming us and overthrowing our system”, and 
said that “we will never participate in such talks and will no longer be bound to 
any agreement”. The statement was similar to the March 1993 statement threaten-
ing to renounce the NPT. It called into question the commitment to “abandon all 
nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” in the September 2005 joint state-
ment from the six- party talks in Beijing. That statement also reconfirmed the valid-
ity of the denuclearisation agreement between the two Koreas of 1992.6
 Only the North Korean leaders themselves know what they are going for, and 
even that cannot to be taken for granted: the objectives may not always be clear- 
cut for them, either. The only way to find out is to probe through systematic give 
and take, offering North Korea a peace treaty, security assurances, normalisation 
of relations and economic assistance in return for denuclearisation. The Clinton 
administration did so only half- heartedly, dragging its feet in implementing the 
Agreed Framework of 1994 and being hampered by a recalcitrant Congress. The 
Bush administration closed the door at first, and when it opened it in Berlin in 
January 2007, it was split on how to proceed. In 2008 it moved the verification 
goalposts up in contravention to the 3 October 2007 agreement on “Second- 
Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement”,7 leaving the 
Obama administration with a process that had veered off course. It remains, 
therefore, to undertake a thorough and systematic probe, true to the letter and 
spirit of existing agreements.
 The North Koreans are known for their offensive diplomatic language. Over 
and over again, provocative statements have been made in response to what they 
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have seen as broken promises and threats from the US and others. Many times, 
they left the table. So far, however, they have always come back. Once more, we 
have to ask: is it different this time? Are they burning bridges behind 
themselves?
North Korea’s nuclear history: the early years
Under a cooperation agreement between the USSR and the DPRK, a nuclear- 
research centre was established in Yongbyon in the mid- 1960s. The USSR sup-
plied a 2–4 MWe research reactor which ran on 10 per cent enriched uranium, 
later upgraded to 8 MWe and converted to the use of HEU (80 per cent). This 
reactor was not a good source of plutonium. However, in combination with 
Soviet training of North Korean scientists and engineers, it kicked off a nuclear 
programme that became increasingly self- sustained in line with North Korea’s 
Juche ideology.8
 The security motive was important from the beginning. In 1957, the United 
States deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea, and in the following years it 
conducted military exercises there involving nuclear- capable artillery, fighter- 
bombers and carrier aircraft. In the early 1970s, enhanced North Korean nuclear 
efforts coincided with South Korean interests in nuclear weapons. To keep the 
South non- nuclear and to thwart competition between the two Koreas, the United 
States intervened to stop deliveries of a reprocessing facility from France, a “Cirus 
line” reactor from Canada9 and a fuel fabrication plant from Belgium, and induced 
Seoul to ratify the NPT in 1975. In 1977, the Soviet Union persuaded North Korea 
to join the NPT (which it did in 1985) in order to be in a position to receive light- 
water reactors (LWR), only to have South Korea resume its nuclear programme. 
Once again, the United States persuaded the South to stop, but the North did not.
 In the early 1980s, North Korea began constructing a 5 MWe gas- graphite 
reactor in Yongbyon, well- suited for plutonium production, along with facilities 
for uranium fabrication and conversion. The reactor became operational in 1986. 
Construction of a 50 MWe and a 200 MWe reactor started, but were never com-
pleted. At this time, the South was outpacing the North economically and mili-
tarily, and the North had growing doubts about the reliability of its allies, i.e. the 
USSR and China. Towards the end of the decade, the building of a reprocessing 
facility near the 5 MWe reactor became public knowledge. In 1989 the reactor 
was shut down and the first load of fuel rods removed. When the safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA took effect in 1992, the Agency found that spent fuel 
had been reprocessed not only in gram quantities in 1990 – ostensibly from 
damaged reactor fuel as part of an experiment – but in 1989 and 1991 as well. 
North Korea seemed unaware that by collecting dust from the remote control 
rods at the reprocessing plant and analysing the isotopic decay, the Agency could 
prove this beyond doubt. At this time, North Korea may have had enough pluto-
nium for one or two nuclear- explosive devices.10
 When the Soviet Union fell apart and China improved its relations with South 
Korea, the United States and Russia, North Korea was left on its own. Trade 
How to understand North Korea  155
with Russia was down, and China’s market economy pushed Beijing in every 
direction but North Korea. China could be relied upon only if North Korea was 
attacked; Russia not even then. In the end of the 1980s, Kim- Il-Sung therefore 
reached out to North Korea’s enemies – the United States, Japan and South 
Korea – in an effort to turn conflict into cooperation and reduce the dependence 
on China. International affairs were in such a state of flux that hedging against 
further Chinese moves to Pyongyang’s detriment seemed appropriate. In 1991, 
the US withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea encouraged 
the adoption of a broader security strategy that emphasised threat reduction as 
well as military preparedness.
 This led North Korea to sign two agreements with South Korea: an Agree-
ment on Reconciliation, Non- Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation11 and a 
Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. The Joint 
Declaration, which was signed on 19 February 1992, states that the two sides 
“shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use 
nuclear weapons” and that they “shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and 
uranium enrichment facilities”. In a move similar to the Argentina–Brazil 
Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the Decla-
ration called for a Joint Nuclear Control Commission to verify the denuclearisa-
tion. On 30 January 1992, the DPRK also signed – at long last – a safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA, which it had been obliged to conclude much earlier 
following ratification of the NPT in 1985.12
 North Korea reprocessed plutonium for weapons while committing itself to 
disarm: these moves were open to interpretation, but not necessarily contradict-
ory. It is not unusual that negotiating parties beef up their bargaining positions in 
the run- up to negotiations. However, the North–South dialogue stalled in the 
autumn of 1992. South Korea announced that full North–South economic coop-
eration would not be possible without resolution of the North Korean nuclear 
issue, and on that score there was little movement. The negotiation of a bilateral 
inspections regime made little progress, and when the IAEA asked for special 
inspections of nuclear- waste sites in order to come to grips with the nuclear 
history of the DPRK, North Korea refused.13
 The South Korean demand concerning the sequence in which cooperative 
steps should be taken accentuated a point that was properly addressed only much 
later. It took another 13 years for the principle of parallel moves – “commitment 
for commitment, action for action” – to be agreed at the six- party talks in 
Beijing.14
Twenty years of overt nuclearisation: the rationale
By 2010, North Korea had conducted two nuclear tests and had perhaps 4–8 
Nagasaki- like nuclear weapons stockpiled.15 What are the functions of these 
weapons? How do they serve North Korean interests?
 Four motives deserve closer examination: to deter attack; to build bargaining 
leverage; to inflate crises in order to raise the compensation for defusing them; 
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and to obtain hard currency and material favours by exporting nuclear and 
missile technologies.
Deterrence
Nuclear weapons are deemed important to deter attack. As the Cold War drew to 
an end and international constellations shifted and traditional allies were lost, 
North Korea was quick to conduct the first reprocessing campaigns. It is not 
known how much plutonium those campaigns yielded, nor is it known when the 
programme was weaponised – if indeed it has been. However, the international 
community had to entertain the possibility that North Korea was acquiring one 
or two nuclear devices.
 What North Korea may have said and done in the name of deterrence, sur-
rounding states have often perceived as threats of aggression. Being shrouded in 
secrecy more than any other nation, the scope for misperceptions is exception-
ally great. Under conditions of opacity, worst- case assumptions are well- known 
to be thriving. The debate between those who see a consistent North Korean 
pattern of tit- for-tat, cooperation when the US cooperates and retaliation when it 
reneges, and those who believe that North Korea has long been determined to 
become an NWS, remains unresolved.
 However, deterrence has not reigned supreme in North Korean security 
policy. Following the adoption of Kim Il Sung’s comprehensive security strat-
egy, repeated attempts to trade nuclear and missile capabilities for security assur-
ances, normalisation and economic assistance were made without any addition 
to the plutonium stock. It was not until the Bush administration terminated the 
Agreed Framework in reference to North Korea’s alleged enrichment pro-
gramme and declared North Korea a member of the axis of evil that another load 
of spent fuel was reprocessed. During the Bush presidency, North Korea prob-
ably produced enough plutonium for another five- to-eight weapons and it con-
ducted its first nuclear test in October 2007.16 In its declaratory exhortations, it 
has used its nuclear capabilities to the hilt, threatening to turn the Korean penin-
sula into a sea of flames if attacked.
Bargaining leverage for normalisation and economic assistance
North Korea’s refusal to allow special inspections and lack of progress on the 
implementation of the North–South denuclearisation accord, triggered actions on 
both sides that led North Korea to announce its withdrawal from the NPT on 12 
March 1993. The US responded by inviting high- level talks, which led North 
Korea to call off the threat of withdrawal. The parties also agreed on basic prin-
ciples for continued dialogue. However, as Seoul resisted and Washington 
deferred to its ally, those talks were slow in materialising.
 In response, North Korea shut down the plutonium- production reactor and 
removed the fuel. When the US turned to the Security Council for sanctions, the 
parties came close to war. It was at this point that President Carter went to 
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Pyongyang to see Kim Il Sung. His mission was a breakthrough that turned con-
frontation into cooperation. A skeleton agreement was outlined and fleshed out 
in the course of four months to become the October 1994 Agreed Framework.17 
Under this agreement, North Korea would freeze and eventually dismantle its 
5 MWe reactor, the reprocessing facility and the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors 
under construction. In return, it would receive two 1,000 MWe light- water reac-
tors (LWR) and an interim supply of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year. The 
agreement also pledged to normalise US–DPRK relations and lift the sanctions, 
and committed the DPRK to North–South dialogue (Wit et al. 2004).
 At the time, the LWR were estimated to cost about $4 billion, later revised to 
more than $5 billion. The value of the heavy fuel oil to be supplied while waiting 
for the LWR to become operational was of the order of $150 million per year. In 
comparison, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine received less than one- tenth of 
this offer for giving up the nuclear weapons that were left on their soil when the 
Soviet Union fell apart. The North Koreans “framed” the deal themselves: they 
were the ones to propose two LWR, and the Americans accepted – on the 
assumption that South Korea, Japan and others would pay for it.18 The Frame-
work Agreement proved that the bargaining value of the nuclear programme 
could be quite significant.
 Ever since, economic compensation has been an important, integral part of 
the disarmament talks. In the spring of 2009, when North Korea said it would 
never go back to the six- party talks in Beijing, it may have had the Agreed 
Framework in mind, preferring bilateral talks with the US and an update of the 
1994 agreement.19 The Agreed Framework offered much higher economic quids 
for the disarmament quo than the six- party deal offered.
Compensation for crises of their own making
Implementation of the Framework Agreement quickly ran into South Korean 
criticism as well as opposition from the US Congress after the Republican 
victory in the 1994 elections. In the following years, Congress interrupted fuel 
oil deliveries by holding back money for them. Also, the Clinton administration 
and other members of the Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) 
were slow in implementing the LWR part of the deal. The problems lay in US 
domestic politics and alliance relations. Some officials may also have waited for 
the North Korean regime to disappear. In the wake of the Cold War, many 
regimes that had been in the Soviet sphere of influence collapsed or were 
expected to fall apart. In the view of many, North Korea had long been destined 
for the dust bin. Historical experiences showing that full- fledged dictatorships 
can be managed for very long periods of time were ignored. Delays in the imple-
mentation of the Agreed Framework were also caused by special North Korean 
demands such as its initial refusal to accept South Korean- designed LWR 
models20 and its salary demands for North Korean workers.
 In another interpretation of North Korean behaviour, Pyongyang turned these 
early negotiating experiences into a strategy to maximise compensation for 
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crises of its own making. Over and over again, it has tried to sell the bargaining 
cards at its disposal, i.e. the nuclear and missile programmes. The prelude was 
the notification of withdrawal from the NPT in 1993, which led to the agreement 
on basic principles for continued dialogue and preliminary discussions of LWR 
for North Korea. One year later the Agreed Framework promised ample remu-
neration for Pyongyang’s willingness to help defuse the crisis it had created by 
removing another batch of fuel rods, threatening to produce more plutonium and 
heightening military tension. Later examples are the testing of a long- range Tae-
podong missile in 1998 in an effort to speed up delivery of the goods that the 
Agreed Framework offered, and the nuclear and missile tests in 2006, which 
made the Bush administration do what it had said it would never contemplate – 
sitting down with the North Koreans in Berlin to negotiate what became the six- 
party agreements of 2007. When North Korea resumed its plutonium programme 
in 2003, it made no effort to trade cancellation for compensation in the belief 
that the Bush administration was not available for deals of any sort.
 There is some circumstantial evidence to support this interpretation. In all 
likelihood the North Koreans considered the Agreed Framework to be a big dip-
lomatic success, much as the disarmament part of it was a big step ahead from 
the American point of view. Later, they have therefore tried to use the assistance 
provisions of this agreement as standards for new deals. The main part of the 
1994 offer was the LWR, which North Korea kept asking for in the six- party 
talks, and the 2005 South Korean offer of 2,000 MWe from the South Korean 
grid was tailored to the provision of two 1,000 MWe LWR in the Agreed Frame-
work. North Korea pursued its nuclear and missile programmes in order to 
achieve remuneration of the magnitude envisaged by the Agreed Framework.
Sources of hard currency
The nuclear and missile programmes have also been sources of much- needed 
hard currency. Missile technology has been sold to Pakistan, Myanmar and 
countries in the Middle East, and nuclear assistance has probably been rendered 
to Syria and possibly Libya and Myanmar.21 The Syrian reactor building that 
Israel bombed in 2007 was strikingly similar to the 5 MWe reactor in Yongbyon. 
Except for minerals and some other items that North Korea is selling to China 
and South Korea, these are the only commodities of interest to (some) others.
 Efforts to obtain much- needed hard currency by selling nuclear and missile 
technologies to potential proliferators tap very well into the bargaining strategy, 
especially after 9/11 and the exposure of the Qadeer Khan network. Qadeer 
Khan is reported to have gone to North Korea 13 times. His network provided 
some 20 centrifuges for reverse engineering. Benazir Bhutto also paid a visit to 
North Korea in what may have been a missile- for-nuclear- technology barter 
deal. Other “liebhabers” of North Korean technology are Iran and – possibly – 
terrorist networks wanting to harm the United States. A regime fighting for sur-
vival, with its back against the wall, hardly shies away from providing 
mass- destruction technologies to others if the price is right.
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 On 5 April 2009, North Korea tested a missile that went 3,800 kilometres, 
longer than any previous missile test. Had the third stage functioned properly, it 
would have had intercontinental range. A little later, North Korea conducted 
another nuclear test. The yield was of the order of 2–4 kilotons. The tests hit at 
the core of US threat perceptions. They were reminders that North Korea has 
interesting technologies to offer potential proliferators. For Washington, North 
Korea’s own capabilities are worrisome, but proliferation of nuclear and missile 
technologies to other states and non- state actors that may use them to attack US 
assets is of even greater concern.
Assessment
None of these theses can be written off. To a smaller or larger extent, they may 
all help explain North Korean behaviour. There is no doubt, however, that secur-
ity is the main driver. Nuclear weapons are deterrents as well as bargaining chips 
for normalisation and security assurances. A related motive is bargaining lever-
age for elimination of sanctions and economic assistance. The nuclear and 
missile programmes are invoked across the board for economic and political 
goals as well as for security purposes. Secluded and impoverished, North Korea 
has no other instruments of significance in the conduct of its foreign policy. In 
the joint six- party statement of 2007 that paved the way for disablement of the 
Yongbyon facilities, North Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer 
nuclear materials, technology and know- how, but went back on that and other 
commitments when the Security Council condemned the 5 April 2009 missile 
test. In the first half of 2009, its moves had the character of diplomatic posturing 
with a view to forthcoming talks with President Obama, who in principal terms 
had underlined his readiness to talk with US adversaries.
 Compensation for crises of its own making is a controversial proposition. 
When cycles of crises and cooperation evolve repeatedly over the years and 
decades, it matters less and less when and how it all started. Conflict manifesta-
tions degenerate into incessant disputes about the distribution of responsibility 
and blame, like in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Different starting points lead 
to different readings of events. The impression that North Korea actively creates 
crises in order subsequently to claim remuneration for helping to defuse them 
starts from provocative North Korean behaviour – ousting of inspectors, with-
drawal from the NPT, nuclear explosives tests and missile tests, threatening 
statements etc. The other side of the coin – that sometimes US failure to live up 
to commitments, insertion of new demands, inaction where action has been 
promised, military exercises and threatening statements instigated the provoca-
tions – is often ignored.
 It is all too easy to get away with partisan narratives because in the media 
world, North Korea is easy prey. Its opponents are immensely more powerful. 
North Korea is a pariah state, both enemy and outcast. For good reasons, it is an 
international “prugelknabe”: its Stalinist political system is hardly less repres-
sive than the original; its human rights record is dreadful; criminal activities to 
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obtain hard currency are well- documented; and abduction of Japanese citizens 
likewise. Its foreign policy tends to be seen in the same perspective of repugnant 
behaviour, confirmed and highlighted by the special brand of provocative lan-
guage that the regime uses. There is a distinct tendency to blame North Korea 
for each new crisis that occurs, also when it its opponents fail to comply with 
agreements that have been entered into.
 A comprehensive analysis of North Korean foreign policy from the early 
1990s until today puts the “compensation for crisis” proposition into a different 
perspective. All the time, North Korea has been keen to reciprocate in kind. In 
the autumn of 2008, when the United States announced that it had delayed delist-
ing of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism until there was agreement on an 
intrusive verification protocol, North Korea suspended the disablement of the 
Yongbyon facilities and started to restore them: when President Bush neverthe-
less took it off the list a couple of months later, disablement resumed. North 
Korea has taken care to phrase this message in clear- cut terms, such as “dialogue 
with dialogue and strength with strength”; “a slap for a slap”: “sword to sword, 
rice cake to rice cake” (Sigal 2009a). Seen in this perspective, “compensation for 
crisis” is not something North Korea has been initiating from scratch, but rather 
a spin it has given to retaliatory measures when the US failed to cooperate. Its 
brinkmanship diplomacy seems based on the assumption that the more serious 
the crisis, the higher the price for defusing it.
 The sequence of cooperation and conflict that unfolded in 2008/2009 is as 
good an illustration as any. In accordance with the six- party agreement of Sep-
tember 2007, North Korea set out to disable its plutonium facilities in Yongbyon 
under international supervision22 and submitted a declaration of its plutonium 
programme.23 In a side agreement, it committed to disclose its uranium- 
enrichment and proliferation activities. That same day, the US announced its 
intention to cut back on the sanctions and remove North Korea from the list of 
states sponsoring terrorism, but with the proviso that the declaration would have 
to be verified. The problem was that in this phase of denuclearisation, there was 
no provision for verification: the US was moving up an issue that had been 
scheduled for the next phase.24 North Korea nevertheless agreed with the US to 
set up a verification mechanism, but after a couple of turns back and forth, Pres-
ident Bush yielded to hardliners in Japan, South Korea and Washington who 
wanted to have the commitment in writing. On 11 December 2008, they threat-
ened to cut off energy aid unless North Korea accepted a formal six- party verifi-
cation protocol. In response, North Korea stopped disabling and began 
preparations for another Taepodong- 2 missile test. The test was made in contra-
vention of Security Council Resolution 1718, issued after the nuclear test in 
2006, which prohibited further testing of long- range missiles. The prohibition 
was tailor- made for North Korea, for there are no strong international norms in 
this field and some 20 states have been launching long- range missiles, among 
them Japan and South Korea. The Security Council condemned the launch and 
approved new sanctions. North Korea protested fiercely and staged its second 
nuclear test in yet another demonstration that the Western crime- and-punishment 
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approach does not function. From mid- 2009, in a repeat of previous cycles of 
crisis and cooperation, North Korea once again signalled interest in resumption 
of negotiations while the Obama administration, reacting to events without any 
comprehensive policy review, stuck to the sanctions and played for time.
Current status
Nuclear profile
On 14 April 2009, one day after the Security Council condemnation, North Korea 
expelled the US technical experts and the IAEA inspectors. The US specialists 
had then lived on the site in Yongbyon for 18 months to monitor the disablement, 
and the IAEA had had three inspectors on site full- time. North Korea said it 
would restore the facilities to their original state for normal operation and that the 
spent fuel rods that had been removed from the reactor in the disablement process 
would be reprocessed. In addition, it said it would actively examine the construc-
tion of an LWR on its own.25 Although the economic and technical capacity to 
build such a reactor is highly questionable, this may allow it to reveal its uranium-
 enrichment programme, presenting it as a source of LEU for power reactors.
 The North Koreans have told the Americans that they had a pilot uranium- 
enrichment programme in the beginning of the 1990s, but that it was terminated. 
It seems to have been brought back to life around 1998, drawing on the Qadeer 
Khan network. Some significant undeclared enrichment activities have obviously 
been going on and may still do, most likely outside Yongbyon. The alleged 
export of hexafluoride to Libya, and possibly also uranium products to Syria, 
points to the existence of a uranium programme, though none has ever been 
located in North Korea.
 When the inspectors left, past plutonium production had not been verified, for 
North Korea had neither allowed sampling of the reactor’s graphite core nor of 
the reprocessing facility and waste sites. There are significant discrepancies 
between Pyongyang’s declaration and US estimates. In 2008, North Korea 
declared that it had separated and weaponised 26 kg. In 2009, it reprocessed an 
additional 8 kg. US estimates of the plutonium inventory were higher, but Sieg-
fried Hecker (2010) did not exclude that the declared amount could be correct. 
No progress had been made on the declaration of weaponisation facilities outside 
of Yongbyon, the nature of the uranium programme or the extent of nuclear 
exports.
 Nearly all of the actions specified by the disablement agreement were com-
pleted. However, the 5 MWe reactor, the reprocessing facility and the fuel- 
fabrication plant can all be restored and returned to plutonium production. On 24 
April 2009, North Korea announced that it had restarted the reprocessing facil-
ity. However, beyond the fuel rods that were removed during the disablement 
process and then reprocessed, it would take at least three years before another 
load of reactor fuel would be ready for reprocessing once the reactor is refuelled 
and restarted.
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Negotiating profile
After the North Korean missile test of 5 April 2009, the United States sought a 
punitive sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council. Japan and South Korea 
were pressing for it, while China and Russia were opposed. China believed 
another round of condemnation and sanctions would prompt retaliation by 
Pyongyang and endanger the six- party talks, but it was not ready to block Secur-
ity Council action. Obama, who had stressed the need to repair America’s alli-
ances in the election campaign, lent an ear to his Asian partners, but did not want 
to confront China. The result was a presidential statement condemning the 
launch in reference to Resolution 1718, and sanctions on three North Korean 
firms involved in missile trading.
 In response, North Korea backed out of the six- party talks and the agreements 
reached in that forum. The rejection may have been caused by the hardliners in 
Japan and South Korea. They had been the ones to insist on a written verification 
protocol in phase two of the denuclearisation agreement, and they had been 
holding back on previous occasions as well. Japan was the only six- party partici-
pant not to provide fuel oil, pending a satisfactory conclusion of the abductions 
issue. Indeed, a North Korean foreign ministry spokesperson said that “Japan is 
primarily responsible for the break- up of the six- party talks” (Sigal 2009b).
 Lingering dissatisfaction with the terms of the 2007 agreements may have led 
to the same conclusion. North Korea is deeply committed to nuclear power and 
never dropped its demand for LWR. The South Korean equivalent of 2,000 MWe 
from the South Korean grid did not have the same attraction, because it would 
make the North dependent on the good will of the South. The Juche ideology 
deprives the US and its allies of the leverage to press it to do what they want 
and, in the view of the North, the lessons from the crises in 1998, 2003 and 2006 
corroborate it. Its economic interactions with other countries are so modest that 
there is little that others can do to punish it for its transgressions.
 At the fourth round of six- party talks in 2005, North Korea asserted that it 
would not agree to dismantle its nuclear- weapons programme unless the LWR 
project was re- established. The other five parties said they were willing to con-
sider the LWR issue “at an appropriate time”. Clearly, in the 2005 joint state-
ment of principles, the commitment to supply LWR is weaker than in the Agreed 
Framework. The fuel oil deliveries were also miniscule in comparison with the 
Agreed Framework: 50,000 tons at the value of $15 million during the first 60 
days (the initial phase) and 950,000 tons in return for disablement.26 North Korea 
may also have wanted to go back to the Agreed Framework for this reason and 
negotiate an updated version of it with the US.
 However, there is no way that DPRK–US negotiations can be segregated 
from the interests and influence of DPRK’s neighbours. The US alliance with 
Japan seems stronger than ever and, unlike the previous Japanese government, 
which tried to block negotiations, the Democratic Party government will move 
to negotiate. South Korea’s economic contribution is crucial in any deal with 
North Korea. The US is sensitive not only to its Asian allies and partners: it 
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would not like to undercut China either, which was offended by the North 
Korean rejection of the Beijing talks.
 Throughout 2009, Bill Clinton’s successful visit to Pyongyang, the North 
Korean visit to New Mexico to see Governor Richardson, the invitation to 
Obama’s point man on North Korea – Ambassador Stephen Bosworth – to visit 
Pyongyang and conciliatory gestures to South Korea signalled North Korea’s 
interest in new talks. A 2010 New Year message issued jointly by the Party and 
the Army said that North Korea “remains consistent in its efforts to establish a 
lasting peace system on the Korean Peninsula and make it nuclear- free through 
dialogue and negotiations”. The US noted that the North Koreans were “saying 
the right things”.27 The North Korean nuclear negotiator Kim Kye- gwan was dis-
patched to Beijing to discuss the resumption of talks and Kim Jong- Il was invited 
to China. The six- party talks have always been a hybrid of bilateral and multilat-
eral diplomacy, and the next round is also likely to entail a combination of both, 
maybe in a different mix. But is Pyongyang ready to commit to a disarmament/
normalisation deal, or do they seek international acceptance as an NWS?
Rollback experiences: lessons for North Korea
Many of the lessons from previous cases of nuclear rollback relate to domestic 
politics. They may or may not be relevant for the case of North Korea, but as 
long as North Korean politics is so opaque, it is difficult to tell. Individual mind-
sets, the role of nuclear mythmakers and nationalistic tendencies defy assess-
ment. The military is known to be very influential, most probably also on nuclear 
and missile issues, but the relationship between the party and the military is hard 
to grasp in any detail.
 Other lessons appear to be of little relevance. There is always a status aspect 
to nuclear weapons and underdogs in the international system can improve their 
status by engaging top dogs, but in the case of North Korea the status motive 
pales in comparison with security concerns. In other cases of proliferation 
concern, the international non- proliferation norm upheld by the NPT has been 
important in arresting weapons ambitions, but it hardly took root with any sig-
nificance in the DPRK. Global disarmament does not matter much, either. A dic-
tatorship fighting for its survival does not pay much attention to the norms and 
provisions of global regimes and global initiatives for nuclear disarmament 
except selectively for its own parochial purposes. Had nuclear disarmament 
become a trend supported by all the big powers, heading for a nuclear- weapon-
free world, it may have also had an impact on North Korea, but less so than on 
other proliferators (with the possible exception of Israel, whose arsenal is inex-
tricably tied to regional conflict formations). The North Korean regime has quite 
enough figuring out how to cope with its existential problems.
 What remains from the list of rollback experiences are alleviation of security 
concerns; economic inducements; engagement with a view to gain leverage and 
encourage openness; diplomatic involvement to buy time; and the role of the US 
and North Korea’s neighbours.
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Alleviating security concerns
North Korea has been quite explicit about the reasons for seeking nuclear 
weapons: military, political and economic insecurity caused by the hostile policy 
of the United States. Militarily, it fears attack by conventional forces, and it has 
been the object of nuclear threats several times over.28 Politically, it is concerned 
about efforts to undermine the regime. Economically, it is worried about the 
sanctions that are levelled at it, although the policy of self- sufficiency reduces its 
vulnerability to a minimum. Its insecurity relates both to the United States and to 
its Asian neighbours, Japan and South Korea in particular.
 Since the end of the 1980s, when North Korea could no longer rely on its 
erstwhile allies, it has pursued a dual strategy of deterrence and threat reduction 
through reconciliation with its neighbours – deterrence underpinned by new 
weapons acquisitions; threat reduction by using the same weapons as bargaining 
chips for normalisation with the United States and negative security assurances. 
North Korean leaders have even indicated that US forces could stay in Korea as 
part of a comprehensive peace agreement on the peninsula. Surprising at first, 
this is classical international political logic: small states are best served by 
spreading their dependence on many others, and a US presence in Korea may be 
invoked to keep China and other neighbours at arm’s length.
 That a small, impoverished and dictatorial adversary would try to use nuclear 
weapons to forge a security partnership with the United States is hard for Ameri-
cans to understand and even harder to accept (Hayes 2007a, b). Yet this is what 
senior North Koreans have consistently said that they want, and there is no 
reason to disbelieve them. During the Cold War, the US developed special 
understandings with its major communist adversary (i.e. the Soviet Union), 
which was of about the same military rank, but to go along with North Korean 
attempts to trade its rudimentary nuclear and missile capabilities for a special 
strategic relationship with the one and only military superpower is quite another 
matter. Short of a special partnership, North Korea may be content with normali-
sation, but for the US and others this is also hard to swallow. Some segments of 
the American political system have even been against talking to the North 
Koreans for fear that it would legitimise an outcast.
 Reconciliation means full diplomatic relations, no sanctions, security assur-
ances and a peace agreement on the Korean peninsula, which is a demanding 
proposition when, at the receiving end, there is a regime with almost no commit-
ment to international norms of political and inter- state behaviour. However, 
unless North Korea’s security concerns are effectively addressed, there is no 
hope of rolling it back to the NPT fold as an NNWS.29
Economic inducements
In the Agreed Framework, the economic inducements were quite significant. In 
the disablement phase of the six- party denuclearisation agreement they were tiny 
in comparison. However, North Korea would almost certainly have pressed for 
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LWR reactors in the disarmament phase had it come to that. In principle, the 
other parties to the Beijing talks held the door open for it.
 Judged on the basis of the Agreed Framework, North Korea values its 
nuclear arsenal to at least $4–5 billion (Hayes 2007b). Still, it seems that eco-
nomic inducements matter less than a peace treaty, normalisation and security 
assurances. The collapse of the Agreed Framework can be interpreted that 
way: when North Korea took an active interest in uranium enrichment in coop-
eration with the Khan network, contrary to the spirit of the Framework, and 
later left the NPT and resumed plutonium production protesting against the 
military policies of the Bush administration, it sacrificed the assistance 
package. The security considerations were in the driver’s seat. The six- party 
agreement of 2007 indicates the same: modest economic assistance did not 
block agreement on freeze and disablement for deletion from the list of state 
sponsors of terrorism and gradual normalisation. Economic inducements are 
important – the modest provisions of the Beijing agreement is probably among 
the reasons why North Korea left Beijing – but less important than progress on 
the politico- military dimension.
Engagement, leverage and openness
In relation to North Korea, which has minimum interaction with the outside 
world, engagement is the way to leverage. Today, there are few items of value 
that the United States and others can deny to North Korea, especially as long as 
China is holding back on sanctions. Engagement, on the other hand, brings both 
sticks and carrots. The more the parties get involved in interactions of value to 
both sides, the greater the harm if they are terminated, especially for the weaker 
party, i.e. North Korea.
 In a globalised world, closed societies are aberrations. They draw unfavour-
able reactions from others and risk being beleaguered. Even if an isolationist 
regime has no nuclear weapon ambitions at the outset, international hostility may 
bring the idea to the fore. Myanmar is worth watching from that perspective. 
North Korea is a pariah state, more isolated than any other country and probably 
also feeling more beleaguered than any other state. Instead of sanctions, which 
seldom function as intended against closed dictatorships, engagement is all the 
more important to break such vicious cycles.
 Engagement is also a way to openness. Normalisation is bound to create 
some avenues into North Korean society. The advantages of engagement are 
manifold: greater leverage, better insights into North Korean affairs, more 
transparency, human contacts and – possibly – elimination of nuclear weapons 
in the end. The question is how far North Korea is willing to go. It brings to 
attention de Tocqueville’s classical observation that when a fully- fledged dic-
tatorship begins to open up, it is difficult to control the processes that are set in 
motion.
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Diplomatic involvement to buy time
China and South Korea take the long view, waiting for propitious moments to 
appear. Time is not on North Korea’s side. Pyongyang’s impatience with Wash-
ington and other negotiating partners indicates that it sees it that way itself.
 This is not the same as waiting for the communist regime to implode. Six 
years of inaction under the Bush administration showed the futility of that. The 
relevant lesson from other cases of reversal recommends sustained diplomatic 
involvement in order to be in the best possible position to exploit new opportun-
ities that may arise.
The role of the United States
US administrations have been split on how to deal with North Korea. In the 
Clinton administration, there were advocates of immediate freeze and dismantle-
ment supporting reassurance and cooperative engagement with the DPRK, more 
or less in line with North Korea’s claim that the role of the IAEA was to verify 
compliance with the freeze provisions of the Agreed Framework. Clearly, North 
Korea tried to use the safeguards issue to put pressure on the United States, 
emphasising that implementation of IAEA safeguards would depend on US 
implementation of the Agreed Framework. Others wanted North Korea to go by 
the NPT book, accepting NPT safeguards (INFCIRC 153) and allowing the 
Agency to reconstruct North Korea’s nuclear history.
 Divisions within the Bush administration were more serious. Some held that 
North Korea was bent on getting nuclear weapons and that it would never 
abandon that objective, arguing that the US should carry a big stick and wait for 
the regime to collapse. Others believed it was possible to negotiate a reversal of 
Pyongyang’s nuclear programme at an acceptable cost, offering carrots while 
carrying a big stick. The 2005 Declaration of Principles was signed in that spirit, 
but only to be followed immediately thereafter by new sanctions that had been 
prepared by the proponents of confrontational policies. North Korea’s nuclear 
negotiator concluded that the Bush administration was “dysfunctional”.30 It was 
seriously split to the end, wavering back and forth over the disablement/normali-
sation issues throughout 2008.
 The Obama administration has been torn between its preference for negotia-
tions and Japan’s and South Korea’s desire to punish Pyongyang if it went ahead 
to test another long- range missile – which it did. After the launch, the adminis-
tration deferred to Japan and South Korea and went for punitive Security Council 
actions, triggering another full- blown crisis in relations with North Korea. It left 
a gap between declaratory policy and action policy, between principle and prac-
tice, between engagement with North Korea and allegiance to Japan and South 
Korea.
 The uncompromising Bush administration policy – carrying a big stick while 
waiting for the dictatorship to collapse – proved self- defeating. Confrontational 
policies usually make it easier for dictatorships to stay, and China would not let 
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North Korea collapse anyhow. Waiting for collapse is, moreover, not a strategy. 
While Bush waited, Pyongyang used the time well to produce another half- a-
dozen nuclear bombs.
 Sustained engagement with a view to gradual change has a better chance of 
succeeding, and it may be the only chance to get rid of North Korea’s nuclear- 
weapon capabilities. Confrontational policies have proved counterproductive and 
nobody wants to go to war. To let the matter drift is not a viable option, either. 
Critics ask: has it not been tried before – through the Agreed Framework and the 
six- party talks – and failed? The answer is that it has been tried, but only half- 
heartedly. If the Obama administration can unite behind a consistent policy of 
“cooperation for cooperation”, sticking rigorously to the agreements that are 
made, it will do something that has not been done before. Will it be able to? At 
home, it is hard to rally broad support behind it. Abroad, it has to be compatible 
with the alliance bonds to Japan and South Korea. Those bonds are too import-
ant to be jeopardised by splits over North Korea. But there is no alternative to a 
cooperative approach.
Negotiating strategies and objectives
Clearly, the negotiating modalities have to be agreed anew. The principles from 
2005 and the experiences from the Agreed Framework and the six- party talks 
left much to build on, but similar to the Oslo agreements on the Middle East, 
time- consuming action- for-action strategies have proven vulnerable to misunder-
standings, unforeseen circumstances and foul play. In the Middle East, the lesson 
drawn was that it would be better to go straight to a comprehensive, final settle-
ment. A comprehensive package deal might also be better in the case of North 
Korea. The parties may therefore want to move faster than before to reduce the 
time and opportunity for spoilers. Nevertheless, given that both sides are seeking 
reassurances about the other side’s intentions, and that complete and verifiable 
disarmament cannot happen overnight, there would have to be an element of 
gradualism.
 But will North Korea be willing to abandon its weapons? The only way to 
find out is to engage them to see how far disarmament can go. If the answer is 
no, there may still be scope for significant partial agreements to limit North 
Korea’s nuclear activities. For the United States, horizontal proliferation out of 
North Korea is at least as dangerous as further vertical proliferation in North 
Korea. In return for steps towards normalisation and economic assistance, North 
Korea may still be dissuaded to bring all exports of nuclear and missile technolo-
gies to a halt. If the answer is yes, the price will no doubt be high, but may be 
worth paying.
9 The relationship between 
disarmament and  
non- proliferation
This chapter winds up Part III by addressing the political and military dimen-
sions of the relationship between disarmament and non- proliferation. Is disarma-
ment important to align the three outliers to the non- proliferation regime? Is it 
important for purposes of rollback? Does it matter for North Korea and Iran? 
The other way around, how important is non- proliferation for disarmament? 
How can the non- nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) contribute to nuclear disarma-
ment by making their non- nuclear status more convincing? Special attention is 
paid to the distinction between disarmament as a process and disarmament as a 
state of affairs, and to the concept of rank disequilibrium, which appears to have 
great explanatory power in cases like Iran and India.
Introduction
To each of the previous chapters, a disarmament question is pertinent: how 
important is disarmament in order to bring the three outliers into the non- 
proliferation regime? How important is it to sustain nuclear rollback? And how 
much does it matter for the outcome of cases of immediate non- proliferation 
concern such as Iran? To the extent that the answer is affirmative, the primary 
responsibility for progress rests with the NWS.
 But the responsibility does not stop there, for Article VI of the NPT commits 
all parties to the Treaty to work for nuclear disarmament. So how can the NNWS 
contribute? For one thing, they can lean on the NWS to do more, in the name of 
international security and in reference to international norms. In the face of 
arms- racing during the Cold War, and of modernisation and widening of the 
roles assigned to nuclear weapons in this century, this is first of all what they 
have been doing.
 However, the new disarmament initiatives present new challenges and also 
opportunities for the NNWS. Beyond urging the NWS to enhance their disarma-
ment efforts, they may facilitate disarmament by deepening their own 
commitments to stay non- nuclear. The more convincingly non- nuclear they 
become, the easier it will be for the NWS to go to zero. The NNWS may con-
tribute by using carrots as well as sticks: working with the NWS to reduce their 
proliferation concerns while leaning on them to expedite arms reductions.
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 More than anything else, the NPT review process has centred on the relation-
ship between disarmament and non- proliferation. All parties to the Treaty are 
obliged to pursue both objectives in good faith (on the meaning of “good faith”, 
see Chapter 4). On three occasions, efforts have been made to clarify the disar-
mament commitment of Article VI and make it more explicit, more binding and 
more tangible: in 1995, when the Review and Extension Conference adopted 
“Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Disarmament”; in 
1996, when the International Court of Justice issued an Advisory Opinion on the 
meaning of Article VI; and in 2000, when the Review Conference adopted an 
agreed roster of steps to implement Article VI, known as the “thirteen steps”. All 
the time, there has been bitter disagreement about the precise contents of the 
obligations and how well they have been fulfilled. The sources of the disagree-
ments and the clarification efforts have been examined elsewhere.1 In the follow-
ing, the focus is not on the legal–political issues of rights and obligations, but on 
the political and military dimensions of the disarmament – non- proliferation 
relationship.
General observations
From time to time, it has been argued that acquisition of nuclear weapons by 
more states is a regional matter, driven by regional conflicts and security con-
cerns. The claim absolves the NWS of responsibility for nuclear proliferation. It 
is fundamentally flawed.
 The policies of the NWS affect proliferation/non- proliferation in many ways. 
First, they shape the security environment of potential proliferators. Recently, 
the main antagonists of the Cold War have geared their military policies less to 
each other and more to regional settings, notably to the Middle East, Central 
Asia and East Asia. This century, all P5 except China changed their doctrines to 
enhance the utility of nuclear weapons in regional contexts. The focus has first 
of all been on the Middle East, where Israel had acquired nuclear weapons by 
the end of the 1960s in response to Arab threats. There, the nuclear proliferation 
issue has been embedded in regional- conflict dynamics ever since, and it has 
become increasingly intertwined with big power politics. Also in other parts of 
Asia, there is an international as well as a regional dimension to the proliferation 
problem. The NWS have it in their power to twist the proliferation problems for 
better or worse.
 The same powers influence the political environment of potential proliferators 
by projecting the status value that they attach to nuclear weapons. They have 
done so by maintaining and modernising big nuclear arsenals and by underlining 
the importance of nuclear weapons in their doctrines and statements. Some of 
them have been outspoken about the pride they take in their nuclear- weapon 
achievements (see Chapter 3). This century, their policies endangered the entire 
non- proliferation regime. The US, in particular, weakened the non- proliferation 
norm by buying selectively into the provisions of the NPT. The Obama adminis-
tration changed that in support of the NPT and its disarmament dimension, and 
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to the extent that it succeeds, it projects a diminishing belief in the political value 
of nuclear arms.
 Whatever happens to the call for a nuclear- weapon-free world (NWFW), the 
thesis that proliferation is driven by regional conflicts and has little or nothing to 
do with the nuclear policies of the big powers is wrong. It was wrong in the past, 
and the growing focus on regional politics has made it even more so in recent 
years. To claim, as NWS sometimes do, that all of this “is inconsequential in the 
difficult and agonising deliberations of a government to go nuclear is far 
removed from political realism” (Muller 2008).
Making disarmament credible
Both governments and non- governmental actors are waiting to see what comes 
of Obama’s disarmament initiatives. Will they materialise and progress towards 
the goal of an NWFW, or will they come to naught? Reykjavik failed to rid the 
world of nuclear weapons, but it was not a fizzle: it inspired substantial nuclear 
disarmament agreements, in casu the INF Treaty and START I. Obama’s call for 
an NWFW is also bringing results, but how far will it go?
 There are concerns that it will boil down to a non- proliferation tool stopping 
well short of elimination of nuclear weapons, and that to the extent that it suc-
ceeds and the NPT is strengthened, more restraints on peaceful utilisation of 
nuclear energy will follow. Modest single steps with no convincing promise of 
follow- on action may leave that impression, and the broken expectations of the 
1990s are close enough in time to be remembered. Then, the NPT was extended 
indefinitely in the expectation that global disarmament would continue and that 
progress would be made towards a zonal arrangement in the Middle East (see 
Chapter 4). If this reading takes hold, the cooperation of many NNWS will be 
half- hearted at best.
 Similar to integration theory, which distinguishes between integration as a 
process and integration as a state of affairs, disarmament may also be viewed as 
a process where one step leads to the next, or it may be seen in a static perspec-
tive where measures are introduced without any particular promise or expecta-
tion of further steps. The neo- functionalist school in integration theory assumed 
that integration could develop its own dynamic or “spill- over” effect from one 
sector into related fields (Haas 1958). Later studies have questioned this, empha-
sising the importance of governmental decisions for successive deepening of 
integration. Disarmament, if it proceeds, will also rest on governmental 
decisions. Still, the question is whether the governments will be willing to 
commit themselves from one step to the next, and whether a disarmament 
process can develop some momentum of its own.
 Single steps towards nuclear disarmament may have little or no impact on 
governments contemplating going nuclear. For instance, if the US and Russia 
were to reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 1,000 each 
with no commitments to further reductions while all NWS modernise their 
weapon systems, the non- proliferation impact would at best be uncertain. As 
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long as the continuation is open to doubt, states of proliferation concern would 
hardly be impressed.
 This would be different if expectations were created that more would follow. 
Then, proliferators would be singled out as exceptions to a trend of improved 
compliance with Treaty obligations, Article VI included, and it is always more 
difficult to act against an existing trend, especially if it enjoys broad support 
from both nuclear- and non- nuclear-weapon states. If such a trend takes hold, the 
non- proliferation norm would be enhanced; the states that have rolled back 
would find it harder to roll forward again; and the international environment for 
management of critical contemporary cases of proliferation concern would be 
more benign. In the UN Security Council, decision- making in support of the 
trend would be easier.
 The opposite of single steps in a static perspective is a convention with a 
timeline for nuclear disarmament to zero. However desirable it may be, the big 
powers are unlikely to accept it. Big powers are less willing to tie their hands to 
international rules, norms and standards than smaller ones. Precisely because 
they are powerful, there is much to gain from being free to exercise the power. 
So far, the convention proposals have therefore met consistent opposition from 
the P5. There is, furthermore, something simplistic about reducing the complexi-
ties of nuclear disarmament to a timeline.
 Are there other ways of committing the NWS so that disarmament becomes a 
likely prospect in the eyes of the great majority of states? Reintroducing the 
declaratory policy of the 1990s – commitments to systematic and progressive 
efforts – is not enough. These promises have already been made and broken. 
However, it is widely assumed that a START follow- on agreement will be fol-
lowed by negotiations for deep cuts, although Obama and Medvedev have not 
been explicit about it. Commitments to follow up on one disarmament measure 
by negotiating another is a first step towards a dependable disarmament trend. 
Generally, the impact of disarmament on non- proliferation depends very much 
on where disarmament is perceived to be on the scale between single steps in a 
static perspective and a disarmament convention with a timeline: the more credi-
ble and dependable it becomes as a long- term trend, the stronger the impact.
 For almost 50 years – ever since nuclear arms control was introduced in the 
early 1960s – disarmament measures have been discussed back and forth in great 
detail. Technically, virtually all stones may have been turned – except perhaps 
for how to make disarmament a reliable prospect short of using the calendar. In 
that regard, more options may exist. The NPT is a framework for disarmament 
to zero, but if and when the world approaches that point, a much more detailed 
description of the final steps and of what kind of NWFW one should go for must 
be agreed. The parameters of that discussion will most certainly be different 
from the ones that apply at present, so the question of timelines may also look 
quite different.
 The bottom line is that as long as some states possess nuclear weapons, others 
will seek them too. The best way to prevent proliferation is therefore to reduce 
existing arsenals to zero. The same recipe applies to the danger that nuclear 
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weapons might be used. The best, and quite possibly the only, way to avoid it is 
to do away with them all.
How is disarmament important for non- proliferation?
There are two broad categories of answers to this question. First, a credible 
movement in the direction of nuclear disarmament would facilitate the manage-
ment of the non- proliferation regime. Second, it would affect the nuclear 
decision- making of states in a non- nuclear-weapon direction.
Disarmament and regime management
Failure to implement Article VI of the NPT has been a chronic source of friction 
in the regime. The NPT review conferences have been blighted by disputes over 
the disarmament obligation; the willingness of NNWS to support and participate 
in NWS calls for stricter enforcement of the Treaty has been undermined as the 
NWS have been widely viewed as ignoring their own NPT obligations; and 
NNWS willingness to support and accept measures to strengthen the regime – 
which often require them to accept additional obligations and constraints – has 
been weakened for the same reason. Credible nuclear disarmament promotes the 
cause of non- proliferation because it is a key to improved regime management. 
This is a familiar point which has been elaborated upon in Chapter 4 and dis-
cussed more extensively elsewhere (Miller 2007a).
 A similar situation exists at the regional level in the Middle East, where arms- 
control and disarmament policies are conditioned by deep- seated regional conflict 
formations. As long as the Israeli arsenal is untouched, Egypt and other Arab states 
are generally unwilling to undertake more arms- control obligations. For instance, 
Egypt has not acceded to the CWC, the BWC, the CTBT, the Additional Protocol 
on safeguards and the Pelindaba Treaty declaring Africa as an NWFZ. In the 
Middle East, the nuclear arms- control and disarmament approach is an NWFZ or a 
zone free of all WMD. UNSC Resolution 687 – the 1991 ceasefire resolution for 
Iraq – explicitly linked the disarmament of Iraq to the establishment of a zone free 
of WMD in the Middle East, and in 1995 the NPT Review and Extension confer-
ence adopted a Resolution calling for such a zone and for Israeli accession to the 
NPT.2 This facilitated Arab acceptance of the decision to extend the NPT indefin-
itely. As no progress has been made in implementing the Resolution, Arab states 
feel that their NPT commitments have been met by broken promises. They are 
therefore holding back on additional arms- control commitments. The Iranian chal-
lenge reinforces this attitude and inspires hedging policies.
 It follows, conversely, that if the NWS move to disarm and if Israel’s nuclear 
capabilities are effectively addressed and constrained, global and regional fric-
tions within the regime will be reduced, the review process will be more con-
structive, and the opportunities to strengthen the regime and enforce its 
provisions will be improved. These are important links between disarmament 
and non- proliferation.
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Disarmament and nuclear decision- making in states
Disarmament and the devaluation of nuclear weapons
Disarmament is not only about the weapons but also about the doctrines that 
define their roles. The doctrines have been variations of nuclear deterrence: 
deterrence by mutually assured destruction; deterrence of conventional forces; 
deterrence of chemical and biological weapons; and extended deterrence in 
cooperation with allies in Europe and East Asia. The nuclear war- fighting doc-
trines of the Cold War were also spins on deterrence. Since deterrence rests on 
the credibility of nuclear- weapon use, it was argued that the best way to con-
vince the adversary about it would be to plan as if nuclear war could be similar 
to conventional war and be lost or won (see Chapter 3).
 Nuclear history may be read as a political struggle over the utility of nuclear 
weapons for the security of states, and over the viability of nuclear deterrence in 
particular. On the one hand, there is the creeping norm of non- use that tends to 
undermine deterrence: the more time that passes without nuclear weapons being 
used, the stronger the norm of non- use. On the other hand, vested interests and 
believers in the utility of nuclear arms have made recurrent efforts to stem that 
norm. New weapons were developed that would be more thinkable to use, and 
that would therefore also more likely be used. Ships and other nuclear- weapon 
platforms were sent to hot spots around the world in shows of force instilling 
respect and awe. When these options were curtailed by the moratoria on nuclear- 
weapon tests, which made it hard to introduce new types of weapons, and by the 
US–Soviet/Russian presidential initiatives that removed tactical nuclear weapons 
from ships and other platforms, the doctrines were expanded to include a wider 
range of situations in which nuclear weapons might have a role. More than 20 
times, the United States has issued nuclear threats in some shape or form, appar-
ently in the belief that they might function as intended, and all the time the 
importance of nuclear weapons has been emphasised in speech acts by state 
leaders. From a non- proliferation point of view, the problem with these efforts to 
sustain the credibility of nuclear deterrence is that they have kept telling others 
how important nuclear weapons are. In upholding the utility of nuclear weapons 
for themselves, the NWS have been teaching others the same lesson.
 The problem is also that, in trying to show what nuclear weapons can do, 
their utility has been much inflated. Fortunately, some of the most glaring exag-
gerations are now receding. The nuclear war- fighting doctrines were among the 
most bizarre products of the Cold War: they have been toned down, if not totally 
laid to rest. The credibility of US extended deterrence doctrines for Europe and 
Asia were always in doubt: they are now ripe for revision. Shows of force and 
threats of nuclear- weapon use may or may not have worked: in most cases the 
effects can neither be proved nor disproved. Realistic reviews of nuclear history 
in these respects, deleting the propagandistic arguments to uphold deterrence and 
justify investments in huge arsenals, therefore reduce the attractiveness of 
nuclear weapons and so contribute to non- proliferation. In reality, the inhibitions 
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against nuclear- weapon use – the nature of the weapons and the norm of non- use 
– probably leave a very narrow range of situations where employment is feasible 
and credible (Berry et al. 2010).
 One such situation concerns the use of nuclear weapons where national sur-
vival is at stake. In its Advisory Opinion of 1996, the International Court of 
Justice was split on this issue. The prime example at the time was Israel. Today, 
Pakistan could be added, and possibly Russia and even China. The Russian doc-
trine of 2010 appears to tighten the criterion for use of nuclear arms, but allows 
for employment when “the very existence [of Russia] is under threat” (Sokov 
2010). China’s no- first-use policy may not apply if its own territory, or territ-
ories that it claims as its own (such as Taiwan and Arunchal Pradesh), are under 
threat. The fear in these huge state conglomerations is that dismemberment, even 
on a small scale, might be the beginning of national breakdown.3 The role of 
nuclear weapons as an insurance premium of last resort for national survival 
speaks to the obstacles that have to be overcome for an all- encompassing inter-
national agreement on no- first-use to be reached.
 The treaties prohibiting chemical and biological weapons were preceded by 
the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibited the use of these weapons. First, 
the use of the weapons was delegitimised and outlawed, and then they were 
banned. The same approach also has traction for nuclear disarmament. The Court 
found it hard to contemplate a use of nuclear weapons that would be compatible 
with international humanitarian law. Certainly, nuclear weapons are no less 
inhumane than chemical and biological weapons.
 In effect, the Geneva Protocol was a no- first-use agreement, and an agree-
ment banning the use of nuclear weapons would also allow for nuclear retalia-
tion. Such doctrines – adopted unilaterally or agreed bilaterally or multilaterally 
with a view to codification in an international convention – would go a long way 
to devalue nuclear arms and send an important message to decision- makers of 
other countries that have not closed the nuclear- weapons option. Moreover, no- 
first-use doctrines have an intriguing in- built disarmament logic: nobody would 
need them if nobody had them.
 Genuine moves towards disarmament will be rooted in the premise that 
nuclear weapons are unnecessary and undesirable. Tightening of doctrines and 
international conventions to devalue the weapons must be accompanied by hard-
ware reductions: the latter is necessary to ensure the credibility of the former. To 
the extent that it happens, the international context of national decision- making 
will change and become more benign for non- proliferation.
 Specifically, how important is disarmament in order to align the three outliers 
with the non- proliferation regime? How important is it for nuclear rollback? And 
how important is it for non- proliferation outcomes in Iran and North Korea?
Disarmament and the three- state problem
India has not undertaken any Article VI obligation. The first part of Article 
VI – “cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date” – is void of Indian 
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commitments. It has not acceded to the CTBT; its support for an FMCT is an act 
of cynicism undertaken in the expectation that it will take a long time to bring 
negotiations to a conclusion, if it is possible at all; and since it is not formally 
recognised as an NWS, it is not a bona fide provider of security assurances to 
others. The second part of it – the commitment to disarm – is contradicted by 
Indian rearmament. Its declaratory policy is dual track: the pragmatic one which 
aligned it with the existing arms- control regime and positioned it for the nuclear 
cooperation agreement with the United States, and the normative long- term one 
charting a road to zero, revived by the American call for an NWFW. For the 
time being, these tracks co- exist, side- by-side (see Chapters 3 and 5).
 In important respects, the impact of disarmament comes down to the time-
line for US–Russian arms reductions versus the timeline for the establishment 
of an Indian minimum- deterrence force. Subsequent to the START I follow- on 
agreement, the next round of US–Russian negotiations is supposed to take a 
long time – a number of years. If it is successfully completed before the Indian 
deterrent is ready, and invitations for multilateral disarmament talks are issued, 
it is conceivable that the size of the Indian force will be affected. Then, the 
build- up might stop at a lower level than would otherwise have been the case. 
However, the basic assumption is that India is unlikely to be ready for cessa-
tion of its arms build- up and for nuclear disarmament talks until a minimum 
deterrent force – somehow defined – has been fully established. More and 
more, the impression is also that US–Russian negotiations will be very 
demanding and time- consuming.
 A criteria- based approach to all three outliers, based on the commitments 
already undertaken by India plus signature or accession to the CTBT and limita-
tions or a ban on fissile material production – the bar may be set higher or lower 
– may lead to de jure recognition of India as an NWS before the deterrent is 
complete (see Chapter 5). That would open up an opportunity for an extension of 
Indian security assurances to NWFZ and, in principle, for Indian participation in 
any multilateral arms- control and disarmament undertaking. Pakistan and Israel 
have a longer way to go in order to meet such criteria.
 India wants to become a big power on the global scene, and its nuclear- 
weapon programme has global ramifications. If it comes to multilateral talks, it 
wants to be in a position to take part. Pakistan’s behaviour is inextricably linked 
to India’s. Pakistani participation would be logical and desirable as well (see 
Chapter 10).
 Israel’s outlook is primarily regional. Its nuclear arsenal is part and parcel of 
the conflict formations of the Middle East. No NWS is so insulated against the 
effects of global disarmament as Israel, partly by its own policy of opacity and 
partly because it is shielded from external pressures by the Western powers 
(Cohen 2010). Generally, the more threatened an NWS feels, the more difficult 
it is to make it disarm; and the more intractable the conflict formations that gave 
rise to the nuclear weapons are, the harder it is to eliminate them. On both 
counts, Israel stands out as a formidable obstacle to the worldwide elimination 
of nuclear weapons.
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 In no part of the world is the need for regional solutions stronger than in the 
Middle East. The name of the game is a nuclear- weapon-free zone (NWFZ) or a 
zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMDFZ).
Disarmament and nuclear rollback
In Chapter 6, 27 cases of nuclear rollback – states that have “done something” in 
the direction of the weapons option and then abandoned it – were divided into 
three categories: rejectionist, hedging (active or passive) and practising restraint 
(stopping, but not rolling back). For the rejectionists, nuclear- weapon acquisition 
is a non- issue. For them, it would take revolutionary world- order changes and a 
radically enhanced role for nuclear weapons in international affairs to reconsider 
this stance. Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden and Switzerland are in this category. Being highly industrialised states, 
they have much of the knowledge and technical- industrial capacity to build 
nuclear weapons on short notice, but their non- nuclear status rests on a solid 
national political consensus. These states are therefore insensitive to questions of 
disarmament/rearmament, for they already decided to disconnect themselves 
from what the NWS are doing. Much the same goes for Romania and Serbia, 
which are technologically less advanced, and for the four states that possessed 
nuclear weapons but gave them up – Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa and 
Ukraine. However, some of them are politically less stable than the countries 
listed above.
 Disarmament arguably begins to matter in relation to states that are passively 
hedging, such as Argentina and Brazil. Disarmament may confirm and reinforce 
their decisions to stay non- nuclear and broaden national support for that stance. 
No progress in disarmament affairs may work the other way around, reminding 
them of the utility that others continue to assign to nuclear weapons and strength-
ening factions that prefer a response in kind such as active hedging or, possibly, 
weapons acquisition.
 South Korea and Taiwan are hybrids of active hedging and restraint. Their 
capability levels are higher today than at the time of rollback 20–30 years ago, 
but they have had to abstain from fuel- cycle facilities. In the past, both of them 
entertained the nuclear option for security reasons (Hersman and Peters 2006; 
Solingen 2007): developments in China and North Korea and concerns about 
Japan triggered material preparations for weapons on more than one occasion. 
Their security concerns have been offset by the US, which has kept them non- 
nuclear by extending security guarantees and providing weapons, and which 
continues to do so. In both countries, transitions from military to civilian rule, 
democratisation and growing sensitivity to international norms were helpful in 
rolling them back.
 South Korea’s and Taiwan’s policies remain sensitive to changes in the 
regional security environment and in their ruling elites, but they are not directly 
affected by the disarmament policies of the leading nuclear powers. Major power 
disarmament is important only if it encourages North Korean reversal to 
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non- nuclear status, Chinese moderation and Japanese restraint. The pertinent 
question is therefore whether the US and Russia can encourage the regional 
powers to go for arms control and disarmament by taking the lead and setting 
good examples.
 To impress North Korea is a long shot. For the leaders in Pyongyang, nuclear 
weapons are the primary means of regime survival. The price for giving them up is 
not written in terms of global disarmament. China’s nuclear posture depends on 
the overall size of US nuclear forces; the future of the US ballistic missile defence 
(BMD) programme; whatever conclusions it draws from the US global conven-
tional strike programme; and its overall assessment of US policies for the long 
term. Will disarmament gain broad enough support in US political life to become a 
sustainable long- term ambition, or is it more likely to change from administration 
to administration? Will global disarmament become a dependable process, or is it 
more realistic to consider it a state of affairs where there is no certainty that one 
step will be followed by another in the same direction, and where new programmes 
– conventional and nuclear – can go forward in areas that have not been regulated? 
If at some stage it is seen to be the first, the impact will be significant. If the second 
is judged more likely, a rapidly growing China has the resources to take precau-
tionary measures. Some significant probability – not necessarily a high one – may 
be enough to make it act defensively and keep the guard up.
 Last but not least, there is some evidence to suggest that the single most 
important way to stem proliferation is to enhance the non- proliferation norm 
anchored in the NPT and in NWFZs (see Chapter 6). Disarmament is perhaps 
the most important way to secure the integrity of the NPT: it follows that much 
of what disarmament can do to sustain nuclear rollback goes via the non- 
proliferation norm upheld by the Treaty. In 1995, when the NPT was extended 
indefinitely, NWS leaders may have thought that proliferation could be managed 
without caring much about nuclear disarmament (see Chapter 4). This has 
changed: today, disarmament is widely seen as important for non- proliferation.4
Does disarmament matter for North Korea and Iran?
It is customary to assume that no such relationship exists. It simply does not 
speak to their vital concerns. Others take the view that, in the end, economic 
measures and security assurances will prove unsuccessful as long as the NWS 
demonstrate so strongly how important they consider nuclear weapons to be 
(Harrison 2006). It will not be possible to convince all others that what is good 
for the existing NWS does not serve the interests of anybody else.
 A third view centres on the non- proliferation norm as an intermediate vari-
able. By complying with the norm, states can build an image of being a non- 
threatening member of the international community, and in that sense become a 
nation in good standing. By breaking the norm, proliferators risk being sanc-
tioned against and turned into pariahs in international affairs. North Korea 
belongs to that category for many reasons other than its nuclear policies, but 
even so, the nature of its nuclear programme and its withdrawal from the NPT 
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underscores it. North Korea says it aims at reconciliation and normalisation with 
the United States and other countries, and if a stronger non- proliferation norm 
evolves, reversal to non- nuclear status would be all the more important to make 
it happen. A strong non- proliferation norm therefore matters, and nuclear disar-
mament is crucial to achieve it.
 The NPT has more members than any other multilateral arms control treaty, but 
this is not to say that it was the Treaty that shaped the non- nuclear policies of its 
prospective members. In many cases, it may have played little or no role in fore-
closing the nuclear- weapon option. But once new members came on board, they 
have taken a distinct interest in other members’ compliance with the Treaty. This 
is a bonus for the Treaty. Indeed, some states acceded to the NPT on the explicit 
condition that there would be no more than five NWS. However, a record number 
of members notwithstanding, the viability of the NPT and the strength of the non- 
proliferation norm have suffered from the NWS failure to honour their disarma-
ment obligations. The end of the Cold War raised expectations that the numbers 
and roles of nuclear weapons would be radically reduced and limited, but while 
the arsenals were cut, the NWS did not abandon their long- term intention to retain 
nuclear weapons, and they widened the roles assigned to them. It was not until 
2009, when the US revived the vision of an NWFW, US–Russian disarmament 
talks started again, and SC Resolution 1887 was adopted that trends began to turn 
for the benefit of the non- proliferation regime.
 Iran is not North Korea. By early 2010 it remained a member of the NPT. In 
principle, it was on negotiating terms with the P5+1 to find a solution to the 
nuclear issue and associated economic, political and security problems, although 
the obstacles loomed high and new sanctions were underway. The government 
in Tehran was, moreover, hampered by internal conflicts. It was not alien to 
questions of global disarmament, but faced more urgent problems in relation to 
the Western powers and its immediate surroundings.
 There was no prospect for US–Russian disarmament negotiations to have any 
direct impact on it. Even if, in principle, deep cuts and subsequent invitations for 
multilateral talks would have mattered, the timelines do not match. Deep cuts 
can hardly be achieved in time to affect the outcome of the Iranian nuclear 
problem. However, resolution of underlying political problems between the US 
and Russia, which is a prerequisite for progress in the nuclear negotiations, may 
also bring the parties closer together on matters pertaining to Iran. An indirect 
impact via the NPT could not be ruled out either, especially if Treaty implemen-
tation is seen to become more just and withdrawal becomes more difficult. 
Justice is a key word in Iranian politics and diplomacy.
How does non- proliferation matter for disarmament?
Non- proliferation as a prerequisite for disarmament
At the Reykjavik summit of 1986, it hardly occurred to Reagan and Gorbachev 
that nuclear disarmament was more than a two- state problem. The bipolarity of 
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the Cold War was so dominant that if the superpowers leaped towards an 
NWFW, the other NWS were supposed to follow suit. As the bipolar world 
became history and the unipolar moment receded, no single state or dyad of 
states can trump the others. In the multi- centric world of this century, many 
states will weigh in on the politics of disarmament. The first thing to be said 
about the importance of non- proliferation for disarmament follows on that note: 
the more states that acquire nuclear weapons, the more complex and difficult the 
road to zero will be.
 The four states that are not members of the NPT are all NWS, so another pro-
liferator would come from the ranks of NPT members. A break- out would cer-
tainly be a set- back for nuclear disarmament: another NWS would have to be 
contained, deterred, isolated or accommodated into the international system; the 
importance of nuclear weapons in international affairs would be reconfirmed; 
and the risk of further proliferation might be significant.
 Could it not be the other way around, a new NWS showing the dangers of 
nuclear proliferation, providing additional incentives for the large majority of 
states to get rid of all nuclear weapons? After all, it was in the aftermath of the 
Indian, Pakistani and North Korean tests, and of enhanced worries about nuclear 
terrorism after 9/11, that the vision of an NWFW was revived. However, a more 
accurate reading of the factors that prompted the “four horsemen”, President 
Obama and leaders of other countries to reach out for comprehensive nuclear 
disarmament starts by stressing the seriousness of where we are: if the trends are 
not turned now, it will be more difficult later.
 That assessment is most probably correct. It is virtually inconceivable that a 
process of nuclear disarmament will prosper in a world where nuclear weapons 
are spreading. The existing nuclear powers are very unlikely to push for nuclear 
disarmament under those circumstances. Hence, a more robust, reliable and 
effective non- proliferation regime is indispensable for the cause of disarmament.
Non- proliferation near zero: containing the break- out problem
At very low levels, non- proliferation becomes of special importance in order to 
facilitate the final steps to zero. If each NWS is left, say, with some tens of 
weapons, the break- out risks could be too big for comfort. The retaliatory cap-
abilities may be in doubt: some weapons may be destroyed in an enemy attack, 
others may be intercepted and yet others may not function as planned. As a 
result, bickering and nervousness over small numbers may increase the risk of 
surprise attack and inadvertent escalation when decision- makers begin to believe 
that war can no longer be avoided. Not only would the NWS be concerned about 
each other: they would also be concerned about possible newcomers – unless 
more effective non- proliferation barriers are developed.
 Therefore, the closer disarmament comes to zero, the more important non- 
proliferation becomes. If there remains a significant risk of break- out from the 
ranks of NNWS, the NWS will hardly be willing to take the last steps to an 
NWFW. The nuclear powers are the ones to abandon their privileges and accept 
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equal rules for all, so in contemplating the final qualitative jump from nuclear- to 
non- nuclear-weapon status, they will have to be convincingly assured against 
break- out. The distinction between civilian and military applications of nuclear 
energy inscribed in the NPT and the current safeguard agreements will certainly 
not be good enough.
 A world immediately below zero may also be unstable. This is a world where 
a mobilisation base for rapid reintroduction of nuclear weapons is maintained. In 
such a world, the possibility of nuclear war might still be entertained. Many 
states may think that hedging is prudent, leading to hedging races to be able to 
turn capabilities faster and faster from virtual to real. Virtual arsenals also need 
arsenal keepers, and they are never neutral experts, but socio- economic actors 
with a vested interest in what they are doing. They would quite possibly push for 
stronger capabilities and even the reintroduction of weapons. In break- out sce-
narios, first- strike capabilities are more likely to emerge than in current nuclear 
constellations.
 It follows that minimum deterrence levels in the low hundreds may have been 
chosen for good reason. They provide a greater degree of stability than arsenals 
in the low tens. In Chapter 10, it is therefore argued that it would be wise to stay 
at such levels until nuclear- weapons infrastructure and weapons- grade materials 
have been eliminated, and then go straight to a world below zero.
 The path dependency of nuclear disarmament must always be kept in mind. It 
may be assumed that when disarmament approaches zero, the weapons have 
been devalued to such an extent that issues that appear important by today’s 
standards have become of little significance. The concerns about nuclear stability 
may have changed or disappeared. Still, it may take only one state to rock the 
boat, so a robust non- proliferation regime would probably have to be in place. It 
is not possible to be definite about these issues, however heuristic assumptions 
about advanced stages of disarmament may be flawed, but they are important to 
stimulate the debate about the feasibility and desirability of an NWFW.
Regional proliferation as a threat to global disarmament
The consequences of break- outs are not uniform. They depend on who the pro-
liferator is and on the circumstances in which it happens. A vulnerable regime 
fighting with its back against the wall, acquiring nuclear weapons in the belief 
that this would improve their chances of survival, does not necessarily trigger 
proliferation. North Korea did not, neither did South Africa. The hypothetical 
case of Myanmar may be similar. In Japan, some political factions stressed that 
in response to North Korea’s acquisitions, the policies of extended deterrence 
and first- use would have to be maintained, and the question of Japanese nuclear 
weapons was brought into the public domain for discussion. Recently, however, 
the Hatoyama government has been working with the United States to reduce the 
role of nuclear weapons in the defence of Japan.
 If Iran were to break out of the non- proliferation regime and establish itself as 
an NWS, the consequences would be more far- reaching. If it is bombed in 
Disarmament and non-proliferation  181
 preventive action, the consequences would be particularly detrimental. If it had not 
been going for nuclear weapons before being bombed, it would be most likely to 
do so afterwards. The experience from Iraq after the 1991 bombing of Osiraq – it 
was after the bombing that Saddam mobilised his resources behind a secret 
nuclear- weapons programme (see Chapter 4) – would repeat itself. The ominous 
comparison with North Korea would be confirmed and generalised: adversaries 
without nuclear arms risk being attacked; those who have them, do not.
 The largest states are all NWS. In terms of size, the next in line are Japan, 
Brazil, Nigeria and other regional big powers followed by smaller states that are 
almost certain to be confined to regional politics. Further proliferation, if it 
happens, will therefore be embedded in regional- conflict formations. For some 
time, leading NWS have oriented their foreign policies and military preparations 
more and more towards regional affairs, their nuclear policies included. The 
introduction of more NWS would therefore interact with regional and global 
affairs in new and complex ways that defy prediction. In East Asia, the wars of 
the twentieth century still cast long shadows on international relations; the 
Taiwan problem has not been solved; and in the South China Sea there are many 
unresolved territorial issues. In the Middle East, the situation is as precarious as 
ever: this is the most volatile of all regions. The negative impact of further pro-
liferation must therefore be seen through regional lenses.
How to understand Iran: some theoretical reflections
The break- out issue of immediate concern is that of Iran. If Iran weaponises its 
programme, more states will invest more in nuclear technologies, and ballistic- 
missile defence will get another boost, generating its own problems for nuclear 
disarmament. Then, regional- conflict dynamics in the Middle East would pose 
formidable obstacles in the way of nuclear disarmament. For good reason, the 
Iranian problem has come to drive a wide range of policies and debates about the 
non- proliferation regime.
 In Chapter 6, two propositions of particular relevance for the Iranian problem 
were identified: playing the status gains of nuclear weapons down and/or playing 
status substitutes up; and paying special attention to oppositional nationalists 
combining fear and pride, security and status concerns. Chapter 7 takes a closer 
look at them.
 Status ambitions are difficult to pin down because, for obvious reasons, gov-
ernments are loath to talk about them. There is something illegitimate and even 
bizarre about seeking prestige through acquisition of the most destructive of 
weapons. For scarcity of empirical references to capture the importance of it, 
some theoretical reflections may be in order.
 All NWS have justified their nuclear- weapon acquisitions in reference to 
national security. States need to deter potential attackers, and the gold standard 
of deterrence is nuclear weapons. What really made them acquire nuclear 
weapons is another matter. In France and India, status considerations were 
important, and such ambitions played a role in Britain, too.
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 In Iran, national status considerations play out in ways that resemble France 
in the 1950s and 1960s. For France, the nuclear- weapon programme was instru-
mental in raising its international status and reviving an independent French 
foreign policy. For Iran, the nuclear programme is a status item that can be 
invoked to become recognised as an important power in the Middle East. Its 
influence in the region has increased after the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, 
but far from recognising it as a legitimate regional player, the United States and 
other countries are doing their best to contain it.5
 To help explain how states handle their status concerns, the concept of “rank 
disequilibrium” is helpful. An actor high on some status dimensions and low on 
others is constantly reminded of it through the differential treatment it is exposed 
to: invited into the good company where its rank is high, and ignored where it 
does not matter (Galtung 1964). Rank disequilibrium is an untenable state to be 
in, calling for corrective action. Invariably, the answer is to try to raise one’s 
rank on dimensions where it is low. The preferred solution is never to equilibrate 
by moving in the opposite direction, from high to low across the dimensions that 
matter. The tendency is always to maximise one’s assets. High rank – being in 
the upper echelons of international hierarchies – is an important source of 
power.
 One such top position is nuclear- weapon status. Karl Marx noted that the 
most effective power is the structural one that functions without being actively 
used. Military force is a case in point. It may translate into influence without 
being activated. States have a fine eye for who is more and who is less powerful 
and accommodate – consciously or not – to the strongest ones. By instilling 
respect and awe, military force can have an impact just by being there and being 
seen. Nuclear weapons are particularly effective in this respect, for not only do 
they represent the highest destructive potential known to humanity: possession 
of them is also limited to a few. Their status value is particularly precious as 
long as they are rare. No wonder that the five powers that first tested nuclear 
weapons – the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – tried to 
pull the ladder up behind themselves by urging everybody else to accede to the 
NPT as NNWS.
 Of course, the possibility that the weapons may be used must always be there. 
If not, there would be nothing to fear and nothing to gain for the possessors. 
Nuclear weapons would cease to be a structural political asset. The impression 
that nuclear weapons may be used can, however, be maintained in a variety of 
ways short of war. The measures that have been taken throughout the nuclear 
age to stem the creeping norm of non- use amply illustrate this.
 It is interesting to compare the status aspirations of India and Iran. For a long 
while, India was in a state of disequilibrium ranking high on many dimensions, 
but without enjoying nuclear- weapon status. It took steps to become a more gen-
eralised top dog in 1998, when it conducted a series of weapon tests, and took 
another step in that direction in 2008 when the US–India agreement confirmed 
its de facto possession of nuclear weapons and made it a bona fide partner in 
international nuclear commerce. Sooner or later, de jure recognition will follow.
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 Iran is also in a state of disequilibrium. Compared with neighbouring Paki-
stan, it is in a domestic disequilibrium, a bit like India. Pakistan is poorer than 
Iran and a young and fragile state, while Iran is an old power with a glorious 
past. Yet Pakistan has nuclear weapons, an imbalance that Iran may remedy 
through its nuclear programme, be it a civilian prestige programme or, in the 
end, a military one. More important, however, is the international disequilibrium 
it is exposed to: it is a big country in the Middle East, representing a proud 
Persian civilisation and thinking at least as highly of itself as of its neighbours 
and opponents, but feels underestimated and humiliated, and for good reason. 
This situation cries out for correction (see Chapter 7). It may be overcome by 
giving Iran a regional role in the Middle East that comes closer to the role it 
feels entitled to. This is a delicate matter, however, for it takes nothing less than 
a new political equilibrium in the region at the cost of some Arab states. To avert 
the most imminent break- out threat must therefore be a shared responsibility, for 
a new equilibrium can only be worked out in cooperation between the P5+1 and 
regional states. If not, Iran may try to do what India did, only on a smaller scale 
tailored to its capabilities. If the first approach is blocked, it is more likely that 
the second will be tried.
 India was an ardent supporter of nuclear disarmament for decades. In theory, 
disarmament – eliminating the very dimension on which it scored low – was a 
way to achieve rank equilibrium. It tested a nuclear device in 1974, but waited 
another 24 years before testing weapons. In the meantime, it argued for example 
for a nuclear- weapon convention with a timeline to zero. In this and other ways, 
the Indians exercised moral leadership, but the realism and sincerity of their dis-
armament efforts were open to doubt both in their own minds and in the eyes of 
others. In the mid- 1990s, when the period of opportunity after the Cold War was 
closing, there could no longer be any illusion that this approach would succeed. 
Still, the diplomatic efforts were useful in building legitimacy for exercising the 
nuclear- weapon option. By 1998 India was, moreover, set on a path of solid eco-
nomic growth, so it was in a better position to invest in the nuclear- weapon pro-
gramme. The self- righteousness was there as well, meaning that it was 
determined to equilibrate upwards. Compensation in the form of a bonus in some 
other field for staying non- nuclear was out of the question. Such bonuses are the 
poor man’s reward. Big India wanted to be recognised as an NWS.
 In the case of Iran, the choice may still tip the other way. If Iran’s status 
aspirations can be met and its security concerns alleviated, the incentives for 
going nuclear would be much reduced. Under such circumstances, peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy may be pursued to the satisfaction of all and under verification 
arrangements that may not have to go much beyond what is normal for a non- 
nuclear member of the NPT. Full transparency and growing confidence in a non- 
nuclear future are keys to it. If, on the other hand, the road to regional status is 
blocked, Iran may turn to nuclear weapons as a means of rank equilibration like 
India did. However, in two important respects there is no comparison between 
Iran and India: the body weight of Iran is far from that of India; and Iran would 
have to act in defiance of the NPT. India never joined the Treaty.
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Shared responsibilities for disarmament and non- proliferation
The NPT links disarmament (Article VI) and non- proliferation (Articles I and 
II), and gives all members an inalienable right to access nuclear energy (Article 
IV) in conformity with their non- proliferation undertakings (Articles I and II). 
These are shared responsibilities: Article VI says: “Each of the parties . . . under-
takes . . .”; Article IV is “the inalienable right of all the Parties . . .”; and non- 
proliferation – not to transfer (Article I) and not to receive (Article II) – is, 
similarly, a shared responsibility.
 Scott Sagan has introduced a conceptual framework that addresses shared 
responsibilities for the management of nuclear break- out dangers; for developing 
a proliferation- resistant fuel- cycle regime; and for rethinking nuclear deterrence 
(Sagan 2009b). The novelty of his approach is the focus on what the NNWS can 
do to implement the Treaty, jointly with the NWS. What the Treaty actually says 
in this respect has been under- communicated, if not completely ignored, for the 
usual way of describing the grand bargain from the second half of the 1960s has 
been to emphasise what the two categories of states – nuclear and non- nuclear – 
are obliged to do, each more or less on their own.
 The following is a review of issues where NNWS can do more and better to 
meet their part of the Article VI commitment and the disarmament–non- 
proliferation bargain: fuel- cycle controls; transparency and safeguards improve-
ments; reduced reliance on nuclear weapons for extended deterrence; anchoring 
non- nuclear-weapon commitments in domestic law; reserving the benefits of 
NPT membership; and clarifying the right to withdraw.
Preventing the spread of fuel- cycle facilities
The fuel- cycle issues are of immediate as well as long- term concern. Today, they 
are at the heart of the Iranian issue, and unless new arrangements to forego 
national fuel- cycle facilities are introduced, they will become a vexing problem 
as nuclear power spreads. At an advanced stage of nuclear disarmament, it is 
doubtful whether the NWS will proceed to an NWFW if other states have 
national fuel- cycle facilities that can produce weapon- grade materials on short 
notice (Perkovic and Acton 2008; Sagan 2009b). The NNWS should therefore 
see it as part of their disarmament obligations to promote multinational and/or 
international arrangements that draw a clearer distinction between civilian and 
military applications of nuclear energy. A variety of proposals have been made 
in this respect, first towards the end of the 1970s (SIPRI 1980) and in greater 
depth in this century (Yudin 2009). The development of such arrangements must 
be guided by the principle of equity (see Chapter 10).
Transparency and safeguards improvements
Transparency is needed in order to enhance predictability; predictability is essen-
tial for the development of mutual confidence; and mutual confidence is needed 
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for arms control and disarmament. This is, in a nutshell, the philosophy behind 
military confidence- building measures, first introduced in the framework of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the 1970s. Trans-
parency is a fundamental condition for arms- control and disarmament agree-
ments as well: what is not transparent cannot be verified, and without 
verification, arms- control and disarmament agreements are not relied upon. In 
view of the importance of nuclear weapons and the modest degrees of trust in 
inter- state affairs, transparency is particularly important in this field. Obviously, 
both nuclear and non- nuclear-weapon states have a responsibility to promote 
transparency on behalf of nuclear disarmament.
 One such area of shared responsibility concerns improvement of the safe-
guards system of the non- proliferation regime – the non- nuclear states for 
accepting upgraded safeguards and the nuclear ones for accepting such safe-
guards on all of their civilian activities.6 The latter should be required under an 
FMCT: if verification is limited to reprocessing and enrichment facilities, it 
would introduce another distinction between the two categories of states – selec-
tive safeguarding of such plants in NWS and full- scope safeguards in NNWS. At 
the end of the disarmament road, the NWS would also become NNWS, so safe-
guards on all civilian activities can be seen as a step on the way to a world 
without nuclear arms. For the NNWS, acceptance of upgraded safeguards – the 
Additional Protocol and further improvements to come – is another way of 
enhancing the credibility of their non- nuclear status, adding to what an interna-
tional fuel- cycle regime can do to facilitate disarmament.
 In the beginning, acceptance of safeguards was not linked to implementation 
of other Treaty obligations. What was agreed when the NPT was negotiated was 
the need to reassure the parties that the non- proliferation obligations were kept. 
There was agreement, in principle, on the need for adequate safeguards. To be 
taken seriously, arms- control agreements must be verified, and the safeguards 
system that was adopted in the early 1970s was an advanced one for its time. 
However, what is considered adequate will obviously change as new technolo-
gies and new experiences are obtained: it began with full- scope safeguards 
(INFCIRC 153), continued with the model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540), 
and in due course further improvements will certainly be called for. However, 
while linkage arguments are not justified in the light of negotiating history, the 
linkage politics of a number of NNWS is a political fact that has to be attended 
to. They are holding back on their arms- control commitments as long as the 
implementation of rights and obligations under the NPT is deemed to be imbal-
anced. In the Middle East, many states are doing so as long as the Israeli arsenal 
is unrestrained.
Cutting back on extended deterrence
In Europe and East Asia, extended deterrence postures that are supposed to deter 
conventional as well chemical, biological and nuclear attack still exist. Since the 
end of the Cold War, NATO and Russian first- use doctrines have been out of 
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touch with political realities, especially between the EU and Russia, which 
declared each other strategic partners many years ago. By January 2010, some 
200 US nuclear weapons remained in Europe.
 However, many NATO allies do not want nuclear weapons on their soil any 
longer, and the first- use doctrine is questioned both in Japan and Europe. The 
credibility of it was always in doubt. The French used to argue that only a 
national finger on the nuclear trigger would do (Ledwidge 1984). Henry Kiss-
inger said much the same, criticising the Europeans for “asking us to multiply 
assurances that we cannot possibly mean” (Kissinger 1979). To pretend to be 
willing to defend Europe by inviting an act of mutual suicide was never credible. 
The best that could be said in support of it is that, since the doctrine has been 
consistently repeated over the years by all alliance partners, the adversaries may 
have assessed the likelihood of its implementation to be a figure above zero.
 During the Cold War, the non- nuclear allies often worked with the US to 
reinforce extended deterrence postures based on first- use doctrines. Practitioners 
of threat- based policies fed on each other, cooperating to beef up threat percep-
tions and justify requests for more weapons. Referring to each other as “the 
Europeans” and “the Americans”, they often monopolised the debates.
 Such interactions have also been at work in US–Japan relations recently. 
The 2009 report of the US Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture 
refers to private discussions with unnamed Japanese officials urging the US to 
maintain its nuclear presence in the Pacific, the nuclear- tipped Tomahawk 
cruise missile (TLAM/N) included. In a letter to Hillary Clinton, Foreign 
Minister Okada noted that neither the former government nor his own had 
expressed any views concerning weapon systems such as the TLAM/N or a 
robust nuclear earth penetrator. Instead, he reiterated his interest in discussing 
“suggestions that the role of nuclear weapons be restricted to deterrence of the 
use of nuclear weapons”, i.e. transition to a no- first-use doctrine.7 In Europe, 
the issue is much the same. Neither NATO nor nuclear deterrence is at stake at 
this juncture, but the question is what the nuclear weapons should deter: any 
attack or nuclear attack only. NATO is conventionally superior – the US 
accounts for 45 per cent of world military expenditure and Russia for 3 per 
cent (SIPRI 2009) – so for NATO there is no military need to maintain the 
first- use option. There is no need to keep US nuclear weapons in Europe either. 
They serve no purpose, and if NATO functions democratically, they will soon 
be removed. If so, all the world’s nuclear weapons will be back with their 
possessors.
 By acting to remove all nuclear weapons from their soil and going for no- 
first-use policies, states that remain under extended deterrence arrangements can 
help diminish the role of nuclear weapons in the nuclear planning of the US. 
Both in Europe and in East Asia, the governments of NNWS can now cooperate 
with the US government to move the nuclear postures in this direction, and some 
of them are actively doing so. In both regions, such cooperation is important to 
counteract and delegitimise whatever collusion goes on in secret, non- democratic 
channels between Cold War vintage believers in the importance of nuclear 
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weapons. To prevent a fall- back to forward stationing, no nuclear weapons in the 
territories of others may be turned into a new, universal principle.
Anchoring non- nuclear-weapon commitments in national law
In 1971, the Japanese Diet endorsed three non- nuclear principles: not to possess, 
not to manufacture and not to introduce nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. 
It did so in the form of a resolution, not in the form of law. Nevertheless, the 
principles have been important in reassuring other countries, as well as the Japa-
nese public, that Japan will stay non- nuclear.
 In 1988, in a prelude to its accession to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and to the 
NPT, Brazil wrote a non- nuclear-weapon commitment into the constitution.8 
This established a strong legal barrier against nuclear- weapon acquisition – the 
strongest possible in the legal system of any country. Other NNWS may con-
sider doing the same – not non- proliferation stalwarts like Sweden and New 
Zealand, where it would be superfluous, and not countries like Egypt and 
Turkey, which would find it untimely under the current circumstances in the 
Middle East. However, countries that are less geared towards trading stronger 
non- proliferation commitments for something else – like Indonesia and South 
Africa – may consider some version of it. In the rollback terminology of Chapter 
6, it may be of interest first of all for countries in a state of passive hedging. This 
way, NNWS may facilitate disarmament by tying themselves more strongly to 
the non- proliferation pole.
 Proposals for societal verification also have to be anchored in domestic law.9 
In addition to transparency measures and inspections that are agreed in inter- 
governmental accords, this idea gives citizens the right and obligation to inform 
appropriate international authorities if they discover activities that are at odds 
with international commitments undertaken by their governments. It comes in 
two main modalities: citizens reporting or inspection by the people, and whistle 
blowing by those who have intimate knowledge of treaty violations, in particular 
scientists and technologists who are employed by the nuclear establishments. To 
work, those who sound the alarm must be assured that they can do so without 
being punished. The international agreements to be verified should therefore 
contain a clause requiring that the parties adopt national laws that guarantee the 
right and require the duty to inform.
 In practice, the effectiveness of such legal assurances would be a matter of 
degree. Often, civil courage and civil disobedience would still be needed. 
However, the stronger the legal protection, the more legitimate the reporting and 
the more likely it is that it would make a difference. Societal verification has not 
been instituted so far, but is worth pursuing in pragmatic fashion as disarmament 
proceeds and national conditions become ripe for it. At low levels of arms, it 
may be much needed as a supplement to international means of verification.
 The bottom line is that, in order to be broadly accepted, the NWS must be 
willing to disarm. If not – if societal verification were to be applied in a two- tier 
system based on the distinction between NWS and NNWS – it would further 
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mark the imbalanced implementation of the NPT and therefore be rejected out of 
hand. One cannot have disarmament without verification and – equally obvious 
– one cannot have societal verification without disarmament.
Reserving the benefits of NPT membership
Article X provides a nearly unconditional legal option to withdraw. All that is 
required is three months’ notification and an explanation of the reasons for with-
drawal. There is no body with authority to pronounce on withdrawal decisions 
by member states, and there is nothing in the Treaty and its negotiating history 
to indicate that exercising the legal right to withdraw gives ground for sanctions 
or reprisals. When the NPT was negotiated, the typical case of withdrawal was 
seen to be a response by a Treaty member in good standing to a security threat 
coming from some other state.
 From the beginning, it was also clear that a withdrawing state should not 
expect to enjoy the benefits of membership. Article IV reserves access to nuclear 
material, equipment and technology for NPT members – although for a long 
while, it was not practised with any systematicity, and in 2008 the NSG made an 
exemption for India. Withdrawal could also mean restrictions on the right to use 
or keep sensitive technologies that have been acquired under the Treaty regime. 
Numerous proposals have been made for what to do with such items. For 
instance, it has been emphasised that such items must be restricted to peaceful 
uses and remain under safeguards; that suppliers should have the right to request 
an immediate “return to sender”; and that there should be a provision for shut- 
down of relevant facilities to prevent their misuse. However, the problem with 
most of these proposals is how to enforce them.
 Only states in good standing can withdraw in legal fashion. Withdrawal 
should not be an acceptable remedy for cheating. In accordance with interna-
tional law, a withdrawing state remains responsible for violations committed 
while it was a party to the Treaty and continues to be subject to decisions made 
by the IAEA and the Security Council. To determine whether there has been any 
violations, immediate verification of the withdrawing party’s compliance with 
the Treaty might be undertaken, mandated by the Security Council if necessary 
(Bunn and Rhinelander 2005; Perkovich et al. 2005; Harrison 2006). Also, it has 
been proposed that the Security Council should authorise an escalating series of 
measures against any country that refuses to abide by the rules, to be announced 
in advance in the form of a generic Security Council resolution in order to 
enhance their deterrent effect (Goldblat 2009).
 The IAEA is entitled to apply sanctions in response to non- compliance with 
safeguards agreements. The measures that may be taken include suspension of 
assistance provided by the Agency or member states; return of materials and 
equipment that have been made available to the withdrawing state; and suspen-
sion of IAEA membership. This is less than biting, for assistance rendered by 
the Agency is modest and return of materials and equipment at the request of 
the Board of Governors depends on voluntary cooperation by the state being 
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penalised, which is unlikely. Suspension of IAEA membership puts a pariah 
stamp on the state, which may hurt but, apart from the modest measures just 
mentioned, it is of no automatic material consequence.
 In Resolution 1887, the Security Council “undertakes to address without 
delay any State’s notice of withdrawal from the NPT”.10 It is for the Security 
Council to decide whether there is a threat to international peace and security 
and, if so, what should be done to restore the peace. The Council may pass 
decisions on sanctions and mandate the use of force, but sanctions usually do not 
work as intended and use of force is even less likely to prove instrumental. Smart 
sanctions should not be dismissed, but they look nicer on paper than in practice, 
and experiences of military counter- proliferation actions have been discouraging 
(see Chapter 3). Diplomatic approaches therefore seem indispensable, and for 
that purpose bilateral talks and small- size negotiating frameworks are needed. 
Seven- power talks are conducted in the case of Iran and six- power talks in the 
case of North Korea, involving the P5 plus Germany and the big neighbouring 
states respectively. The role of the Council will usually be to back the negotia-
tions and provide incentives to stay non- nuclear.
 Many NNWS – members of the non- aligned movement (NAM) in particular 
– are generally opposed to referring withdrawal matters to the Security Council. 
One reason for this is their general objection to punitive measures. The role of 
the Security Council has often been to issue sanctions. Another reason is that the 
Security Council has become less and less representative of the international 
community of states, and the veto institute adds to its in- built bias in favour of 
the West and the veto powers.
Clarifying the right to withdraw
The withdrawal clause of Article X is logically linked to the disarmament obliga-
tion of Article VI. The closer one comes to zero, the stronger the connection. On 
the one hand, if the NWS irreversibly disarm with a view to freeing the world of 
nuclear arms, it will be easier for the NNWS to agree to restrict the withdrawal 
option. On the other hand, the NWS will find it easier to take the final steps 
towards zero if withdrawal becomes less likely. Other measures such as foregoing 
fuel- cycle facilities and instituting more effective safeguards may be more reassur-
ing, but clarification of the right to withdraw from the NPT may also help.
 The current situation is untenable. North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985; 
entered a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1992; announced its intention 
to withdraw on 12 March 1993, but went back on that notice on 11 June, one day 
before it would have taken effect; and stated on 9 January 2003 that it would 
leave the Treaty the next day in reference to the 89 days’ notice ten years earlier, 
which had merely been suspended (see Chapter 4). North Korea had violated its 
commitments, but the Security Council failed to act and the 2005 NPT Review 
Conference did not even record that one party had left the Treaty.
 Amendment of Article X is not the issue. The NPT will not be amended 
unless or until it is implemented to the satisfaction of the great majority of its 
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members. However, some of its provisions may be clarified. The options may be 
limited to (1) voluntarily giving up the right to withdraw, and (2) establishing 
better procedures for assessing the reasons for withdrawal and what can be done 
to alleviate them and maintain the integrity of the Treaty.
 The first option has an interesting historical precedent. The Tlatelolco Treaty 
had strict requirements for entry into force, but gave the signatories the option to 
waive them, bringing the Treaty into force in gradual fashion. The NPT has a 
significant waiver potential too – i.e. for waiving the right to withdraw – first of 
all among those who followed the so- called Swedish example. In the 1960s, 
Sweden concluded that regardless of what the NWS were doing, it would not be 
in Sweden’s interest to acquire nuclear weapons. The conclusion was virtually 
unconditional. The only reservation was in reference to possible long- term 
developments making “nuclear weapons standard equipment of ordinary states” 
(Prawitz 1995). States that have a strong commitment to the NPT and wish to 
exercise leadership in building a stronger regime might consider this possibility.
 As for the second option, three months is too short a time to seriously address 
the questions raised by a notification to withdraw. The validity of the alleged 
reasons must be assessed; there may be a need for special inspections to deter-
mine whether the withdrawing party has been in compliance with its Treaty 
obligations prior to the notice to withdraw; and there should be time for meas-
ures to improve the security situation and maintain the integrity of the NPT. 
Over the years, the notification time has increased from three months in the NPT 
to 150 days in the CFE (1990) to six months in the CTBT (1996) to 12 months 
in the Treaty of Pelindaba (1996) and the Semipalatinsk Treaty (2006). However, 
even the simplest of amendments – changing the figure three to a higher figure – 
seems out of the question for a long time to come.11
 In view of the serious consequences that withdrawal might have for regional 
and international security, the statement of “the extraordinary events” that the 
withdrawing state “regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests” should 
be detailed and unambiguous. The Vienna Convention is helpful in determining 
what may reasonably be invoked. It says that changing circumstances cannot be 
used as a ground for withdrawal,
unless the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of 
the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty, and the effect of the 
change is radically to transform the extent of the obligations still to be per-
formed under the treaty.12
By this criterion, the North Korean reference to US–South Korean military exer-
cises, which had been conducted routinely for years, and to the IAEA request for 
special inspections, clearly did not constitute a bona fide reason for withdrawal. 
A list of criteria might be developed, explaining what the “extraordinary event, 
related to the subject matter of the Treaty”, might be about.13
 Much of this is controversial, with little chance of being agreed in the near 
future. The mainstream views of the non- aligned movement (NAM) differ from 
Disarmament and non-proliferation  191
those of the Western states. NAM members stress that the right to withdraw is a 
sovereign right to be upheld. This does not mean that NAM states turn all pro-
posals to improve the operationalisation of Article X down. For instance, there is 
a body of agreement among NPT members on the need for a consultation mech-
anism, in the Treaty framework, when faced with a notification to withdraw.14 
However, agreement on more substantial measures to tighten the right of with-
drawal will have to wait for better and balanced implementation of the NPT, of 
Article VI in particular. Having made a series of strong proposals in the imme-
diate aftermath of the North Korean withdrawal, Western states seem to have 
realised this and are now going more carefully and realistically about the issue.

Part IV
Towards a nuclear- weapon-
free world

10  Towards a nuclear- weapon-free 
world
Introduction
In a speech in Prague on 5 April 2009, President Obama reconfirmed his inten-
tion to seek a nuclear- weapons-free world (NWFW): “today, I state clearly and 
with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world 
without nuclear weapons” (Obama 2009b). In Cairo two months later, he defused 
the charge of double standards that has been levelled at the nuclear- weapons 
states (NWS) throughout the 40-year history of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT): “No nation should pick and choose which nation holds nuclear 
weapons. That’s why I strongly reaffirmed America’s commitment to seek a 
world in which no nations hold nuclear weapons” (Obama 2009a). By seizing 
the high ground he was set to win important debates. However, there are numer-
ous obstacles in the way.
 What might a NWFW look like? The term is used in a variety of ways, some 
of which appear more stable and satisfactory than others. Certain principles, pre-
requisites and transitional issues, as well as political order requirements, must be 
considered on the way to such a world. On the whole, growing international 
interdependence is helpful, but for nuclear disarmament to succeed, interdepend-
ence must be turned into cooperative security practices between the big powers, 
with a view to more effective collective security mechanisms.
An NWFW: the rationale
In their Wall Street Journal article of 4 January 2007, Shultz, Perry, Kissinger 
and Nunn emphasised the interrelationship between the vision of an NWFW and 
measures to that end: “without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived 
as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic 
or possible.”1
 To achieve a dynamic, interactive relationship between vision and measures, 
one has to be serious about both. To be serious about the vision means that a 
convincing rationale for a NWFW has to be spelt out; that the broadest possible 
agreement must be sought; and that the advantages of such a world should weigh 
in the assessment of specific steps to be taken. If not, the advantages and 
196  Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world
 disadvantages of each single step will instead be weighed within the framework 
of the existing international system, with little or no regard for the gains that a 
NWFW offers, leaving the steps hostage to the obstacles that will surely be 
raised along the way. The “four horsemen” are therefore right in their emphasis 
on vision: if the vision is not persistently invoked in the discussions of how best 
to promote disarmament and non- proliferation, efforts in this direction may not 
lead very far. The dynamism will be missing.
 One part of the rationale relates to the terrorist threat: terrorists seek nuclear 
weapons in order to use them. The weapons themselves may be in solid custody 
in nearly all NWS, but there is no guarantee that treacherous elements in a weak 
state like Pakistan would not be willing and able to leak a weapon or two to al- 
Qaeda or Lashkar- e-Tayyiba, the group behind the December 2008 commando 
raid in Mumbai. Access to significant amounts of HEU is a greater danger.2 If 
terrorists get their hands on fissile materials, the rest – building a first- generation 
uranium bomb – may be manageable. After the Cold War, a variety of measures 
have been instituted to reduce the amount of weapon- grade materials and secure 
what remains, but as more states pursue weapons programmes, new potential 
sources emerge. Sooner or later, catastrophic terrorism may therefore be a reality 
– unless weapons and fissile materials are eliminated and subject to stricter 
controls.
 Another part of the rationale emanates from the state paradigm. In an increas-
ingly multi- centric world with more NWS, nuclear weapons are likely to interact 
with inter- state conflicts in more regions and in new ways. New NWS do not 
have the benefit of warning, control and communications arrangements of the 
kind that were developed, step- by-step, during the Cold War, and the cold warri-
ors are widely recognised to have benefited from good luck. Control mechan-
isms to prevent war by human error, accident or technical malfunction will, 
moreover, be more difficult to institute and practise in a multi- polar world than 
in the static, bi- polar configuration of the Cold War. The four horsemen summed 
it up this way:
the US will soon be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more 
precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically costly than Cold 
War deterrence. . . . Will new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate 
in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?
There is a growing sentiment that nuclear weapons are too dangerous in an inter-
national system which is partly anarchic, partly chaotic.
 A NWFW would also be safer for nuclear energy. This is not among the 
major factors in the case for such a world – the overriding objective is to prevent 
nuclear weapons from being used – but for proponents of nuclear power it is 
another attraction. Others emphasise that a NWFW would be far more sustaina-
ble as part of a double abolition: an end both to nuclear weapons and to nuclear 
energy. However, much like the compromise between the “no” to nuclear 
weapons and the “yes” to nuclear power built into the NPT, an NWFW would 
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probably entail the same compromise. If and when a NWFW comes into being, 
the energy situation will certainly be a lot different from what it is today, but this 
is what full implementation of the Treaty implies.
 Rationales that are phrased in international security and world- order terms will 
not be sufficient, however. In the words of Zia Mian, they may lead to agreement 
on abolition, “but it is just as likely, if not more likely, that these policy debates, 
all of which would be based on power, mistrust, threat, fear, and violence, could 
combine to derail the whole process” (Mian 2009). To avoid these pitfalls, the 
frame of discourse must be broadened to include normative, moral and legal con-
siderations. In addition to their inherent merit, the normative arguments have the 
benefit of being universally relevant and applicable both to governments and to 
civil society. They widen an elitist process conducted in power and security terms 
to encompass popular movements as well. Normative arguments resonate across 
borders and “may contribute better to mobilize support for abolition, build confi-
dence in good faith, inevitability, and irreversibility of the disarmament process 
and the global benefits that it would bring” (Mian 2009). Zia Mian wants them to 
be at the centre of the debate, not at the margins.
 No yardstick can determine which line of argument is more important – a 
rationale based on security gains or one that sees nuclear weapons as a crime 
against humanity. The NWS would, for obvious reasons, concentrate on the 
security gains and reject the view that nuclear weapons are immoral and illegal. 
The custodians will not pass such sentences on themselves. Many NNWS argue 
both ways, as do popular campaigns to rid the world of nuclear arms. Without 
raising the legality or illegality of nuclear- weapon possession and use, NWS 
may also call for abolition out of ethical considerations as well as security gains. 
Reflecting on “what really happened at Reykjavik”, Secretary Shultz came close 
to doing the same: “As I often said to the critics . . . and proponents of status quo, 
‘What’s so good about a world where you can be wiped out in thirty minutes?’ I 
had never learned to love the bomb” (Shultz et al. 2008). The vision can best be 
promoted by both lines of argument.
Doubts and pitfalls
In the Final Declaration of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, adopted by con-
sensus, the five NWS expressed their “unequivocal undertaking . . . to accom-
plish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear 
disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI” (United 
Nations 2000). In the years that followed, some NWS returned to guarded, con-
ditional statements.3 Others simply fell silent. It was as if the NWS had come to 
regard Article VI of the NPT the way the parties have dealt with Article V on 
peaceful nuclear explosions: acting as if it does not exist. The four horsemen and 
the leaders of other countries who followed suit broke that silence. Barack 
Obama joined them. In commemorating Rajiv Gandhi’s speech on nuclear disar-
mament before the UN General Assembly in 1988, Indian officials also reiter-
ated the call for abolition (Sethi 2009), and the Security Council followed suit. 
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 Still, the call for a NWFW remains primarily a Western one. In other regions, 
nuclear- and non- nuclear-weapon states are waiting to see what comes of it. For 
a while, disarmament opponents have been on the defensive, but they may hit 
back with greater political clout both in the United States and elsewhere. The 
legacy of threat- based security policies remains a formidable obstacle in the way 
of a NWFW, and arms control and disarmament are still seen by many as part 
and parcel of an ongoing quest for unilateral advantage, not as a global common 
good. Sceptics noted, furthermore, that both the title and the measures advocated 
in the second WSJ article of 15 January 2008 by the same American horsemen 
seemed more modest than those of the first,4 and that SC Resolution 1887 of 24 
September 2009 is mostly about non- proliferation. Will the grand disarmament 
ambition fizzle out? Will the domestic interests in nuclear weapons hit back and 
reaffirm the continued relevance of nuclear arms? Abolition has been proposed 
three times before – the Baruch plan in 1946, the McCloy–Zorin proposal of 
1961 and the Reagan–Gorbachev attempt in 1986 – and they were all short- 
lived. 
 Yet others have more fundamental doubts about it all. They are concerned 
that the call is part of a double agenda, the real purpose of which is to sustain 
and enhance Western unilateral advantage. The synergies of disarmament and 
non- proliferation may stop smaller and weaker states from acquiring “the great 
equaliser” – nuclear weapons – thus minimising those states’ ability to counter 
the vast US conventional superiority. So why should North Korea, Iran and other 
states at odds with the US willingly expose themselves to threats and humilia-
tion? In a world without nuclear weapons, US forces may be even more superior 
than they are today; moreover, at low levels of offensive forces, an advanced 
ballistic- missile defence system may give the US a first- strike capability vis- à-
vis other NWS. Seen in one or more of these ways, nuclear disarmament is not a 
hallmark of progressive politics but a conservative goal: change in order to pre-
serve the dominance of the United States and the West.5
 Big powers have always gone for unilateral advantage. Recent history is rich 
on examples in this regard. The US withdrew from the ABM Treaty to be free to 
pursue ballistic- missile defence. Starting with Ronald Reagan’s Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI), the US is unrivalled in this field. Outer space is a 
related arena where the US is the leading nation and so objects to arms control. 
The US will ratify the CTBT, critics surmise, when it can do without testing, 
while less- sophisticated NWS will be restrained by it. Having conducted 1,000 
tests and having a sophisticated nuclear- stewardship programme, a CTBT could 
help maintain and even enhance its unilateral advantage in weapons design. Pro-
ponents of US ratification have actually argued that way.6 Non- proliferation of 
ballistic missiles is a high priority, especially because many Asian states pursue 
such weapons to counter the threat from US bases in their vicinity. Production of 
sophisticated aircraft, on the other hand, are beyond the capabilities of smaller 
and less- industrialised countries, so the advanced powers see no similar need for 
arms control in that sector. The US and Russia have aired the idea of making the 
INF Treaty global, which would eliminate the ballistic missiles of many Asian 
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states while the two leading nuclear powers have a variety of other weapons that 
can be used over intermediate distances. To various degrees, the big powers have 
twisted the implementation of rights and obligations under the NPT so much in 
their own favour that by the time George W. Bush left, the Treaty may have 
been on the verge of crumbling. Ever since the first Gulf War of 1991, it has 
been argued that nuclear disarmament would make the US even more superior 
because nobody can match its conventional forces. Last but not least, the United 
States is about to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons by preparing for some 
of their functions to be exercised with long- range high- precision conventional 
weapons that others do not have. This will make it more, not less, difficult for 
China, Russia and others to embark on disarmament (see Chapter 3).
 In the NWS, there are various objections to the elimination of nuclear 
weapons. There is the view that nuclear weapons make major war very unlikely, 
if not impossible; that they provide unique and irreplaceable security benefits; 
that a world of zero would be highly unstable; and that approaching zero might 
spur proliferation by making it possible for very small arsenals to have large 
strategic implications not neutralised by the much bigger arsenals of the major 
NWS. Then there are the less legitimate, but still very real, unilateral advantages 
that nuclear weapons are seen to offer: they can be used to threaten and intimi-
date others, and they confer status on their possessors that is thought to be gener-
ally useful in the pursuit of national interests.
 During the Cold War, deep- seated superpower concerns about upper edges 
turned into sterile obsessions with parity in order to block perceived attempts by 
the other side to gain unilateral advantages – so much so that parity became part 
of the problem, making agreements more difficult. Even then, however, there 
was one exception to the bickering for unilateral advantage: a string of arrange-
ments were instituted to avoid war by human error, accident or technical mal-
function. In the most fundamental of senses, this was a common interest because 
their own survival – and that of human civilisation – was at stake. Reagan and 
Gorbachev took it further, stating that a nuclear war cannot be won and must 
therefore never be fought.
 In a multi- centric world, it is critically important to convince states – nuclear 
and non- nuclear – that disarmament will be pursued neither as a matter of unilat-
eral advantage nor of national sacrifice, but as a common, public good. If the key 
players cannot be convinced that the initiative is no ploy for unilateral advant-
age, it will go nowhere. Also for this reason, the call for abolition must be 
phrased both in terms of international peace and security and in terms of moral 
leadership. Universal moral considerations – preventing mass slaughter; preserv-
ing human civilisation – must be turned into realpolitik. National interests will 
not be abandoned, but elimination must be seen as being in the best interest of 
states. All parties to the NPT are legally obliged to work for nuclear disarma-
ment, but the NWS have a special responsibility.
 Declaratory policies putting the rationale in universal terms while eschewing 
all talk about unilateral advantage are of the essence. Even more important, the 
military postures must be adapted to facilitate nuclear disarmament in the 
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 universal interest. In many cases, the crux of the matter will be to reduce the 
security concerns of states that currently rely on nuclear weapons by alleviating 
conflicts and adjusting conventional force constellations so that their national- 
security affairs can be managed without nuclear arms. This applies to states that 
are under the US nuclear umbrella; to states that are conventionally inferior in 
relation to neighbours that may use their military might for political gains; and 
to states that see nuclear weapons as insurance premiums of last resort.
 To get going, US leadership is a must and Russian cooperation is vitally 
important. If Russia is not ready for major cuts, the disarmament ambition will 
not go far. Next in the line of importance is China, because of its geopolitical 
significance. Together, these are the states that most affect the security dynamics 
in regions of proliferation concern, i.e. in Northeast Asia, South Asia and the 
Middle East. As veto- wielding members of the UN Security Council, they also 
determine whether confidence will be built in the enforcement of disarmament 
commitments (Perkovich 2008). If they cannot stabilise their strategic relation-
ships and put the nuclear order on the path of disarmament, the international 
non- proliferation regime will be on shaky ground. As for the other P5, the UK is 
positive to multilateral disarmament and sensitive to US priorities while France 
remains more of an independent actor and more strongly wedded to nuclear 
weapons (Tertrais 2009).
 As the international distribution of power shifts towards the East and South, 
more attention must be paid to the priorities of the emerging powers. Not only 
do China and India care about their security, like all others: disarmament must 
also be compatible with their historical claims for greatness. If the process seems 
designed to contain and subdue their rise to prominence, they will not cooperate. 
While Western leverage is diminishing, the self- confidence and staying power of 
the emerging powers are growing (see Chapter 1). To get them on board, there 
has to be a significant element of equity in the disarmament strategy as well as in 
single steps, and the sooner they are drawn into strategic dialogues on how to 
proceed, the better. A strategy of co- option – starting with the US and US allies, 
continuing with NNWS that always made a case for abolition, and successively 
building pressure on the recalcitrant ones – would be to ask for trouble.7
 Active involvement of NNWS is important as well. The goal is not just to 
disarm the armed but to create a world order free of nuclear weapons comprising 
all. In the NPT, disarmament is a shared responsibility for all members (see 
Chapter 9). NNWS always played an important role in keeping the big powers 
honest, and in reaching out for an NWFW, they will be much needed in that 
role.
An NWFW: in what version?
Words like “zero”, “elimination” and “abolition” all have in common the idea of 
no nuclear weapons. However, “zero” can be conceived of in a variety of ways, 
and not everyone means the same when referring to it. It may be taken to mean 
no deployed weapons; no stockpiled weapons; no assembled weapons; no 
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nuclear weapons in the hands of the military (but possibly under civilian govern-
mental control as an insurance premium); or no national nuclear weapons (but 
possibly nuclear weapons controlled by an international body).
 Beyond the various meanings of zero, the vision of an NWFW also comes in 
several other forms, one of which imagines a world where all ready- made 
weapons have been eliminated, but where many states maintain a mobilisation 
base for the rapid reintroduction of them. It might include fissile materials in 
stock, able nuclear- weapon engineers and manufacturing equipment on hand, 
and delivery vehicles ready for use. For the NWS, this would be a form of deep 
de- alerting, approaching the status of Japan today. The purpose of such a base is 
to deter others from breaking out of the agreement and to confront violators if 
deterrence breaks down.
 Harald Muller argues convincingly that, as a fixed end state, virtual arsenals 
are a bad idea (Muller 2009). First, because they sustain the mentality that 
nuclear war is possible at any time. Many states may come to think that hedging 
is prudent, suspecting that others may be cheating, with the result of a hedging 
race: vertically towards capabilities that can be turned faster and faster from 
virtual to real; horizontally to involve more states. The trust on which abolition 
was achieved would then evaporate. Second, virtual arsenals need arsenal- 
keepers, and they are never disinterested experts, but socio- political actors legiti-
mising their activities in terms of threats to be met and demanding more 
resources to counter them. In effect, the arsenal- keepers are likely to push for a 
hedging race, and would quite possibly prefer a return from virtual arsenals to 
real ones. Such an end state would therefore contain the seeds of its own destruc-
tion. Third, it is a particularly bad idea because in the break- out scenarios, first- 
strike capabilities are more likely to emerge than in current nuclear 
constellations.
 It would therefore be better to go “below zero” to eliminate the fissile mater-
ials that have been dedicated to nuclear- explosive uses; to institute strict interna-
tional control of all remaining materials; to dismantle the nuclear- weapons 
infrastructure; and to redirect the workforce to other sectors. Even more, nuclear 
materials that can be used to build weapons should be banned from civilian use 
as well. HEU is not the big issue here – there is little HEU left in the civilian 
sector and what remains is being phased out – but plutonium continues to pose a 
problem. Technical fixes may or may not solve it: if not, a compromise would 
have to be struck to accommodate the civilian industry. Dual- capable production 
facilities for civilian use would remain, possibly based on proliferation- resistant 
technologies and certainly subject to international control. This would be a more 
stable NWFW, building trust in a non- nuclear future. However, going below 
zero is a matter of more or less, so this image of a NWFW comes in several 
variations.
 A third version relies on joint capabilities to intercept a nuclear attack before 
the weapons reach their targets – the idea that Reagan presented to Gorbachev in 
Reykjavik. Reagan offered to share his SDI technologies with the Soviet Union 
in order to erect a common shield against break- out attempts. An effective shield 
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could be traded against milder restrictions on nuclear infrastructure and modified 
requirements of international control. However, 25 years and 150 billion dollars 
after the SDI was born, ballistic- missile defence remains an unproven techno-
logy with no certainty of success. Countermeasures seem to be simpler and 
cheaper. Furthermore, to convert the programme into a global asset to the benefit 
of all may not be possible, for it takes a much more cooperative world to over-
come the formidable political problems involved. In Reykjavik, it was a matter 
of course for Reagan and Gorbachev that what they agreed to do would set the 
rules for all others. Their duopoly was tantamount to world order. In the multi- 
centric world taking shape today, the technology would have to be shared by a 
consortium of big powers, not just two of them, making implementation much 
more complex. Still, in a world that has come close to elimination, missile 
defence is likely to be seen through other lenses. If the road to a NWFW results 
in, say, 100 or 200 weapons for each NWS, further steps will be considered in an 
environment much different from where the journey started. The path- 
dependence of the disarmament process must always be kept in mind, so the 
option should not be ruled out.
The vision: a guide to action?
A world that allows the disarmament process to proceed to the point where the 
end station is in sight defies description. Today, it would therefore be premature 
and presumptuous to select some version of the end state and discard others.
 Nevertheless: for the reasons given above, a NWFW leaving a number of 
virtual arsenals intact seems unattractive. In classical nuclear terminology, this 
would be a world of many threshold states, and the risk is great that it would be 
unstable. A version that does away with fissile material stocks and dedicated 
nuclear infrastructure, with or without a shield against ballistic missiles and 
other means of delivery, appears preferable. However, removing the remnants of 
weapons programmes is a matter of degree – it can be more or less complete – 
so such a version can take many different forms. If a global shield becomes part 
of the overall arrangement, the requirements of build down “below zero” might 
be less stringent.
 With this caveat, can the vision be a guide to action?
The principle of equity
It is hard to imagine a NWFW with different ground rules for different categor-
ies of states. Some 40 years of discontent with the NPT’s division of the world 
into nuclear- and non- nuclear-weapon states, and persistent complaints over the 
slow implementation of Article VI, which was supposed to end it, have led many 
NNWS to insist on equal rules for all. In general terms, Obama’s Prague and 
Cairo speeches alluded to the same. New measures must therefore be equitable 
and capability differences reduced, more and more as the process unfolds. Dif-
ferent versions of the end state aside, the principle of equity will be important all 
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throughout the disarmament process. If it is compromised by moves for unilat-
eral advantage, the emerging powers of Asia, in particular, are unlikely to be 
cooperative.
 The NPT was meant to be a regulatory mechanism for non- proliferation, dis-
armament and peaceful uses all the way to zero. The parties may wish to reinter-
pret some of its provisions, but they will probably see fit to keep it until it has 
been implemented, i.e. until all weapons have been eliminated. At that point, 
however, the equity that it prescribes stops. The NPT goes to zero, but says 
nothing about the precise meaning of zero. Therefore, a new convention outlin-
ing the ground rules of an NWFW has to be written before reaching that point. 
The NPT is, moreover, no more than a skeleton agreement, so new rules guiding 
the final approaches to an NWFW will be needed in any case. To be agreeable, 
those rules must be informed by the principle of equity and lead to a NWFW 
where the rules are the same for all.
Elimination of fissile materials
The importance of fissile material controls was universally recognised during the 
NPT negotiations in the 1960s, and became the central element of NPT safe-
guards in the early 1970s. The main hurdle on the way to a nuclear bomb is 
acquisition of weapons- grade materials. The first requirement in going “below 
zero” would therefore be to eliminate all stocks of fissile materials dedicated to 
military use.
 Given the vast amounts of fissile materials that exist, more steps in this direc-
tion had better be taken right away. Uppermost on the international agenda is a 
Fissile Material Cut- Off Treaty (FMCT). Such a treaty should be conceived not 
only as an arms- control measure banning all activities at dedicated military pro-
duction facilities – which would freeze the advantages of the big and advanced 
nuclear powers – but also as a measure limiting the size of existing stocks. The 
equity principle means that single steps should be designed to incrementally 
reduce the capability differences on the way to a NWFW setting the same rules 
for all.
 The safeguards reassuring the international community that all military pro-
duction facilities are effectively shut down would also have to be equitable. 
NNWS are unlikely to accept another differential deal such as safeguards limited 
to declared, dedicated facilities, which means selective safeguards for NWS and 
full- scope safeguards for all the others. In France, the UK and India, the civilian 
sectors are safeguarded – in the UK and France by EURATOM/IAEA and in 
India by the IAEA pursuant to the US–India agreement – but in the other NWS 
civilian activities are not fully covered. Under an FMCT, NWS may want to 
mothball their production facilities at first, leaving dismantlement for considera-
tion later on.
 So far, limitations and reductions of existing stocks has been a NNWS 
demand. The NWS have been more or less unwilling to include them in FMCT 
negotiations. For them, cut- off has primarily been a non- proliferation measure. 
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However, if they were to subscribe to a NWFW below zero, that might change. 
Logically, both categories of states should then take an interest in the vertical as 
well as the horizontal dimension of the issue. This way, the vision could impact 
on the negotiability of an FMCT, illustrating what a dynamic interactive rela-
tionship between vision and measures might be about.
Elimination of nuclear- weapon infrastructure
In a world where virtual arsenals remain, nuclear infrastructure would be kept. 
Scenarios starting from this version of the end state tie in with a well- known 
argument of nuclear- weapon supporters: the more advanced the nuclear infra-
structure, the further down one may go in operative nuclear weapon systems. 
The theoretical end point of that argument is zero operative weapons in return 
for a comprehensive capability to bring them swiftly back to operative status, 
maybe in a time span not much different from the time it takes to ready de- mated 
systems for use. From other versions, dismantlement of nuclear weapon infra-
structure follows.
 Of course, the nuclear- weapon infrastructure has many more components 
than fissile materials and their production facilities. Those components should be 
phased out as well. For instance, if it became known that a state was testing trig-
gering mechanisms for nuclear devices, or was engaged in studies of weapons 
designs, the message would be unnerving. Under the NPT, such activities are 
already banned among the non- nuclear parties to the Treaty, for they constitute 
unambiguous signs of weapons intent. A NWFW allowing current NWS to stay 
engaged in weapon- oriented activities while prohibiting them for all others 
would be inequitable and therefore unacceptable.
 However, knowing that the main bottleneck in weapons acquisition is access 
to fissile materials, elimination of other components might be a lower priority. 
For some of them, effective safeguards are, moreover, a bigger challenge than 
safeguarding nuclear materials. Today, non- nuclear components of nuclear 
weapons are beyond the reach of IAEA safeguards, and given the constraints on 
transparency in some NWS, more intrusive means must be pushed gradually as 
new opportunities emerge. Overambitious attempts may backlash and do more 
harm than good, especially in states in the East and South that go by the princi-
ples of state sovereignty and non- interference. For instance, universal acceptance 
of societal verification will be out of the question for some more time, even on 
the most optimistic of assumptions. For China, secrecy remains, moreover, a 
significant part of its nuclear posture.
Proliferation resistance
This leaves a big set of issues of how to make peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
more proliferation- resistant. Today, the promoters of proliferation resistance are 
mostly suppliers; with some important exceptions, the recipients tend to be nay- 
sayers.
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 Progress has been hampered by the imbalanced implementation of the NPT. 
NNWS have put their feet down, objecting to any limitation of Article IV rights 
as well as stricter Article III safeguards as long as the NWS do not do more to 
meet their disarmament obligations. In this respect, declaratory policies convey-
ing big power seriousness about a NWFW are helpful, although the great major-
ity of NPT parties consider this to have been a legal obligation under the NPT all 
along, unequivocally confirmed by the 2000 NPT Review Conference. While 
welcoming recent statements in support of a NWFW, NNWS therefore hesitate 
to take anything for granted until the words are supported by facts.
 Deep cuts and measures blocking qualitative developments of nuclear arse-
nals would create a benign context for radical approaches to proliferation resist-
ance. In turn, enhanced proliferation resistance would make a NWFW more 
sustainable. In any scenario- writing tracing the implications of a NWFW back to 
the present, proliferation- resistant modes of nuclear energy appear desirable, 
regardless of which version one chooses. However, the main driver – the con-
cerns about weapons proliferation in a world where nuclear power is proliferat-
ing – would seem stronger today and in the foreseeable future than in a NWFW. 
Today, the incentives to acquire nuclear capabilities and nuclear weapons are in 
some cases strong, while the mechanisms to enforce the non- nuclear commit-
ments of the NPT and of NWFZ are generally recognised to be weak. In a 
NWFW, on the other hand, the further below zero one goes, the stronger the 
assurances against re- militarisation and the less concerns there are about the 
shape of the civilian sector. Therefore, when it comes to the proliferation resist-
ance of peaceful uses, the vision is not a particularly powerful guide to action.
Deep cuts
If the US and Russia can agree on radical overall reductions of their nuclear 
forces, more is likely to follow. If not, the call for elimination may come to 
nought. A breakthrough presupposes resolution of at least some of the controver-
sial political issues mentioned above, and of what to do about the tactical nuclear 
weapons. There is a strong case for including them, but Russia always dragged 
its feet when that question was raised. Other matters of contention are the US 
missile- defence programme and the emerging US conventional Prompt Global 
Strike capabilities. Russia would certainly like to bring both of them into the 
next round of negotiations. 
 A deep cut succeeding New Start (the START I follow- on agreement) and 
including all categories of nuclear weapons – tactical as well as strategic 
weapons, reserves as well as operative ones – would obviously be a major 
achievement. The build- down should be guided by the principles of transpar-
ency, implemented step- by-step; verification of agreed limitations on weapon 
holdings; and irreversibility to prevent weapons and materials that have been 
withdrawn from being redirected to operational status and military applications. 
It is conceivable that such an agreement would lead to multilateral talks involv-
ing all the P5 as well as other nuclear and non- nuclear weapon states.
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 How deep do US and Russian cuts have to be to engage France, China and 
the UK in disarmament negotiations? The three used to say that the superpowers 
would have to come down to their level, i.e. to the low hundreds, although 
recently, the UK has shown flexibility in this respect. Maybe, the US and Russia 
need not come down to the same level as the smaller P5 powers before multilat-
eral negotiations can begin. If they agree to cut their forces to three- digit figures 
while stating their readiness to go for common P5 ceilings at about the current 
level of the UK, France and China, this may suffice. With such an approach, 
reductions to 1,000 weapons may also be enough. But if they were to invite the 
others with proportional reductions in mind, so that the US and Russia would 
retain significantly larger arsenals than the others in the three- digit range, it 
might go nowhere. China used to say that it had the smallest arsenal of the P5. 
That may no longer be true – in terms of deployed warheads, the UK and France 
have been trimming their forces while China has gone up somewhat – but by 
2009 they all had fewer than 200 operational weapons (SIPRI 2009).
 In 2009, the US had 500 operational tactical weapons, 200 of them in Europe. 
On the basis of the number of available delivery platforms, it is estimated that 
Russia has approximately 2,000 weapons in this category (SIPRI 2009). Influ-
enced by the bombing of Serbia in 1999, Russia upgraded the role of nuclear 
weapons in its military doctrine: if NATO could go to war against Serbia without 
any mandate from the UN Security Council, it might do it again closer to Rus-
sia’s borders. Tactical nuclear weapons are deemed relevant in such contingen-
cies. Presumably, tactical nuclear weapons also play a role in Russian 
considerations of how best to defend Siberia. However, inclusion of them would 
be an increasingly legitimate US demand, for the lower the level of strategic 
arms, the higher the stock of unregulated tactical weapons would loom. Agreed 
reductions of operationally deployed strategic weapons to the level of 1,000 or 
below while leaving 2,000 Russian sub- strategic weapons aside are virtually 
impossible to imagine. To prepare for their inclusion, Russia might do more of 
what the US has been doing, i.e. assigning long- range weapons to regional roles 
(see Chapter 3). Freedom to mix strategic and tactical weapons under common 
ceilings might also facilitate inclusion of them. However, the main approach to 
inclusion and reduction of them is alleviation of threat perceptions. 
 What about the reserves? The United States holds about 2,500 weapons in 
reserve for strategic and tactical use.8 The corresponding Russian figure is not 
known, but it may be higher. These reserves are much larger than those of the 
smaller P5. Not to leave the US and Russia with much larger break- out poten-
tials than the others, all reserve warheads should therefore be included in the cal-
culations at some stage, especially if there were to be few or no limits on the 
capabilities for delivery. In the US Congress, the bipartisan McGovern–Lungren 
resolution brings reserves into the deep- cut framework, proposing to limit US 
and Russian arsenals to no more than 1,000 weapons deployed and no more than 
3,000 weapons in all, reserves included, and with a freedom to mix. 
 During the Cold War, arms- control limitations centred on delivery vehicles. 
SORT focused on operationally deployed strategic warheads, but the counting 
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rules referred to delivery vehicles.9 Those rules became a matter of discussion 
when the US made plans for deployment of conventional warheads on some of 
its ballistic missiles. New START solved the problem by counting all warheads, 
conventional or nuclear, against the 1,550 limit: a conventional warhead can 
only be deployed at the expense of a nuclear one. But the US government was 
quick to underline that “New START protects the U.S. ability to develop and 
deploy a CPGS [Conventional Prompt Global Strike] capability. The Treaty in 
no way prohibits the United States from building and deploying conventionally 
armed ballistic missiles” (US Department of State 2010). Such systems may be 
physically separated from strategic nuclear weapons to facilitate verification. 
New methods to count nuclear weapons without revealing sensitive information 
may also help, and will be needed anyhow in order to take stock of tactical 
nuclear weapons and reserves. For tactical applications of nuclear weapons, a 
variety of dual- use vehicles may be used, and reserves may not be specifically 
assigned to particular delivery systems. Studies of how to do this are underway 
in many countries.10 However, CPGS leaves others with the intriguing problem 
of how to deter and defend against conventional strikes. Nuclear deterrence of 
pin- point conventional attacks where the objective is not to conquer another 
nation but to destroy specific objects may not be credible, and protective meas-
ures may be very costly or unfeasible. The Russians and the Chinese are con-
cerned about it, and the concerns are by no means confined to them. 
 Reductions of total numbers, reserves included, mean that more weapons will 
be slated for dismantlement. In the US, 4,500 weapons are already waiting to be 
taken apart.11 In Russia the number is probably higher.12 The current pace of dis-
mantlement is slow – approximately 350 warheads per year in the US. There-
fore, stronger dismantlement capabilities, and codification of the principle of 
irreversibility, become all the more important in order to remove these weapons 
from hedging speculations and limit the mobilisation base for renewed arms 
build up. To build trust between the US and Russia; to convince others about the 
seriousness of the disarmament ambition; and to sustain the impression that there 
is no way back to arms racing, systematic application of the principles of trans-
parency, verification and irreversibility – emphasised in the 13 steps for nuclear 
disarmament adopted by the 2000 NPT RevCon, but disregarded by the Bush 
administration and ignored by SORT – is of the essence. 
Missile defence
The US cancelled the missile- defence plans for Poland and the Czech Republic, 
thereby facilitating the advent of New START. However, these plans were only 
a small part of the overall US ballistic- missile defence programme and, thus, 
only a small part of the problem.
 For deep cuts to be agreed, some clarification and modification of the missile- 
defence programme will undoubtedly be needed. Russia cannot but be concerned 
about the viability of its nuclear deterrent if the programme continuous unre-
strained in the face of far- reaching nuclear disarmament. Sooner or later, further 
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cuts will not be possible if US defences that threaten to undermine the penetra-
bility of diminishing Russian offensive forces are improving. In other words, if 
offensive systems are built down and defensive systems built up, there comes a 
point where the owner of the defensive systems might deny the other NWS a 
second- strike capability. What may be a problem for Russia in the future is 
already a problem for China: it develops its forces i.a. in response to emerging 
US missile- defence capabilities. The US BMD deployments in Alaska and Cali-
fornia, allegedly to defend against North Korea, may be improved and expanded 
and directed against China as well. 
 Mutually assured destruction is far from being an ideal basis for international 
security. The risks of breakdown are too great. It is counterintuitive at that, 
because it says that we are best protected when we are naked. However, ballistic-
 missile defence makes an untenable situation even worse; for, by stimulating 
competitive acquisitions of offensive and defensive capabilities, it stands in the 
way of nuclear disarmament.
 Ronald Reagan proposed a cooperative US–Soviet missile shield as a hedge 
in case somebody would try to break out of an NWFW. His idea was theoreti-
cally attractive, but in practice hard to implement. Like the Baruch–Lilienthal 
plans for global control of nuclear weapons after the Second World War, the 
technology developer could be left with an advantage. This was the way the 
Soviets saw it in 1946, and this was the way they looked at it in Reykjavik 40 
years later. 
 In 1946 the Cold War was brewing; in 1986 it was dying. That year, the suc-
cessful conclusion of the Stockholm conference on confidence and security- 
building measures and the Reykjavik summit were the first signs of different 
times to come. Still, suspicions ran deep. What appeared practically impossible 
then may therefore tell little or nothing about the cooperative ventures that may 
be possible if and when the world approaches zero nuclear weapons. The trust 
that will still be missing during another round of deep US–Russian cuts, and the 
suspicions that would continue to burden disarmament negotiations well into the 
multilateral phase, may no longer be there – or be there, but in a much different 
way – when the goal is in sight.
 Can a shield be developed as an option for an NWFW while nuclear disarma-
ment is taking place? It is conceivable that research and development of defen-
sive technologies could continue if deployment limitations are agreed upon. But 
would this be enough to reassure others? China and other states are not only con-
cerned about the specific missile- defence applications of the US programme, but 
are also worried that someday there may be a technological breakthrough in 
another related area that leave them at a disadvantage. The trust- consuming 
effect of such an R&D programme should therefore not be underestimated.
 Scaling down missile defence is another way to reduce the overall concerns 
surrounding it. In the years ahead, the United States is likely to do so, as missile 
defence was always more of a Republican programme than a Democratic one. 
Additionally, there are strong financial pressures for cuts. Yet another option is a 
cooperative venture with Russia. For some time, Russia and the US have dis-
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cussed a cooperative shield against missiles from Iran and other countries in the 
Middle East. Such a joint venture could be seen as a pilot project illuminating 
technical problems and cooperative requirements that have to be solved and met 
on the way to a global shield. It may facilitate negotiations towards deep cuts, 
but would send a dubious signal not only to countries in the Middle East, but to 
China as well. Combined with the sword of overwhelming offensive weapons, it 
puts them on the spot. Richard Nixon phrased it simply and sharply when 
defending the ABM Treaty of 1972: if you have a shield, it is easier to use the 
sword. To enhance US–Russian security at the expense of the security of others 
is not in the spirit of global public good, and not the way to pursue the long- term 
ambition of a NWFW.
 This builds up to an argument for deployment limitations on a slimmer US 
missile- defence programme. Deployment limitations mean reinstating the Anti- 
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty or negotiating an updated version of it; a 
slimmer programme is the likely outcome of US politics anyhow. Whether the 
stability of a NWFW would best be enhanced by erecting a shield will be a 
matter for consideration in a world much different than ours now.
Doctrines
Article VI was always about hardware and software – both about the weapons 
and the roles assigned to them. For half a century, calls have been made to 
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs. Ever since the NPT 
was negotiated, assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against 
non- nuclear parties have been sought. On and off, no- first-use doctrines have 
been advocated.
 During the presidential campaign, Barack Obama promised to “work with 
Russia to take US and Russian ballistic missiles off hair- trigger alert”. The US 
keeps roughly 1,000 nuclear warheads on alert atop ICBMs and SLBMs ready to 
be fired about 3–4 minutes and 12 minutes respectively after a presidential order 
has been issued. Russia retains approximately 1,200 warheads at top readiness, 
nearly all of them on ICBMs. British and French weapons might require days’ 
notice to launch and Chinese, Indian and Pakistani weapons at least as long 
(Kristensen et al. 2009). De- alerting and de- mating are therefore primarily for 
the US and Russia to do. They are the ones lagging behind in this respect. 
However, neither New START nor the new US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 
introduce any change in existing alert postures.
 The P5 have issued security assurances to the non- nuclear members of the 
NPT, summarised in Security Council Resolution 984 of 1995. Except for the 
Chinese assurances, they are all qualified in ways that limit their value. The NPT 
review conferences have therefore urged the NWS to be more forthcoming. This 
century, the opposite happened: national doctrines significantly widened the 
range of missions assigned to nuclear weapons (see Chapter 3), shedding doubt 
on the validity of the assurances contained in Resolution 984. Only China 
remained true to its original policy of no- first-use. In this respect, the Obama 
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administration’s NPR is a trend- breaker. Hereafter, the US will not use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non- nuclear NPT members “in good 
standing” (see Chapter 3). It does not go as far as no- first-use (NFU), but prom-
ises to work in that direction.
 NNWS are more vulnerable to use and threats of use than NWS. Where mutu-
ally assured destruction applies, resort to nuclear weapons is an ordained act of 
suicide while, in relation to NNWS, the aggressor may get away with it. Non- 
aligned states have therefore called for an international convention committing the 
NWS not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS parties to the 
NPT, no qualifications added. While the NPR may pave the way for a new SC res-
olution containing stronger security assurances than Resolution 984, it takes more 
to meet the non- aligned demand for an international convention (see Chapter 3). 
 NFU doctrines, limiting the role of nuclear weapons to that of deterring others 
from using theirs, would meet the same concerns and, in addition, reduce the 
role of nuclear weapons in inter- NWS affairs to the passive one of deterring 
others from using theirs.13 Unqualified undertakings never to be the first to use 
nuclear weapons have, moreover, an intriguing disarmament corollary: nobody 
would need them if nobody had them. In deep cuts and elimination scenarios, 
this proposition is therefore more relevant than extension of non- use assurances 
to NNWS, which are primarily a part of the non- proliferation bargain. 
 The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibited the use of chemical and biological 
weapons. These weapons were considered inhumane. Later, possession of them 
was outlawed as well: biological weapons by the BWC of 1972; chemical 
weapons by the CWC of 1992. The CWC set a timeline for destruction of the 
arsenals, and agreement was reached on a comprehensive verification system. In 
the 1990s, a verification protocol was negotiated for the BWC as well, but the 
Bush administration turned it down. Stressing that any use of nuclear weapons 
must be compatible with international humanitarian law, the ICJ Advisory 
Opinion of 1996 came close to a non- use position also for these weapons. The 
effects of nuclear arms are such that it is hard to imagine circumstances in which 
they could be used without colliding with humanitarian law. A reservation was 
made for situations where national survival is at stake (as in the case of Israel). 
The Court did not rule out the use of nuclear weapons in such circumstances.
 A protocol banning the use of nuclear weapons, on the model of the Geneva 
Protocol, would convey the same message: the effects of nuclear weapons are 
such that no civilised state or sane leader should or would use them. An interna-
tional legal instrument declaring their use to be a crime against humanity would 
send an even stronger message and be a better deterrent against use.
 In effect, the Geneva Protocol was a no- first-use agreement. An agreement 
banning the use of nuclear weapons would similarly allow for nuclear retalia-
tion; that is, it would be a no- first-use agreement. It may include provisions 
branding the use of nuclear weapons a crime against humanity. Alternatively, 
the Security Council could be invited to issue such a declaration.
 Given its conventional preponderance, the US could more easily convert to 
no- first-use than could Russia. Nuclear weapons are critically important for Rus-
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sia’s big power status, and to be confident that its enormous territory can be 
effectively defended without nuclear weapons, a combination of conventional 
force improvements and alleviation of threats will be needed. However, if the 
US seizes the initiative and progress is made in reassuring Russia to the point 
where it would be willing to generalise the bilateral Russia–China no- first-use 
commitment, the P5 would end up with such a doctrine, for it is hard to imagine 
that the UK and France would not follow the US lead, especially when rein-
forced by Russia. The US alliance commitments and nuclear umbrellas would 
have to be changed accordingly, reassuring its allies in other ways. 
Dealing with the break- out potentials
Two disarmament scenarios – both of them outlined above – illustrate how dif-
ferently the break- out concerns can be addressed. One says that the more 
advanced the nuclear infrastructure, the further down one may go. The logical 
end point being zero weapons in return for a capability to reintroduce them on 
short notice. The other says that such a world would be dangerously unstable 
because of its trust- consuming break- out potentials, and therefore recommends 
moving “below zero” to eliminate the mobilisation bases and the nuclear- weapon 
mentalities that they sustain. These very different worlds have very different 
implications for the structure of the disarmament processes to be pursued. The 
weight of the argument is in favour of a disarmament process that builds up to a 
world significantly below zero.
 In both cases, the starting point is a world of limited confidence between the 
big powers, where fall- back positions will be maintained in case disarmament 
agreements break down or new demanding security challenges emerge. Fore-
most among those precautionary measures are weapons held in reserve; surplus 
stocks of weapon- grade materials; and a scientific- technical mobilisation base, 
including production facilities in a state of preparedness to be switched on again.
 In one respect the end state is also the same: both scenarios lead to zero 
nuclear weapons. In both cases, the reserves must be eliminated along with the 
operational weapons, although the philosophy behind the hedging scenario 
means greater caution in doing away with the weapons than that leading below 
zero. More than others, hedging proponents read international affairs in terms of 
threats and conflicts, partly as a continuation of Cold War mentality and partly 
reinvigorated by 9/11, so it takes more to convince them that the time is ripe for 
elimination. At best, hedging proponents may want to move more slowly and 
cautiously. In all other respects, the scenarios differ: the one wants to keep 
stocks of weapon materials, teams of nuclear engineers and scientists to uphold 
virtual arsenals, and the necessary physical infrastructure to start production 
anew; the other wants to close it all down, more or less, and to start doing it 
before all the weapons have been eliminated.
 Two measures from the classical arms- control agenda aim to prevent renewed 
arms build up. In Article VI of the NPT, the phrase “cessation of the nuclear 
arms race at an early date” was always understood to refer to a CTBT and an 
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FMCT, the former curbing qualitative improvements and the latter limiting 
quantitative expansion of the arsenals. The more universal these and other arms- 
control measures become, and the more effectively they can be verified and 
enforced, the more difficult it will be to break out and return to arms racing.
 The US and China have not ratified the CTBT while the other members of the 
P5 have done so. The US has conducted 1,000 tests and Russia 700; the others, 
far fewer. There is concern, moreover, that sooner or later, simulation techniques 
will allow the US to make new types of weapons without live testing. To stem 
these inequalities and avoid qualitative improvements in the face of a test ban, 
the P5 should be asked to join the CTBT and undertake not to develop and 
deploy qualitatively new types of weapons. This is also primarily up to the most 
advanced NWS, i.e. the US and Russia. China appears ready to ratify the CTBT, 
provided the US goes first.
 Already at their first meeting in April 2009, presidents Obama and Medvedev 
called for an FMCT as well as further cuts of existing arsenals, but they did not 
address the question of what to do with existing stocks of fissile materials in the 
framework of an FMCT. The simplest would be to go for a ban on further pro-
duction, leaving the stocks aside, but on the way to an NWFW, much if not all 
weapon- grade materials have to be eliminated, step- by-step, and a cut- off nego-
tiation presents an opportunity to move in that direction. At least, implementa-
tion of the Trilateral Initiative (US, Russia and the IAEA) concerning permanent 
removal and verification of nuclear materials from the military stockpiles should 
be set in motion as a supplementary measure. Irreversibility is important at every 
stage of the process. Still, if and when it comes to multilateral negotiations, the 
participants would have very different fissile material stocks at hand. Those dif-
ferences cannot be erased overnight, but reductions can be carried out in such a 
way that, gradually, the differences will be reduced. In the end, the same rules 
must also apply for all in this respect.
 Like the other P5, China seems to have stopped production of fissile materials 
for weapons, but unlike the others it has made no statement or formal commit-
ment in this respect. In view of the uncertainties surrounding missile defence 
and the future of US forces, it is not confident that it has enough fissile materials 
in stock. India and Pakistan, which are building up their forces, are far from 
being ready for a cut- off. Therefore, an FMCT does not seem to be near at hand.
 A CTBT and an FMCT are also important because nuclear infrastructures 
would be shut down or dismantled, notably nuclear test sites and fissile material 
production facilities. There may be consequences for personnel as well. The 
treaties would signal that there will be less of a future for nuclear- weapon works, 
which may lead experts in other directions, unless they are absorbed by expand-
ing stewardship programmes for the weapons that remain and for what may 
become virtual arsenals in the future. In the United States, where the stewardship 
programme has been a middle ground between weapon supporters and disarm-
ers, the administration has increased the funding of it in order to build support 
for CTBT ratification.
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From P2 to P5 and beyond
Categorising the nuclear powers
Is it a matter of course that the transition from bilateral to multilateral negotia-
tions would be, first, from the US and Russia to the P5 and then to all de facto 
NWS? Is this the logical way to group the nuclear powers?
 Pan Zhenqiang suggests a different categorisation (Pan 2009). He puts them 
into three groups: (1) the US and Russia, the first among unequals; (2) the UK, 
France and India, which share one major motive for nuclear weapons: to be 
accepted by the international community as major powers; and (3) China, Paki-
stan and Israel, which acquired nuclear weapons in response to specific, serious 
threats – China from the US, Pakistan from India, and Israel from a hostile 
neighbourhood. For status and security reasons, respectively, groups (2) and (3) 
will find it hard to abandon their weapons.
 China’s nuclear weapons were not acquired to make up for conventional 
weakness. It declared a no- first-use policy from the beginning. Neither does it 
need nuclear weapons to bolster its international status. Surely, these weapons 
also have a status value for China, but its international leverage rests primarily 
on its size, economic performance and ability to concentrate and exercise polit-
ical power. The status tag attached to its modest nuclear arsenal matters less and 
less. However, China is not ready to say what would be required of the US and 
Russia for it to join multilateral disarmament negotiations. The strategic relation-
ship with the United States remains unsettled, and the ballistic- missile defence 
and conventional global- strike programmes complicate its calculations (see 
Chapter 3).
 If the principle of enhanced security at lower levels of armaments is applied, 
it should be less difficult for China than for the UK and France to join the US 
and Russia in multilateral talks. This principle does not require parity: in the 
framework of large US cuts and limits on missile defence, it is easy to imagine a 
win–win situation. Parity may not be attained until all the weapons have been 
eliminated – and not necessarily then, either, depending on how the end state is 
defined – but the closer one comes to a NWFW, the more the configuration 
would resemble a relationship between equals. The UK and France may also find 
that there is more than one way in which their security can be enhanced, but for 
them a qualitative political asset would be lost: their big power status would 
probably disappear with their weapons. Increasingly, their status ambitions 
would have to be channelled through the EU. Russia would be left somewhere 
in- between the US/China and the UK/France, being bigger in terms of popula-
tion and enormous in terms of territory, but modest in terms of economic 
strength. To cut the P5 short by taking China out would therefore seem artificial.
 Neither would it make sense to embark on multilateral negotiations without 
the UK and France. What would be the rationale for leaving their forces out? 
Loss of status is a real concern for both of them, but it is not a legitimate concern 
in the view of others. Last not least, the P5 is a well- established concept. These 
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are the five NWS recognised by the NPT and the five permanent members of the 
UN Security Council, which have a special responsibility for nuclear disarma-
ment under Article VI of the NPT and for international peace and security under 
the UN Charter. All parties to the NPT have committed themselves to work for 
nuclear disarmament, but to hold the five and only de jure NWS accountable, in 
particular, is straightforward common sense.
Involving the outliers
Whether the multilateral phase should be limited to the P5 at first and widened to 
include the outliers thereafter, or include all NWS right away, is open to 
question.
 The NPT defines a NWS as a state that had tested a nuclear explosive device 
before 1 January 1967. By that definition, the nuclear club became synonymous 
with the P5.
 Another four states have acquired nuclear weapons since then. One of them, 
North Korea, may or may not be disarmed irrespective of what the other nuclear 
powers are willing to do about their arsenals. There remains the possibility that 
Pyongyang will trade its nuclear programme for economic assistance and nor-
malisation with the US and others. In 1992 the two Korean states signed a “Joint 
Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula” which ruled out 
fuel- cycle facilities as well. In 2008, a denuclearisation agreement was reached 
in the framework of the six- power talks, although it did not explicitly provide for 
elimination of the weapons that have been produced. The Obama administration 
will probably be in a better position to deal with North Korea than the Bush 
administration, which was split on what do to.
 The other three – India, Pakistan and Israel, sometimes referred to as “the 
outliers” – have come to stay. There is nothing to suggest that they will give up 
their nuclear weapons any sooner than any of the P5. From this point of view, it 
seems appropriate to include them from the beginning, together with the P5. For 
all we know, Israel’s arsenal may be of a size not much different from those of 
the UK, France and China. India and Pakistan are at lower levels, but seem to be 
on their way to similar numbers of weapons. An agreement limiting the arsenals 
to the low hundreds would allow the South Asians to meet their minimum deter-
rence objectives, and by the time a multilateral negotiation gets started, they may 
be there. In principle, acceptance of such a deal should therefore be no problem 
for them. Including them and capping their arsenals is a necessary step on the 
way to an NWFW.
 At the moment, accession to the CTBT is a problem for India and Pakistan. 
However, if the US and Russia continue to cut their arsenals and all P5 ratify the 
CTBT, they may no longer be in a position to resist, even if it would leave Paki-
stan, and maybe India too, without fusion weapons.14 A fissile material cut- off 
will hardly be agreeable until they have produced enough material to meet their 
minimum deterrence- force targets. They are unlikely to let an international 
agreement compromise that objective.
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 Even if the United States and Russia undertake to burn plutonium in power 
reactors as fast as possible and dilute remaining HEU to reactor fuel, they are 
likely to have significantly bigger stocks than the others by the time a multilat-
eral disarmament agreement comes up for negotiation. In a process perspective – 
in the expectation that disarmament will continue and all nuclear weapons be 
eliminated – the differences may not matter much. The parties may accept them 
in anticipation of equal rules at the end of the process. In a static perspective, 
where the continuation is open to question and the parties may choose to stay 
where they are, different break- out potentials are likely to be more controversial.
 The South Asians are less sensitive to the US missile- defence programme 
than China. India’s security concerns relate to China and Pakistan; Pakistan’s 
concerns relate to India; and none of them bother very much about a retaliatory 
capability towards the US. To the extent that India cooperates with the US on 
missile defence, it is actually a beneficiary of the programme. So is Israel.
Israel
Israel is a de facto NWS, but never acknowledged it, neither by confirmed 
testing nor by any public statement.15 Its declaratory policy – “never to be the 
first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East” – is part of a general 
policy of opacity (Cohen 1999)
 This policy has served Israel well. On the one hand, there is no formal basis 
on which to address its arsenal; on the other hand, everybody has to assume that 
the weapons exist, so the deterrent effect is there. The policy is therefore hard to 
change. It is all the harder because unless Israel goes public with its nuclear 
weapon possession, it cannot be drawn into multilateral disarmament talks, and 
as long as there is no regional peace arrangement in sight, Israel is not ready to 
participate in such talks. Israel argues that, first, regional affairs have to be nor-
malised and a just and comprehensive peace established. Only then can a zone 
free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction be implemented, shoring 
up what has been achieved.
 The rationale for Israeli nuclear weapons is distinctly regional. Elimination is 
therefore a regional issue more than a global one. This is another unique feature 
of Israel. South Asia comes closest, but India’s foreign- policy reach goes beyond 
the subcontinent. India has global ambitions and no doubt considers it natural to 
take part in global, multilateral disarmament talks, time and circumstances per-
mitting. Pakistan is a function of India in this respect and can hardly hold back if 
India enters the ring. Israel is therefore left to be treated separately, in the 
regional Middle Eastern context.
 The name of that game is a zone free of weapons of mass destruction or, spe-
cifically, a nuclear- weapon-free zone. Security Council Resolution 687 – the 
ceasefire resolution for Iraq – explicitly linked the disarmament of Iraq to the 
establishment of such a zone. The proposal for a Middle Eastern zone was first 
made in 1974, and calls for the establishment of it have been made repeatedly 
over the years but often for purposes other than progress towards a zone. The 
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disarmament of Iraq notwithstanding, no progress has been made in the imple-
mentation of it.
 Therefore, two of the four outliers – Israel and North Korea – can best be 
addressed separately. For the other two – India and Pakistan – the ambition must 
be to draw them into global negotiations together with the P5. If a criteria- based 
approach is adopted in relation to the outliers, asking all three to abide by the 
commitments that India has undertaken and raising the bar for de jure recogni-
tion by demanding, say, accession to the CTBT and a moratorium on fissile 
material production, only India may be able to live up to these requirements. In 
that case, the table would be enlarged from five to six NWS.
 NNWS should also be invited to the table, e.g. states with advanced civilian 
nuclear programmes, and with a view to regional representation. They can do 
much to facilitate disarmament by reassuring the NWS and each other that they 
would stay non- nuclear (see Chapter 9). Without stronger commitments in this 
respect – foregoing national fuel- cycle facilities; accepting improved safeguards 
– the NWS may not be willing to take the final steps to a NWFW.
From the low hundreds to what?
One or more NWS may find that they can go no further unless their security con-
cerns have been much alleviated and the military and political role of nuclear 
weapons has been much diminished. Russia may be such a case. Others may be 
ready to push proposals pointing beyond the low hundreds: China to follow up on 
its no- first-use posture; India to push its long- standing proposal for a nuclear- 
weapon convention; NNWS to press their case for a NWFW whether they are 
brought into the negotiations or not. Most importantly, the US may remain commit-
ted to the course initiated by President Obama. However, all of this is uncertain.
 Ceilings in the low hundreds will presumably be drawn on the basis of some 
notion of minimum deterrence. In terms of hardware, minimum deterrence is a 
function of the vulnerability of the weapons, their ability to penetrate enemy 
defences, and the possibility that some of them will malfunction and fail to 
arrive on target for that reason. In terms of software, it is a function of the effi-
ciency of the C3I system and the perceived political will to follow through on 
the deterrence doctrines. Today, the powers that subscribe to minimum deter-
rence keep close to 200 operative weapons. India and Pakistan may be going for 
forces in about the same range, and Israel may already be there. 
 It may be assumed that multilateral negotiations will be heading for ceilings 
in the lower end of this range, compatible with notions of minimum deterrence, 
but not allowing significant increases in any of the forces. Substantial additions 
would run against the declared aim of the exercise, which will be framed in dis-
armament terms. How could one go on from there? What approach would mini-
mise the risks on the way to a NWFW and the advantages that it offers? The 
prize is high, but so may be the risks.
 This is the point at which the continuation is hard to foresee, for the world 
will look much different. Indeed, it would be presumptuous to claim to know 
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much about it. However, political- order issues aside, some force constellations 
are known to be more unstable and dangerous than others. A few parameters 
may therefore be laid down to steer the process away from the greatest risks in 
the final approach to the goal.
 This pertains, in particular, to the worlds immediately above and immediately 
below zero. The dangers of a world immediately below – of virtual arsenals – 
have been spelt out above (see pp. 200–202). Similar dangers would exist in a 
world immediately above. At the level of, say, 30 nuclear weapons, the retalia-
tory capabilities may be in doubt. Some weapons may be destroyed by an 
attacker, others may be intercepted, and yet others may not function as planned. 
As a result, first- strike propensities may be too great for comfort. It may lead to 
surprise attack, hitting an enemy when its guard is down, or to inadvertent esca-
lation when decision- makers begin to think that war can no longer be avoided. 
However flexible the notion of minimum deterrence is, force levels in the low 
hundreds may have been chosen for good reason.
 It may therefore be wise to skip those transitional phases immediately above 
and immediately below zero and go from the low hundreds directly to an NWFW 
significantly below zero. That can be done by eliminating weapon- grade mater-
ials, dismantling dedicated nuclear infrastructure and redirecting nuclear- weapon 
expertise before eliminating the remaining weapons. In other words, the stability 
of minimum- deterrence postures would be maintained until the stability of an 
NWFW has been ensured. Then, and only then, would it be time to move from 
the one state to the other.
Disarmament: process or state of affairs?
On the way to a NWFW, the differences between the NWS will diminish. Still, 
their capabilities will remain different in many respects, especially qualitative 
ones. The principle of equity should inform the process, but how agreeable is it 
and how will it be practised? Would China use the opportunity to go for equal 
status with the US and Russia in as many respects as possible and as soon as 
possible? Would India reach out for the same? Why should the US and Russia 
give up their nuclear superiority and accept equal status with the much smaller 
nuclear powers any sooner than is strictly speaking necessary? Would they ask 
for proportional reductions when they come to the multilateral table? Even if the 
US maintains its commitment to an NWFW, why should it yield to the others 
any more or any sooner than is strictly speaking necessary?
 If the commitments to an NWFW are firm and the expectations that it will be 
achieved are strong, equal or unequal terms some steps earlier will not neces-
sarily matter very much. The end result would be the same for everybody. In a 
process perspective, there would be more leeway in the negotiation of transi-
tional steps than in a static perspective where each stage stands on its own and 
the future is open- ended. For instance, if a multilateral deal is struck in a static 
perspective – this far, but no promise of going further – the NWS are likely to be 
more sensitive to competitive edges and seek unilateral advantages. Then, the 
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leading powers cannot be expected to generously relinquish their lead. More 
than in a process perspective pursued in the name of global public goods, the 
name of the game would be old- fashioned power politics.
 A static perspective, seeing disarmament not as a process but as a state of 
affairs, presents a problem similar to a well- known question in integration theory 
(see Chapter 9). Integration is also seen variously as a process or a state of 
affairs. In the European Union, which has inspired integration theory more than 
any other empirical setting, there is the recurrent question of whether integration 
can stop and stay at some point without unravelling. Is there such a point of 
stability, or will stagnation be the beginning of reversal? 
 The same question is pertinent to the field of disarmament. If the US and 
Russia stay content after having reduced their forces to, say, 1,000 operative 
weapons all in all, losing sight of the objective of a NWFW, what will others 
do? Clearly, proliferation is more likely in a static context, where the NWS con-
tinue to demonstrate the significance that they attach to nuclear arms, than in a 
process perspective where proliferators would confront a big majority of states 
set on the course of continued disarmament. Stagnation may therefore lead to 
proliferation, which in turn may lead NWS to rearm.
 Darwin Bond- Graham and Will Parish have raised a related question under 
the heading of “anti- nuclear nuclearism” (Bond- Graham and Parish 2009). They 
expect that the Obama administration will rely on overwhelming US power, 
nuclear weapons included, while making rhetorical and substantial commitments 
to disarmament, however vaguely defined. Anti- nuclear nuclearism thrives both 
in think tanks and weapons laboratories and is a tactical adaptation to the call for 
a NWFW. It means retention of slimmer arsenals, bringing disarmament to a halt 
at a level compatible with US national interest in continued military superiority. 
The President has declared higher aims for nuclear disarmament and so have 
many of his collaborators, but in the face of domestic and international opposi-
tion, he may have to strike a national compromise of this kind. However, a lower 
plateau does not mean a lower risk of proliferation. Like the disarmament agree-
ments by the end of the Cold War, which were not followed by new agreements, 
but by revived national interests in nuclear arms instead, stagnation may be the 
beginning of reversal.
 In SC Resolution 1887, the P5 declared themselves in favour of a world 
without nuclear weapons. Still, when it comes to specific measures, they tend to 
take one step at a time without making any further promises. Nevertheless, if 
President Obama and others manage to stay their course, promoting nuclear dis-
armament as a global common good, it may be possible to generate explicit com-
mitments from one step to the next: from New START to a follow- on agreement 
on deep cuts to further steps setting the stage for multilateral negotiations; from 
an FMCT to further cuts in fissile material stocks; from the steps taken by the 
US NPR to limit the role of nuclear weapons to a new SC resolution to an inter-
national convention on unqualified non- use assurances to no- first-use doctrines; 
from procedural to material steps towards a NWFZ in the Middle East etc. – all 
the time invoking the advantages of a NWFW in support of the process.
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 Endowed with big power and unwilling to tie their hands in the exercise of it, 
the same states have been against proposals for a convention on the elimination 
of nuclear weapons, with a timetable. To reduce the complexities of nuclear dis-
armament to a timeline is arguably reductionism beyond reason. However, at 
some stage of the process it will be necessary to supplement the NPT, which is 
but a skeleton agreement to zero, and to define what kind of NWFW to aim for. 
A convention defining the rules of the road towards nuclear- weapon freedom can 
also reduce the action space for spoilers and for unforeseen developments to take 
the process off- track. The lessons from the Oslo process on the Middle East and 
from negotiations with North Korea point in the same direction. If at all possible, 
a compressed, comprehensive approach to the final objective has distinct 
advantages. 
 Two arguments in support of the process perspective carry particular weight. 
First, 60 years of no use does not guarantee another 60 years without the use of 
nuclear arms. On the contrary: there is much to suggest that the risk of nuclear- 
weapon use is greater than before. The premium on abolition has therefore 
grown. For many proponents of a NWFW, this is hard- nosed realism. The four 
US horsemen were always known to be realists, and so are many other statesmen 
that have joined them in the call for a NWFW. Second, the threat of mass 
destruction is morally unacceptable and should be made unambiguously illegal. 
Chemical and biological weapons are already outlawed on such grounds. Since 
the effects of nuclear weapons are stronger, more indiscriminate and longer- 
lasting than those of any other weapon, there is all the more reason to ban them. 
From both angles, MAD is an appropriate acronym for continued reliance on 
nuclear deterrence.
Political- order requirements
The first stages of the disarmament process – US–Russian cuts leading to multi-
lateral talks – do not presuppose any change of world order, but imply a distinct 
shift from antagonistic to cooperative behaviour. Subsequent stages require more 
of the same, gradually transforming the current security system based on nuclear 
deterrence into a system based on cooperation and mutual restraint. Arms control 
and disarmament can assume the role of catalyst and amplifier of such a change. 
It has had that role before: starting with the Stockholm agreement on confidence 
and security- building measures in 1986, it helped to move the world out of the 
Cold War (Muller 2008)
 If disarmament is widely recognised as a high- priority global public good, it 
can become an important driver of systemic change. Confidence must be built, 
conflicts must be alleviated and solved, conventional force relationships must be 
adjusted and international politics better institutionalised as the process unfolds. 
There will always be many other drivers: economic interests may dovetail or 
collide; liberal internationalism confronts some of the norms that the UN Charter 
prescribed and that Asian states adhere to; unresolved border issues invoke 
national interests, etc. However, if there is broad agreement to make disarmament 
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a global public good, disarmament can become one of the organising principles 
of international affairs, enhancing world security in many more respects than 
nuclear disarmament per se can offer.
 The first test of disarmament as an organising principle was Obama’s use of 
the re- set button, inviting Russia to follow- up on START I. For deeper cuts to be 
achieved, controversial military problems regarding tactical nuclear weapons, 
missile defence and new long- range conventional weapons must be solved. This 
in turn presupposes that contentious political questions like NATO’s role and 
reach and other sensitive issues along Russia’s southern borders and towards 
Iran are better managed to the satisfaction of all concerned.
 When multilateral reductions to the low hundreds have been agreed, further 
steps will depend on fundamental world order changes, for it is from then on that 
the question of how to live without nuclear deterrence becomes pressing. A 
better system must be developed to substitute for it. Would all the NWS be ready 
to engage in that endeavour? Would the Middle East look peaceful enough for 
Israel to join in and disarm?
 Contemplating what world- order changes may be needed to enhance interna-
tional security and sustain disarmament, references have been made to the so- 
called “European concert” after the Napoleonic wars, when the European powers 
undertook to respect each other’s vital interests and exercise restraint in a system 
characterised by balance of power. Henry Kissinger, an authority on concert 
diplomacy, describes it as a system where
the great powers work together to enforce international norms. . . . Common 
action grows out of shared convictions. Power emerges from a sense of 
community and is exercised by an allocation of responsibilities related to a 
country’s resources. It is a kind of world order either without a dominating 
power or in which the potentially dominating power leads through self- 
restraint.
Believing that the Obama administration favours some kind of concert diplo-
macy, he argues that American leadership will “result from the willingness to 
listen and to provide inspirational affirmations [of norms]” (Kissinger 2009).
 A big power concert may be predicated on equilibrium between the partici-
pating states or it may be based on consensus. Generally, the former has been 
considered less demanding than the latter, although there are few examples of 
sustained operation of any version of power concerts. Today, however, when 
power is shifting so rapidly, a lasting equilibrium is dead on arrival. Better, then, 
to focus on norms – norms of mutual respect and self- restraint embedded in a 
growing body of international law, i.a. with a view to building a platform for 
effective enforcement action.
 The NPT suffers very much from lack of well- functioning enforcement mech-
anisms. Not only is it difficult to forge consensus between the P5, but the Secur-
ity Council is increasingly out of tune with the distribution of power in the 
international system. More and more, the legitimacy of its decisions is ques-
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tioned. Progress towards a NWFW requires cooperative security between the big 
powers with a view to more effective collective security mechanisms in the 
hands of a reformed world organisation.
 Globalisation encourages development along these lines. Interdependence is 
growing by the day and necessitates broad- based international cooperation on 
regulatory measures. However, globalisation is far from portraying a golden age 
for international norms in general. Protectionism is back on stage, and liberal 
internationalism is pitted against state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non- 
intervention in internal affairs.
 In East Asia, rapidly growing economic interdependence is a brake on con-
flict dynamics in the region. Use of force will come at tremendous cost to all 
involved. However, economic cooperation and security policies are conducted 
along different trajectories. Economic cooperation means interdependence, but it 
is pursued by sovereign states and does not translate into political integration 
(see Chapter 1).
 Europe is different in this respect. Starting from the interdependence of the 
Coal and Steel Union, integration has been going on for more than 50 years. 
When the Cold War ended, the European Union and Russia named each other as 
strategic partners. Still, Russia and the European nuclear powers threaten to be 
the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. There is no reasonable con-
nection between the political sphere and existing nuclear doctrines. Many ele-
ments of the nuclear postures have become anachronistic. In particular, extended 
deterrence in the form of forward basing of nuclear weapons and first- use doc-
trines are deemed increasingly dysfunctional both in Europe and in East Asia. 
 The EU is based on international rules, norms and standards, and is commit-
ted to follow up on them in its external affairs. The Europeans are strong and 
stable supporters of all ten of the requirements for a new non- proliferation and 
disarmament consensus outlined in Chapter 4, with some reservations made for 
France and to a smaller extent for the UK. The United States is less predictable 
in this respect because of the likely fluctuations of unilateralism. Where the US 
emphasises military strength and application of military means in international 
affairs, Europeans emphasise non- military solutions to problems out of convic-
tion as well as necessity, having cut their military investments to the bone after 
the Cold War. As for relations with Russia, there are different cultures at work in 
Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the United States and in Russia itself (see 
Chapter 1), but there is more to suggest that Russia will be better integrated into 
European affairs than that it will be kept out.
 The danger of nuclear- weapon-use may be highest in South Asia and the 
Middle East. These are volatile areas that call for combinations of regional meas-
ures and global initiatives. In the Middle East, the name of the game is a zone 
free of nuclear weapons or of chemical and biological weapons as well. These 
proposals are inextricably linked to the management of the conflict formations in 
the region. The 1995 review and extension conference adopted a resolution on 
the matter, but no progress has been made in implementing it. As long as the 
Israeli arsenal is untouched, Egypt and other Arab states are generally unwilling 
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to undertake more arms- control obligations. Hence, Egypt has not acceded to the 
CBC, the BWC, the CTBT, the Additional Protocol on safeguards and the 
Pelindaba Treaty on Africa as a nuclear- weapon-free zone. The emergence of 
the Iranian nuclear programme reinforces this attitude and inspires hedging. 
 Thinking beyond multilateral talks and nuclear arsenals in the low hundreds, 
the path- dependence of nuclear disarmament blurs the picture. That far ahead in 
political time, the nature of world politics defies prediction. However, much is 
known about force constellations that are threatening and non- threatening, dan-
gerous and less dangerous, stable and unstable, so in such terms it is possible to 
formulate some guidelines for the final approaches to a NWFW. One such pro-
position has been forwarded here: since stability concerns and bickering over 
numbers are likely to become more of a problem at very low levels, and since 
virtual arsenals are likely to be unstable, it may be wise to stay at minimum 
deterrence levels until the nuclear- weapons infrastructure and weapons- grade 
materials have been eliminated, and then go straight to a world below zero.
 For political leaders to act on complex realities, the realities have to be sim-
plified. Heuristic assumptions to that effect may be flawed, but by making the 
move towards a NWFW more thinkable, realisation of it becomes more likely.
Notes
1 Power shifts and nuclear weapons
 1 The term “security dilemma” was coined by John H. Herz (1951) in Political Realism 
and Political Idealism. The British historian Herbert Butterfield (1951) described the 
same situation in History and Human Relations. He referred to it as the “absolute pre-
dicament and irreducible dilemma”.
 2 Department of Defense deployment numbers, 31 December 2007. Unofficial numbers 
are higher.
 3 The FY 2009 budget, the last budget submitted by the Bush administration, was 
expected to result in defence outlays of $675 billion, implying a real- terms increase in 
US military spending of 71 per cent during FYs 2000–2009. See SIPRI (2009).
 4 Fareed Zakaria was the first to bring this to public attention. See Zakaria (2008a, b).
 5 Chinese government statistics show that for every four students who left in the past 
decade, only one returned home. Recently, China has begun to exert a reverse pull, 
investing more in R&D and playing on patriotism. See LaFraniere (2010).
 6 A security community is a region where large- scale use of violence has not only 
become very unlikely, but has disappeared from the political agenda. Examples are 
the Nordic countries and the United States and Canada. Karl W. Deutsch et al. (1957) 
distinguished between amalgamated (e.g. USA) and pluralistic security communities 
(e.g. the Nordic countries; the United States and Canada). Raimo Vaÿrynen (2000) 
differentiates between interstate security communities where war between states is 
unlikely (e.g. Southeast Asia) and comprehensive security communities where both 
interstate conflicts and civil wars are deemed unthinkable (e.g. Western Europe).
 7 India ranked 120 out of 178 economies according to the “World Trade Indicators 
2008” report by the World Bank. See The Hindu Business Line (2008) and European 
Commission Directorate- General for Trade (2009).
 8 The concept of “peaceful rise” was first introduced at the Boa’o Asia Forum in April 
2004. See Bronson (2007).
 9 This paragraph draws on Chapter 1 of Gill (2007).
10 Many scholars use Ray S. Cline’s power equation in their measurements of compre-
hensive power. See Cline (1977).
11 “Asians welcomed the U.S. presence and role as their region’s security and prosperity 
guarantor not because they loved America the most but because they feared America 
the least. Not any more” (Thakur 2007).
12 Russian officials usually refrain from commenting on the roles that nuclear weapons 
might have in Siberia. See SIPRI (2009).
224  Notes
2 The first nuclear era
1 In addition, there were 98 tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba, which General Issa Pliyev, 
the Soviet commander in Cuba, had the authority to use. A total of 24 IRBM 
(intermediate- range ballistic missile) warheads of half- a-megaton yield, slated to be 
deployed on the IRBMs that never arrived, remained aboard the Alexandrovsk in the 
port of La Isabella and were not available to Pliyev.
2 The article applies to individuals and non- governmental units, as well as to govern-
ments, the latter being responsible for the behaviour of the former.
3 Post- Cold War doctrines
 1 Existential deterrence is similar to the thesis of “fleet in being” which, in the words of 
Alfred Mahan, holds that “the presence of a strong force, even though inferior, near 
the scene of operations, will produce a momentous effect upon the enemy’s action”. 
The perceived existence of such a force would constrain and deter the enemy. Mahan 
rejected the thesis. See Westcott (1918).
 2 The Soviet declaratory policy of no- first-use (NFU) had little credibility anyhow, as 
long as large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons were deployed along the dividing 
line in Europe. Oleg Grinevsky cites the former head of the Soviet General Staff Mar-
shall Nikolay Ogarkov:
We are not about to wait when we are attacked. We ourselves will attack if we are 
forced to and when we find initial indications of a NATO nuclear assault. . . . We 
have the right to consider it as a response even without being under actual missile 
attack.
(Grinevsky 2004)
 3 In Asia, nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Japan and South Korea. About 100 
nuclear warheads for Tomahawk sea- launched cruise missiles were retained for 
deployment in case of emergency. In Europe, successive reductions brought the 
number of US nuclear weapons down to the low hundreds.
 4 
European allies should not keep asking us to multiply assurances that we cannot 
possibly mean, or that if we do mean, we should not want to execute because if 
we execute, we risk the destruction of civilisation. Our strategic dilemma isn’t 
solved with reassurances.
(Kissinger 1980)
 5 Had Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons he might have used them as an act of last 
resort since the regime and his own life were at stake. Fortunately, the nuclear 
weapons programme had been found and destroyed by UNSCOM.
 6 The background for these threats may also be understood in defensive terms. Iraq and 
Iran were viewed as revisionist states wanting to control much of the Middle East, 
with potentially severe effects on the flow of petroleum to the West. While it had been 
US policy to contain and deter these states, it seems that the original ambition of the 
Bush administration was to push all anti- status-quo states in the Middle East into obe-
dience by regime change and use of military force if need be.
 7 In his book, Feith does not identify the names of regimes to be targeted after 9/11 
except Afghanistan, but when asked which of the regimes on Clark’s list were 
included, he said “all of them”. See Clark (2003), Feith (2008), Porter (2008).
 8 More evidence is needed to establish whether there is a causal relationship here and 
not just a correlation due to other factors.
 9 “Military–industrial” is shorthand for a complex with much wider ramifications, 
including R&D establishments and vested political interests.
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10 The 2002 National Security Strategy was updated in 2006, building heavily on the 
2002 version. See The National Security Strategy of the United States 2006.
11 President Nixon, when signing the ABM Treaty on 26 May 1972.
12 The authors of the UN Charter hardly saw it that way. In their view, the right to self- 
defence did not include pre- emption. Today, however, most lawyers see pre- emptive 
action as being legal.
13 Linton Brooks says that there was no internal consideration of nuclear pre- emption, 
but that the administration failed to make this point explicit in its public pronounce-
ments. See Brooks (2009).
14 The Clinton administration did that as well. The B- 61-11 bunker- buster bomb was 
further developed without nuclear testing during the 1990s.
15 In the autumn of 2005, a Draft Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations had a special 
chapter on theatre nuclear operations – not in the previous version of 1995 – which 
extended the role of nuclear weapons from deterrence by retaliation to battlefield 
destruction of targets. It also lowered the bar for nuclear- weapon use by replacing 
“war” with “conflict”, a change proposed by the Strategic Command. Clearly, the 
emphasis was moved from war between the major powers to regional contingencies, 
where the nuclear planners anticipated that nuclear weapons might be used in less- 
intense conflicts than previously envisioned. However, the text was never approved 
by the political authorities. For the text and editing comments, see www.nukestrat.
com.
16 Donald Rumsfeld, in his foreword to the new NPR submitted to Congress on 8 
January 2002.
17 On the contrary, the administration wanted to remove Clinton’s signature from the 
Treaty, but did not find a way to do it.
18 The wording was slightly different from the statement at the first UN special session 
on disarmament in 1978: 
The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non- 
nuclear-weapon state- parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United 
States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state 
toward which it has a security commitment carried out, or sustained by such a 
non- nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear- weapon state.
19 NSC official Robert Bell. See Mendelsohn (1999).
20 To wait for its conventional forces to be strong enough to allow for no- first-use is no 
alternative: the US accounts for 45 per cent of world military expenditures, Russia for 
3 per cent.
21 Oleg Grinevsky quotes the head of the Soviet General Staff Marshall Ogarkov:
We are not about to wait when we are attacked. . . . We ourselves will attack if we 
are forced to and when we find indications of a NATO nuclear assault. . . . We 
have the right to consider it a response even without being under actual missile 
attack.
(Grinevsky 2004)
22 The first official endorsement of this modification was in the 2001 NPR.
23 The war broke out at the end of 1999, after the new doctrine had been drafted, but it 
had been clear for some time that a second Chechnya war was imminent.
24 The bombing of Yugoslavia revived the worst instincts of the Cold War among 
Russian civil and military leaders, confirming assumptions of NATO hostility that 
only a few years before had been confined to extreme nationalists and communists. 
See Arbatov (2000).
25 Because of the Chinese factor, Russia’s policy is to be “founded on nuclear weapons 
and presumes strategic cooperation with the West”. See Ostankov (2005). Concerns 
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about demography, the competition for resources and military imbalances are not 
expressed at the governmental level, however.
26 The new Military Doctrine was published on 5 February 2010. See Sokov (2010). 
27 From 2009, the airborne component will be equipped with the ASMP- A cruise 
missile, deployed on Mirage 2003 NK3 and Rafael aircraft, stationed in France and 
carrier- based. The number of nuclear- capable land- based aircraft will be reduced from 
60 to 40. See Defense et Securite national (2008). After the cut, the French stockpile 
would contain fewer than 300 weapons.
28 An English version of the speech is reproduced in Disarmament Diplomacy (2006), 
No. 82.
29 French Defence Minister Alliot- Marie, hearing on nuclear deterrence before the 
Foreign Affairs Commission on the Defence and Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence, 
1 February 2006.
30 Speech by President Sarkozy on 21 March 2008. In an analysis of the speech, Bruno 
Tertrais emphasises that it was noteworthy in at least two respects: it signalled that 
continuity would prevail as far as nuclear- weapons policy is concerned, and it devoted 
an unusual amount of time to issues of disarmament. See Tertrais (2008).
31 Since Chinese nuclear assets are vulnerable, this policy may well be declaratory rather 
than based on credible options.
32 Fact sheet from the US Department of Defense, 9 April 2010. The Obama administra-
tion has requested $239.9 million for prompt global- strike research and development 
across the military services in fiscal year 2011. Budget documents indicate that by the 
end of fiscal year 2015, $2 billion may have been spent on the PGS programme.
4 A global consensus on non- proliferation and disarmament
 1 Article X.2 says that 25 years after the entry into force of the NPT, a conference shall 
decide whether the Treaty “shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended 
for an additional fixed period or periods”.
 2 Article V is about peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). PNEs have been found to be 
of little or no utility, so the article is commonly considered to be a “dead” one.
 3 The Resolution asked all parties to the Treaty, and in particular the nuclear- weapon 
states, to “extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to 
ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of 
nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems” (Reso-
lution on the Middle East (NPT/CONF.1995/32/RES/1) 1995).
 4 The only reservation was in reference to possible long- term developments making 
nuclear weapons standard equipment of ordinary states. See Prawitz (1995).
 5 In 2006, the author argued that to save the NPT, a high- level UN meeting should be 
called to confirm the validity of the three pillars on which it is based – non- 
proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses – and to seek agreement on approaches 
to the implementation of Article VI. The reasoning, furthermore, was that the meeting 
might be convened in the autumn of 2009 – midway between the inauguration of a 
new US president and the 2010 review conference of the NPT – not in the belief that 
policies of exceptionalism, unilateralism and coalitions of the willing would suddenly 
be abandoned, but in the hope that they would soon be significantly modified in 
favour of multilaterally negotiated international agreements, of which the NPT occu-
pies the centre- stage. See Lodgaard (2007).
 6 The Council reaffirms
its firm commitment to the NPT and its conviction that the international nuclear 
non- proliferation regime should be maintained and strengthened to ensure its 
effective implementation [and recalls] in this regard the outcomes of past NPT 
Review Conferences, including the 1995 and 2000 final documents.
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 In paragraph 6 it “Calls upon all States Parties to the NPT . . . to set realistic and 
achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars: non- proliferation, the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy, and disarmament”.
 7 Asked if he was worried that Obama’s UNGA speech, calling for an NWFW, would 
apply to Israel, Netanyahu said:
It was utterly clear from the context of the speech that he was talking about North 
Korea and Iran. . . . I want to remind you that in my first meeting with President 
Obama in Washington I received from him, and I asked to receive from him, an 
itemised list of the strategic understandings that have existed for many years 
between Israel and the United States on this issue. It was not for naught that I 
requested, and it was not for naught that I received [that document].
(Quoted in Lake 2009; see also Cohen and Perkovich 2009)
 8 Such as when military units begin to move in preparation of an attack. Terms like 
“about to attack” and “seeing the attack coming” leave much to interpretation, 
however. The downside of it is that pre- emption may trigger inadvertent escalation 
leading to war. For instance, during the Cold War, the offensive capabilities along the 
dividing line in Central Europe were commonly recognised to outweigh the defensive 
capabilities on the other side, so the temptation to pre- empt would have been strong 
had one or the other side begun to believe that an attack was coming. Pre- emption of 
terrorist attack is quite another matter: in this case, there may be no immediate 
warning signals, leading into an argument for preventive action against terrorists.
 9 International law recognises a limited right of reprisal in addition to the right of self- 
defence. It legitimises certain actions that would otherwise be unlawful, in response 
to an illegal act by or under the aegis of another state. Reprisals, too, are subject to the 
general requirements of necessity and proportionality. Non- coercive means should be 
considered before a reprisal is carried out. There is a substantial body of legal opinion 
holding that permissible reprisals are limited to measures other than armed force.
10 Osiraq was built to run on highly enriched uranium (HEU) and was a poor pluto-
nium source. Had a natural uranium blanket been put around the core, some pluto-
nium could have been produced, but without major reconstruction of the reactor it 
would not have been enough for weapon production. The HEU that had been stored 
at the reactor site was not hit by the bombs and stayed there until shortly before the 
1991 war, when Saddam Hussein ordered it removed in a futile, last- minute effort 
to get a bomb. Had the Iraqis begun to adapt the reactor to make it a better source of 
plutonium, or removed the HEU it was designed to use, the alarm bell would have 
rung immediately, for the reactor complex was under IAEA safeguards. See Reiter 
(2006).
11 On the network of underground tunnels and protection of assets in hard rock, see 
Broad (2010).
12 By 6 October 2009, 129 states had signed an Additional Protocol.
13 The right to enrich is spelt out convincingly and in all necessary detail in Miller 
(2007b).
14 See Rauf (2007). In a much- noted article published in the autumn of 2003, Mohamed 
ElBaradei proposed a sequence of measures that formed a constructive agenda for 
further inquiry and action. The elements are: assurances of supply (of fuel) and access 
(to equipment and technology); a moratorium on new national fuel- cycle facilities; 
restricting enrichment and reprocessing operations to facilities under multinational 
control; investments in new proliferation- resistant nuclear energy systems; and multi-
national approaches to the management and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive 
waste (ElBaradei 2003). The High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of 
the United Nations (2004) supported many of these measures. So did UNGA/Kofi 
Annan’s report, “In Larger Freedom” (2005).
15 Although the preamble pays particular attention to one specific measure: discontinua-
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tion of “all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time”. As noted below, the 
negotiating history sheds light on a number of other measures.
16 In 1965, a UNGA Resolution used the language “coupled with or followed by” to 
capture both positions.
17 This language is often used in NPT discussions, e.g. in the “Thirteen steps” of nuclear 
disarmament adopted by the 2000 Review Conference.
18 In case nuclear war nevertheless breaks out, NNWS want to be assured that they 
would not be targeted. Unqualified non- use assurances to non- nuclear parties to the 
NPT cover such contingencies, while no- first-use (NFU) doctrines do not. If some-
body breaks the doctrine, the other NWS would be freed from their obligations. The 
prime objective, however, is to prevent a nuclear war from breaking out. Should it 
nevertheless occur, self- imposed restraints to spare NNWS of the horrors of nuclear 
warfare can realistically not be expected in any case, regardless of what kind of assur-
ances that have been given in time of peace.
19 For a recent discussion of the pros and cons of NFU, see Sagan, Halperin, Tertrais 
and Subramaniam in Survival (2009).
20 In many ways, however, the policy of opacity is anachronistic and at odds with inter-
national liberal norms to which Israel generally adheres. See Cohen (2010).
21 A resolution of this kind has been proposed by Goldschmidt (2008). Paragraph 17 of 
S/Res/1887 notes ongoing discussions on how the NPT parties could collectively 
respond to notifications of withdrawal and affirms that a state remains responsible 
under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal.
22 Paragraph 4 of S/Res/1887, which calls on all states to adhere to the NPT, adds “and 
pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms”.
23 Introduced by Representatives Lungren (Republican) and McGovern (Democrat) in 
March 2008.
24 
Today, let me put forward four pillars that I believe are fundamental to the future 
that we want for our children: non- proliferation and disarmament; the promotion 
of peace and security; the preservation of our planet; and a global economy that 
advances opportunity for all people. First, we must stop the spread of nuclear 
weapons, and seek the goal of a world without them.
(President Obama addressing the UN General Assembly, 24 September 2009)
5 The three- state problem
 1 In 1992, the two Korean states declared their intention to make the Korean peninsula 
an NWFZ: “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula”, 20 
January 1992, www.fas.org/news/dprk/1992/920219-D- 4129.htm. In a joint statement 
from the six- party talks – North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan and the US 
– on 19 September 2005, the DPRK again “committed to abandoning all nuclear 
weapons and existing nuclear programs . . .” (www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/
doc/2005–09/19/content_479150_2.htm). The statement reiterated that “the 1992 
Joint Declaration of the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula should be observed 
and implemented”.
 2 While the justifications have always been phrased in security terms, in some cases the 
main drivers have been different (see Chapter 6). On the UK and France, see Pélopi-
das (2010b). On India, see Perkovich (2001).
 3 Among them Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Japan, South Africa and South Korea.
 4 Not only because the agreement contains such specifics, which is to state the obvious, 
but also for diplomatic and political reasons in order to facilitate ratification of it.
 5 George Bush when signing the US–India Nuclear Cooperation Act, 18 December 
2006 (www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0612/doc04.htm).
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 6 New Framework for the US–India Defense Relationship, signed 28 June 2008 (http://
newdelhi.usembassy.gov/ipr062805.html).
 7 Nicholas Burns at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 
5 April 2007 (www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/81207.htm). On the notion of “democratic 
bombs”, see Perkovich (2006) and Hayes (2009).
 8 In the ratification debate in the US Senate, Christopher Dodd (D- Conn.) said there were 
compelling geopolitical reasons to approve the bill, mentioning India’s location near 
China, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Richard Lugar (R- Indiana) said the agreement was one 
of the most important strategic diplomatic initiatives undertaken in the last decade.
 9 Because of the delay in India, adoption of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA 
had to wait until 1 August. The NSG gave its consent on 6 September, and the bill 
was introduced to Congress on 10 September. In order to conclude the deal before the 
Congressional recess, the Hyde Act of 2006 – which required that Congress be in 30 
days of continuous session to consider the deal – had to be sidestepped. This was 
done: the House voted on 27 September, and the Senate on 1 October.
10 “Your voice was very effective, and I welcome it” – President Bush when signing the 
US–India nuclear cooperation act into law, 18 December 2006.
11 For an early discussion of the “as if ” proposition, see Lodgaard (2004) and Lodgaard 
et al. (2005).
12 The Agreement was made on the basis of Section 123 in the US Atomic Energy Act, 
hence the references to “the 123 Agreement”.
13 The paragraph commits the five NWS “not in any way to assist, encourage or induce” 
other states in the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
14 The US has claimed that all future breeders will be on the civilian side (Burns 2007).
15 The two US- built reactors at Tarapur, the two Canadian- built reactors in Rajastan and 
the two reactors being built by Russia at Kundankulam.
16 
Given India’s uranium ore crunch and the need to build up our minimum credible 
deterrent as fast as possible, it is to India’s advantage to categorise as many power 
reactors as possible as civilian ones to be refuelled by imported uranium and con-
serve our native uranium fuel for weapon- grade plutonium production.
 (K. Subramaniam in The Times of India, 12 December 2005)
Subramaniam is head of Prime Minister Singh’s Global Strategic Development Task 
Force. After the Agreement was concluded, India made a deal with Russia to import 
2,000 metric tons of uranium, and made an agreement with Kazakhstan that includes 
provisions for natural uranium deliveries to India.
17 George Perkovich says:
the deal’s champions . . . persuaded the president to issue internal guidelines to the 
negotiators that terms of the deal should not constrain India’s strategic capabil-
ities. Per implication, the negotiators could hardly require India to, say, limit its 
production of fissile materials or sign the CTBT. 
(Perkovich 2010)
18 After the 1974 test, nuclear fuel to the power plant in Tarapur was withheld when a 
new nuclear non- proliferation act (NNPA) was passed by the US Congress.
19 A cut- off agreement, requiring that in the NWS safeguards would apply only to 
reprocessing and enrichment plants, would introduce another element of unequal 
treatment into the non- proliferation regime. On the one hand, there would be the 
NNWS, required to put all their activities under safeguards, and on the other, the 
NWS which should be trusted not to divert nuclear material from their unsafeguarded 
civilian reactors, fuel- fabrication plants, etc. To avoid yet another differential treat-
ment in favour of the NWS, all civilian activities should also be placed under safe-
guards in these countries. See David Fischer (1994).
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20 Except for states with little or no nuclear activity where, in some cases, safeguards 
agreements remain to be concluded. The NPT mandates that safeguards agreements 
be concluded within 18 months of the Treaty’s entry into force, so failure to do so 
is a violation of the Treaty. To date, however, this has not been a matter of much 
concern.
21 “By far the most forward looking foreign policy achievement of the current Adminis-
tration”, Senator Richard Lugar at the National Defense University, Washington, DC, 
15 October 2008.
22 To the dismay of the Iranian government, in 2008 India launched an Israeli spy satel-
lite, ostensibly to monitor Iranian nuclear facilities.
23 India has very friendly relations with Iran. It will continue to do so” (Defence Minis-
ter A.K. Anthony).
24 The “umbrella” agreement, adopted by consensus on 1 August 2008.
25 South Africa, Iraq, Nigeria, Morocco, Thailand, Chile, Ecuador, Ghana, Bolivia, the 
Philippines, Algeria, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and Malaysia.
26 The Begin doctrine, named after Prime Minister Menachem Begin who authorised the 
attack on Osiraq.
27 Beyond the Additional Protocol, the “Commission of Eminent Persons”, which was 
asked to reflect on the role of the IAEA up to 2020 and beyond, recommends that the 
IAEA’s existing authorities be interpreted to give the Agency the responsibility to 
inspect for indicators of nuclear weaponisation activities. Reinforcing the Global 
Nuclear Order for Peace and Prosperity, Report prepared by an independent commis-
sion at the request of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, May 2008.
28 Commenting on the safeguards agreement with India, ElBaradei said that the India- 
specific agreement could be used for the conclusion of other 66-type agreements as 
well, indicating that there might be a follow- up in other outlier states.
29 The International Commission on Nuclear Non- proliferation and Disarmament rec-
ommends that
Provided they [Israel, Pakistan and India] satisfy strong objective criteria demon-
strating commitment to disarmament and non- proliferation, and sign up to specific 
future commitments in this respect, these states should have access to nuclear 
materials and technology for civilian purposes on the same basis as an NPT 
member.
(International Commission on Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Disarmament 2009, 
p. 100)
6 Rollback experiences
 1 The term “proliferation” was introduced by Albert Wohlstetter in 1961. For a discus-
sion of the way it has been used and its in- built implications, see Pélopidas (2009, 
2010c).
 2 For a critical examination, see Sagan (2010).
 3 In the first two decades of the nuclear age, no non- proliferation norm existed. No 
international legal instrument obliging the parties to stay non- nuclear had been estab-
lished, and the safeguards that were introduced in the second decade (INFCIRC/66) 
had limited coverage. In this period, the P5 did not conduct their nuclear- weapons 
programmes under the guise of dual- use facilities. The existence of the programmes 
could not be hidden given the size of gaseous diffusion facilities. The dual- use option 
became attractive later on when there were more technologies and facilities to hide 
behind and when non- proliferation norms, obligations and safeguards had begun to 
take hold.
 4 Today, all NNWS are members of the NPT, so proliferation means break- out of the 
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regime and a certain likelihood of “publicity before consummation”. India and Paki-
stan were the last ones not to violate any such commitment.
 5 For a study of the US influence on the South Korean and Taiwanese cases, see 
Hersman and Peters (2006).
 6 For fear of exposure, South Africa also refrained from using English- language 
experts. For a recent overview of the case, see du Preez and Maettig (2010). Waldo 
Stumpf, former Chief Executive Officer of the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South 
Africa, appointed by Frederik de Klerk to lead the dismantlement of the weapons pro-
gramme, in a 1995 lecture entitled, “The Birth and Death of the South African 
Nuclear Weapons Programme”, delivered in Castiglioncello in Italy.
 7 See www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/stumpf.htm. It was not until 24 March 1993 
that President de Klerk publicly revealed to the Parliament and to the world that South 
Africa had built nuclear weapons. There remains about 500 kg of HEU in South 
Africa.
 8 The three non- nuclear principles – not to possess, not to manufacture and not to intro-
duce nuclear weapons into Japanese territory – were adopted by the Diet in 1971 in 
the form of a parliamentary resolution. It was never turned into law, but have been 
repeated by Japanese leaders ever since. Prime Minister Hatoyama did so in January 
2010. See Kyodo News (2010).
 9 Sudden departure from its non- nuclear policy is nevertheless deemed unlikely. See 
Hymans and Okagaki (2008) and Solingen (2010).
10 This unpredictability should not, however, be regarded as generating only worst- case 
outcomes. For a critique of this tendency, see Pélopidas (2010c).
11 This is not to say that it was the power play between the main antagonists of the Cold 
War that prevented proliferation, only that it is one of many factors accounting for it. 
See Muller and Schmidt (2010).
12 Henry Rowen coined this expression. See Wohlstetter et al. (1976).
13 Realism offers competing explanations that can a posteriori be compatible with many 
different outcomes. In epistemological terms, it suffers from under- determination: the 
rather vague notion of “security maximisation” tends to make it unfalsifiable. See Sol-
ingen (2007).
14 By using domestic perceptions of the international system and/or domestic incentives 
as intervening variables between distribution of power in the international system and 
foreign- policy decisions, neoclassical realism can explain more than classical realist 
and neo- realist approaches.
15 On the September 1979 double flash detected by a Vela satellite, interpreted by some 
as an Israeli or possibly a South African test, see Richelson (2006).
16 For an overview, see the slightly outdated but still relevant article by Goldblat (1997).
17 Comparing US allies in Europe, Asia, South East Asia and the Pacific with non- 
aligned countries in the same regions.
18 The Irish Resolution, adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly on 17 
August 1961, called on all states, the nuclear powers in particular, to conclude an 
international agreement to refrain from transfer and acquisition of nuclear weapons.
19 Relative, meaning as a share of the total number of states. In the 1960s, the number 
was fast increasing because of the decolonisation wave.
20 States without economic strength to start nuclear weapon activities not included. See 
Muller and Schmidt (2010).
21 In some cases, liberalisation is the consequence of democratisation, which may be the 
root cause of the non- proliferation effect otherwise assigned to openings towards the 
outside world.
22 “The features of the building, along with the connectivity of the site to adequate 
pumping capacity of cooling water, are similar to what may be found in connection 
with a reactor site” (IAEA 2008).
23 However, the stability of decision- points stopping just a little short of weaponisation 
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is doubtful. A favoured way out is multinational or international solutions to the fuel- 
cycle problems. These are complex propositions, however, and they have yet to be 
applied in any region of proliferation concern.
24 For a critique of the democratic peace theory as applied to South America, see 
Velazquez (2004).
25 This is close to being a truism, however.
7 Challenge from within: the case of Iran
 1 The term “virtual arsenal” is a comprehensive one. It can be used in reference to many 
different sets of capabilities: reprocessing and enrichment plants, fissile materials on 
stock, nuclear- weapon design information, and triggering technologies – in short, dif-
ferent capability levels and different ways of producing nuclear explosives. Prohibited 
under the NPT are activities unambiguously related to nuclear- weapon production, 
such as weapon- design studies and development of implosion mechanisms.
 2 Developed against the background of Iraq’s nuclear weapon programme in the 1980s, 
which the IEA did not discover.
 3 As required by Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part.
 4 
The Iranians made clear to IAEA inspectors that parts for centrifuges had been spread 
out in stockpiles and small factories around the country. They were insurance, it 
seemed, against losing the whole program at once. The message to the United States 
and Israel was clear: if you hit Natanz, we’re ready to speed up elsewhere.
(Sanger 2009)
 5 In June 2009, two proposals were up for consideration by the IAEA Board of Gover-
nors: a “Proposal for the Establishment of an IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank” 
and a “Russian Federation Initiative to Establish a Reserve of Low Enriched Uranium 
(LEU) for the Supply of LEU to the IAEA for its Member States”.
 6 It stopped short of offering Iran light- water reactors (LWR). While Article IV of the 
NPT commits supplier states to facilitate access to technology for NNWS parties, the 
Framework only promised “not to impede participation in open competitive tender-
ing” (para. 19b). The United States was opposed to a European reactor offer.
 7 “I have seen the Iranians ready to accept putting a cap on their enrichment [pro-
gramme] in terms of tens of centrifuges, and then in terms of hundreds of centrifuges. 
But nobody even tried to engage them on these offers” (M. ElBaradei in an interview 
with Newsweek; see also Dickey 2009).
 8 On 12 August 2009, 4,592 centrifuges were being fed with UF6 and an additional 
3,716 centrifuges had been installed. See IAEA report by the Director General (2009).
 9 For a comprehensive discussion of Iran’s sovereign right in connection with this, see 
Miller (2007b).
10 For quotations of Iranian officials, see The Middle East Media Research Institute (4 
June 2009).
11 Lessons based on 27 cases of rollback. See Muller and Schmidt (2010).
12 Iran “ignores parts of its security concerns . . . for the sake of broader security goals 
for all countries . . . despite the fact that threats to the national security of the Islamic 
republic all point to a security imbalance”. Former Minister of Defence Ali Shamkani 
(2002), as quoted in Bar, S. (2009).
13 Takeyh argues that the main concern is to negate the American and Iraqi threats. The 
Israeli nuclear capability is a lesser worry. See Takeyh (2005).
14 For Chubin, the United States is a secondary factor and not the primary cause of the 
Iranian programme. See Chubin (2006).
15 Founded in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, the ECO is dedicated to development, 
trade and investment issues. The D8 consists of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, 
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Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey. The SCO consists of China, Russia and the 
Central Asian states except Turkmenistan. India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan are 
observers.
16 Iran has much in common with France in the 1950s and 1960s. While Hymans suggests 
that such leaders are rare, in Iran this is a common state of mind. See Hymans (2002).
17 Gone were references to sticks and carrots, “a policy suitable for a donkey but not for 
a proud nation” (Newsweek 2009). See Dickey (2009).
18 Crisis Group interview with Khalil Shirgholami, Centre for Euro- American Studies, 
Institute for Political and International Studies, Tehran, 25 February 2009, as quoted 
in International Crisis Group (2009).
19 The full text is available at www.mideastweb.org/iranian_letter_of_2003.htm (see 
MidEastWeb 2003). Whether it was a genuine offer, a means of alleviating a dire 
threat to Iranian security at that point in time, a matter of buying time for its nuclear 
programme, or a combination of these factors, remains unclear.
20 The most prominent of those who oppose nuclear weapons on an Islamic basis are 
Ayatollah Montazeri, Ayatollah Saanei, Ayatollah Ali Ayazi and Ayatollah Sistani 
(who has not made any statement on the matter, but is rumoured to support this 
stance). See Bar (2009).
21 The fatwa of September 2003 was instrumental in legitimising Iran’s acceptance of 
the Additional Protocol a couple of months later.
22 For a reference to existing studies and an overall assessment of this issue, see Potter 
(2010).
23 An exception was made for North Korea. Shortly after North Korea’s first nuclear test 
(October 2006), US and Korean representatives met in Berlin in January 2007: this 
was the beginning of the six- nation agreement later that year.
24 Obama sounded this threat on the campaign trail: “If we can prevent them 
from importing the gasoline that they need and the refined petroleum products, that 
starts changing their cost–benefit analysis.” Here, as quoted in David Sanger (2009).
25 Iran declared the facility to the IAEA on 24 September 2009.
26 Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement.
27 Shortly after the announcement of the facility, the IAEA was promised access to the 
site, starting 25 October 2009.
28 
This is a contingency plant. It is one of the pre- emptive measures aimed at pro-
tecting our nuclear technology and human work force. . . .This site . . . was selected 
on purpose in a place that would be protected against aerial attack. That’s why the 
site was chosen adjacent to a military site.
(Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Commission, as quoted in 
Associated Press 2009)
The site is located near a military compound of the Revolutionary Guard.
29 Statement by President Ahmadinejad, 29 November 2009. See e.g. Thomas Erdbrink, 
“Ahmadinejad vows dramatic expansion of Iran’s nuclear program”, Washington Post 
Foreign Service, 30 November 2009.
30 Turkey offered to serve as an alternative location for a fuel swap and Japan – which 
does not have the same troubled history with Iran as France and Russia do – offered 
to enrich the LEU.
31 While previous sanctions have been dysfunctional, measures to punish the Revolu-
tionary Guards for their human- rights abuses and deprive them of incomes might be 
welcomed by many democratic activists. However, when levelled in the name of non- 
proliferation, the sympathisers would be fewer.
32 Co- chaired by US Deputy National Security Advisor Tom Danilon and Israeli 
National Security Advisor Uzi Arad.
33 They are described in Sanger (2009).
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34 It is not known who pulled the plug. The NIE also concluded, with a lower level of 
confidence, that the weapons- oriented activities have not been resumed.
35 Obama said “no system of government can or should be imposed upon one nation by 
any other”; the Helsinki Decalogue said “non- intervention in internal affairs”. Obama 
spoke about democracy, religious freedom, human rights and the rights of women in 
particular; the Helsinki Decalogue said “Respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief ”. In 
Europe, respect for other countries’ systems of government was a confidence- building 
measure that facilitated agreement on human rights and political freedoms. In due 
course, however, the promotion of those rights and freedoms tend to translate into 
systemic change. This way, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE, later the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)) 
became a precursor to regime- change in Eastern Europe in the wake of the Cold War.
8 How to understand North Korea
 1 In 1993, North Korea referred to US military exercises, the IAEA demands for special 
inspections and the allegedly partisan basis of the Agency’s demands that the DPRK 
comply with its safeguards obligations. In 2003, it said it withdrew because it was 
designated by the United States as part of the “Axis of Evil” and targeted by the US 
pre- emptive strike policy. See du Preez and Potter (2003).
 2 This is the language of Article X of the NPT. Article X.1 says that notice of with-
drawal shall be given to “all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations 
Security Council”. The 2005 NPT Review Conference failed even to note what North 
Korea had done.
 3
In 2010, North Korea will try to improve relations with the United States, extend 
its olive branch to its rival South Korea, reach out to Japan by showing its willing-
ness to resolve the issue of Japanese nationals who were abducted by North 
Korean agents in the 1980s, and also strengthen its ties with China and Russia. . . . 
The whole goal is to be recognized as a nuclear state.
 (Zhang Liangui, a Chinese expert on North Korea at the Central Party School, in 
Lee 2010)
 4 At least in some phases and in the view of some Iranian leaders.
 5 Sigal (2009a). Siegfried Hecker seems to agree: “We found that Pyongyang was 
willing to slow its drive for nuclear weapons only when it believed the fundamental 
relationship with the United States was improving, but not when the regime was 
threatened” Hecker (2010: 54).
 6 In 1992, the two Korean states declared their intention to make the Korean peninsula 
a NWFZ. See “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula”, 
1992. In a joint statement from the Six- Party Talks – North Korea, South Korea, 
China, Russia, Japan and the United States – on 19 September 2005, the DPRK again 
“committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs . . .” 
(China Daily 2005). The statement reiterated that “the 1992 Joint Declaration of the 
Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented”. The 
October 2007 Accord did not say that the weapons that North Korea has produced 
should be eliminated. The text is not explicit on this fundamentally important point. 
However, this is the US interpretation.
 7 This was the agreement on disablement of the Yongbyon facilities. On 13 February 
2007, the parties had reached agreement on “Initial Actions for the Implementation of 
the Joint Statement”, in which North Korea undertook to close down and seal the 
facilities in Yongbyon and invite the IAEA back to monitor and verify these actions.
 8 Juche is a national ideology of self- reliance. The regime justifies its dictatorship with 
arguments derived from concepts of collective consciousness and the superiority of 
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the collective over the individual, appeals to nationalism and citations of “the Juche 
idea”. The core concept of Juche is the ability to act independently without regard to 
outside interference. Originally described as a creative application of Marxism–Len-
inism in the national context, Juche is a malleable philosophy reinterpreted from time 
to time by the regime as its ideological needs change.
 9 Cirus- line reactors are research reactors using natural uranium and heavy water. They 
are good plutonium sources. It was a Canadian reactor of this kind that produced plu-
tonium for India’s explosion in 1974, and Israel got the same type of reactor in the 
early 1960s.
10 According to the CIA. Estimates vary from less than 2 kg to 10 kg (Hecker 2010: 46).
11 Also known as the Basic Agreement, signed on 31 December 1991.
12 According to Article III.4 of the NPT, negotiation of safeguards agreements shall 
commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of the Treaty, and the 
agreements shall enter into force not later than 18 months after the date of initiation of 
negotiations.
13 This was the first time the IAEA moved to exercise its right to conduct special inspec-
tions. The DPRK objected on the grounds that it was singled out. Had the Agency 
also asked for special inspections in other, less- sensitive settings than the North 
Korean one, the reaction may have been different. However, this was hardly the main 
reason for rejecting them. North Korea was not ready to make its nuclear programme 
fully transparent.
14 “The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps . . . in a phased manner in line with the 
principle of ‘commitment for commitment, action for action’ ”. See PIR Center (2005).
15 For plutonium production and weapons estimates, see Hecker (2010).
16 Only partially successful. The yield has been estimated as slightly below 1 kiloton. 
See Hecker (2010: 47).
17 In a rudimentary way, the terms of the Agreed Framework had been defined a year 
earlier. The United States indicated that it would support the introduction of light- 
water reactors (LWR) in the DPRK, and Pyongyang suggested that it would invite the 
IAEA to implement safeguards to the Agency’s satisfaction.
18 Rich countries in Europe, the Middle East and Asia had paid for the first Gulf War, 
and by 1994 there remained a willingness to cover the costs of collective actions 
under US leadership. Later, that willingness abated, as became obvious in connection 
with the occupation of Iraq in 2003.
19 Informal North Korean communication to the author.
20 North Korea finally agreed to accept KEDO’s decisions regarding the selection of 
reactor model and the choice of prime contractor to carry out the project. KEDO 
selected the South Korean designed Ulchin 3–4 LWR as the reference model for the 
project and a South Korean firm to be the prime contractor. South Korea undertook to 
cover most of the costs, of the order of $3 billion.
21 Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to Libya. Evidence of nuclear cooperation with 
Myanmar is even weaker. See Borger (2009). The prime suspects for the UF6 in 
Libya are Pakistan and A.Q. Khan.
22 The term “disablement” was used in reference to an agreed list of 12 measures. In the 
view of Christopher Hill, the US negotiator, it meant that in the event North Korea 
wanted to restart its facilities in Yongbyon, it would take approximately a year to do 
so. See Hill (2007).
23 On 26 June 2008.
24 Condoleezza Rice at the Heritage Foundation, 18 June 2008.
25 It did not threaten to resume construction of the 50 MWe and 200 MWe gas graphite 
reactors. After the breakdown of the Agreed Framework, the North Koreans resumed 
construction of the 50 MWe reactor, but the progress was slow. The damage to the 




During the period of the Initial Actions phase and the next phase . . . economic, 
energy, and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of 
heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons of 
HFO, will be provided to the DPRK.
27 State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley, as quoted by Reuters.
28 According to Sigal and Wit (2009), at least seven times. For the Clinton administra-
tion’s nuclear threat to North Korea, see Norris and Kristensen (2006).
29 “Barring a miraculous change in political culture and orientation in Washington and/
or in Pyongyang”, Peter Hayes argues that the only solution is a regional system of 
nuclear non- proliferation to be developed by the local states, building on the Korean 
nuclear- weapon-free zone declaration of 1992 and consistent with the global non- 
proliferation regime (Hayes 2007b).
30 
How can you expect us to return to negotiations when it’s clear your administra-
tion is paralysed by divisions between those who hate us and those who want to 
negotiate seriously? At the very time when we were engaged in such a long dia-
logue last year, your side was planning for sanctions. . . . We have concluded that 
your administration is dysfunctional. 
(Harrison 2006)
9 The relationship between disarmament and non- proliferation
 1 For a lucid analysis, see Miller (2007a).
 2 Resolution on the Middle East. Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the 
Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 11 May 1995. NPT/
CONF.1995/32/RES/1.
 3 Gill (2007), Sethi (2009). Chinese observers emphasise that the Soviet Union should 
never have let Estonia and the other Baltic states go. One domino can lead to the fall 
of others and end in dismemberment.
 4 Like mainstream opinion in most Western countries, the op. ed. on nuclear disarma-
ment by four French statesmen (Juppe, Norlain, Richard, Rocard) also sees it this 
way (www.regards- citoyens.com/article- pour-un- desarmement-nucleaire- mondial-
seule- reponse-a- la-proliferations- anarchique-par–41459606.html).
 5 Of course there are many pertinent differences as well. De Gaulle felt that France had 
been sidelined. France also looked at the British Empire, which was considered to be 
stronger than the French, and saw it was declining. For France, it was therefore 
important not to be sliding on a downward slope. By comparison, Iran’s influence in 
the Middle East has been growing in recent years. The challenge for Iran is that its 
influence is stiffly contested by the US, Arab states and others, which are building the 
broadest possible coalitions against it.
 6 France, the UK and India have done so, but not the other NWS.
 7 Letter of 24 December 2009 from Foreign Minister Okada to Secretary of State 
Clinton. Okada released the Japanese version of the letter at a press conference in 
Tokyo on 22 January 2010. See also his speech at the 174th Session of the Diet on 29 
January 2010 (www.mofa.qo.jp/u news/2/20100129 201247.html).
 8 Article 21 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution states that “all nuclear activity within 
the national territory shall only be admitted for peaceful purposes and subject to 
approval by the National Congress”. Brazil and Argentina ratified the Treaty of Tlate-
lolco in 1994 and joined the NPT in 1995 (Argentina) and 1998 (Brazil).
 9 First proposed by Leo Szilard and further developed by Jo Rotblat and others. See 
Glaser et al. (2009).
10 Point 17 of Resolution 1887, adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council 
on 24 September 2009, reads:
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[the Council] undertakes to address without delay any State’s notice of withdrawal 
from the NPT, including the events described in the statement provided by the 
State pursuant to Article X of the Treaty, while noting ongoing discussions in the 
course of the NPT review on identifying modalities under which NPT States 
Parties could collectively respond to notification of withdrawal, and affirms that a 
State remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT com-
mitted prior to its withdrawal.
11 It is conceivable that if an NPT Review Conference passes a decision by consensus, it 
may be easier to have it formally agreed later on through the Treaty amendment pro-
cedure, which requires the support of all NWS and all members of the IAEA Board of 
Governors.
12 The VCLT entered into force in 1980 and has no retroactive effect, but it is generally 
considered as a codification of existing customary international law. The United 
States and North Korea are not parties to the Convention.
13 NPT/conf.2005/pc.III/wp. 15, submitted by Germany on 29 April 2004.
14 Indonesian statement on Article X at the 2008 PrepCom, Geneva, 7 May 2008. A 
meeting of the parties could be modelled on the Open Skies Treaty, which rules that if 
a party to the Treaty announces its decision to withdraw, the depositaries are to 
“convene a conference of the States parties, no less than 30 days and no more than 60 
days after they have received such notice”.
10 Towards a nuclear- weapon-free world
 1 See also the second and third Shultz et al. op. eds in the Wall Street Journal (15 January 
2008 and 19 January 2010). A number of high- level statements have been made in 
support of this initiative, including the statement by German leaders (Bahr, Schmidt, 
Genscher, von Weizsäcker); the statement by British leaders (Rifkind, Hurd, Owen, 
Robertson); the statement by French leaders (Juppe, Norlain, Richard, Rocard); the 
statement by Norwegian leaders (Bondevik, Brundtland, Nordli, Stoltenberg, Willoch); 
the statement by Australian leaders (Fraser, Gration, Jones, Nossal, Sanderson); the 
statement by Polish leaders (Kwasniewski, Walesa, Mazowiecki); the statement by 
Italian leaders (D’Alema, Fini, La Malfa, Parisi); the statement by Dutch leaders 
(Lubbers, van der Stoel, Mierlo, Korthals Altes); the statement by Belgian leaders 
(Claes, Verhofstadt, Dehaene, Michel); the joint statement by Presidents Obama and 
Medvedev; and the joint statement by Carter, Gorbachev, Beckett, Rocard et al. (Global 
Zero). These and other statements by a great many leaders, individually and jointly, 
show that the interest in reviving the objective of a NWFW has also spread to the polit-
ical mainstream in countries that had not been very vocal on this matter in the past.
  Of the many academic contributions to the debate, this chapter draws, in particular, 
on Perkovich and Acton (2009). Perkovich and Acton’s own contribution to that 
volume was first published as an Adelphi Paper in September 2008.
 2 Plutonium – Pu- 239 – contains small amounts of heavier, unstable isotopes and is, 
therefore, more difficult to work with. To set a plutonium explosion off, an implosion 
mechanism is needed. This is another technically demanding task.
 3 In the run- up to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, US and French officials essen-
tially disavowed the pledges made in 2000. See Johnson (2004).
 4 At the conference commemorating Rajiv Gandhi’s UN speech (9–10 June 2008), K. 
Subrahmanyam alluded to it. See also Walker (2009). A third article by the “four 
horsemen” in the Wall Street Journal of 19 January 2010 advocates increased support 
for the stewardship programme in order to maintain the safety, security and reliability 
of the nuclear arsenal. On 29 January, Vice President Biden announced that the 
administration’s FY 2011 budget proposed an increase of $600 million, and $5 billion 
more for the next five years. See Biden (2010).
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 5 In his essay “On Perpetual Peace”, Immanuel Kant says that: “No state at war with 
another shall allow itself such acts of hostility as would make mutual trust impossible 
during a future peace.” Kant warns that by following narrow prudential interests, 
leaders of victorious states undermine the possibility of constructing a durable peace, 
which is the ultimate aim of warfare. The same warning applies to arms control as a 
tool of unilateral advantage. During the US unipolar moment, the web of arms- control 
agreements broke up under the pressure of aggressive US unilateralism, and the most 
important remaining treaty – the NPT – was used to promote US non- proliferation 
interests while neglecting those parts that constrain US freedom of action. This was 
done at the expense of trust between nations, casting a shadow of suspicion into the 
future that jeopardises the prospects for arms control and disarmament. Heavy lifting 
is necessary to bring it on stream again. See Gregor (1996).
 6 
Under the CTBT, America would gain the security benefits of outlawing nuclear 
tests by others, while locking in a technological status quo that is highly favorable 
to us. We have conducted more than 1,000 nuclear tests – hundreds more than 
anyone else. We do not need more tests to protect our security. Would- be prolifer-
ators or modernisers, however, must test if they are to develop the kind of 
advanced, compact nuclear weapons that are the most threatening.
(US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in the 1999 Senate ratification hearings 
of the CTBT; Albright 1999)
 7 The case for such an approach has been made by Daalder and Lodal (2008).
 8 By 30 September 2009, the figure was 2,613. See US Department of Defense (2010).
 9 Weapons loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas at heavy 
bomber bases are counted as operational strategic weapons.
10 Work is being done by national laboratories in the United States, Russia, the United 
Kingdom and Norway. The United Kingdom and Norway are doing a joint project, 
the first of its kind between a nuclear- and a non- nuclear-weapon state. For the time 
being, societal verification is a non- starter. The proposition is very attractive, and by a 
Board of Governors’ decision of 1992, the IAEA is already in a position to make use 
of information stemming from non- governmental sources. However, Russia and 
China are far from ready to institutionalise a verification system that recognises non- 
governmental actors. As long as this is the case, it is better not to burden the process 
with ideas that are incompatible with their traditions and political systems.
11 As of 30 September 2009. See US Department of Defense (2010).
12 It is estimated that about 8,800 weapons are held in reserve or have been slated for 
dismantlement. See SIPRI (2009).
13 In case nuclear war nevertheless breaks out, the NNWS would like to be assured that 
they would not be targeted. Unqualified non- use assurances to non- nuclear parties to 
the NPT would cover such contingencies, while no- first-use (NFU) doctrines do not. 
If somebody breaks the doctrine, the other NWS would be freed from their obliga-
tions. However, the prime objective is to prevent a nuclear war from breaking out; 
and, should it nevertheless happen, self- imposed restraints to spare NNWS of the 
horrors of nuclear warfare can realistically not be expected in any case, regardless of 
what kind of assurances have been given in time of peace.
14 Two retired scientists, K. Santhanam and P.K. Iyengar, questioned the outcome of the 
tests, but were contradicted by A. Kakodkar, head of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
and R. Chidambaram, principal scientific advisor to the government, who said the 
tests had achieved the desired scientific objectives and would help India to build 
fission and fusion weapons from low yields up to 200 kt (Deccan Herald 2009; 
Parthasarathi and Santhanam 2009).
15 In 2006, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert was guilty of a slip of the tongue: “Can you say 
that this [Iran] is the same level, when they are aspiring to have nuclear weapons, as 
France, America, Russia and Israel?” Interview with German television (December 2006).
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